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This study examines how Islamists are socially, discursively and 
linguistically represented in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram. The main question of 
this study is what would the Egyptian government do to halt the Brothers’ political 
growth and potential threat? To answer this question, the study uses Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how Islamists are represented in frontpage 
news reports in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram, in 2000 and 2005. The analysis 
first examines both discursive and social practices related to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This analysis examines the process of news making, role of ideology, 
history of Islamism, and type[s] of relationships between Islamists and the regimes. 
Second, the news reports are analyzed linguistically in terms of Idealized Reader 
(IR) framework, transitivity, sourcing, lexical choices and presupposition.  
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the Egyptian regimes have been 
practicing a constant and systematic strategy of exclusionary nature towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This exclusion has been implemented through the use of sheer 
power (detention, prison, and military tribunals) and through soft power (media 
negative representation) as well.  Van Dijk’s ideological square (1998) is found 




we are good and they are bad. The analysis of al-Ahram data, supplemented by 
analyzing other news sources, shows that: 
A. Almost all the accusations of the Egyptian government against the Muslim 
Brothers are unfounded,  
B. al-Ahram uses the technique of silence to conceal the good aspect of the 
Muslim Brotherhood,  
C. Islamists, in contrast with what is said about them, are willing to participate 
in democratic and civil society, and 
D. There is a relation between the discourse on Islamism and Orientalism.  
The negative representation, the study also concludes, is explained by the 
government’s fear of Islamists as a political threat, its desire to maintain the West’s 
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Although the copyright date of this dissertation is December, 2011, it was 
successfully defended on May 2010. For unforeseen reasons, the researcher was not 
able to submit it until the fall of 2011.  This explains why there is no reference to the 
momentous changes that took place in Egypt and the Middle East, in general, after 
May 2010. Following are some reflections on the Arab spring that started in 
December 2010. 
Inspired by the successful revolution in Tunisia, Egyptian people, on the 25th 
of January 2011, went into the streets to express their resentful wrath. They protested 
the autocratic rule of President Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for thirty years, with 
rampant corruption and widespread poverty. The government, blinded by its faith in 
the use of suppressing force, responded by shutting down all Internet and cellular 
phone services, blocking Twitter and Facebook, and using tear gas, water cannons, 
batons and live bullets. Surprisingly, the people did not draw back. The numbers of 
protesters started to increase in the streets and main squares in Cairo and in most 
other Egyptian cities. The use of force and the fall of tens of martyrs, instead, 
enraged Egyptian citizens and increased the national attention to the uprising.  
Main figures and organizations joined the uprising from its first day, 




Agency Mohamed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood, the long and fierce 
opponent of the Mubarak regime. This gave a tremendous impetus to a revolution the 
likes of which Egypt had not seen since the large-scale protests of the 1970s. The 
escalating protests made the situation uncontrollable by the police, which led 
Mubarak to call on the military to take over security. This move was welcomed by 
most of the Egyptian people who hold the army in high regard. The protesters in 
Tahrir square, which witnessed the gathering of over three million people, were 
lucky enough as the military saved them from a real massacre when Mubarak and his 
cronies hired thugs and gangs to attack the protestors. The Minister of the Interior 
had given orders to set all criminal prisoners free to spread terror and panic among 
civilians.  
Egypt was on fire when Mubarak, after a long silence, appeared on the state 
television to announce a change of the government. At that point, the protesters 
raised the ceiling of their demands and finally, on the 11thof February 2011, Mubarak 
was forced to step down. That day is considered a day of the second liberation of 
Egypt after it was first liberated from the British occupation in 1952.  
The present research concluded that Mubarak’s regime is a typical example 
of durable authoritarianism and the U.S. would support any regime that secures its 
interests even if it is undemocratic. Mubarak enjoyed the support of the U.S. for 
thirty years and, furthermore, attempts were being made to groom his son, Gamal, to 
inherit the rule of Egypt. One of the factors that explains how Mubarak managed to 




democratic appearance with an autocratic content. Egypt, under Mubarak, had 
political parties, elections, civic associations, and a relatively free press etc. All these 
processes were, however, scrupulously run and carefully controlled to provide a 
well-calculated space for democracy, a space that would consume people’s 
frustrations without being a real threat to the regime. 
The United States, which considered Mubarak as the safety valve of the 
Middle East, doubted that Mubarak would go. “Our assessment is that the Egyptian 
government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and 
interests of the Egyptian people,” said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on January 
25, 2011.This is how Obama’s administration saw Mubarak: a resilient regime. 
Therefore, it can be said that the U.S. did not want the revolution to succeed because 
Mubarak had instilled a fear of Islamists who would be in power in case he was 
thrown out.  
Islamists in the Arab world, the present study concluded, have been 
marginalized and excluded on all levels from being part of the political scene. 
However, repressive strategies have failed to eradicate Islamists’existence in the 
Arab political street or to weaken people’s sympathy with them. A quintessential 
case is the results of the first transparent elections that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt 
after the beginning of the Arab spring. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won a 
majority of board seats in the Teachers’, Journalists’, Pharmacists’ syndicates.  In 
Tunisia and as of the 29th of October 2011, the provisional final results have 




the assembly that will rewrite the constitution, appoint a president and form a 
caretaker government. 
This is a significant indicator of the fallacious political assessment of the 
U.S., the West, and the Arab leaders regarding the situation in the Middle East. The 
U.S. administration has been uncertain as to which way to go: to go with the people 
and support their intrinsic rights for freedom or support the sham Arab leaders. This 
hesitant and ambiguous situation led the raging masses in the Arab streets to lose 
faith in Western democracy. In short, the U.S. has missed a golden chance by putting 
all its eggs in the basket of the Arab autocratic regimes and not opening serious 
channels of communications with Islamists who, seemingly, are going to take over in 










The present study utilizes the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) framework 
to explicate the form and function of mainstream Islamists’ ideological 
representation in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram. The present study is based on 
van Dijk’s concept of ideological square (1998a), where the us/them dichotomy 
underlies the representation of people in a given ideology. This dissertation focuses 
on the following points: 
1. Does al-Ahram, through its representation of Islamists, contribute to the 
formation of in-group and out-group identities; and if so, how? 
2. Are there consistent themes of exclusion in the news material covering 
Islamists in al-Ahram? 
3. Would the whole discourse of exclusion be related to a wider local and/or 
global sociopolitical context? 
4. Would discourse on Islamism be considered an extension, or another form of 
colonialist and/or Orientalist discourse? 
CDA is a framework of analysis that is not confined by or associated with 
any one theory or certain science – it is a multidisciplinary approach. The feature that 
distinguishes CDA from other discourse analysis frameworks is that it integrates 
ethical principles into issues it deals with. In other words, it is not just an analysis for 
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the sake of analysis, where the goal could be to demonstrate how textual features are 
used in certain patterns or to show stylistic or genre features. CDA, although it 
includes textual analysis, includes also the social, historical, and cognitive contexts 
that surround the creation of a text. Combining all of these elements in an analysis 
offers a more comprehensive understanding of the discourse, situates it in both its 
social and cultural context, and finally explains the subtle ideologies that are latent in 
and between the lines. 
The ethical aspect in the CDA approach is that it tries to uncover subtle 
manipulation of language, provide the reader with the necessary tools to become 
aware of the hidden and subtle meanings in the discourse, expose issues of inequality 
and racism, and strive to promote a democratic society. The following tenets are 
common in CDA (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Huckin, 1995):  
1. CDA addresses social problems; 
2. Power relations are discursive; 
3. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by society and culture; 
4. Discourse is ideological; 
5. Discourse is historical; 
6. The link between society and text is mediated; 
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory; 
8. Discourse is a form of social action; 
9. CDA has an ethical stance. 
3 
 
   
    
Drawing on the concepts of intertextuality (i.e., the relationship between 
various texts, past and present, pertaining to the same topic), interdiscursivity (i.e., 
the combination of discourses in a text) and hegemony (i.e., the dominance of certain 
ideologies: political, social, etc.), Fairclough (1992a ; 1992 b; 1995b) develops an 
analytical framework to conduct CDA. He includes these three elements in every 
event analysis. Therefore, every event is a text, discursive practice (including the 
production and interpretation of texts) and social practice. 
CDA thus is conducted through three main stages: description, where a 
detailed linguistic analysis is carried out; interpretation, where an attempt is made to 
find a relation between the linguistic findings and the social context; and 
explanation, where the analyst connects both the linguistic and the social to the 
cultural level (Fairclough, 1995a). It is worth noting that these are not separate levels 
of analysis, for sometimes they overlap and interrelate during actual analysis. 
Ideology is an essential concern in CDA. It is defined as the interface 
between social structure and social cognition (Van Dijk, 1998b) and as “the  mental 
frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the 
systems of representation” (Morley, 1996: 25) that different groups use to understand 
and explain various social practices. More significantly, ideologies function as 
symbolic systems of thought to organize, maintain, and stabilize particular forms of 
power relations (Hall, 1996; van Dijk, 1998b). In CDA, the researcher attempts to 
pin both the explicit and implicit forms of ideologies underlying any text and alerts 
the reader to them.  
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Popular Islamists, also called political Islamists, are those who” believe that 
struggle [against undemocratic regimes] is futile and self-defeating, and reject the 
assumptions of urgency advocated by militants” (Karawan, 1997: 20). Popular 
Islamists have chosen to pursue legitimate means, such as social work and national 
and union elections to peacefully and civilly change existing military regimes that 
have been running Arab countries since the beginning of the postcolonization era in 
the second half of the twentieth century. The interminable dominance of military 
institutions in the political life of the Arab world resulted in the growth of a branch 
of Islamists in the political populace, and in Egypt this growth has been reflected by 
their substantial existence and influence on social institutions. In the 1990s, Islamists 
won positions on executive staff club boards of most Egyptian universities and on 
the boards of the professional syndicates of doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. Most 
importantly, their active participation in parliamentary elections has noticeably 
increased. The influential and growing presence of Islamists has been a strong 
catalyst of the government’s apprehension about this emerging phenomenon, usually 
called Islamism. Therefore, it was not unexpected that the government would create 
many strategies to suppress or even eradicate the influential existence of Islamists. 
These strategies ranged from the use of sheer power (imprisonment, detention, 
confiscation of financial resources, etc.) to misrepresentation in the media. 
Finally, in the modern world, media have become the primary focus of 
attention as it has superseded other institutions in the cultural production of 
knowledge. Bell and Garrett cite the following as good reasons to stimulate interest 
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in studying and analyzing media discourse: first, media discourse is ready and 
accessible data that provides rich sources for research, studying and teaching. 
Second, media discourse not only represents speech communities’ use of attitudes 
towards language but also influences them. Third, the formation and expression of 
culture, politics, ideological beliefs and social life are not only reflected in the media 
but are also influenced and created by it. Fourth, because of what it represents, media 
discourse can reveal a great deal about social meaning and stereotypes embedded in, 
produced and reproduced throughout discourse and communication (Bell, 1998). 
Using CDA, the present research attempts to explain, through the three levels 
of analysis, how Islamists are represented in the mainstream Egyptian official media 
and the factors that influence this representation. Therefore, in addition to the 
linguistic analysis of news items related to Islamism, the researcher has conducted an 
analysis of both discursive as well as social practices. The first analysis concerns 
how media work while the latter concerns the socio-political system in Egypt. It is 
hoped that this multilayered analysis will help create a better understanding of how 
and why Islamists are represented the way they are. 
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of the study is to analyze how Islamists are linguistically 
represented in the government-oriented and controlled newspapers. Therefore, the 
goal of the study can be summed up as follows: 
1. To explain how Islamists are represented in the Egyptian media; 
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2. To investigate the role of language both as constituted by society and by 
culture, i.e., social semiotic (Halliday, 1978), and as constituting other social 
practices such as media discourse. That is to say, this research investigates 
how language is employed in the media to represent social events and, 
simultaneously, how it constructs other social practices;  
3. To prove the validity of CDA as a powerful approach that utilizes various 
linguistic tools to dissect a text on both the micro and macro levels; 
4. To demonstrate how CDA can be useful in enlightening media consumers by 
helping them read between the lines, discern manipulated discourse, and 
differentiate between informative and manipulative/persuasive media reports;  
5. To show how Egyptian media are used as a powerful instrument of hegemony 
and as tool of social exclusion by the elites over the less powerful social 
groups; namely, Islamists; 
6. Consequently, to help achieve a democratic society by depriving the elites of 
one of their “loaded weapons” and spreading language manipulation 
awareness. It is expected that this research will promote awareness of how 
newspapers’ language can be manipulated and how readers can critically read 
news stories;  
7. To decipher the reasons for the conflicts in the Middle East between 
governments and a major part of the society. This could lead to lessening 




   
    
1.2. Study Questions 
The relation between the Egyptian government and Islamists has been 
dynamic since the mid-twentieth century. Historically, these relations have been 
primarily tense. This tension reached its climax when the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), the main active political Islamist group in Egypt and in the Arab world, 
emerged as a serious and powerful rival of the government in the 2000 and 2005 
legislative elections, and afterward. Al-Ahram, being the largest paper in terms of its 
educated and elite readership within and outside Egypt, is expected to reflect the 
government stance and perspective regarding Islamists. 
It is noteworthy here to mention that Edward Said discusses how Western 
media represent Muslims. According to Said, media are the “cultural apparatus” 
through which the West derives its perception of Islam and Muslims (1981: 43). 
Therefore, the success of the images created by the media lies not in whether they 
are true or not, but in the power of those who market them and their ability to make 
them appear as truthful and invulnerable to questions. “Labels have survived many 
experiences and have been capable of adapting to new events, information and 
realities” (ibid.: 9).  
This research claims that the same ideological basis of the Western 
newspapers’ representation of Islam and Muslims holds true to the representation of 
the Egyptian elite’s al-Ahram of the mainstream Islamists – a representation based 
on the ideology of exclusion and othering. 
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When it comes to the Egyptian media’s representation of Islamists, the 
government media are expected to reflect the ruling regime’s policy and ideology. It 
is also expected that the government media would reflect the tense relations between 
the government and the MB. Working within the framework of CDA, the present 
study will investigate and analyze the representation of popular Islamists by the 
government newspaper in Egypt and attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. To what extent is al-Ahram the mouthpiece of the regime? 
2. How are Islamists linguistically represented in al-Ahram? 
3. What are the socio-political factors that are conducive to this type of 
representation? 
4. Is there a preferred reading-between-the-lines of reports about Islamists? In 
other words, what is present in the text that reflects the writer’s preferred 
reading? 
5. Are there any linguistic traces in the text that highlight the policy of 
exclusion? 
6. How is language discursively used to portray both the good self and the 
negative other, following van Dijk’s ideological square (1998c)? 
1.3. Significance of the Study 
Since 11 September 2001, the world has witnessed a new era in which the 
United States is set to become the one and only superpower that manages world 
affairs. One side of this arrangement was reflected in the announcement made by the 
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United States administration addressing the necessity of having a “new Middle 
East,” of spreading democracy in the Arab world, and encouraging Arab 
governments to implement radical reform in various systems (educational, economic, 
political, etc.) in their countries so as to pave the way for liberal Western democracy. 
In a wide-ranging keynote address on Middle East policy in September 2003 
at the US-Arab Economic Forum, US Secretary of State Colin Powell (CNN, 2007) 
urged the Arab community to “build a new Middle East” based on religious 
tolerance, the rights of the individual and the rule of law. On 25 July 2006, the US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice again made it clear that the United States was 
seeking major changes in the Middle East, rather than a quick cease-fire (Rice, 
2006). Moreover, President Bush’s rhetoric used the same language on many 
occasions and expressed the same message: to get rid of Saddam Hussein, to have a 
new Iraq, and to spread democracy in a new Middle East. In February 2003, Bush 
(2003), discussing the future of Iraq, said, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a 
dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.” 
Since the advent of the third millennium, the Middle East has received 
significantly more attention from the United States and the West. The area has been 
encouraged to adopt a new morphology. The West’s interest was followed by a wide 
range of political gestures by various Arab countries. The Arab countries varied in 
terms of their response to the United States demands. In February 2005, for example, 
President Mubarak of Egypt suggested a bill for basic constitutional amendments 
that allow, for the first time in Egyptian history, multicandidate presidential 
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elections. Moreover, the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections witnessed an 
organized domestic mobilization on the issue of election management and 
monitoring, judicial oversight and discreet international backing. 
The most significant electoral outcome was that the active and organized 
Muslim Brotherhood managed to secure 20 percent of the Egyptian Parliament seats. 
It is outside the scope of this study to investigate the validity or the reliability of the 
elections or to validate whether or not the Egyptian government truly did illegally 
interfere in the elections.1  
Every now and then, especially since the 2005 elections, news stories of 
negative representation of the MB appear in the State-run media. However, there has 
not been any analysis of the nature and quality of such coverage of the MB in the 
Egyptian (or even Arab media) within the theoretical and analytical framework of 
CDA. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the present study will be the first 
analysis of the representation of mainstream Islamists in the Arab Media within the 
CDA approach.  
The significance of this study lies in: 
                                                 
 
1 Mona el-Ghobashy, commenting on the elections in Egypt in the second half of the last 
century, called the elections an “extremely valuable tool” in the hands of “undemocratic regimes in a 
democratic age”. “[The elections] create opportunities for limited popular participation, disarm 
domestic and international critics, and enhance political monitoring and control by revealing the 
relative political strength of government and opposition candidates. Such elections are successful to 
the extent that they maximize tolerated competition and minimize the residual uncertainty that 
accompanies even the most managed poll. It is no mystery, then, why authoritarian elites convene 
elections. The paradox is why they constrain themselves in fixing them.” From 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer238/elghobashy.html, retrieved in January 2005. 
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1. Its attempt to analyze how the ruling regime in Egypt handled the dilemma of 
being squeezed between the external Western demands of opening the doors 
for freedom and democracy, and the internal emergence of organized political 
Islamists.  
2. Its attempt to dissect the complexities involved in the nature of the clash 
between Islamists and subsequent regimes in Egypt; that is to say, to 
investigate this question: is the clash between Islamists and the regime 
ideological, authoritative or coercive? Does the regime, in its dealing with 
Islamists, depart from an ideological base, or it is just a matter of material 
interests? 
3. Its questioning of the relation, if there is any, between Islamophobia (the 
growing fear of Islam in the West) and Islamism-phobia (the growing fear of 
Islamists in the Arab world and in the West); and furthermore, the influence of 
external factors on the way local regimes deal with Islamists. 
4. Its relevant topic: In the early years of the twenty-first century, the nations of 
the world were facing many challenges to living in peace, one of which was 
called the “danger of Islamism” and the “clash of civilizations.” This study 
traces the historical roots of Islamism to understand if it is really a threat to 
democracy and civil society or only to dictatorship and imperialism.  




   
    
1.4. Literature Review 
There are relatively few studies that deal with either the theme of Islamism or 
Arabic political discourse in general. There is no single study, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, that deals with Islamism from a CDA perspective. The 
available studies either examine political discourse from a nonlinguistic approach 
(Ismail, 1998), or analyze the discourse from a perspective other than CDA (Bengio, 
1998; Mazraani, 1995, 1999; Shabana, 2005). The one study that uses CDA as a 
framework (al-Ali, 2006) does not analyze political discourse. Mazid’s thesis (1999) 
deals with issues of ideology and social control in terms of analyzing various genres 
(Sadat’s speech, US Declaration of Independence, advice columns and headlines). 
However, no studies have ever dealt with the Islamists’ representation in the Arab 
newspapers from a CDA perspective. 
Ismail’s (1998) study was conducted from a political economy perspective 
and it analyzes the conservative and radical Islamist discourse, its role in shaping the 
political field in Egypt, and its impact on the dominant relations of power in society. 
Based on Greimas’s On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory (1987), 
Ismail tries to extract the prominent defining features of the discourse of 
conservative Islamists (Jihadists and militant Islamists) and how this discourse 
challenges the postindependence secularist and nationalist discourse in defining 
identity, history, and the place of Islam in the world. Ismail’s study focuses on the 
discourse of conservative Islamists, not the moderates, and how this discourse is 
trying to compete with the postindependence secular nationalist discourse over 
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certain topics like identity, Islam, and the West. Moreover, the study uses some 
linguistic tools of analysis, lexical semantics and narrative structure, to highlight the 
prominent features of the radicalists’ discourse. However, the study does not address 
the representation of the radical Islamists by the ruling regime.  
Bengio, in Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (1998), analyzes how 
the Ba’thist Party of Saddam, as a way to establish and legitimize its power, uses and 
manipulates language, symbolism, history, art, myths, etc. Using a thorough content 
analysis, the study shows how the lexical items had been frequently used by the Iraqi 
Ba’thist Party to establish its identity and to paralyze its enemies. The study uses as 
data Hussein’s speeches and writings, Iraqi newspapers, Ba’thist publications, and 
Iraqi government documents. Through an etymological analysis, Bengio shows how 
the usage of a large number of terms has been twisted and how this twisting is an 
indicator of political change. The Ba’thists, for example, stripped terms like 
“freedom,” “Arab unity,” “revolution” and “socialism” of their original meaning by 
the continuous association of these words with the party’s slogans and infusing them 
in its rhetoric. Emphasizing pan-Arabism, the word qutr, “country,” is used 
negatively to mean “separatism” (95); to face the Kurdish attempts to be separated 
from Iraq, their attempts are called fitnah, “sedition” or “conspiracy.” The 
association of Saddam with metaphorical images of the lion, fortress, eagle and sun 
is part of a populist strategy of the use of symbols. The gradual decline, for example, 
of the secular terminology and the growing use of Islamic rhetoric shows the need of 
the party to recruit mass support after the disasters it brought to the country. The 
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study also shows how the Ba’thist regime depended on four legs to establish its 
identity: Arabism, Islamism, tribalism and ancient Mesopotamian history. Although 
Bengio’s study deals with the good self, the first part of van Dijk’s ideological 
square, it does not analyze how the other is represented in the Ba’thist discourse. 
In Functions of Arabic Political Discourse: The Case of Saddam Hussein’s 
Speeches, Mazraani (1995) analyzes one of Saddam’s press conferences in terms of 
code switching between Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Baghdadi Arabic (BA), 
and Saddam’s native Tikriti dialect. Purposes of persuasion and unification were 
crucial in determining which dialect is used. MSA is used in formal situations as it 
adds a tone of authority to the text while the BA or mixed MSA-BA codes seek 
audience involvement and commitment. Saddam Hussein avoids use of his own 
dialect with its potential to be a barrier to friendly, cooperative interaction with the 
audience. 
 In her book Aspects of Language Variation in Arabic Political 
Speechmaking, Mazraani (1999) studies the linguistic variation between Modern 
Standard Arabic and colloquial Arabic, and how this code-switching is seen as a 
discourse function strategy. On a microlevel analysis of the levels of syntax and 
phonology, the author cites where the speakers, Presidents Nasser, Gaddafi and 
Hussein, in their political speeches switch between MSA and dialect and how this 
switch is discourse-derived. Both of Mazraani’s studies are done from a 
sociolinguistic perspective and therefore, are descriptive rather than critical in nature. 
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 Shabana’s A Pragmatic Study of Aspects of Political Discourse in Press 
Headlines (2005) analyzes the headlines of al-Ahram newspaper in two war periods, 
pre-1967 and pre-1973, to explore the different aspects of political discourse of the 
two periods and to show whether the political discourse of each leadership was 
appropriate and in the interests of the country. The headlines are analyzed within 
discourse pragmatics, Speech Act Theory and Gricean Pragmatics. Tools such as 
deixis, intertextuality and framing are used. This study, even though it uses 
newspaper data from al-Ahram, does not utilize CDA as a framework of analysis. 
The researcher believes that using CDA in this particular study would have rendered 
more critical reading of the two historical periods under analysis. Moreover, that 
researcher does not state how many headlines he used and the rationale behind his 
data choice. 
In Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse, Dunne (2005) 
investigates the theme of democracy in the public area in Egypt. Dunne, in an 
attempt to analyze not what the texts say on democracy but what they do, examines 
texts taken from speeches of President Mubarak, newspaper commentaries and a 
petition written by opposition leaders to Mubarak. The analysis is conducted on two 
levels: first, the social ethnographic level, where the interactional context that 
produced the discourse is explored; and second, the linguistic level, where specific 
linguistic devices, such as deixis, interdiscursivity and framing are employed; that is 
to say, what social/interactional function does talking about democracy achieve and 
what linguistic traces are found. Dunne found that a deep analysis of the texts reveals 
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the real paradox in Egyptian political discourse about democracy: the discrepancy 
between theory and practice. 
In the introduction, Dunne refers to some of her unpublished research on 
discourse construction of identity in policy speeches by a United States cabinet 
member. The researcher believes that it would have been beneficial if she had briefly 
exposed the results of the unpublished research and compared it with the Egyptian 
political discourse data. Moreover, the study’s data are relatively small and this may 
pose questions on how representative the data are of the respective genres. One could 
also argue that a section or more on how democracy is represented in the discourse 
of Islamists and/or other Egyptian presidents would have added a more 
comprehensive picture on the discourse of democracy in contemporary Egypt. 
Al-Ali’s ‘Religious Affiliations and Masculine Power in Jordanian Wedding 
Invitation Genre’ (2006), uses CDA to analyze the genre of written wedding 
invitations in terms of their component patterns, and the role played by the broader 
socio-cultural norms and values in shaping this genre. The analysis has revealed that 
two components, culture/religion and masculine authority, are playing a crucial role 
in constructing and shaping the text, coloring the lexical choices, and naming 
practices. This is a relevant application of CDA on social concerns, like gender and 
equality. However, it would have been very enlightening if the researcher had shown 
how and where masculine authority is derived from culture and/or religion, since 
Arab culture is sometimes, if not most times, taken as Islamic. 
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In his unpublished PhD thesis Ideology and Control in Some Speech and 
Newspaper Genres: a Politico-linguistic Approach to Discourse Analysis, Mazid 
(1999) uses an eclectic approach. He analyzes one speech of former Egyptian 
president Sadat, an advice column in al-Ahram, and headlines from three Egyptian 
newspapers. He compares the Arabic data with excerpts from the US Declaration of 
Independence, advice columns in Cosmopolitan and three headlines from the Herald 
Tribune and The Times. While Sadat’s speech aims at a compromise with Israel, the 
Declaration writers aim at freedom and independence. Both texts employ different 
tools to express ideology and control based on the variation of the text settings and 
this difference is reflected in the use of pronoun systems. The study is interesting in 
terms of revealing how Sadat negotiates the I, we1 and we2 to refer to himself, 
himself and the rest of the Arabs, and the Arabs and Israelis, respectively. On the 
other hand, there is only we1 and we2 and they in the Declaration of Independence 
referring to the representatives, the representatives and the rest of the American 
people, and the British, respectively. The analysis shows how Sadat was aware of the 
ideology he was departing from and of Israel’s status in the area, causing the use of 
we1 and we2. In Sadat’s speech, inclusion, involvement and convergence are the 
ideological function of the pronouns while in the Declaration of Independence it is 
exclusion, separation and divergence. 
Analysis of the advice columns shows, according to Mazid, that columnists 
have  more access and more reach than their average clients and hence have 
communicative authority. Therefore, the columnists are in power positions and they 
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control their clients and the relation between the columnist and the reader is similar 
to patient-doctor or teacher-student relationship in terms of dominance and power. It 
is not clear what role power and control play in the advice columns as the 
relationship between the columnist and the client is of virtual power and is not a real 
power, as it is the case with other forms of institutional discourse that are mentioned 
(e.g., doctor-patient). One important feature in the institutional discourse is 
directness and face-to-face relation in, for example, the classroom, clinic, lawyer’s 
office, etc. There is no actual or presumed power to actualize the illocutionary force 
of the advice column. Therefore, although the linguistic analysis in terms of 
transitivity, modality and metadiscourse shows the reader as a beneficiary and a 
sensor and not as an actor or an agent, still this could be regarded as genre schematic 
structure and features. The cross-culture and linguistic differences between the 
advice columns in both al-Ahram and Cosmopolitan, such as allusions to religious 
references, ratio of modality and engendered assertions are really interesting and 
significant. 
In his analysis of the political speeches, Mazid focuses on how the ideology 
of the speaker/writer plays a role in the production of the concerned discourse. 
However, if the researcher had added the social and historical background as well as 
the repercussion of the discourse, in Sadat’s speech, for example, this would have 
increased our appreciation of why the speech was the way it was. This addition 
would have been interesting in the case of Sadat, as he went to Jerusalem despite the 
strong objections to the visit both in Egypt and the Arab world. On another level, and 
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in terms of genre analysis, I think that comparing Sadat’s speech with the 
Declaration of Independence does not reveal too much in terms of genre analysis. 
The two texts differ socio-linguistically along the medium: oral versus written; 
historicity (1977 vs. 1776); and discourse type (declaration vs. initiative). In his 
analysis of the newspaper headlines, along with its not being at all representative, the 
author does not justify the choice of headlines or why he is comparing the three 
Arabic headlines with the English ones. In addition, there is no analytic basis for the 
comparison: he analyzes different topics, different newspapers and different dates, an 
issue that renders the results of the analysis unrepresentative. 
Lastly, El-Moshtohry (2006) analyzes data collected from both Arabic and 
French Egyptian newspapers while trying to pin down linguistic markers of 
ideology. She uses a contrastive analysis of the news on political events in both 
Arabic- and French-language newspapers. Her conclusions are: 1) the two dailies, 
Arabic and French, and the weekly Arabic-language paper are subject to a very 
elevated degree of discursive and textual constraint and to authoritarian and Arab 
ideologies; 2) the French weekly displays the most elevated degree of freedom of 
expression and adopts a liberal ideological stance; and 3) in all the newspapers, we 
have been able to pinpoint regularities in terms of angles of sight, textual 
schematization, and thematic approaches. 
In this study, El-Moshtohry does not justify the choice of the period 2000–
2002 to collect data. Moreover, the analysis is done by looking for certain 
grammatical tools to verify the dominance of subjectivity vs. objectivity, personal vs. 
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impersonal view, etc. The topic dimension is neglected while it could have an effect 
on both the form and content of the text. 
It is evident that none of the above works dealt with Islamists from a CDA 
perspective and this makes it significant for the present research to investigate to this 
area.  
1.5. Thesis Layout 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The second 
chapter introduces CDA as a framework of analysis; the basic terms of definition and 
the various trends within CDA are elaborated. A response to the critiques directed 
towards CDA is also presented. 
Chapter 3, departing from Fairclough’s tripartite framework, deals with the 
social and discursive practices as the first two levels of analysis. It examines the 
process of news production and the role of media in sustaining or excluding certain 
social practices. The chapter also deals with all the social, political and historical 
accumulations that are involved in the production, reception, and interpretation of 
any social events. Various approaches of ideology and its relation to media and 
representation are also elaborated. The chapter ends by laying out the origin and 
history of Islamism, how Islamists have been politically treated under the 
consecutive Egyptian regimes, and the position of Islamism in third millennium. 
The fourth chapter explains the process of data collection and justifies the use 
of al-Ahram during the 2000 and 2005 periods. It also shows how data were 
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collected, sampled, and analyzed. The second part of the chapter elaborates on the 
linguistic tools of analysis that are used to analyze the data textually. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the textual analysis of the 2000 and 2005 data 
respectively. Both chapters approach the data in terms of Idealized Reader 
framework, transitivity, presupposition, sourcing and lexical choices, and the 2005 
data are then introduced in terms of the same tools. 
Chapter 7 approaches the data using silence framework to examine what was 
not said in the news reports on MB. The chapter also compares the results of the 
discursive and social practices, and textual analysis with the silence analysis. 
The Conclusion paints a complex mosaic and presents the results and 
outcomes of the analysis. It also summarizes the analysis done in Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Moreover, in this chapter an attempt is made to identify why Islamists are 
misrepresented in the government’s media and excluded from the social arena. 
Another question that is dealt with in the Conclusion is: can Islamists be included as 
a legal social power and political players?
  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter lays down the theoretical framework on which the present study 
is based, namely, CDA: its definition, CDA and media discourse, its origins and 
goals, the common features among the CDA trends, and the three main CDA trends. 
Fairclough’s social approach is discussed in some detail because the present study 
draws heavily on it. The section closes by listing some of the criticisms directed at 
CDA, followed by a response to them. 
2.2. CDA: Origins and Goals  
 CDA is concerned with providing methods and tools to help conduct 
empirical studies of the relations between discourse and society and culture. Its main 
target is to uncover minute details of that discourse-society relation. It can be traced 
to the 1970s in the work on power, ideology and control by Fowler, Hodge and Kress 
(1979). Their work focused on how language works in the social context and how it 
is related to power and ideology. The work of M.A.K. Halliday on language as a 
social semiotic (Halliday, 1978) and how language shapes and is shaped by social 
and cultural context was an influential drive to examine in-depth the language-




for Contemporary Culture Studies as a significant source of influence on CDA. 
According to Blommaert, the areas of a political, social, and cultural nature in British 
capitalist society which the Centre dealt with became topics in CDA.2  
CDA is not a school of one trend but rather an approach under the scope of 
which we can find many trends. This is the reason why one cannot simply accept a 
single definition of CDA. We can define the trends under CDA by their goals rather 
than by their techniques and tools of analysis. Simply put, CDA aims mainly to 
uncover the socio-political inequalities, whether based on political, economic, 
cultural, religious, or gendered grounds, that exist in a certain society. According to 
Fairclough (1995a: 132), CDA is the study of: 
often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) 
discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural 
structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events 
and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and 
struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships 
between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and 
hegemony. 
Here, Fairclough aims at a CDA that is aware of the social and cultural 
events, the discursive practices which produced them, the dialectical relationship 
between them and furthermore, the role of discourse, which is itself a product of the 
social and discursive practices in producing and sustaining social relations of power 
and ideology. Elucidating the function of CDA in modern society, Huckin defines it 
as “a highly context-sensitive, democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on 
social issues with the aim of improving society” (1995: 95). It strives to explore how 
                                                 
 





these nontransparent relationships are crucial in securing power and hegemony, and 
it draws attention to domination forms, social inequities, nondemocratic practices, 
and other injustices so as to encourage people to perform corrective actions 
(Fairclough, 1993). From both Fairclough and Huckin, we can conclude that CDA is 
a means to show readers how to be aware of the guising and indoctrinating 
ideologies meant to manipulate them. 
Almost all CDA practitioners share a concern with issues of power and 
change caused by recurrent social practices. The inherent core of CDA is to 
demonstrate how selectively the world is construed in discourses. Such selection 
renders a translated, condensing and reductionist reading of some aspects of the 
world (Harvey, 1996). The job of CDA research is not only to demonstrate what is 
occurring within the text, but also to note what is absent from the text; why this 
particular selection or reduction, why here, why now (Huckin, 2002)? The 
overarching goal of CDA is to make visible the way in which institutions and their 
discourse shape us. CDA aims to show how “linguistic-discursive practices” are 
linked to “socio-political structures of power and domination” (Kress, 1990: 85) by 
emphasizing “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of 
dominance” (van Dijk, 1993: 249). According to Wodak, the purpose of CDA is to 
analyze “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 
2001: 2). More specifically, “[CDA] studies real, and often extended, instances of 
social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is 




the relationship between analysis and the practices analyzed” (Fairclough and 
Wodak, 1997: 258). 
It is worth mentioning here that CDA is different from other approaches to 
discourse in that it is critical. CDA does not limit itself to analyzing the immediate 
formal properties of the text but rather it situates the text in its wider social, 
economic, historical, cognitive and political context and critically examines how this 
text relates to other texts, how it is constituted by the existing social practices and is 
constitutive of other new social practices. According to Wodak, “critical” could be 
understood as having “distance from the data, embedding the data in the social, 
making a political stance explicit, and having a focus on self-reflection as scholars 
doing research” (2007: 209). Being critical also means showing how “our use of 
language in particular [is] bound up with causes and effects which we may not be at 
all aware of under normal conditions” (Fairclough, 1995b: 54). Put differently, CDA 
demystifies “discourses by deciphering ideologies” (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 14). It 
is worth noting that “critical” does not mean detecting only the negative sides of 
social interaction and processes and painting a black and white picture of societies. 
“Quite to the contrary, critical means distinguishing complexity and denying easy, 
dichotomous explanations, and making contradictions transparent” (Wodak, 1999: 
168).  
It is proper to end this section on the goals of CDA with how Wodak and 
Meyer (2001) responded to those who see CDA as a tool to judge what is right and 
what is wrong. Instead, she stresses that the role of CDA should be, above all, “to 




transparent. It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of 
discursive events seem more valid than others” (65). So CDA just opens the doors 
and provides the tools to those who are willing to practice and lead critical thinking 
and social change and it is not imposing certain ideologies on certain situations or 
problems.  
2.3. Common Features 
We can identify five common features among the various CDA approaches. 
The following account draws on Fairclough and Wodak’s overview (1997): 
1. Social and cultural structures are partly linguistic-discursive. Discursive 
practices, through which texts are produced and consumed, are important 
factors in shaping social practices. This indicates that not all social practices 
are formed by language.  
2. Discourse is both constitutive and constituted. Discourse both constitutes 
social relations between individuals and groups in society and, at the same 
time, is constituted by these social relations. The representation of, for 
example, Islamists in the Egyptian government broadsheet newspaper al-
Ahram is simultaneously socially constitutive (produced by a certain group of 
people – elites) and constituting of more social practices towards Islamism. 
3. Language use should be analyzed within its social context. Here, CDA is 
different from other approaches in terms of degrees of focus rather than 
difference in qualitative analysis. CDA constitutes an empirical linguistic 




4. Discourse functions ideologically. CDA is based on the fact that discursive 
practices create unbalanced social powers and unequal relations between 
groups based on religious, political, racial, or gender issues. All these issues 
deal with ideology.  
5. CDA is ethically critical. CDA commits itself to an agenda, social change and 
uncovering of the manipulative power in society. CDA sides with the 
oppressed and unfairly treated. 
2.4. Approaches in CDA 
CDA presents a diverse picture in terms of the approaches under its umbrella. 
Since its beginnings, some CDA practitioners have used systemic-functional 
linguistics as a framework of analysis. However, categories and concepts have also 
been borrowed from other disciplines: discourse analysis, text linguistics, stylistics, 
social semiotics, social cognition, rhetoric, social psychology and conversation 
analysis. Some practitioners of CDA welcome the diversity of methodology 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:17); others strive for a systematic and focused 
framework based, for instance, on concepts of genre and field and on the socio-
semantic representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1995). In spite of the 
importance which Kress (1997) and Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) have given to 
incorporating visual images into concepts of discourse and to the multimodal 
conceptions of semiotics, CDA is still mainly inclined toward examining the textual 




production of inequality, power, ideology, authority, or manipulation (van Dijk, 
1995).  
One can define three main approaches working within CDA: the historical-
discoursal, the social-discoursal, and the cognitive-discoursal. In the following 
subsections, while briefly pinning down the main features on the first two 
approaches, the researcher will discuss in detail Fairclough’s approach, as the present 
study draws heavily on the social-discoursal approach. 
2.4.1. Historical - Discoursal 
Ruth Wodak is the main figure associated with this approach. Wodak’s 
sociolinguistic ethnographical CDA approach is frequently referred to as the 
discourse-historical approach. Wodak’s research emphasizes not only the 
contextualized nature of discourse within its present state of occurrence, but also 
explains the development of this discourse through a historical continuum. Her focus 
has centred on issues of antiSemitism and is particularly relevant to the research at 
hand. Wodak has developed a discourse-historical method devoted to tracing the 
(intertextual) history of phrases and arguments (see, for example, Wodak, 1995; van 
Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The method starts with studying original documents 
(e.g., in their analysis of the Waldheim Affair, Wehrmacht documents on war 
activities in the Balkan) augmented by ethnographic research of the past (e.g., 
interviews with war veterans), and proceeds to wide-ranging data collection and 
analysis of contemporary news reporting, political discourse, lay beliefs, and 




strategies adopted in any discourse without understanding the historical/social 
background against which they were created. We can summarize the main features of 
the discourse-historical approach (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; Reisigl and Wodak, 
2001):  
A. It adheres to socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory. 
B. It embraces at least three elements:  
1) “text or discourse immanent critique” which aims to discover the 
inconsistencies, self contradictions, paradoxes in the text –internal.  
2) “socio-diagnostic critique” which aims to demystify exposures of the 
manipulative feature of discursive discourse using the historical and social 
background to do so,  
3) “prospective critique” which aims to transform and improve 
communication. 
C. It tries to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about historical 
sources and background of social and political background in which discursive 
events are embedded (ibid.: 32-34). 
2.4.2. Cognitive - Discoursal 
Reconciling cognitive sciences and CDA with its emphasis on social and 
linguistic aspects is an uneasy task and is still in its infancy. The call to include 
cognitive psychology in any serious CDA research is attributed to Teun van Dijk, 
whose plea to have a multidisciplinary approach to CDA (van Dijk, 1993, 2001) has 
not been widely received. 
According to van Dijk (2006 a and b), there is an agreement among discourse 
analysts that communicative events should be approached in terms of their 
immediate constituents: grammatical, stylistic, rhetorical, pragmatic, argumentative, 
interactional or other related structures. There is less agreement on adding context to 




beliefs, intentions, and processes involved in the production and comprehension of 
the discourse. Van Dijk is a strong advocate of including cognition in studying 
discourse. For example, he laments that metaphors are too often analyzed only as 
lexical or even rhetorical devices rather than as conceptual metaphors or as cognitive 
phenomena (e.g., van Dijk, 1998a: 45).  
Van Dijk views “ideologies” as “interpretation frameworks” which “organize 
sets of attitudes” about other elements of modern society. Ideologies, therefore, 
provide the “cognitive foundation” for the attitudes of various groups in societies, as 
well as the impetus to pursue their own goals and interests (1991: 36). Showing the 
centrality of ideology in discourse, van Dijk defines it as “the overall, abstract mental 
systems that organize such socially shared attitudes” (van Dijk, 1995: 18). Van Dijk 
et al. (2004: xviii) argue that “Ideologies may be exhibited in many social practices.”  
Among these practices, “discourse, that is, socially situated text and talk” may be 
considered as “one of the most crucial social practices” (van Dijk, 2005: 3). 
Van Dijk is also interested in how cognitive theories deal with discourse 
processing. Language is comprehended by constructing mental representations; i.e., 
prior knowledge is used to construct a mental model of the incoming discourse (van 
Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Furthermore, discourse 
comprehension is an ongoing process which operates both at a local or 
microstructural level and at a global or macrostructural level. At a microstructural 
level, each utterance is analyzed and encoded into memory. Macrostructural 
processes operate over a series of utterances to form a coherent representation by 




operate at a macrostructural level, provide expectations regarding the flow of 
information (van Dijk, 1998a).  
Van Dijk offers a “schema” of relations between ideology, society, cognition 
and discourse: within social structures, social interaction takes place. This social 
interaction is presented in the form of text/discourse, which is then cognitively 
processed according to a cognitive system/memory. This “system/memory” consists 
of short-term memory, in which “strategic processing,” or decoding and 
interpretation takes place. Long-term memory, however, serves as a holder of “socio-
cultural knowledge,” which consists of knowledge of language, discourse, 
communication, persons, groups and events existing in the form of “scripts.” “Social 
(group) attitudes” also reside within long-term memory and provide further decoding 
guides. Each of these “group attitudes” can represent an array of ideologies which 
combine to create one’s own personal ideology which conforms to one’s identity, 
goals, social position, values and resources.  
According to van Dijk, hegemonic power takes the form of controlling 
people’s minds (van Dijk, 1993; 1997), a phenomenon, in social cognition, referred 
to as mental models structuring ideologies. These models are acquired and 
(re)produced through social, including discursive, practices and interact with the 
personal cognition of group members. Cognitively structured ideologies provide 
group cohesion by defining membership in a group as well as its tasks/activities, 
goals, norms/values, position and resources (van Dijk, 1995). Ideology therefore has 
both social and cognitive functions and according to van Dijk, ideology can be the 




discourse and action) and the societal position and interests of social groups (van 
Dijk, 1995a: 18). Therefore, power relations can be reproduced and legitimated at the 
ideological level; which means that to control other people, it is most effective to try 
to control their group attitudes and attitude-producing, ideologies (van Dijk, 1991). 
The result of this process is that audiences will behave out of their own “free will” in 
accordance with the interests of the powerful. Van Dijk’s thesis implies that the 
exercise of power in modern, democratic societies is no longer primarily coercive, 
but persuasive, that is, ideological. 
Another important aspect in van Dijk’s approach is the analysis of 
implicitness in discourse. Implicitness is to say without saying, to pass on the 
idea/ideology without stating it in the text or discourse. This concept is crucially 
relevant to the study of media discourse in relation to ideology. Van Dijk stresses on 
the “the systematic analysis of implicitness” as journalists and media users are in 
possession of “mental models...about the world.” Consequently, the text is really like 
“an iceberg of information” and it is only the “tip” which is “actually expressed in 
words and sentences. The rest is assumed to be supplied by the knowledge scripts 
and models of the media users, and therefore usually left unsaid.” Van Dijk 
concludes, therefore, that “the analysis of the implicit...is very useful in the study of 
underlying ideologies.” (1991: 181–83). 
Van Dijk (2000) acknowledges that CDA does not have a unitary theoretical 
framework or methodology because it is best viewed as a shared perspective 
encompassing a range of approaches instead of one school. What van Dijk is calling 




exclusively, in terms of mental representations” (van Dijk, 1998a: 22; original 
emphasis). Van Dijk (2006c: 161) advocates: 
… a broad multidisciplinary approach to discourse, which integrates a 
detailed and explicit study of structures of text and talk with an analysis of 
their social and cognitive contexts as a basis for problem-oriented critical 
discourse analysis. In such an approach, the study of relevant knowledge, 
ideologies and other socially shared beliefs is crucial in describing many of 
the properties and social functions of discourse. 
Van Dijk has researched many fields and discourses in which aspects such as 
racism and ideology can be located. Such fields include the press, everyday 
conversation, parliamentary discourse and debates, press conferences and textbooks. 
His book, Racism, Discourse and Textbooks: The Coverage of Immigration in 
Spanish Textbooks (2004b), analyzes the role of academic textbooks in the 
maintenance of societal myths and hegemonic structures. Van Dijk situates his 
research findings within a cognitive framework, with reference to both episodic and 
long-term memories. 
2.4.3. Social-Discoursal 
Although no one single framework has been used to analyze the data, 
Norman Fairclough’s approach has formed the point of departure in the layout of the 
present work. The dissertation is organized around his triaspectual framework: social 
practices, discursive practices and textual aspects.  
Fairclough’s approach is different from both the historical-discoursal (Reisigl 
and Wodak, 1999; 2002) and the cognitive discoursal (van Dijk, 1993, 1998a, 2001) 
in its emphasis on the social aspect. There is a dialectical relationship between 




social practices (Fairclough, 1995a: 131). Fairclough’s research agenda focuses on 
language and globalization, contemporary social change, as well as language, 
education and power. 
Fairclough’s CDA has been defined as a methodology which is 
fundamentally interested in analyzing “opaque as well as transparent structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in 
language” (Wodak, 1995: 204; Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 15). This framework, 
through deconstructing society, aims at critically investigating possible social 
inequalities as expressed, constituted, legitimized by discursive practices. CDA aims 
to make more transparent and more visible the opaque aspects of discourse. This 
approach emerged from Critical Theory (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), which 
was developed by the Frankfort school. According to Kincheloe and McLaren (2000: 
281), Critical Theory 
… analyzes competing power interests between groups and individuals 
within a society – identifying who gains and who loses in specific situations. 
Privileged groups, criticalists argue, often have an interest in supporting the 
status quo to protect their advantages; the dynamics of such efforts often 
become a central focus of critical research…critical research attempts to 
expose the forces that prevent individuals and groups from shaping the 
decisions that crucially affect their lives. 
Therefore, the agenda of Critical Theory is:  
1. Identifying and challenging assumptions behind ordinary ways of perceiving, 
conceiving and acting; 
2. Recognizing the influence of history, culture, and social positioning on beliefs 
and actions;  
3. Imagining and exploring extraordinary alternatives, ones that may disrupt 
routines and established orders; 
4. Being appropriately sceptical about any knowledge or solution that claims to be 




 Fairclough extended Critical Theory when he connected it to discourse 
analysis. So a critical analysis explains the ways in which people are unequally 
socially positioned, the ways discourse constitutes objects and is constituted by them 
in society, and the ways meanings are created by both language production and 
consumption. Henceforth comes the dialectical and mutual relationship between the 
social and the linguistic: Language both constitutes the social practice and is 
constituted by the social practices as well (Fairclough, 2003). It is an important 
characteristic of the economic, social and cultural changes of late modernity that they 
exist as discourses as well as processes that are taking place outside discourse, and 
that the processes that are taking place outside discourse are substantively shaped by 
these discourses (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). This dialectical relationship 
marks CDA as an interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary framework drawing on works 
from different fields: Gramsci, Althusser, Habermas, Halliday, Kress and Bakhtin, 
(Fairclough, 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). The multidisciplinary nature 
of CDA makes it the task of CDA practitioners to: 
… systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and 
determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) 
wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate. 
How such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped 
by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the 
opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor 
securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough, 2003: 135) 
Moreover, CDA attempts, via textual analysis, to describe the nuances of 
unequal relations of power, hegemony, marginalization and exclusion. It is an 
emancipative and a “democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social 




tries to explain how social injustices are produced, reproduced, and legitimized as 
well as understand the agencies that institutionalize and mystify them, and, above all, 
relate these interpretations to wider socio-cultural, political and historical contexts.  
Fairclough’s (1992b) Discourse and Social Change introduced the social-
discoursal framework in CDA. In that book, Fairclough prescribed a social theory of 
discourse with a methodological blueprint for critical discourse analysis. Figure (2.1) 
summarizes his plan of action to conduct a comprehensive analysis (Fairclough, 
1995a: 98).  
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This diagram shows three distinct but intrinsically interwoven levels of 
analysis: the text level, the discursive practice level, and the socio-cultural level. In 
Fairclough’s model, “the connection between text and social practice is seen as being 
mediated by discourse practice” (Fairclough, 1995a: 133). So “each discursive event 
has three dimensions or facets” (ibid.): 
1.  it is a spoken or written language text; 
2.  it is an instance of discourse practice involving the production and 
interpretation of text; 
3.  it is a piece of social practice.  
There is, therefore, a tripartite method of discourse analysis, where:  
… the method of discourse analysis includes linguistic description of the 
language text, interpretation of the relationship between the (productive and 
interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the 
relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes. (ibid. 
:97) 
In the remainder of this section, these three dimensions of the model will be 
elaborated. 
2.4.3.1 Discourse as text. The first dimension is discourse-as-text. The focus 
is on the contents of the text, the linguistic features of discourse. Choices and 
patterns in vocabulary (e.g., wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g., transitivity, 
modality), semantics, cohesion (e.g., conjunction, schemata), and text structure (e.g., 
episoding, turn-taking system) should be systematically analyzed. The use of passive 
verb forms in news reporting, for instance, can have the effect of obscuring the agent 
of political processes. Included in the text dimension is intertextuality: how a certain 




The analyst, basically, looks for what is represented in the text in terms of 
actors, recipients, benefactors, etc.; what is represented in the theme and rheme of the 
sentences composing the text and collocations; and patterns of co-occurrences of 
words in text, which simply means looking at which other words most frequently 
precede and follow any word which is in focus. At this level, it is significant to 
analyze: 
1. Genre, and check if the data conform or deviate from the specific genre norms, 
i.e., the semantic relationships; 
2. How elements of social events (processes, people, objects, means, times, places) 
are represented; 
3. To what degree some elements are present or absent (foregrounding and 
backgrounding); 
4. How events are ordered and the angle which is being taken; the main 
assumptions and presuppositions of the discursive compositions of text. 
(Fairclough, 2003; Huckin, 1995) 
2.4.3.2 Discourse as discursive practices. The second dimension is discourse-
as-discursive-practice. Discursive practices of discourse include all the factors that 
contribute to the production of the text. It, as Fairclough puts it, “… involves various 
aspects of the processes of text production and text consumption. Some of these have 
a more institutional character where as others are discourse processes in a narrower 
sense” (1995a: 58). Discourse practice refers to the production and reception of 
messages. Participation in certain recurrent patterns of discursive practice is what 




condition for their reproduction or transformation. An example of this is the parent-
child interaction at a home that helps to constitute family relationships, or male-
female interaction in the workplace setting and outside, which helps to constitute 
gender relations in society. Knowing how to act in this way means that the 
participants draw upon what Fairclough calls members’ resources (MR). The MR 
includes internalized knowledge of all three levels in the discourse model: 
1. Social structure and social practices – the mental maps or cultural models 
(Gee, 1996) that people carry in their heads; 
2. Knowledge about the production and interpretation of discourse types – which 
are often hybrids involving creative combination of genres and discourses;  
3. Detailed knowledge of particular linguistic and textual structuring devices.  
The analysis of this aspect includes but is not limited to the sociology of 
journalism, the newsroom production, the process of text production, circulation and 
consumption in a certain society. This dimension indicates affiliating the text to a 
wider context that contributed to this production and consumption. In dealing with 
discursive practices, questions like the following are considered: 
1. Why are certain events rather than others chosen to be reported? 
2. Why are the events reported the way they are? 
3. What are the factors that influence and /or control journalists in their reporting? 
4. What are the other related texts and genres circulated in a society that might 
affect the production and consumption of this certain text? 
5. Are there any other competing texts/discourses? 




Although the analysis of the linguistic features of any text will inevitably 
involve the analysis of discursive practices and vice versa, Fairclough maintains that 
both levels of analysis should be separated analytically.  
2.4.3.3 Discourse as social practices. The third dimension is discourse-as-
social-practice. This is concerned with the social, ideological and hegemonic 
practices prevailing in the society and how these practices shape (and are shaped by) 
discursive practices. Social practice, which includes discourse, does not merely 
reflect reality; it also has effects on social structures and can play an active role in 
social change. Fairclough (1999) gives the example of schools. Schools have a 
certain way of ordering social space in which there are distinct settings where 
discourse occurs (classroom, assembly, principal’s office, staffroom, playground) 
and in each of these there are discourse practices belonging to certain types. For 
example, the classroom sets up discourse types in which there are distinct subject 
positions for teachers and students. Occupying these subject positions means 
following certain conventions that determine the discoursal rights and obligations of 
teachers and students – what each is allowed and expected to do or say within the 
discourse type. This is an example of how the level of culture and society and the 
level of text are connected through what Fairclough calls “discourse practice.” 
Understanding the wider socio-cultural, political, ideological, institutional 
and historical context and structures surrounding the text, in other words, the wider 
context, helps to explain the dynamics of a text, in terms of its production, 
distribution and consumption. At this explanatory level, we consider more than 




their roles in generating and establishing power asymmetries among social actors, 
their roles in facilitating the marginalization and exclusion of groups as well as 
possibilities of change and resistance. Showing that this level is somehow different 
from the other two levels, Fairclough says that the social/cultural practices “may be 
at different levels of abstraction from the particular event: It may involve its more 
immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is 
embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and culture” (1995a: 62). The 
analyst, at this level, should be ready to deal with semiotic as well as nonsemiotic 
elements. Social practices “… can be seen as articulations of different types of social 
elements. They articulate semiosis (hence language) together with other non-
semiotic social elements” (Fairclough, 2004: 227). He suggests that the following 
elements may be key elements in the composition of any social practice:  
1. Action and interaction; 
2. Social relations; 
3. Persons (with beliefs, attitudes, histories, etc); 
4. The material world semiosis (ibid.). 
This comprehensive analytic agenda assists in understanding and interpreting:  
1. The wider picture in which certain discourses and ideologies work and interact 
in society; 
2. The complexities involved in the hegemonic process and its role in social and 
political exclusion and marginalization of the less-powerful groups; 




shape beliefs, fantasies and desires so as to regulate practices of institution 
building that set the stage for material production and reproduction of 
activities that in turn construct social relations that finally return to ensure the 
perpetuation of power (Harvey, 1996: 82); 
4. The “radical changes that are taking place in social life” and locate the negative 
impacts of any prospective changes on the social life (Fairclough, 2003: 205). 
Point number (4) is relevant to social studies as it enables researchers, 
through comprehensive analyses of both dominant and competing discourses, to 
trace the processes of hegemony and prospective change in the “orders of new 
discourses.” Hegemony, Fairclough states, concerns power that is achieved through 
constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that 
“the articulation and rearticulating of orders of discourse is correspondingly one 
stake in hegemonic struggle.” (Fairclough, 1992a: 93) 
This tripartite framework is followed in the present study. Both social and 
discursive practices are discussed in Chapter 3 and the textual analysis is introduced 
in Chapter 4. Any analysis of Islamism in the Arab world, for example, should 
analyze the historical roots of Islamism, the socio-economic and socio-political 
factors that are at stake.  
2.5. Critiques of CDA 
A number of criticisms have been directed to CDA. In the following 
paragraphs, the criticisms against CDA are grouped and a response follows. 
1. CDA is, by nature, interpretive and subjective in its analysis (Schegloff, 1997; 




how to disengage the researcher’s preconceptions and personal beliefs from the 
various researchers’ procedures.  
2. Widdowson also attacks CDA, stating that it ignores context and separates it 
from text.  
3. CDA does not discuss the effects of discourse in the globalized context of 
language use. Blommaert accordingly argues that “a critical analysis of 
discourse … necessarily needs to provide insights in the dynamics of societies-
in-the-world” (Blommaert, 2005: 2). 
4. In terms of methodology, CDA has been attacked as missing the essential 
flavour of being a theory and as having “a strange mixture of theoretical 
eclecticism and unreflexive modernism” (Pennycook, 2001:87), Widdowson 
(1998) criticized CDA practitioners as “a kind of ad hoc bricolage which takes 
from theory whatever concept comes usefully to hand.” 
5. Pennycook (2001) cites the need to combine textual analysis with production 
and consumption practices, noting that what is produced without this last step 
is reduced to nothing more than a particular reading of a particular text. 
A recurrent criticism is that CDA practitioners tend to focus “excessively on 
different segments of textual material, considering news discourse in terms of mainly 
grammatical features, topics, or themes to sort out textual materials and organize 
discussions” (Barkho, 2008c). Despite the warnings from prominent thinkers on 
discourse analysis (Bourdieu, 1991; Thompson, 1990), Barkho believes that CDA 
analysts still rely on the text as “a final product to reveal how ideological power is 




Responding to the above critiques in the listed order may lead to a sort of 
repetition and redundancy, so they will be answered in terms of topics. The issue of 
subjectivity and multiplicity of truths is unavoidable in qualitative analysis in social 
sciences. Fairclough (2001b, 2002) has emphasized that his approach is a set of 
guidelines that can be used with lucidity, and that CDA can never be objective: it 
always has particular interests, always comes from a particular perspective, and 
renders analyses that are partial and incomplete. Stressing the same concern, 
Fairclough (2001b: 4), clarifying his position, says that he is “a socialist with a 
generally low opinion of the social relationships in society and a commitment to the 
emancipation of the people who are oppressed by them.” His approach has been 
entwined to a commitment to emancipation and to acknowledge the way that his 
“reading” or analysis of data is made from a particular position. Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 208) elaborate that: 
We all have preconceptions, our pet theories about what is happening. The 
risk is taking them for granted, imposing these willy-nilly, missing the 
inductive grounding that is needed. We do not hold as strongly as Glaser 
(1992) that all predefined concepts should be abjured in favor of solely 
“grounded theory” emergence. 
In the view of the researcher, what is actually relevant is how cogent and 
rigorous the research is. Fairclough has not claimed that his framework is not open or 
cannot be juxtaposed by or infused with any other methodology; meaning the 
substance that CDA deals with is by nature a dynamic process prone to multiple 
interpretations. So, the following procedures can be added to ensure rigour and 




A. The inclusion of ethnographic methodologies, such as interviews and 
questionnaires; 
B. Verification of the analysis results by asking for peer-reviews; 
C. The use of quantitative analysis; 
D. Relating the results of the textual analysis in logically-based procedures to the 
readings from any nontextual contexts.  
CDA practitioners have always stressed the significance of context and 
intertextuality to their analysis. Fairclough and Wodak (1997:276) insist that 
“discourse is historical”: 
Utterances are only meaningful if we consider their use in a specific situation, 
if we understand the underlying conventions and rules, if we recognize the 
embedding in a certain culture and ideology, and most importantly, if we 
know what the discourse relates to in the past. Discourse is not produced 
without context and cannot be understood without taking the context into 
consideration … discourses are always connected to other discourses which 
were produced earlier …  
As for Blommaert’s criticism of the lack of “historicity,” where the analyst 
ignores the historical background and context of the texts analyzed, this can be 
remedied by including Wodak’s historical approach as well as including the 
synchronic dimension onto the analysis.  
As for the methodological criticisms, according to Weiss and Wodak 
(2003:7), it is useful to think of CDA as “a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools.” 
Weiss and Wodak argue that a plurality of theory and method should not be 
considered unsystematic or eclectic, suggesting instead that it can be understood as a 





This point leads to a related critique pointed at CDA: the researcher as an 
individual and his/her subjective influence on the analysis. Wodak (1999: 185) also 
states that the term “critical” implies a self-reflective researcher who considers 
his/her own position while doing research about social problems. Researchers must 
constantly be aware of how they are analyzing and interpreting, thus CDA requires a 
particular kind of balance between theory and empirical phenomena. Wodak (1999: 
186) rightly observes that researchers “cannot separate their own values and beliefs 
from the research they are doing … [therefore]… researchers must be constantly 
aware of what they are doing” (ibid.). Self-reflection points to two aspects: a 
constant awareness of one’s own biases, and “a constant balancing between theory 
and empirical phenomena,” in an attempt to understand the social life rather than 
announcing truths (ibid.). I could add here that the researchers should try to find 
recurring patterns in the discourse they are analyzing. These recurring patterns, be it 
on the micro or macro levels, are consolidating support against subjectivity. 
Discourses do not exist in a vacuum, but they are products of histories of 
interactions between peoples, groups, ideas, ideologies and interests. Therefore, to 
have a full account of any discourse, we need to study these histories along both 
diachronic and synchronic dimensions. Analyzing the diachronic aspect explains the 
historical accumulations presented in the discourse while dealing with discourse 
synchronically educates us on how the present discourse more or less competes or 
conforms with other discourses, and how the interplay of both local or global forces 




Most of the studies done in CDA tend to focus on a single aspect of analysis. 
However, this does not mean that these studies totally neglect other aspects of 
analysis. Rather, it means that if the analyst is coming from a historical-discoursal 
angle, he or she would center on the historical background and this focus would 
outweigh both the textual and social aspects. To fill in this gap, the present analysis 
attempts to lay out, in a balanced manner, the various aspects pertaining to the 
phenomena of Islamism: historical, social and linguistic. 
2.6. Concluding Note 
 CDA, as exemplified within this dissertation, will be defined following van 
Dijk (1988a) as the linguistically-based study and analysis of written texts and 
spoken words in order to reveal the underlying discursive sources of power, 
dominance, inequality, and bias evidenced in both. This study will connect this 
definition to Fairclough’s framework, represented in Figure 2.1. It is important to 
stress that although the framework analytically provides three layers or levels of 
analysis, these three levels, in fact, overlap in real analysis. Chapter 3 talks about 
both the discursive practices involved in the process of news making in Egypt and 
the social practices that have contributed to the production and perception of 
Islamists. Combining these two levels of analysis would significantly shed light on 
how and why Islamists are represented in the way they are in the Egyptian media.
  
3. DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES: IDEOLOGY, 
MEDIA, REPRESENTATION AND ISLAMISM 
3.1.  Introduction 
 This chapter, departing from Fairclough’s tripartite framework, discusses the 
first two levels of analysis in this approach: discursive and social practices. 
Discursive practices concern how the news is made and presented in the way it is, 
the role of media in sustaining or quashing social practices and the process of news-
making. Since an event is not an event until it is reported and mediated in words via 
discourse to the reader, we need to analyze the crucial factors that shape the news-
making process. Analyzing social practices includes dealing with all the social, 
political, and historical accumulations that are involved in the production, reception, 
and interpretation of any social phenomenon. The present chapter sheds light on:  
A. Ideology: the various definitions and different approaches to analyze 
ideology; 
B. Media: elaboration on media as an ideology carrier in modern society and the 
role of media as a discursive practice that (mis)represents social events; 
C. Representation: what events are presented and how;  





3.2.  Ideology 
3.2.1. Ideology: Neutral Connotations 
Ideology, like almost every term in social sciences, does not lend itself to one 
unified and self-contained definition. Rather, literature on ideology provides us with 
a variety of definitions that range from one that has neutral connotations to other 
pejorative examples. In his Internet course, van Dijk provides a general working 
definition of ideology: “Ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its 
members” (1998b: 7). This is an example of a definition that does not have a 
negative evaluation of ideology; it also does not limit itself to ideologies that 
legitimize dominance and control. This definition is more than enough if the purpose 
of the research is mainly to segment points of view in a certain discourse or of 
certain people toward the outer world, without judging these ideologies. 
Furthermore, the definition focuses on the group and not on individuals. This means 
that individual and personal beliefs are not considered ideology, nor are social or 
culture beliefs or traditions. The ideology or beliefs of a whole culture are 
commonsense knowledge that is unquestionably perceived and taken for granted, at 
least as far as this particular culture is concerned. Any group with a certain ideology 
tries, over the course of time, to establish its beliefs as commonsense knowledge by 
utilizing many tools, the most significant of which is discourse.  
The word “group” in van Dijk’s definition also needs some explanation, as it 
does not apply to all people who are gathered in a certain place at one time. Rather, 
we are interested in social groups that are formed by individuals who have common 




be more or less officially part of the group (e.g., simply having a membership card), 
but also include individuals or subgroups who fulfill specific positions or have 
special roles. They have leaders and followers, teachers and ideologues, as well as 
offices that have similar functions. This kind of organization in groups is vital for the 
acquisition, spreading, defense or inculcation of ideologies. Thus, new members 
need to learn the ideology of a group (van Dijk, 1998b). 
Van Dijk emphasizes the role discourse plays in the development and 
promulgation of ideologies. Ideologies both influence the content of discourse and 
are also acquired and transformed through discourse. This perspective is very close 
to Fairclough’s interpretation of the role of discourse in society: discourse both 
constitutes and is constitutive of social practices (1995a; 1995b; 1999). 
On the other end of the scale, there are definitions of ideology with pejorative 
and negative connotation. A good example of this type is the West’s perception of 
communism. According to van Dijk (1998b: 6): 
Communism as well as anticommunism, socialism and liberalism, feminism 
and sexism, racism and antiracism, pacifism and militarism, are examples of 
widespread ideologies. Group members who share such ideologies stand for a 
number of very general ideas that are at the basis of their more specific beliefs about 
the world, guide their interpretation of events, and monitor their social practices. 
It is this type of ideology that generates polarization of people into us and 
them, and the audience begins to produce and consume discourse in terms of the we 
and they dichotomy. This process of polarization leads to the discussion of van 




character of the prevailing discourses in societies. The ideological square gets its 
label from the four dimensions that make it up and which explain and justify the 
presence of inequality in the society. The square polarizes the in-groups and out-
groups through both emphasis and mitigation: ideological discourses emphatically 
present the good self and the bad other and simultaneously mitigate the bad self and 
the good other. Van Dijk (1995) maintains that ideologies are often articulated and 
based on the ideological square. The ideological square: 
A. Emphasizes positive things about us; 
B. Emphasizes negative things about them;  
C. De-emphasizes negative things about us; 
D. De-emphasizes positive things about them. 
It is actually this ideological square that forms the departure point of the 
present dissertation; how far this square applies to the Egyptian government in its 
representation of mainstream Islamists. 
3.2.2.  Ideology: Pejorative Connotations 
As stated above, there is the approach to ideology that bears a pejorative 
meaning (Blommaert, 2005; Thompson, 1990). This approach is associated with the 
way in which Marxists view ideology, a view where the ideational aspect is 
“materially mediated” (Blommaert, 2004: 164). Blommaert draws on Gramsci’s 
view of hegemony, which is defined as the “cultural domination of the bourgeoisie” 
and as power by which the bourgeoisie is related to other social classes. In Gramsci’s 




the ruling class. In that sense, Giddens’ definition of ideology as “shared ideas or 
beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups” (583) makes it easy 
for us to understand Gramsci’s concept of ideology. Here, ideology is used as soft 
power in the hands of the ruling class to dominate. According to Gramsci, no regime 
could sustain itself primarily through the absolute use of state power and armed 
forces. Therefore, he suggests the use of ideology as a soft alternative to absolute 
power; this means hegemony and consent as the political power that originates from 
“intellectual and moral leadership.” Consensus based on soft ideology will be more 
effective than that which is based solely on armed forces. He borrowed this concept 
from the way in which the Catholic Church exercised a substantial intellectual power 
over its followers to obviate widening the gap between the educated and uneducated 
followers. Therefore, according to Gramsci, the ruling class could maintain its power 
and hegemony in society via establishing cultural and political consensus through 
utilizing its institutions: schools (textbooks, language policy, administration system, 
etc.), political parties, media, and others (Gramsci, 1971). Blommaert defines 
hegemony and power as dominant and determining factors in the ideological 
processes. He observes that the “coercive and disciplining system of education” lie 
beneath the reproduction of dominant culture. This is what Foucault views as the 
“locus of capillary power, all-pervasive surveillance, and perpetual punishability” 
(Blommaert 2005: 167).  
Thompson, while distinguishing between the pejorative/critical and the 
neutral definitions of ideology, adopts the critical. For Thompson, ideology is “the 




(1990: 56). He provides a definition of ideology that is not restricted only to conflicts 
between social classes but to any form of domination:  
When established relations of power are systematically asymmetrical, then 
the situation may be described as one of domination. Relations of power are 
“systematically asymmetrical” when individuals or groups of individuals are 
endowed with power in a durable way which excludes, and to some 
significant degree, remains inaccessible to, other individuals or groups of 
individuals, irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried 
out. (ibid: 151) 
 Ideology, because of its dynamic and dialectical relationship with meaning 
takes various semantic modes or forms. According to Thompson (1990), these forms 
are: 
1. Legitimation: the process of representing an event or incident as “legitimate,” 
“just,” and “worthy of support.” Max Weber (quoted in Thompson) identifies 
the following three grounds on which legitimacy can be claimed:  
A. Rational grounds. This means “appealing to the legality of enacted rules and 
using a chain of reasoning to persuade the audience of the validity of existing 
social relations;” 
B. Traditional grounds. This means “appealing to the sanctity of immemorial 
traditions.” What Thompson refers to as narrativization is very close to this 
notion; the claims to legitimacy are seen to be consolidated by how the 
present has emanated from a glorious past and is attached to time-honored 
traditions. In many cases, ideology propagators may create traditions to color 
the present with legitimacy; 
C. Charismatic grounds. This concerns “appealing to the exceptional character 




Charismatic attributes are inherent in the person as “attractive” and 
“popular,” but the person may be propagated as associated with words 
qualities that represent the charismatic flavour: the Iron Lady with Thatcher, 
al-ra’ees al-mulham “the inspired (revealed-to) president” with Gamal abdel-
Nasser, and al-ra’ees al-mu’men “the believer president” with Sadat.  
These three grounds, Weber explains, do not occur in “pure forms” (329, 
333) but they may occur in combination. He also observes that developing from one 
ground to the other is done gradually. 
2. Dissimulation: the process of concealing, denying, or mitigating relations of 
dominance in a given context. The techniques used to achieve dissimulation 
are: 
3. Displacement: a process where a term that is used to refer to one object or 
individual is used to refer to another and, thus, either positive or negative 
attributes connoted by the term is transferred. This process is meant to 
associate a person, a system, or a regime with a glory past or popularity in 
present;  
4. Euphemization: a process of beautifying a (negative or unacceptable) action or 
process: the US existence in Iraq is not called “invasion” but “liberation;” the 
Americans did not “destroy” the Vietnamese villages, they “disassembled” 
them, and the Egyptian government did not “liquidate” the public corporations 
in favor of private sectors but they are “modernizing” Egypt and “improving” 




5. Trope. This includes figures of speech such as synecdoche, metonymy and 
metaphor. A popular example is the Egyptian government’s use of the word al-
sha’b “the people,” which means the whole people while an analysis of the 
discourse where the word “people” is mentioned will reveal that actually it 
means the government and dominating elites; 
6. Unification: a process of establishing “a form of unity which embraces 
individuals in a collective identity” regardless of racial, religious, social, 
gender, or political barriers which may separate them. 
7. Fragmentation concerns the process of fragmenting the opposing or the other 
individuals and groups whose unity stand as a challenge or a threat to the 
dominant individuals and groups. 
8. Reification means “representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it 
were permanent, natural, outside of time. Processes are portrayed as things or 
as events of a quasi-natural kind, in such a way that their social and historical 
character is eclipsed” (67). Processes presented this way are represented in a 
manner that renders them invulnerable and unquestionable. 
The modes through which ideology operates can be more or less tailored to 
van Dijk’s ideological square: legitimation, dissimulation and unification establish 
the good self while fragmentation the bad other. The ideological modes of operation 





3.2.3. Fairclough: Meaning in the Service of Power  
The last approach to ideology that we will tackle here is that of a prominent 
figure in CDA, Norman Fairclough. According to Fairclough, ideologies “[only] 
arise in class societies characterized by relations of domination” and therefore 
discourse is ideological only in so far as it contributes “to sustaining or undermining 
power relations” (1995a: 82). Departing from Giddens’s definition of ideology, 
Fairclough defines it as “meaning in the service of power” (1995b:14). Therefore, his 
understanding is that ideologies are constructions of meaning which generate 
production, reproduction and transformation of relation dominance (Fairclough, 
1992b: 87; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:26). This means that ideologies exist in 
societies that have conflicts and tension in the social structure, like class struggle, 
gender, etc., and every ideology attempts to create its own discourse that will 
compete for domination with other discourses prevalent in society. 
Fairclough perceives discourse as a pertinent carrier of ideology; hence 
discourse can be more or less ideological. “Orders of discourse can be seen as one 
domain of potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert 
and maintain particular structuring within and between them” (Fairclough, 1995b: 
56). This indicates that in a certain society, not all ideologically competing 
discourses have equal status. Some discourses have more powerful impact than 
others based on their producers” access to resources (van Dijk, 1996). This also 
shows that Fairclough does not conceive ideology in a literally Marxist sense, i.e., as 
an abstract system of values that work as a unified social body, binding people 




process of meaning production and reproduction in daily life an important role in 
maintaining social order. 
It is crucial here to stress that Fairclough does not adopt the deterministic 
view of the effects of ideology on people, i.e., the passivity and incapability of the 
people to counter manipulation. Rather, people “are ideologically positioned, but 
they are capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the 
diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed and to restructure 
positioning practices and structures” (1992b: 91). 
The discussion of ideology so far leads us to the conclusion that the different 
approaches are not as antithetical as they may seem to be; instead they are looking at 
ideology from different angles or emphasizing a certain dimension over the other in 
analysis. Van Dijk, for example, stresses the role cognitive networks play in 
processing ideology – this may be because this aspect has been neglected by 
discourse analysts. Blommaert, within the Marxist trend, deals with ideology as a 
system next to power to maintain social order. Thompson’s position, reflected also in 
Fairclough, is clear on the penetration of ideology in meaning production and 
reproduction in our daily life. Fairclough stresses the social dimension in studying 
ideology. The relation between language and ideology is given more and better 
explication in the ensuing section. 
3.2.4. Ideology and Language in CDA 
Power associated with any discourse is not initiated by language itself as 




make of it” (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 14). The power of any discourse is acquired 
from the various social practices (different social institutions) that generate that 
discourse. These institutions (government, parliament, school, asylum agencies, etc.) 
“operate as incarnations of power” (Harvey, 1996: 95). Different discourses are, 
therefore, a result of “relation of difference” on social structures. Language is 
entwined with social power in a number of ways: Language indexes power, 
expresses power, is involved where there is contention over power and where power 
is challenged. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to 
challenge power, to subvert it, and to alter distributions of power. (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2001: 2). 
Language, however, is not the only condition to exercise or challenge power 
but one also must have access to various social outlets (media, institutions, 
textbooks, education, etc.). The elites and the dominating people use their power to 
generate, maintain, institutionalize, and legitimize their discourse. Fairclough calls 
the process of using discourse to institutionalize ideology and achieve hegemony 
normalization and in many cases “normalization brings about social change in our 
knowledge, our attitudes, values and so forth” (Fairclough, 2003: 8). Language 
therefore sustains or reproduces dominant ideologies and it is thereby “establishing, 
maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation” 
(ibid. : 9). 
The centrality of language in CDA as an ideology carrier makes it 
ideological, too, and this echoes Habermas’ claim about language as a medium of 




1967: 259). Those who have power and access can legitimize or delegitimize objects 
(persons, actions, institutions, etc.) in the world by their own way of language use. 
Hall (Morley and Chen: 26) describes this process as having “especially to do with 
the concepts and the languages of practical thought which stabilize particular forms 
of power and domination” and is meant to “reconcile and accommodate the masses 
of the people to their subordinate place in the social formation.” (ibid.) 
To sum up the section on ideology, the main question is: can CDA dissect 
this subtle relation between ideology and discourse and other semiological forms, 
and, if so, how? Both Wodak and Fairclough suggest a positive answer to this 
question (Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 3; Fairclough, 1992b: 91). As for the present 
study, the tense relation between the Egyptian government and Islamists is not based 
on class struggle but on a socio-political basis. Therefore, the present study attempts 
to analyze the ideological stance that the Egyptian government has towards Islamists 
and the role that language plays in carrying that ideology. 
3.3. Media 
In this section, the role of media in mediating discourses in the modern world 
is discussed, and then the role of media in the Arab world in general, and in Egypt in 
particular, is given more attention.  
3.3.1. Media and Ideology Dissemination 
 Herman and Chomsky (2002) explain that people’s opinions and beliefs are 




the social, political and economic interests of the dominating elites. It is accepted 
that what the media will reflect will support the social interests of the elite. 
Consequently, the dominant ideology of the elites will be presented as a 
commonsense and rational understanding, and will also attempt to extenuate what is 
presumed to be contesting beliefs and strategies (Knight and Dean, 1982).  
Media are used here to mean the institutional system through which social 
meanings are produced, stored, distributed and consumed on a mass scale. The goals 
beyond that process vary based on the produced content (TV ads, editorials, talk 
shows movies, news reports, etc.). The present study analyzes one form of media: 
government newspapers that are used to produce, sustain, maintain and protect social 
meanings that are favourable to the ruling regime. It is hard to limit journalism to 
just one function. It is true that journalism in a capitalist age is a business and aims 
for profit. This, however, is not the essential and sole reason for its existence.  
Journalism is meant to achieve many goals, the most important of which is 
reporting and informing audiences about the outside world and representing events 
that the audiences did not see. Richardson sees that the function of journalism is to 
“enable citizens better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world” 
(2006: 6). This perspective is an ideal stance, because it stresses what journalism is 
supposed to do but not what it is actually doing. What the media are actually doing is 
offering its audience selective presentations of selective events. The main function of 
newspapers is to provide the readers with news about the events that happened “out 
there.” Newspapers, then, are transmitting/transferring events in the form of 




selection of the events to be reported as news and the manner of presentation. 
Journalists have to decide what events will be selected and reported, and in what 
form these events will be presented.  
In fact, events become news only when selected for inclusion in news reports. 
This process of inclusion is treated differently by different newspapers and the 
difference will be reflected in both form and content of the coverage. The world of 
news is not a copy of the real world. Fowler (1991: 12) calls it “a world skewed and 
judged.” Moreover, the selection process indicates subjectivity in terms of both form 
and content. Regarding content, Fowler (1991: 11–12) notes that all news is 
inevitably mediated and news medium cannot be completely “neutral” or “unbiased.” 
Fairclough (2001: 41, 128) goes further claiming that mass media discourse involves 
hidden relations of power: text producers in mass communication address an “ideal 
subject,” construing their own notion of their “ideal reader,” and by these means may 
succeed in manipulating audiences to accept their view of particular events. On the 
level of form, questions like the following are considered: 
1. The phrasing of the headline: Is it nominal or verbal? 
2. What information should be included in the headline? 
3. Does this action have an agent or is it agentless? 
4. With much vocabulary at hand, which words will be chosen and why? 
5. In formatting the report, what type of information distribution in terms of 
headline, lead, body and conclusion will be used? 




 How discursively the event is reported departs from an ideological base of 
the reporter. Hartley (1982: 47) explains how the news takes the discourse form it 
does as something determined by “the way the news-makers themselves act within 
the constraints, pressures, structures and norms that bring the larger world of social 
relations to bear on their work.” The same idea is iterated by Fowler:  
Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a 
particular ideological position: Language is not a clear window, but a 
refracting, structuring medium. If we can acknowledge this as a positive, 
productive principle, we can show by analysis how it operates in texts. (1991: 
10) 
 This is what the present research is trying to achieve: to show how the text is 
woven around a certain ideological stance in terms of representing both the self and 
the other. 
3.3.2. Media Filters 
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (2002) describe the media as 
businesses which sell a product (readers) to other businesses (advertisers). In their 
propaganda model of the media they point to five filters which determine what we 
read in the newspapers and see on the television. These filters produce a very narrow 
view of the world that is in line with government policy and business interests. This 
model explains the constraints on what is/is not reported and what makes its way to 
the audience. These filters are ownership, funding, sourcing, flak and antiideologies. 
Most of the world’s big media corporations are privately owned. News 
International, CBS (now merged with Westinghouse), Turner Broadcasting (now 




such as General Electric (owners of NBC) – are just examples. All these have close 
ties to the local and international stock markets, which in turn would affect the nature 
of the media production. Sourcing is related to who gets to be sourced for the news 
and commentaries. “The mass media are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with 
powerful sources of information by economic necessity and reciprocity of interest.”  
(Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 14).  In today’s world, professional journalism 
depends mostly on what the official sources say and that what these sources say is 
the news (McChensey, 2000). As for sourcing, according to McChensey, “if you talk 
to prisoners, strikers, the homeless, or protesters, you have to paint their perspectives 
as unreliable, or else you’ve become an advocate and are no longer a ‘neutral’ 
professional journalist.” Such reliance on official sources gives the news an 
inherently conservative cast and gives those in power tremendous influence over 
defining what is or is not ‘news.’ Advertising concerns the source of funding and as 
ads are a major source of fund, the news that would negatively affect any of 
advertised products are filtered. 
Herman and Chomsky describe flak as the negative responses to a media 
statement or TV or radio program. It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone 
calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of 
complaint, threat and punitive action.  
The fifth filter is ideology. This filter deals with the question: does the story 
justify political manoeuvering and defend corporate interests around the world? In 




enemy of the West. With the collapse of the USSR, any ideological framework that 
is perceived as opposing Western interests can assume the filter position. 
These filters show how media carry concealed ideologies and interests. This 
model has been criticized (see, for example, Klaehn, 2005a, 2005b) for its 
deterministic view and as a conspiracy theory. However, this author believes that if 
the model is read from CDA perspective, it would be seen as a reader-kit to inform, 
educate and enlighten the readers of the process of news-making. 
With this in mind, it can be said that media mobilize the public to support the 
social interests of the elite or whoever stands behind media industry. To work 
securely, this dominant ideology tends to exclude any contesting beliefs, values that 
undermine the elites’ worldview (Knight and Dean, 1982). This is what Gramsci 
(1971) refers to as the soft power (persuasion). By using soft power, the ruling 
groups in democratic societies gain dominance through a double process of coercion 
and persuasion. 
Many studies have talked about the complexities involved in the production 
of news of representations (Cottle, 2000; Fowler, 1991; Hartley, 1982; Herman and 
Chomsky 2002; Richardson 2004; Poole 2002). The guidelines that these studies 
elaborated on as regulating the work of journalism in the West can hardly be 
stretched to be applied to Arab media. Just one example will be used to explain this 
point: Richardson (2004: 34) talks about finance, profit and advertising as 
professional constituting parts of news production in the West. However, this does 
not apply to the Egyptian al-Ahram. Al-Ahram is a state-owned, government-funded 




making industry in the production of the newspaper or the institution. The board of 
the al-Ahram, as well as of many other papers in Egypt, is appointed by the editors-
in-chief who, in turn, are directly appointed by the Egyptian President. It is not, 
therefore, unexpected that the mainstream line of al-Ahram would be government-
oriented. The media filter in the case of al-Ahram is government interference. Since 
the editor-in-chief is appointed by the President and the paper is government-funded, 
it is expected that al-Ahram would be a mouthpiece of the government and any 
antigovernment news or reports will be filtered. 
3.3.3. Egyptian Media: Discursive Practices and News-making 
In almost all Arab countries, both official and private press exist in the 
political venue. However, no one can issue a newspaper or own any media outlet 
before getting the official approval and license from the government. In Egypt, for 
example, the majority of Egyptian newspapers are government-owned, and the 
consent of Supreme Council on Journalism is a prerequisite to publish any private 
newspaper. Given that this Council is government-appointed, it is expected that only 
regime-favoured orientations or individuals would be licensed. This Council also has 
the right to discontinue and confiscate a newspaper at any time. 
In some Arab countries, although in sharp contrast with the basics of freedom 
of speech, access to and working in the journalism profession requires the approval 
of certain official bodies. Al-Jammal explains that the Arabs’ authorities justify this 
interference by the need to maintain political and social stability (in Mellor, 2005: 




(article 47/1980). The constitution states that the freedom of speech is granted to 
every citizen and everyone is free to express their opinions via any medium, that 
censoring or confiscating media outlets is prohibited and that the right is granted to 
any individual as well as groups to own, issue and publish newspapers or other 
media forms. However, practically, this freedom is not applied at any level. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, categorizing the press was 
based on the well-known Four Theories of the Press (McQuail, 2002), which divides 
local press into four types: authoritarian, libertarian, communist, and social 
responsibility. In spite of the criticism directed to this categorization (Akhavan-
Majid and Wolf, 1991; Ostini and Fung 2002) as lacking the requisite flexibility to 
analyze modern press systems, its idealism and lack of empiricism, I see that it well 
applies to the official media in Egypt. Egyptian media, including al-Ahram, falls 
under the authoritarian type, where the ruling regime and the elites monopolize 
media outlets. The authoritarian type indicates that journalism is subservient to the 
interests of the state in maintaining social order and achieving political goals. Saying 
that al-Ahram is under the authoritarian type implies it avoids criticism to the 
President, the government policies or officials, and it censors publishing any material 
that challenges the established order. Although Mubarak’s time has been propagated 
as the age of free press, multiple cases prove that the state retains the right to punish 
journalists or close media outlets that transgress “permissible” limits on reporting 
and commentary. In the next sections, media under the consecutive Egyptian 




3.3.3.1 Nasser and media. In 1960, Nasser nationalized all privately-owned 
press organizations and since then the press has been under the control of the regime. 
Whatever was published must gain the approval of the censor (Nasser, 1990: 3–4). 
Nasser invented the task of appointing new editors-in-chief for the state-owned 
papers, a policy that is still applied at the time of writing. According to Nasser 
(1979), this policy led journalists to choose “self censorship” to ensure that their 
work would be published. Abd el-Nasser himself once said that there were no 
restrictive laws on the press and that journalists themselves chose to ignore certain 
issues out of self-censorship. Moreover, Nasser also controlled the Egyptian Press 
Syndicate to mobilize his political and economic views (Nasser, 1990: 5). 
Summarizing the role of press during Nasser’s era, Abd el-Rahman (1989, quoted in 
Mellor: 31 ) states that Nasser’s period was the beginning of detaching the Egyptian 
press from its main function of informing readers (22). 
3.3.3.2.Sadat and media. In 1970, when Sadat came to power, he lifted some 
of the Nasserite controls on press, like opening news sources for information, yet the 
censorship remained untouched. A major incident during Sadat’s time was the 
dismissal of Mohammed H. Heikal, the most influential journalist in Egypt in the 
second half of the twentieth century, after criticizing Sadat’s way of handling the 
1973 war. In the mid-1970s, Sadat started to loosen the controls on press freedom in 
what he called “doses of freedom” but he seemed to be discontented with the many 
criticisms that began to spread against his open door policy. He called for journalists 
to adopt a “code of ethics to control the misuse of freedom” (Nasser, 1991:13). After 




against both national and Arab consensus by visiting Israel. So in 1979, Sadat, in a 
press conference, attacked the press and accused it of committing crimes against the 
people, and consequently two Islamic-oriented papers were closed. Al-Sha’b 
(People) newspaper was the major opposition paper during Sadat’s time and the 
government frequently harassed its journalists (Nasser, 1990: 16). In 1980, Sadat 
proposed the Bill of the Law of Shame ﺐﻴﻌﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻗ . He proposed to “punish Egyptians 
who disparage their government.” He urged the People’s Assembly (Egyptian 
Congress) to adopt legislation on ethics to curb critics who criticized his polices 
through publications and broadcast (Nasser, 1991: 18ff). 
3.3.3.3 Mubarak and media. The general line of press in the Arab world is to 
punish any journalist who transgresses the freedom limits set by the government. The 
punishment varies from administrative to judicial. This statement does not hold true 
any longer concerning the press under Mubarak. Mubarak has ruled the country since 
1981 by Emergency Law. The TV channels are state-owned, which means they are 
government-owned, which also means they are owned by the National Democratic 
Party. The following is a short list of serious freedom and human rights violations 
recorded during Mubarak’s time:  
1. One of the most active political parties during the 1980s and 1990s was the 
Labor Party   ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ , and its weekly newspaper al-Shaa’ab was the fiercest 
and boldest in confronting the malefaction and corruption of the government. 
Both the party and the paper were closed and, in spite of the frequent judicial 
verdicts of the illegality of closing the party and the paper, the regime insists 




2. According to a recent report of Reporters Without Borders, Egypt occupied the 
145th rank among countries with regard to press freedom; 
3. The 2007 Reporters Without Borders report documented severe transgressions 
on the part of the Egyptian governments towards journalists and political 
activists as follows:  
1. Twelve  journalists were sued by the government under accusations such as 
infringing “public interest,” or “national security;” 
2. In September 2007, four editors-in-chief were sentenced to a year in prison 
with Force Work. Those are Ibrahim Isa of al-Dustuur, Adel Hammuda of 
al-Fajr, Wael ibrashi of Sawt al-Ummah and Abdel-Halim Kandil of al-
Karrama. In fact, according to the report, an NDP (the ruling party) 
member had raised a case against these four editors-in-chief because they 
had dealt with issues related to Mubarak, his sons and the corruption in 
Egypt;  
3. Huwaida Taha, an al-Jazeera correspondent in Cairo, was sentenced to six 
months in prison plus 20,000 LE on the basis of her report about the 
current situation of the Egyptian prisons; 
4. Two web bloggers, Kareem Amer and Moneim Mahmoud, were sentenced 
to four years and two months, respectively, in prison. The charges were 
criticism of the president and the government and working with an outlaw 
group (the Muslim Brotherhood). 
This short list reflects the repressive nature and reality of the ruling regime. 




press have managed to launch Arab satellites and publish Arabic press from abroad. 
According to Lynch (2003: 83): 
Whereas the broadcasting of the 1950s had been in the service of powerful 
states, the new media (both television and press) have self-consciously 
portrayed themselves as a mouthpiece for an Arab public deeply frustrated 
with all Arab regimes and beholden to none of them. Based primarily in 
London, the elite Arab press has been able to escape direct government 
control while drawing on writers and journalists from all over the world. 
Mellor applies this framework to media in the Arab world. He summarizes the state 
of press and its role in the Arab world: 
In general, the press was regulated so that it promoted the government’s 
developmental aims by writing about government projects and encouraging 
people to buy locally manufactured goods. As a consequence, the press 
turned into a mere mouthpiece for national governments. (2005: 31) 
Therefore, the main function of the local Arab news agencies is to assist the 
government in disseminating its information and controlling the incoming news from 
foreign sources (Rugh, 1987). 
Lastly, the interference and control of the Egyptian government of the news-
making process is verified by Al-Moshtohry in her dissertation L’idéologie a travers 
des indices linguistiques: Analyse des discours de la presse écrite arabophone et 
francophone en Egypte (2000–2002). She found that there are variations in the 
quantity and types of the linguistic indices of ideologies between the French and 
Arabic newspapers published in Egypt and neither the type of newspaper nor 
language is behind the variations. The variation exists because of constraints 
imposed on journalists, on the newspaper, or even on the press agencies. The 
constraints are determined by the ideologies and journalistic values which orient 





Representation means transmitting X via Y, where X is an event, people, 
place etc., and Y is the medium through which the X is transmitted. This means that 
representation is a process. It is recalled from the media section that media represent 
reality and this indicates that what is represented in media are not a copy of reality, 
but is more or less discursively presented reality. 
In this study, representation is used to refer to the process of meaning 
production through combination of semiotic signs. Reality is not always experienced 
directly but always through the symbolic categories made available by a society, and 
these categories are the sifters or filters of the original reality they are transmitting. 
The result is more or less similar to the original reality. It is as Hall (1982) puts it, 
“Representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. It implies the active 
work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the 
transmitting of an already existing meaning, but the more active labor of making 
things mean” (64). The elites, as a dominating power and to achieve hegemony by 
using media, are involved in what Hall calls “the politics of signification” (1982: 67, 
72). In this process, images about the world are produced and reproduced, generating 
particular meanings and interpretations of events, people, ideas, etc. According to 
Poole (2002: 23), at the same time media reproduce the prevailing ideologies of the 
society, media also construct their own “meanings” (norms and values) through 
signifying practice. Therefore, it is hard to say media representation of a certain 
event is a transparent copy of the reality; it is rather a modified copy. This modified 




through which they see the world. Media, thus, has “the power to signify events in a 
particular way” (Hall, 1982) and it is our role as researchers to look for the patterns 
that are used and reused to frame the events in a particular way. 
There is a strong correlation between representation and culture. The more 
forms of representation that recur in a society; the most likely these representations 
would turn into cognitive concepts and cultural modes. Representation, according to 
Hall (1997), bifurcates into objects representation and language representation. The 
first type relates objects in the outside world to sets of mental representation in our 
heads and it is this type that people use when they think. Hall states that these are 
accumulations of systems related to each other through the various cognitive 
processing methods such as similarity and difference, temporal sequence, and cause 
and effect. Language presentation relates to language as used to delineate the world, 
i.e., discourse. The relation between representation and cultural models, between 
language and object representation is what Gee (1996) calls Discourse and 
discourse, respectively. The lower case discourse is the linguistic words, signs and 
sounds and Discourse is what we have in our minds regarding these signs.  
This definition of representation is very significant to studying how Islamists 
are represented in al-Ahram. The linguistic representations of this group of people 
build, and at the same time, are explained by mental models that the language users 
have. Furthermore, the recurrence of a certain representation transforms over time to 






In this section, the term Islamism is defined in terms of its origins and 
development. This section discusses the social practices related to Islamism and 
therefore deals with the socio-political background of Egypt under three presidents 
since 1952: Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. In each subsection, and after the 
socioeconomic background is given, a discussion of Islamism under each president is 
presented. Islamism in the current millennium is presented is a separate section.  
3.5.1. Origins of Islamism 
Islamism refers to the movements and ideologies that adopt and believe in 
Islam as the basis for “restructuring contemporary states and societies according to 
an idealized image of Islam’s founding period 1400 years ago” (Karawan, 1997: 7). 
Islamic movements’ basic formations can be traced back to the third decade of the 
twentieth century. This period marked the official collapse of Islamic caliphate in 
1924. Attempts have never stopped since then to reformulate groups and 
organizations to regain “the glory of the past” (ibid.). The situation in the Islamic 
world in the 1920s was that the Muslim ummah (nation) was without a leader after 
the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 and most of the Arab/Muslim 
countries were placed under Western colonialism that drained the cultural and 
natural resources of the colonized. Colonialism lasted until around the 1950s and 
1960s when most of struggles and revolutions ended in the freedom of the colonized 
countries. In 1952, in Egypt, for example, a military cadre succeeded in deposing 




Most postcolonialism Arab regimes, in a search for identity, were keen to 
emphasize the Islamic identity of the state. In Egypt, for example, the second article 
in the Constitution states that “the official religion of the State is Islam” and in Saudi 
Arabia, the flag has “no god but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger” inscribed 
on it. Other states prohibited the inclusion of Islamic practices in the state’s affairs. 
In 1961, the Tunisian President Bourguiba argued that Ramadan (the month of 
fasting in Islamic tradition and one of the constituting five pillars of Islam) should 
not be observed under the pretext that it reduces productivity. Neither of these two 
types of postcolonialism states won the interest of Islamic activists or the public. 
Both were perceived with apprehension of being allies of the West, and were 
accused of “deviating from the true Islam and of serving the interests of [the] 
enemies” (Karawan, 1997: 14). 
During this bleak and difficult phase, many reformation movements led by 
intellectual figures called for the need of the Muslim nation to revive its way of life 
in order to restore the glory of the past. Among those reformists were Gamal al-
Afghani, Muhammad Rashid Reda and Muhammad Abdu. 
Influenced by his father, who was an Azharite scholar, Hasan al-Banna was 
an avid reader of Islamic sciences with a strong connection to modern life styles and 
politics. al-Banna, who graduated from a secular university – Cairo University – had 
a substantial and influential connection with the reformationist ideas of el-Afghani, 
Abdu and Rida. He was particularly influenced by Reda as he contacted him during 
his stay in Cairo. He voraciously read Reda’s al-Manar magazine and absorbed all 




state, ruled by Islamic law, the dangers of Westernization, and the necessity of Egypt 
and all other Islamic countries independence. Esposito (1998) refers to two main 
factors that affected el-Banna’s thought and laid down the connection between 
religion and politics: First, there was the 1919 revolt against the British; and second, 
his membership in his adulthood in many Islamic and civil societies. 
In 1928, Hasan al-Banna, a school teacher, founded al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn 
(Muslim Brotherhood Society) with six Egyptian labourers in the Suez Canal city of 
Isma’iliya in North Egypt. The group was first established under the necessity of 
establishing organized work to achieve the goal of Islamic revival. The group began 
to grow as its members started to roam the neighbouring cities and countryside, café 
shops, social clubs, public and personal places, spreading their revival ideas. In its 
first three years, al-Banna, known for his charismatic character, focused on building 
the inner self and personality of his followers and membership-building activities. 
The original goal of the MB was to “reform […] hearts and minds, to guide Muslims 
back to the true religion, and away from the corrupt aspirations conduct created by 
the European dominance.” (Zubaida, 1989: 48). 
With both focused vision and well-organized teamwork, the MB grew so 
rapidly that its leader had to fully devote himself to the organization and move to the 
capital, Cairo, in 1933 to establish and direct the main headquarters of the society. 
The early years of the MB – between 1930 through 1938 – witnessed a rapid increase 
in the number of members, which, although there is no precise documentation, is 
estimated by Mitchell as 150,000 representing three hundred branches over Egypt. In 




Society’s members conference. Both the comprehensive agenda of the MB and its 
distinctiveness from other active political or religious groups helped to boost its 
popularity. Whereas in 1932 The MB had 15 branches, by 1938 the number had 
reached 300 (Mitchell, 1969). 
 The MB Society was defined as “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi 
truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an 
economic company, and a social idea” (Mitchell, 1989: 9, 14). The MB was, thus, 
attractive, as it did not focus on one aspect, like the Sufis who focus only on the 
mystical aspect and neglect the political, and the secular political parties that focus 
on politics and disregard religion. The agenda was all-inclusive and appealing to 
various social classes. 
The MB reform agenda was and still is comprehensive, as it includes 
initiating reform on all societal levels beginning with the individual, to the family, 
the neighbourhood, and up to the whole nation and then the world. Because of the 
comprehensiveness of its agenda, the MB devoted its power in its early years to 
recruiting members and building a social service organization. Its popularity was 
enhanced by its support of national and pan-Arab causes: the British evacuation, 
Palestine, and the eradication of poverty and illiteracy. The MB began to hold large 
public rallies and demonstrations, calling for social reform and an immediate 
withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. British authorities stopped the group’s 
activities and el-Banna was imprisoned in late 1941. In 1942, the group performed its 
first formal political activity when it competed with secular parties in the 




resumed during and after the World War II. The group members and branches during 
the second half of 1940 were increasing significantly. The Society produced several 
publications and increased the frequency of its public rallies. It created what came to 
be known as the secret apparatus, a covert paramilitary arm of the organization 
whose principal aims were to protect the leaders of the organization and to further 
the Society’s goals through political violence. 
In 1948, the MB military apparatus members joined the Palestine side in their 
war against the Israelis and blamed the Egyptian government for its passivity in 
dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Commenting on their military 
achievements in that war, Mitchell says: 
[The] Brothers’ most notable achievement was the assistance they rendered 
to the besieged Egyptians caught in the ‘Faluja pocket’, created by the Israeli 
advance after the second truce had broken down in October 1948. In the field 
the Brothers helped to run supplies through the encircled forces; in Cairo the 
Society joined with others to press the Egyptian government for more 
volunteers to relieve the trapped garrison. Nuqrashi refused and it was only in 
the following February, after the armistice agreements, that the pocket was 
relieved. The Faluja excitement reached its highest pitch in November 1948. 
Early in the next month the Society of Muslim Brothers no longer legally 
existed. (1969: 58) 
 The MB’s performance in the 1948 war was so puissant that it bred anxiety 
in the minds of the Egyptian monarchy, who felt, together with the colonizing 
British, the potential threat embedded in leaving the MB free to practice its political 
role in the Egyptian society, disseminate its ideas, and recruit more mass support. 
Consequently, King Farouk’s government dissolved the MB and imprisoned a 
number of its prominent leaders on accusations from wishing to use a growing secret 




was the official reason given to justify the arrest (ibid.). The MB founder was not 
among the imprisoned because the regime had another plan for him. In the same year 
of 1948, the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi was assassinated 
and an attempt to kill the Minister of the Interior, Ibrahim abdel-Hadi, who took over 
as the new PM, took place. Although al-Banna denied the accusations that members 
from his organization were behind all this, the official decision blamed the Society 
for the chaos, and the charismatic leader and founder of the MB was assassinated in 
February of 1949. 
It is noteworthy here to mention that the regimes let the MB grow as long as 
it did not constitute a tangible threat to the monarchy. At some points, the MB was 
used to consolidate the government position in contesting competing Communist 
trends. According to Mitchell (1969: 59), when the weak government during the 40s 
failed to recruit any popular support, it used the MB popularity to contest the Wafd 
party. We will find out that this has been a recurrent strategy used by almost every 
authoritarian system that has permitted Islamists to unobstructedly practice their 
political rights. Kassem (2004: 137) also captures the same pattern and notes that 
both the “cooperative” and “coercive” tactics were more or less maintained by the 
three regimes that ruled Egypt after 1952. 
3.5.2. Post-independent Egypt: Socio-Political Background 
One main feature of any democratic system is the balanced separation 
between executive, legislative and judiciary powers. In Egypt, the power balance 




(Kassem, 2004). This is evidenced by the fact that the Egyptian regime’s policies and 
strategies have meant to empower the President with sultanic prerogatives that gather 
both legislative and executive powers in his hand. Since independence, the Egyptian 
regimes have been “one of the most resilient personal authoritarian systems in the 
world” (Kassem, 2004:11) and one common feature among them is their 
invulnerability to both outside and inside pressures to achieve any minimum tangible 
democratic progress and their relentless exclusionary wars against their political 
opposition. 
For five decades, “personal authoritarian rule in Egypt survives and has been 
maintained” (Kassem, 2004). Kassem’s justification of this view is supported by the 
fact that “the implementation of a multiparty arena has not affected the outcome of 
the government. The formal branches for government remain subservient to the 
overwhelming domination of the executive and development of autonomous 
groupings and constituencies remain hindered and weak” (ibid.: 1). The multiparty 
system devised by Sadat has not been able to move Egypt into the real democratic 
zone as the political parties are, as can be induced from both Sadat’s and Mubarak’s 
practices, “as much as tools for maintaining social order and managing elite conflict 
than as mechanisms for mass mobilization” (Brownlee,  2004: 81). 
The concept “neosultanistic regimes” from Chehabi and Linz (1998) fits well 
in our attempt to delineate an account of the political system in modern Egypt. 
Chehabi and Linz (1998: 7) define the contemporary sultanistic regimes as:  
…  based on rulership and people’s loyalty to the ruler is … motivated not by 
[the ruler’s] embodying or articulating an ideology, nor a unique personal 




rewards to his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint at 
his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rule nor any commitment 
to an ideology or a value system … The binding norms of … administration 
are constantly subverted arbitrary personal decisions by the ruler. As a result 
corruption reigns supreme at all levels of society. 
This image applies perfectly to Egypt, at least in the last fifty years. The state 
is run according to the personal interests of the President and his cronies who, being 
beneficiaries, blindly support whatever policies he dictates. 
The ensuing sections will elaborate on the political and social system in 
Egypt under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, and on how the phenomenon of Islamism 
was dealt with during the reign of each of them. 
3.5.3. Nasser: Socio-Political Background 
The coup d’état on 23 July 1952 changed the monarchy system into the Arab 
Republic of Egypt. At first, Mohammad Nagib presided over the Command Council 
of the Revolution, the leading authority following the coup, and was the first 
Egyptian President. Although Nasser was the most ambitious among the officers, he 
let Nagib be President to utilize Nagib’s popularity and win the masses’ support to 
the revolutionary young officers. But Nagib’s growing popularity in the Nile valley 
seemed to instigate Nasser’s and the other officers’ unrest. By early 1954, the 
competition over political supremacy had escalated into an “all or nothing” 
confrontation between Nasser and Nagib (Gordon, 1992: 124, Vatikiotis: 384). The 
contest ended in Nasser’s victory and Nagib was forced to leave the president’s chair 




When Nasser became president, he conducted essential political, economic 
and agricultural reforms such as evacuation of the British forces from Egypt, 
distribution of lands to subordinate peasants, nationalization of the Suez Canal and 
the establishment of basic industries. These achievements strengthened his relation 
with the masses. Adding Nasser’s charismatic character to these achievements, the 
aggressive popular support he enjoyed at both the local and the pan-Arab levels is 
understandable. 
As is the case with every ruler who wants to establish power through 
legalizing their dictatorship, Nasser’s 1956 constitution replaced a parliamentary 
system of government with presidential republican system. Under the new 
constitution, the President (Vatikiotis, 1991, Kassem, 2004; Baaklini et al., 1999) 
1. Is to be elected by a general popular plebiscite; 
2. Is vested with the executive power; 
3. Presides over the council of ministers; 
4. Appoints and dismisses ministers; 
5. Lays down the general policy of the state; 
6. Is the supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the defense 
council; 
7. Appoints the commander–in-chief of the armed forces.  
In short, the state is embodied with the President’s persona. The new single 
party, National Union, was born as a result of the 1965 constitution’s putting all 
powers in the hands of the President (Kassem, 2004:18). The constitution granted 




sectors empowered the ruling regime as they “were enmeshed in the government 
rural patronage network and hence beholden to it” (Baaklini et al., quoted in Kassem, 
2004: 18ff). Furthermore, to give the regime a strong hold on the internal affairs, 
State Security Courts were created to “handle cases of treason and internal 
subversion, as well as ‘political crimes’ of lesser magnitude which are defined as 
coming under their jurisdiction” (Hill, quoted in Kassem, 2004: 19). The political life 
in Nasser’s time was that of a single party where only the National Union (1956–
1962) and the Arab Socialist Union (1962–1976) led and formed the country’s 
policies. During that period, the practice of some professions (e.g., journalists) 
depended upon party membership (Waterbury, 1983: 314). 
3.5.4. Nasser and Islamism 
Nasser’s period was, in fact, the most incommodious in the history of the MB 
as Nasser “crushed the Muslim Brotherhood movement in a manner unprecedented 
to date” (Kassem, 2004: 137). It has already been noted that in the period before 
1952 revolution, the MB grew rapidly, establishing an educational, economic, 
military and political infrastructure. After the assassination of al-Banna, Hasan al-
HuDaybi, an Egyptian High Court judge and well-respected member of the Egyptian 
elite, was elected to succeed al-Banna in 1951. When the military cadre overthrew 
the king, the relationship between the Free Officers and the MB was strong from 
both sides. The imprisoned MB members were thus released and the organization 
resumed its normal activities in the Egyptian society. One interpretation of this 




organized and most influential group to gain the support of its more than one million 
members. Compared to other parties in the political opposition field, the MB enjoyed 
a longer grace period under Nasser’s regime. This may be attributed to two facts: 
first, the relationship that tied the military cadre members with the MB particularly, 
as Nasser used to attend the MB religious and intellectual meetings; and second, the 
group’s influential existence in the Egyptian society, massive ability to recruit 
members, tight organization, infrastructure network and the para-organization 
military apparatus. However, the latter was the very reason that ignited Nasser’s 
wrath toward the MB. It caused, as it did before with King Farouk, the regime’s 
apprehensions. Therefore, the grace period was not expected to last for long. In 1954, 
Nasser was shot at, but not injured, while giving a public speech in Alexandria. The 
MB was accused of plotting against Nasser and since then the relationship between 
the regime and the organization went into a dark tunnel. The MB Society was 
redissolved, thousands were imprisoned, military trials ended in the execution of six 
leaders while tens of thousands were jailed and tortured for almost a decade; and 
moreover, the group was labeled “an extremist organization” (Gordon, 1992: 184). 
In 1966, the regime held military tribunals and some of the MB prominent 
think tanks, like Sayyid Qutb and Abdel-Qader Ouda, were sentenced to death. 
Despite the hard times it faced during the Nasserite regime, al-HuDaybi, the Guide 
General, managed to keep the uniformity and unity of the organization and bravely 
confronted the calls that originated among MB members inside the Nasser’s prisons 
to takfir al-mujtam’ “to call the society infidel” by publishing his seminal work 




that the MB mission is to call, preach, and attract people to the true religion and true 
path of God and it is not their business to judge them whether they are Muslims or 
Infidels or categorize them or hold trials to classify people; it is God’s business to do 
so and this was the MB belief regardless of severe torture and jails (al-HuDaybi). 
Although the thesis of book worked effectively among the broad range of the 
organization members, it did not hinder the creation of the takfir and Hijara group, a 
radicalist movement that advocates using force and power to overthrow existing 
regimes and to effect changes in society. 
3.5.5. Sadat: Socio-Political Background 
Sadat succeeded Nasser after the latter’s sudden death in 1970. He was keen 
to get rid of all the old guards (Nasserites) and to tailor laws and the constitution to 
strengthen his grip on the internal affairs. According to Kassem (2004), the most 
salient feature of Sadat’s period was the “personal authoritarian.” The expulsion of 
the Soviets in 1972, the war with Israel in 1973, the introduction of a multiparty 
system in 1976 and the historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 were all personal policy 
initiatives and decisions of the president (23). Although Sadat redirected the state’s 
economy towards the open-door policy and he leaned toward the West (United 
States) instead of the Soviets, he, like Nasser, developed his own network to keep 
control of the country’s affairs.  
In 1971, the constitution was tailored to fit into how Sadat wanted to rule the 
country. The constitution was packed with presidential prerogatives that would serve 




three branches of government, supports many democratic freedoms, and guarantees 
people’s right to vote and contest their leaders, el-Ghobashy (2005: 31), summarizes 
the nature of the 1971 document as a “composite creature” that was: 
… overwhelmingly weighted towards the chief executive, granting him the 
power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet ministers, start 
impeachment proceeding against them, issue decrees with the force of law, 
hold referenda by which parliament can be bypassed, declare states of 
emergency, convene emergency sessions of parliament and appoint ten 
members of that body. The constitution grants the president staggering 
powers over the two other branches, giving him the right to dissolve 
parliament after putting the issue to a referendum and empowering him to 
chair the Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees affairs of the nation’s 
judges. 
El-Ghobashy, moreover, explains that the good features that the constitution 
stipulates can be reduced or even abolished by the application of self-made laws. So 
the constitution makers did not forget to put the phrase “these rights are to be 
determined by law,” a phrase which left the door open to envisage new laws to 
curtail the people’s rights. 
The following is a quote from the 1971 constitution to show how 
authoritarian Sadat was. The article number is referenced between parentheses: 
1. The President of the Republic shall have the right to promulgate laws or object 
to them. (112) 
2. The President of the Republic shall not dissolve the People’s Assembly unless it 
is necessary and after a referendum of the People. (136) (It is noticed that the 
word necessary is so vague that it renders itself to many interpretations.) 
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister, his deputies, the 




4. In case it becomes necessary during the absence of the People’s Assembly, to 
take measures which cannot suffer delay, the President of the Republic shall 
issue decisions in this respect which have the force of law. (147) 
5. The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner 
prescribed by the law. (148) 
6. The President of the Republic may call a referendum of the People on important 
matters related to the supreme interests of the country. (152)  
It may be asked, what else is left to both the legislative and judicial powers? 
The president’s control over the legislative power is rendered very significant by 
Kassem (2004) as it eliminates the possibility of having rivals to the presidency, and 
placing all powers in Sadat’s hands, or the prospective president under his control. In 
reality, Sadat, to ensure his supreme power, harassed all his political opponents, even 
those who served in his cabinet. Springborg (1989) exemplifies this policy by 
referring to the fact that Sadat either jailed, home-arrested or replaced his army 
generals once they showed serious opposition to his polices. 
Sadat tried to promote the slogan that Egypt is the “state of law and 
institutions.” However, this “state of law and institutions” is rendered meaningless, 
as it was crippled and hindered by the intertwined relationship between the judiciary 
system and the president’s prerogatives which entitles him to appoint judges, public 
prosecutor, attorney generals, the judges of the Cassation court, and judges of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (Law 46/1972, articles 173). 
Although it is not known for sure why Sadat decided to move to the 




political practices, that this was not intended to promote a healthy political life based 
on real participation and democracy. In 1980, he changed article # 77 of the 
Constitution to define the president’s term of six years without any maximum terms, 
but he did not live to enjoy a typical life-long presidency. 
3.5.6.  Sadat and Islamism 
The relationship between the government and the MB at the end of Nasser’s 
era was at its worst. The turbulent times the MB suffered during Nasser’s period was 
partially eased during the reign of Sadat who, to restrain the growing leftist trend, 
allowed the MB to work publicly. Upon ascension to power in Egypt in 1971, Sadat 
released the imprisoned members of the MB and opened the door for them to 
publicly resume their Society activities. This tolerance was informally recognized, as 
Sadat did not approve the existence of the MB as an officially legal group.  
At that time, Sadat believed that he needed the MB to curb and obliterate the 
main threat to his position in its early years, namely, the remnants of the Nasser era, 
always referred to as “power centres.” However, he remained quite suspicious of the 
MB and he did not allow them to restore their legal status (religious or political) but 
left them to work in limbo: they were allowed to work and practice their religious 
and political activities without being recognized as a political party or as an official 
religious organization. This may indicate that Sadat did not believe in the legality of 
the MB but he used it temporarily to confront the Nasser and communists remnants.  
Moreover, to solidify his position against the Nasserites, Sadat amended the 




religion.” Given Nasser’s secularism, this change was very significant. The 
Constitution further stipulated that the shari’a (Islamic Law) is a main source of 
legislation. The radicals and the Muslim Brotherhood were not satisfied and in 1980 
Sadat rechanged the same clause to emphasize that shari’a is “the main [my italics] 
source of legislation.” It is worth mentioning that the annihilation policy of Nasser 
pushed active Islamists underground and to exile. The moderate mainstream line 
within the Society of MB could not abort the growing militant attitude born as a 
logical consequence of Nasser’s policy, the 1967 defeat, and the failure of the state’s 
developmental projects. So, and as Binder puts it (1988: 341): 
Many new local and often small and secret organization were founded after 
1965, some of which challenged the vestige of the Ikhwan [MB], and others 
of which did their own religious thing. Some were highly politicized and 
militant while others sought the comfort of fraternal association and the 
consultation of mutual cooperation. 
Given this, one more reason can be added to explain Sadat’s tolerance toward the 
MB activities: to restrain the diffusion of the radicalist Islamists.  
The MB enjoyed the freer atmosphere up to 1979 when Sadat signed the 
peace treaty with Israel. This step was considered a betrayal by almost all the 
political activists, especially the MB. Sadat, accordingly, began to display the 
“canines of democracy,” as he himself coercively put it in the September 1981 
speech. He put in prison representatives of almost all the colors of political life in 
Egypt, ranging from leftists, Islamists, nationalists, Christian leaders and even 




In October 1981, military radicals that emerged from inside the army 
assassinated Sadat during the annual October military parade, and his deputy, Hosni 
Mubarak, took office via a referendum in 1981. 
3.5.7. Mubarak: Socio-political Background 
Although Mubarak does not enjoy the charismatic character of Nasser nor the 
dominating network over elites of Sadat, the authoritarian presidency remained the 
centrepiece of his reign. Mubarak ruled Egypt since his ascension to power in 1981 
after the assassination of Sadat. He came to authority empowered by the 1971 
Constitution that put almost all power in his hand. Although Mubarak did not feel 
threatened by the remnant power centers of Nasser’s period, he was threatened by 
powerful and charismatic figures. His tendency to abolish any threat was similar to 
that of his predecessor, removing men from critical power positions and away from 
mass support. Two cases are worth mentioning here: the Minister of Defense, Abu-
ghazala and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amr Musa. Both were removed from 
their positions (1989 and 2001, respectively) when they were at the apex of their 
power and popularity, and had the armed forces’ support. 
When Mubarak came to power in 1981, he declared that he would not 
nominate himself for more than two terms. In 2005, he ran for the fifth term in the 
first multi-candidate presidential elections in Egypt. The candidates who ran against 
Mubarak were either inactive politicians or unheard-of names and they only gave the 
election a democratic gloss from the international vantage point. The only serious 




and a senior parliamentarian. In 2004, he managed, after long and fierce trials, to 
legalize a new political party, al-Ghad ‘Tomorrow’, which was expected to disturb 
the politically stagnant life in Egypt. The ruling elites felt threatened by Nour and 
thought his new party might mobilize the masses against Mubarak, so when Nour 
came second to Mubarak’s in the number of votes, he was convicted and jailed based 
on allegedly forged accusations.  
The government has been trying to suborn the judiciary and render it 
subservient. Nevertheless, the judges, via their active professional club, have been 
working to preserve their independence in the face of government constraints. The 
judges have been a thorn in the government’s side for so many years, insisting on the 
respecting of the judges’ rights, keeping a vigil over elections and demanding the 
right of the civilians to be tried before the natural judge and not before the Supreme 
State Security courts or the military courts. 
In 1992, the parliament, dominated by ruling regime members, passed 
amendments to the penal code (Law No. 97).  A number of provisions dealing with 
terrorism were added and made it harsher and more severe; prison terms, for 
example, were replaced with forced labor, temporary sentences with life sentences 
and life sentences with the death penalty. The term terrorist acts has been vaguely 
defined to include almost any violent behaviour against the state: 
… terrorism means any use of force or violence or any threat or intimidation 
to which the perpetrator resorts in order to disturb the peace or jeopardize the 
safety and security of society and which is of such nature as to harm or create 
fear in persons or imperil the lives, freedoms or security; harm the 
environment; damage or take possession of communications; prevent or 




application of the Constitution or of laws or regulations. (Egyptian Criminal 
Law No. 97, 1992) 
It is under this penal code that Sa’d-eddin Ibrahim, a renowned Egyptian 
human rights activist and professor, was tried and convicted. Ibrahim established 
Ibn-Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, a research and advocacy institute in 
Cairo that is concerned with human rights, issues of democratization and political 
and social development and civil rights awareness. Ibrahim has monitored and 
recorded the government’s performance regarding violations of human rights 
elections infringement, and that was enough reason to be charged under the penal 
code. 
Mubarak has ruled Egypt under Emergency Law 162/1958 since 1981. This 
deeply unpopular law has to be renewed every three years and with its dominating 
majority in the parliament, the government faces no problem in this regard. In its 
internecine battle against its political opposition, the regime appears legally vested 
by Emergency law. The law authorizes the regime to: 
1. Arrest suspects at will and detain them without trial for prolonged periods; 
2. Refer civilians to military or exceptional state security courts, whose procedures 
fall far short of international standards for fair trial; 
3. Prohibit strikes, demonstrations and public meetings;  
4. Censor or close down newspapers in the name of national security. 
Under this infamous law, civilians have been tried before either the Supreme 
State Security court or a military court. Table 3.1 shows the number of cases handled 




Table  3.1 Number of trials before military courts (based on Kienle, 1998: 222) 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
No. of cases 8 12 5 43 70 
 
 
It should be noted here that judges in the military courts are judicially 
inexperienced and fall under the influence of the regime and their superiors 
regarding their job and tenure. Therefore, it is not surprising that most trials end in 
conviction. Based on a 2003 report by the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights 
the number of detainees under the emergency law exceeds 20,000. Kassem sees that 
application of Emergency Law has been politically advantageous to Mubarak as it 
dwindled the judiciary interventions (Kassem, 2004): the regime can detain, convict 
and prosecute political activists without any judicial pursuits. 
The calls, both from inside and outside, for democratizing the Middle East 
surprised and even scared the autocratic regimes. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia said, 
“The democratic system prevailing in the world does not suit us in the region, for our 
people’s composition and traits are different from the traits of that world. We cannot 
import the way in which other peoples deal [with their own affairs] in order to apply 
it to our people” (Herbert, 2003: 142). Hafez al-Assad, (Shavit) a Syrian President 
iterating the same tone, declared at his inauguration ceremony that: 
Each nation has its own heritage and history, and consequently, its own 
culture, soul, concepts, and manners. If this were not so, our world would 
have been one nation, and this is not the case … even in Arab countries, you 
will find someone who talks about democracy and has in mind only one 





The response of Mubarak to the call for democratization was no different 
from that of Fahd and al-Asad. He believes in a democracy that is self-made: 
authoritarian democracy. In a speech at the conference “Arab Reform: Vision and 
Implementation” (2004), he reports the Arabs consensus that having a better life is 
based on “… push[ing] forward efforts for modernization and development based on 
the self-made vision of our Arab societies as well as on the harmony and cohesion 
between Arab governments and their peoples” 
After the tragic events of 9/11, the US launched a war on terrorism. George 
W. Bush, the US President stated (Bush, 2001): 
Today, millions of Americans mourned and prayed, and tomorrow we go 
back to work. Today, people from all walks of life gave thanks for the heroes; 
they mourn the dead; they ask for God’s good graces on the families who 
mourn, and tomorrow the good people of America go back to their shops, 
their fields, American factories, and go back to work. […] This is a new kind 
of – a new kind of evil. And we understand. And the American people are 
beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a 
while. 
He also declared “We’re a nation that can’t be cowed by evil-doers. We will rid the 
world of the evil-doers. We will call together freedom-loving people to fight 
terrorism.” 
Although there has been no precise definition of terrorism, the term has been 
loosely and widely used to label any act to justify launching a war against the bad 
other, be it a verbal, psychological, economic or military war. In November 2001, 
President Bush said that there was no room for neutrality in the war against terrorism 
and every country has to participate in the war on terrorism. Bush said he would not 




nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity,” he said. “You’re either 
with us or against us in the fight against terror” [emphasis mine]. 
Moreover, in September 2003, President Bush, in a speech to the UN 
inaugurating session, said, “Leaders in the region [Middle East] will face the clearest 
evidence that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term 
national success and dignity. And a transformed Middle East would benefit the entire 
world, by undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands” (Bush, 
2003). 
The United States, pushing for democratic changes in the Middle East, put 
the despotic Arab leaders in a quandary. The puzzle for the Arab leaders was how to 
reconcile the United States call to implement democracy and to keep their 
authoritarian power; in other words how to apply a self-made democracy. In Egypt, 
for example, Mubarak came up with a constitutional amendment that was put into 
effect in February 2005, to allow a multicandidate presidential election. September 
of the same year witnessed for the first time nine candidates running for the office. 
However, the constitutional amendments made it difficult if not impossible for 
anyone other than Mubarak to win the election. Now Mubarak’s regime has the 
democratic gloss and he still enjoys ruling the country in his own authoritarian 
“neosultanic” style. 
Other provisions in the amendment and the new election law include the 
following: 
A. Candidates from legal opposition parties must come from their party’s 




would need to have been licensed for at least five years and to hold at least 5 
per cent of the seats in the lower and upper houses of parliament to get on the 
ballot. This last requirement would make it difficult for many small opposition 
parties to field candidates. It also heightens the importance of the upcoming 
parliamentary elections in November 2005, and in 2010, since President 
Mubarak, at age 77, may choose not to seek another term.  
B. Oversight of the presidential election process is given to a Presidential 
Electoral Commission (PEC) composed of current and former judges and other 
“public figures.” Five of the Commission’s ten members are chosen by 
Parliament.  
C. The PEC has the sole authority to approve candidate nominations, supervise 
election procedures, and tally the final results. Most importantly, since some of 
its members are judges, the PEC has final “judicial competence” to rule on any 
contestation or challenge submitted in relation to the presidential elections, and 
its decision will be final and subject to no appeal. Critics charge that this final 
provision places the PEC above the rule of the court.  
3.5.8. Mubarak and Islamism 
Mubarak began his reign with a period of partial or temporary appeasement 
towards the MB (Campagna, 1996: 281): He released the third Guide General of the 
MB, Omar al-Telmisani, and all the MB members imprisoned by Sadat. The group 
revived again and began to restore some of its power in the Egyptian community. 




secure their side, wanted to have the MB on his side to counterbalance radicalism. 
This grace period actually lasted until 1984 when the government was astounded by 
the election performance of the MB in coalition with the Wafd party. In the 1984 
elections the Wafd-Brotherhood alliance won 58 seats, most of which were won by 
the Brotherhood. Since then the organization has been perceived as a threat. This 
threat was realized when the group publicly announced its intentions to escalate its 
political opposition to the government policy. In an interview the Guide General, al-
Telmisani, said: 
We were completely serious when we joined the elections. Our aim was to 
reach Parliament through a legal channel, the Wafd Party, because People’s 
Assembly members enjoy parliamentary immunity. The brothers who will reach the 
Assembly will speak on behalf of the Brotherhood, will urge enforcement of the 
Islamic sharia laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of 
detention or torture … Now some of them [MB] are People’s Assembly members, 
watching the government and entitled to make it account for its actions. (Policy, June 
1984: 9–10; cited in Campagna 1996: 283) 
The 1984 and 1987 elections were important, as they were the most open and 
competitive elections since 1952. They included more parties: the New Wafd Party 
and the National Progressive Unionist Party, excluded by Sadat, and the MB, which 
was allowed to run individual candidates under the auspices of an allied secular 
party. The government, as usual, had the upper hand via the various means: media 
monopoly, restriction of opposition parties to hold conferences and reach the voters, 




intimidation of the police to poll watchers and voters, through which it can secure the 
electoral outcome for to the government’s  interest. In 1987, the MB – Socialist 
Labor alliance won 78 seats out of which 36 went to the Brotherhood.  
During the period from 1984 to 1989, the regime practised a consistent policy 
of non-confrontation with the MB except, as Campagna notes, for occasional arrests 
of some members by security forces. The escalation started in 1989 when the then-
Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public statement in which he placed all 
Islamists, violence and non-violence advocates, in one basket and accused the MB of 
being a façade for the militant Islamists: “[T]he extremists are in fact a secret 
organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations. There is no conflict 
between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in fact a single 
association” (quoted in Campagna, 1996: 285). 
Throughout the year, arrests of MB members continued and escalated. In 
1990, the MB joined other opposition parties in boycotting the parliamentary 
elections because there was no minimum guarantee for fair elections. This event 
marked the MB as an influential threat to the regime. In the MB spokesman’s words,  
We wanted a free and fair election. We did not accept the circumstances of 
this election. Our demands were refused. We asked for judicial supervision; 
this was refused. We asked that voters prove their identity; this was refused. 
The Minister of the Interior is controlling everything. Everyone is under his 
orders. There are no guarantees. (Campagna, 1996:9) 
Moreover, the mid-1980s and the 1990s witnessed a substantial MB 
involvement and successes in political and social life; this was embodied in the MB 
members dominating presence in professional syndicates: the doctors’, engineers’, 




until the mid-1990s. It is again out of a well-organized and focused vision that the 
MB was able to dominate almost the boards of all the professional syndicates and 
run it efficiently. Kassem, explaining the significance of the MB winning of 14 out 
of 24 seats of the 1992 Lawyers Syndicate elections, clarifies that this particular 
Society has traditionally been a highly vocal defender of liberalism and secular 
thought. Consequently, the success of the Brotherhood in winning more seats in this 
traditional liberal entity than did the NDP and the secular opposition parties 
combined appeared overtly challenging to the regime. Moreover, the government 
enacted legislation to minimize, if not obliterate, the control of the MB over civil and 
professional organizations and to bring most of the syndicates under the management 
of government- appointed judicial committees (2004: 113). On the symbolic level, 
the MB “was able to introduce the son of the Brotherhood’s founder, Saif-Eddin 
Hassan al-Banna, into a leadership position” (Stacer, quoted in Kassem, ibid.).  
This large-scale success along with civil work was conducive to recruiting 
more members, or at least sympathizers. However, it was also fuelled by the 
stagnation prevalent in the political life in Egypt.  
Alongside with these achievements, the MB started to raise its protesting tone 
against the government. Protesting the absence of complete judicial supervision and 
distancing itself from being a facade of false democracy, the MB joined the major 
opposition parties. The Wafd Party and the Labor Party affiliated with the Muslim 
Brothers (but not the leftist Tagammu’), and signed a pact in October 1990 to 
boycott the parliamentary poll. They also, jointly with other opposition parties, 




been running since 1981 and condemned the Egyptian government participation and 
marketing for the 1991 Madrid peace talks.  
The regime perceived these successes and growing criticism as “a formidable 
threat to its own declining legitimacy” (Campagna, 1996: 280) and, as expected, it 
could not stand silent as the MB crossed the preset demarcations. The regime replied 
by detaining members of the MB with other people under the charge of organizing 
antigovernment rallies and distributing leaflets opposing the Madrid talks. 
In 1995, Mubarak won the presidential elections with 94 percent of the votes, 
against no opposition candidate. The same year witnessed the parliamentary 
elections where the NDP (Mubarak’s party) won 90.4 percent of the seats with only 
14 out of 444 seats going to opposition parties. Reading merely the results of both 
elections would refute any claim of democratic or pluralistic life. Moreover, the 
reports of human rights and civil society watchers of the elections have shown that 
“series of fraud and irregularities had taken place in more than half of the 222 voting 
districts” (Ibrahim, 1996: 4), the “judges eventually nullified the results in 80 out of 
88 electoral districts” (Ibrahim and Sherbiny, 2000: 62) and also, the elections were 
“heavily marked by fraud, coercion, and bans on many potentially competitive 
parties” (Stepan and Robertson,  2003: 39). The 1995 legislative elections have seen 
the NDP’s share of the parliament’s seats steadily increase, from 68 percent in 1987 
to 86 percent in 1990 to an incredible 94 percent in 1995.  
On the coercive level, in November 1995 the regime’s Supreme Military 
Court sentenced 54 leading members of the MB to prison terms ranging from three 




Sixteen of those convicted had wanted to run for parliament and fourteen had served 
in the 1987 Parliament (Makram-Ebeid, 1996: 128). The charges were “affiliation to 
and reviving an outlawed movement and the attempt to establish control over the 
syndicates and arrange to out-throw the regime.” The verdict represents the first 
prosecution of members of the organization by a military court since 1965, when 
Nasser sought to demolish the group by imprisoning its leaders. The regime 
interfered fiercely in the elections process to assure the results, “the police ejected 
the opposition, shut the police stations and filled the ballot boxes to the brim” 
(Makram-Ebeid, 1996: 131). 
Since 2000, state security forces have continued arresting the MB members, 
raiding private residences, and detaining them for long periods without trial and on 
charges of belonging to an illegal organization or plotting to overthrow the 
government. The regime has been escalating conflict with the MB since 2005. The 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) Website has collected the names of 226 of members of 
the banned, nonviolent organization, Egypt’s largest opposition group who are 
currently held by Egyptian authorities. Among the detainees is Khairat al-Shatir, 
Deputy General Guide of the MB and sixteen other prominent members of the 
organization. 
The 1990s were the bloodiest in Egypt’s internal history, where clashes 
between militant Islamists and the state forces escalated, and the number of both 
casualties and detainees hit unprecedented numbers. The EHRW Website provides 
the number 15,000– 20,000 as the detainees and 1,164 as casualties. Indeed, 




violence,” “an upsurge in the number of Islamist prisoners,” “mass military trials … 
of civilians” and above all the advent of “political terrorism” (Kassem, 2004: 145). 
Despite the regime’s attempts to stem the MB tide, all ballot-manipulation 
and opposition voters’ harassment, the 2000 and 2005 elections resulted in 17 and 88 
seats, respectively, reserved for the MB in the parliament. Although this is too 
modest a number of seats to have any influential effect inside the parliament, it 
indicates the significantly threatening potential of the MB to the regime if given the 
free and democratic space to practice its activities in civil society without any 
harassment.  
3.5.9. Islamism in the Third Millennium 
One approach to studying how political opposition works, in general, is what 
can be called the reactionist approach. This is where the opposition course of action 
is interpreted only in the light of the prevailing political system. It is true that the 
regime decides on the nature of the opposition’s course of actions, and this is due to 
the imbalance in the power scale of both the ruling elites and the opposition. The 
regime with its dominating and, mostly, coercive strategies aims to control and/or 
demolish the opposing parties. Defining that type of relation, Anderson says that the 
nature of relation between the ruling systems and oppositions is reactive and the way 
the system perceives the opposition is influenced by the type and function of the 
prevailing political system. She also defines opposition as “having the unusual 
characteristic of being defined partly by what it opposes; it develops within and in 




deal not only about its own adherents, but also about the individual, polices, regimes, 
and states in authority” (Anderson, 1987: 18–19). 
Moreover, she explains that the opposition is usually perceived by 
authoritarian regimes as disloyal and rejectionist because of the lack of a reliable and 
transparent political atmosphere that contains all parties. Islamists fall within this 
category of opposition as they are never allowed to “play the election game” in a fair 
political atmosphere (ibid.).  
Islamists, both moderates and radicalists, constitute the afflictive opposition 
to the ruling regimes in the Arab world and the regime perceives them as such. 
Although the ruling regimes analyze Islamists as one composite (opposition), 
scholars who study the phenomenon agree that Islamism is not a monolithic 
phenomenon (Ayoob, 2007; Karawan, 1997; Anderson, 1987; Kassem, 2004). 
Ayoob agrees that Islamism consists of more than one color and they “are not cut 
from the same cloth. They were and continue to be very different sorts of 
organization in terms of their strategies, with their respective characters determined 
largely by the milieus in which they have had to operate over several decades” 
(2007: 75). All Islamists share the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Karawan, 
1997: 16). However, they differ on the means to achieve that. One trend sees that the 
use of force and attrition war against the state is the only way to remove these “un-
Islamic regimes;” these are called militant Islamists (ibid.) and those who adopt the 
peaceful techniques in change are called “political Islamists” (ibid.: 20f) or “centrist 
Islamists” (ibid.: 23). The MB is the mainstream in the latter trend. In its dealings 




on the solid bringing up of the members, meticulous network organization and the 
gradual/staged change policy (see Zubaida, 1989: 47–55).  
In nondemocratic states, regimes maintain political pluralism as long as it: a) 
does not threaten, sooner or later, their own existence; and b) remains within their 
self-drawn game rules. Therefore, authoritarian rulers will tolerate a multiparty 
system if the opposition agrees to act as puppeteers in the political arena and is 
satisfied with whatever as-a-reward-prerogatives from the ruler. The only function of 
the opposition in that case is to stamp the regime with a democratic gloss. However, 
if the opposition plans to genuinely perform its national and patriotic role in serving 
the country and the people, the clash is the inevitable end.  
My study of the history of Islamism in Egypt led to the hypothesis that any 
official discourse in government newspapers will be a discourse of exclusion, 
disaffection, marginalization and stereotyping.  
The reasons and motives backing the regime’s war of exclusion on Islamists 
are so interrelated and complicated that we cannot explain them in terms of just one 
reason or the other, domestic or international. It is a multifaceted phenomenon. The 
present work will just refer to two main reasons that are believed to be mainly 
driving that campaign. First, there are the domestic reasons of sustaining the internal 
social stability and securing its domination against any imminent or potential threat. 
The Egyptian regime, like any other authoritarian monarchy, is keen to maintain its 
internal social stability so as not to lose power and control over the people and/or 
country’s resources. To achieve hegemony, the regime depicts a negative picture of 




The second reason is to establish a strong relationship with the world 
superpower, i.e., the United States. The regime depicts Islamists as a potential threat 
to the West and Western interests. The regime, therefore, would gain the support of 
the West and the US in particular on the pretext of being the guardian of the Western 
interests and values in the Middle East. 
After the fall of the former USSR in 1989, the world became unipolar and the 
US became the world’s only policeman that strives to maintain the world stability so 
as not to lose power and control over the world’s countries and resources. To achieve 
control through hegemony and/or coercion, the United States presents a negative 
picture the other and a positive one of the self. This is, of course, one option among 
many others, such as the use of military power. After the fall of the USSR, the US 
and the West tried to depict a new foreign policy matching the new World Order, a 
policy based on disseminating the liberal democracy throughout the developing 
world. The support of democratizing the Middle East, thereof, became a central issue 
in the United States foreign policy.  
To prove that they were part of the war on terrorism which was declared by 
Bush after the 9/11 events, the regimes in the Middle East re/packaged Islamists, 
both radicals and moderates, as the imminent danger to the Western interests in the 
area. The war on terrorism has been an invaluable chance for the Egyptian regime to 
get rid of its main opponents under the claim of their being terrorists. Henceforth, the 
ferociousness of the war against Islamists, which took the form of exclusion, 
marginalization or demolition, can be explained. The MB, being the most prominent 




Analyzing the social and political state of the Arab countries leads to one 
conclusion: the United States did not call for democracy to prosper nor did the Arab 
leaders initiate a democracy that suits their own traits and culture, as they claimed. 
Instead, they maintained their own dictatorial grip on their countries and people.  
Before this section comes to an end, it is worthwhile raising a significant 
issue related to the legitimacy of Islamists. If Islamists have lost the regime’s and 
official legitimacy, they continued to, as Esposito describes: 
… root itself more deeply and pervasively in Egyptian society, growing 
among the lower and middle classes, educated and uneducated, professionals, 
students and laborers, young and old, women and men. Islamists gained 
cultural legitimacy, becoming a more visible and effective part of mainstream 
Muslim life and society. …the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists 
became dominant voices in professional organizations and syndicates of 
lawyers, doctors, engineers, and journalists (1999: 259). 
This quotation poses a relevant question: what are the genuine sources of 
legitimacy in a certain society? Is it the ruler, the constitution, or the people? As a 
case in point, are Islamists legitimate because they genuinely gained the “cultural 
legitimacy” or are they illegitimate and outlawed because they lack the regime’s 
blessing and official stamp?  
The history of the relationship between the successive regimes in Egypt and 
the MB has always been in ebb and flow and the regime has always been 
unscrupulous in its transactions with political Islamists. The ebb and flow 
repercussions depended mainly on the regime’s self-drawn off-limits; that is to say, 
the ruling regime has always set the criteria for a self-made democracy, a superficial 
democracy that is packaged for the outside and that befits its own authoritarian 




In conclusion, the analysis of the social practices of the Egyptian in the post-
independence régimes towards the Islamists proved that the policy has not been of 
containment and participation but of exclusion and exoticism. The textual analysis 




This chapter describes the data used for analysis in terms of its source, 
period, and selection. The second and third sections lay out the method of textual 
analysis and present the linguistic tools that are used in the analysis. 
4.1. Data 
4.1.1. Data Collection 
The data used for the research are taken from one of the Egyptian media 
outlets; namely, al-Ahram newspaper. Al-Ahram was chosen as a research field 
because of the importance of the media in contemporary society and the integral role 
it plays in framing the world around us. According to Hall, journalism and journalists 
draw interpretative frameworks from their society’s cultural repertoire, serving 
simultaneously as the producers, distributors and re/producers of public discourse 
(1997b). The mass media have been found to be a good site for ideology and a very 
powerful tool for its dissemination through discourse (Billig, 1995; Bishop and 
Jaworski, 2003; Chouliaraki, 1999; Madianou, 2005). The discourse of the media in 
general, and that of the press in particular, is considered the interface for the elites to 
practice their social domination and as the self-appointed voice of the people: Their 
voice is the whole society’s voice. The role of the press is more than that of a 




have access to all the resources in society. This type of access allows the elites to 
impose a policy of exclusion on minorities or any social group that does not belong 
to us. Henry and Tator’s study of racism (2002) reveals that most of what the Whites 
in the US and Europe know about minorities and immigrants is from the press.  
The corpus of the present study has been collected from front page news 
reports published in al-Ahram during the years 2000 and 2005. I have used al-Ahram 
Online Index to retrieve any front page item pertaining to the MB.3 
The results included any occurrence of the following variables in both 
headlines and texts:  ناﻮﺧﻻا‘the Brothers’,   ةرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا / ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ‘the banned’,  ناﻮﺧﻻا
 ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا / نﻮﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’ (in both nominative and accusative 
case). The inclusive search periods were 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000 and 1 
January 2005 to 31 December 2005. After retrieval of the research results, the items  
were manually checked individually to make sure the retrieved outcomes talked 
about the MB. It was discovered that the keyword search retrieved items that were 
irrelevant to the search variables. One of the results, for example, was an article that 
talked about the Wright Brothers ﺖﻳار ناﻮﺧﻷا and plane invention. The search also 
retrieved all the morphologically related inflectional forms like    ناﻮَﺧﻷا (al-
Akhawaan) ‘the two brothers’ and ناﻮﺧﻹا (al-Ikhwaan) ‘the brothers’.  
Al-Ahram Index allows limiting search options to include or exclude any 
news section/s from the scope of research. The following sections were chosen to 
                                                 
 
3 This is a simple online search engine and it allows the researchers to look for words or 





search for the MB occurrences: front page and headline. The choice of these sections 
renders a comprehensive repertoire rather than a sketchy or cursory picture when 
only one news section is selected for analysis. These sections represent news reports 
that mediate the event to the reader without, supposedly, interference on the part of 
the reporter. They would also reflect the ideological base of the newspaper towards a 
certain issue, here the MB. Finally, the number of readers who skim headlines and 
front page drastically outnumbers those who read full news stories, articles, columns, 
editorials, etc. By focusing the analysis on front page items, we would have a closer 
understanding of how the MB is represented to and construed by the al-Ahram 
readership. 
4.1.2. Why al-Ahram 
 Founded in 1875 by the Lebanese Takla family, al-Ahram is Egypt’s largest 
newspaper in circulation. According to the al-Ahram Website, it now has a 
circulation of over one million. The newspaper is published in Arabic, and is the best 
known and leading newspaper in the Arab world today. The newspaper also has 
subscribers in most of the world’s countries, and is often the first Arabic newspaper 
that libraries in non-Arab countries make available in their newspaper selections. Al-
Ahram has a wide coverage of world affairs, but as for Egyptian affairs, it is 
considered the medium that expresses views that are close to the government. The 
choice of al-Ahram is triggered by the fact that it: 
1. Is the end-market paper in Egypt and the Arab world. 




3. Is one of the broadsheets, not tabloid, papers. 
4. Has the highest circulation and is the ‘intellectuals’ newspaper. 
The periods for collecting the research data have been selected for the 
following reasons: 
1. In 2000, there were parliamentary elections in which the MB significantly 
participated. The MB won 17/444 seats which, although too little to be 
influential inside the parliament, is considered a historical achievement. This 
is the first time the group could secure that percentage in spite of the 
government’s aggressive political intolerance towards the group members 
and ballot manipulation. This relative success was enough to fuel the 
government’s apprehensions from the growing threat. This apprehension is 
expected to be reflected in the government’s media outlets in 2000. 
2. In 2002, Mubarak appointed his son, Gamal, as the Chairman of the ruling 
NDP’s powerful policy-making committee. This step was seen as grooming 
Gamal to succeed his father. Since then, Gamal quickly made known his 
agenda: economic and political reforms. In 2004, the cabinet shuffle reflected 
the influence of Gamal Mubarak, as the majority of the new cabinet members 
were among his and his father’s cronies. This gives the 2005 election a 
challenging taste to the MB, who will definitely fight to circumvent the 
inheritance project by trying to win an influential number of parliamentary 
seats.  
3. In 2005, Egypt witnessed passing the Egyptian President’s bill to amend the 




that the amendments were constrained a set of crippling conditions, it 
invigorated the stagnant political life in Egypt.  
4. In 2005, the Presidential election ended with Mubarak being the President for 
another 6 years, to complete 25 years in power. 
5. In 2005, the parliamentary election outcomes (87 seats for the MB out of 444) 
reflected the continuous growing mobility and organization of the MB as a 
challenging rival of the government. 
6. In 2005, the widely controversial issue of Mubarak’s intention to secure the 
presidency seat for his son to succeed him took a tangible form. 
4.1.3. Data Sampling 
Data collection consisted of retrieving news reports that mainly talk about the 
MB. Other retrieved items, like interviews or press conferences, in part refer to the 
MB. In the latter case and for the purpose of analysis, I have separated the part on the 
MB from the rest of the report while keeping the context in which the MB reference 
is made. This means if the MB is mentioned in the middle of an interview, the 
relevant questions and answers on the MB are sorted out while keeping the context 
of the selected part mentioned, i.e. what is before and after. This method proved to 
be useful later on in the analysis because sometimes the surrounding questions and 
answers in the interview are used as a preamble to the questions on Islamists and to 
make some relevant insinuations. The headlines have been separated, translated and 
analyzed individually. This is meant to have an idea of data orientation in terms of 




has proved to be useful in verifying the validity of the study hypothesis and to make 
clear the rising curve of the negative MB representation from 2002 to 2005. Table 
(4.1) presents the number of retrieved items pertaining to the MB in 2000 and 2005. 
To prepare the data for analysis, the texts have been divided into numbered 
sentences to make it easy to refer to in the analysis. If the analysis deals with a long 
text and uses only selected sentences that are not in order (e.g.,1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 14), these 
are inserted with original text number followed by the Arabic translation in a 
matching numbered line. At the end of the English translation, citing information of 
the source of the data analyzed is provided. Source information is given in the 
following order: first there is the text type (HL = headline; FP = front-page), 
followed by the year (00 = 2000; 05 = 2005) and then by the text #according to the 
chronological order of the data. HL00, # 3, for example, stands for the headline from 
2000 and it is # 3; FP05, # 19 means front page report number 3 in the 2005 data.  
AConcorde software was used to search for the frequencies and lexical items related 
to the MB. The software, though simple, was enough for the goals of the present 
research. It was useful in locating the lexical choices that are close to any reference 
to the MB. 
Table  4.1 Total number of news items on the MB in 2000 and 2005. 
Year Headline Front page 
2000 4 11 




4.1.4. Method of Analysis 
CDA is sometimes criticized on the grounds that the data it analyses is 
complicated and requires too much cognitive processing to be practiced by average 
readership or those who read for a gist. Goatly rightly defines the majority of 
newspaper consumers: “For many people, newspapers are probably the only regular 
leisure reading, and are the most widely circulated print medium” (2000: 286). Such 
readers exert the minimal effort to process information and connect propositions and, 
in most cases, reading for gist is a goal in itself. Therefore, there is a need to include 
a type of analysis from the vantage point of the average reader. Huckin has been 
developing a CDA framework that incorporates the average reader in the analysis 
equation (1995, 2002, forthcoming). His approach is a user-friendly CDA manual, as 
he calls it: a manual that can be used by everyone if the method is included within 
literacy education curricula.  
In his user-friendly manual, Huckin suggests a three-step approach to conduct 
such an analysis. It focuses not only on the explanation level (see Figure 1.1) but also 
on the interpretation level from the average reader’s perspective. His framework 
starts with, first, setting the general mode of the text. The analysis should start from 
scratch (Huckin, 1997) by initially looking at the a text in an uncritical manner, like 
an ordinary, undiscerning reader who is looking for the general picture of the text 
without trying to position or angle it. Second, the analyst rereads the text in a critical 
manner, focusing on the pictorial elements and headlines, raising questions on why 
headlines are phrased the way they are and what the function of any attached images 




and situate it into its genre. Here, he suggests a toolbox that a CDA practitioner 
would resort to in order to dissect the text, such as framing, foregrounding, textual 
silence, voice, labels and naming, topicalization, agency, modality and register. In 
the last step, the analyst tries to connect the conclusions of the analysis to a wider 
social and cultural context. 
Similarly, O’Halloran (2003), from a language cognition perspective, 
suggests an Idealized Reader (IR) framework, where the IR is the average reader 
who reads for a gist and does not have either the time to spend or the effort to exert 
on analyzing the text beyond skimming the headlines or, at best, reading the first two 
or three sentences in the lead. O’Halloran outlines a set of eighteen principles that 
would characterize the IR’s approach to reading newspapers (189–91). These 
principles, derived from various approaches to language cognition (such as 
Connectionism, Cognitive linguistics, Relevance theory), explain what reading for a 
gist can or cannot afford to the reader. This is crucial in the context of refuting a 
frequent criticism to CDA as being subjective: it reads and analyzes for the reader; it 
assumes a job that average readers do not usually do when skimming the news. 
Applying some or all of O’Halloran’s IR principles would guard the analyst against a 
subjective reading of the text. Some of these principles are: 
1. The IR reads in line with minimalist hypothesis and thus their reading involves 
only automatic inferences that are only generated when available information is 
available. 
2. Strategic inferences are a talk likely to be generated at the IR’s reading as they 




3. Causal-antecedent inferences are automatic for IR. The IR can connect the main 
point of the current to a previous one, or he/she can retrieve information from 
prior text to be activated during the reading of the current text, or he/ he can 
make use of background knowledge a likely but not mentioned causal 
antecedent. (O’Halloran, 189ff) 
In reading and analyzing the text from the average reader’s perspective, 
Huckin’s and O’Halloran’s approaches are combined in the analysis of headlines and 
front page news reports. Data of 2000 are analyzed first and then the 2005 data, 
using the same tools of analysis. The textual analysis is conducted in the following 
order: 
1. The IR analysis of headlines and front pages; 
2. Transitivity; 
3. Sourcing; 
4. Lexical choice; 
5. Presupposition. 
Starting with the IR analysis is useful as it gives an idea about the average 
reader approach to the news report and it validates the detailed analysis which 
unveils the covert ideological strategies through which the MB is meant to be 
excluded from Egyptian political life. The next section explores the analytic tools 





4.2. Tools of Analysis 
4.2.1. Idealized Reader Framework 
For the analysis of headlines (HL) and front page (FP) reports, the news 
reports from the regular reader’s view are approached without any predetermined 
perspective. O’Halloran’s IR framework is used to ensure approaching the text from 
the perspective of the average reader. According to the IR framework (O’Halloran, 
2003: 225), the type of inferences that the IR is unlikely to draw automatically are 
the elaborative inferences such as:  
1. Super ordinate goal: why did someone do something? 
2. Instrument: what did they use? 
3. Subordinate goal-action: how was the action achieved? 
4. Instantiation: ‘filling in’ a general category with more specific category; 
5. Casual consequence: what were the results of the action? 
For the IR to get information on these items (1–5), he/she has to be provided 
with them in the news report, otherwise the report will be analyzed as mystifying and 
as an example of manipulative “textual silence” (Huckin, 2002: 348). 
4.2.2. Transitivity: What Is Going on in Our World? 
The use of the term ‘transitivity’ indicates more than suggested by the 
distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs. Transitivity, here, deals with not 
only verbs, but with the verb’s associated participants and circumstances as well 
(Halliday, 1967–8: 81ff; 1973: 39; 1985: 103). Hence the area of transitivity 




involved with it, i.e., subjects and/or objects where ‘participant’ is to be understood 
as the linguistic representation of non-human, inanimate and even abstract entities, as 
well as human beings. Transitivity “refers to the content or factual-notional structure 
of the clause in its entirety” (Halliday in Kress, 1997: 159). According to Halliday 
(1994: 106-107) 
Transitivity is an area of meaning in which a writer or speaker chooses and 
constructs a certain type of process for his clauses. This selection of process 
type from a finite set of possibilities which are made available in the network 
reflects a reality outside language, a reality in the human community of 
which the writer is a member and in which there are events like relations, 
actions, mental processes, locutions and behaviors. Analyzing transitivity 
implies concern with the clause in its ideational function, its role as a means 
of representing patterns of experience and its various aspects of reality, i.e., 
goings-on: doing, happening, feeling, being, etc. It also specifies the different 
types of processes that are recognized in the language (in its semantic 
system) and the structures by which they are expressed (the 
lexico-grammatical system). 
Transitivity analysis includes identifying who is set as agent (doer or sayer, 
etc.), as goal (who is acted upon), and the processes (doing or saying). This type of 
analysis would reveal a good deal of the intricate system of hegemony and 
domination in society as expressed in media headlines and reports. The basic 
semantic framework for the representation of processes shows that a process consists 
potentially of three components: 
• The process itself; 
•  Participants in the process; 
•  Circumstances associated with the process (Halliday, 1994). 
Halliday (1994) identifies six process categories in his system of transitivity 




Table  4.2 Process types, their meaning and key participants, (Halliday, 1994: 143) 
































Existential Existing Existent 
 
A. Material processes or ‘processes of doing’; 
B. Mental processes or ‘processes of sensing, perceiving or understanding’; 
C. Relational processes or processes of being such as is or have; 
D. Behavioural processes, which involve human physiological or psychological  
E. Behaviour such as ‘watching’, ‘dreaming’, ‘tasting’; 
F. Existential processes such as in ‘there is a tree at the end of the street’; it 
represents the fact that something exists or happens; 
The significance of analyzing the data propositions in terms of Participant, 
Process and Goal types puts our hands on the doers, the actions done and the 




relates to the ideational metafunction (Halliday, 1978, 1994; Eggins, 2004) in 
Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics and which delineates the goings-on in the 
external world around us. Applying transitivity analysis to the presentation of the 
MB answers the following questions: 
1. Are the members of MB presented as Doers? 
2. If yes, what are the Process types they are associated with as Doers? 
3. Are they presented as Goal/Recipients of any Processes? 
4. If yes, what are the Process types they are associated with as Recipients? 
Analyzing the sentences that have the MB in the subject or object position is 
significant as it highlights the following aspects: with 
1. Material processes: what they do or what is done to them. 
2. Mental processes: how they perceive the world and how the world perceives 
them. 
3. Verbal processes: what they say and what is said about them; 
4. Relational processes: how the world identifies them as they are/are not, have or 
have not.  
The analysis of transitivity will, moreover, include a subset categorization 
where the verbal group is further subdivided into three subgroups: negative, neutral 
and positive (Chen, 2005). Negative verbal processes are those that cast some doubt, 
scepticism and a feeling of negativity on the reporter’s part on what is reported or 
quoted. A good example of this type is insist. Neutral subgroups are those that do not 
add any flavour to the content, like said. Positive verbal processes, like announced, 




whoever is reported. It will make what is quoted appear as wise, valid, authentic, 
clear and true. 
 A second approach to the study of transitivity is what Halliday calls 
ergativity (1994: 161). Ergativity deals with the clause on an abstract level that 
relates and examines causation. Halliday (1994) makes a distinction between two 
types of ergativity: 
A. Middle: the processes which are brought about internally (self-engendered), 
e.g., the cup broke; 
B. Effective: the processes which are brought about externally (by some other  
 entity), e.g., he broke the cup.  
The participant in the Middle type is medium and in the second, Effective, 
agent and medium. So in six people were injured, the six people is the medium. The 
Agent is the “participant functioning as external cause” (164). The ergativity system 
is also relevant to the analysis of the data as the Middle type mystifies agency and 
hence removes responsibility from the cause and leaves it vague. Therefore, 
examining ergative analysis in the news reports would lay down the actual role(s) of 
the MB in the Egyptian society as construed and presented by al-Ahram.  
4.2.3.  Sourcing: Whose Voice? 
News reports are presentations of events by reporters who either have 
witnessed the event or sought other witnesses and sources who will be considered by 
the reader – or at least are presented to them as – trustworthy, and their utterances as 




in news reports to align the reporter at a certain distance close or far from what 
he/she reports. By choosing whose voice is sourced, the reporter positions the reader 
attitudinally with regard to the content of the report. Newsmakers tend to present 
their sources as informed knowers and legitimate sources so what is reported will go 
unquestioned and will be accepted as facts. Sourcing, according to Tuchman (1972), 
is considered one of four “strategic rituals” for achieving “objectivity.” This is if the 
report is represented in a balanced way by reporting the opposite sides of the 
reported event. But since this is not always the case, sourcing can be considered as a 
tool of achieving power and authority. Van Dijk refers to sourcing as a way to 
achieve hegemony, because access to news media is not available to everyone but to 
“members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their 
leaders (the elites) have more or less exclusive access” (van Dijk, 1998b: 5).  
Sourcing in news takes two forms: direct and indirect quoting. Directly 
quoting the sources highlights the news trustworthiness. Direct quotes in this context 
help to present the news as a fact that is invulnerable to questioning because it is 
coming from an official, an informed source or a witness. It also helps to distance the 
reporter’s voice from the event presentation.  
Readers tend to accept the quoted person as an authority; therefore, the 
quoted voices are attributed with some authoritative quality to legitimize the 
journalist’s claims in the news story (e.g., Van Dijk, 1988b). Elite people whose 
voices are used in the news stories are assigned credentials (or titles) that embody 
their claims to news value. Examples of such accreditation are PM, MP, informed 




their own voices even in the direct quoting and align their positions with or against 
what the source is saying. News reports “evoke fragments of discourse outside the 
text either to show agreement with them, because they are considered transcendental, 
or to criticize them or discredit them” (Rojo, 1995: 54). On the other hand, indirect 
reporting is a place where the reporter’s voice can be sought. This will appear in the 
way he/she rephrases the source’s words. 
In addition to the information that voicing analysis reveals on who is always 
quoted, who has access to media, which actors are found more important than others 
to be quoted, it also shows “how the journalist evaluates quoted opinions” (van Dijk, 
1993: 252). Van Dijk suggests that when there is a reported speech, it is always 
accompanied by the reporter’s voice in words like claim, alleged and insisted, which 
signify the reporter’s orientation towards the message he/she is quoting.  
Therefore, the significance of voicing in news reports lies in the 
legitimatization wrapping which is added to the message (Wodak and Van Leeuwen, 
2002) and the worldview, held by those in positions of power and influence, which 
reinforces the effectiveness of social control (Habermas, 1987).  
In the present study, the analysis will focus on who is reported and sourced, 
how this sourcing contributes to the legitimization/delegitimization of social actors 
and whether voicing reinforces the process of the MB exclusion by the ruling regime 





4.2.4. Lexical Choices 
Analyzing lexicalization means studying individual lexical items and their 
connotations and denotations. Such analysis is significant because naming and 
lexical choices are value-laden and ideologically charged. The most classic example 
of lexicalization is noun-pairing: freedom fighters vs terrorist (e.g., Kress, 1983; van 
Dijk 1995; Clark 1998). The naming choice is based on the ideology of those who 
name (Thetela, 2001: 354). Allan (1999: 178–9) cites a list of such pairings that 
work on the level of nouns, verbs and adjectives. Fairclough argues that “a text’s 
choice of wording depends on, and helps create, social relationships between 
participants” (1999: 116). According to Huckin (1995: 101), special attention should 
be given to studying words and phrases because “labels often carry unavoidable 
connotations.” He gives abortion as an example; those who oppose it are named pro-
life by sympathizers and antichoice by opponents. For Fowler, lexical choices have 
always been seen as very crucial in the construction of meaning. They “mark off 
socially and ideologically distinct areas of experience” (1991: 84). The idea of 
“marking off” indicates a categorization process where labellers divide the world 
into us and them; we are good, they are bad. The analysis of lexical choices sets out 
how reference to participants in an event can cognitively and socially categorize in-
group and out-group identities as “the different possibilities [of naming] signify 
different assessments by the speaker/writer of his or her relationship with the person 
referred to or spoken to, and of the formality or intimacy of the situation” (Fowler et 




Studying labelling is, in fact, a study of representation because objects are 
given names to identify them and the process of identification is done on ideological 
basis. So when we identify/label social objects, we represent them from our own 
perspective. Describing a social actor as legal or illegal partly helps in the 
representation of the social actors as such. But the recurrence of the label legal or 
illegal, for example, will discursively lead to setting up mental concepts about the 
labelled actor which over time becomes an inalienable attribute which ultimately 
becomes part of the culture and common sense knowledge.  
In this section, labels which refer to the MB will be examined to see whether 
they contribute to excluding the group and if so, how. According to Fairclough, there 
are two aspects of representation: “The first has to do with the structuring of 
propositions, [and] the second with the combination and sequencing of propositions” 
(1995b: 104). Thus, the choice of words used in nomination and characterization of 
social actors are of particular significance in analyzing the positive self-presentation 
and negative other-presentation integral to the ‘ideological square’.  
The Appraisal theory is also useful in the context of analyzing labels because 
of the evaluative role of lexicalization in the context of news reporting. Approaching 
the data from the perspective of appraisal framework would highlight how the 
language is used to “evaluate, to adopt stances, to construct textual personae and to 
manage interpersonal positioning and relationships” (White, 2002). The Appraisal 
theory focuses on three particular systems: Attitude, Engagement and Graduation. 
The present analysis will draw only on the Attitude system. White defines Attitude as 




assessment to participants and processes by reference either to emotional responses 
or to systems of culturally-determined value systems” (1999:5). Attitudinal 
positioning is concerned with lexical items that carry or can be interpreted to carry 
positive or negative assessment of people, places, happenings, things, states of 
affairs, etc. It also includes items that trigger positive or negative assessment of 
people, places, things, happenings and states of affairs in the reader’s cognition (or 
the listener’s, in case of verbal utterances). Attitude is divided into three subsystems:  
1. Affect: The writer’s or speaker’s expression of emotion towards people, 
places, things, happenings. 
2.  Judgment: It is concerned with the ethics and allows the writer or speaker to 
evaluate human behavior by making reference to norms of social propriety and 
expectation. 
3.  Appreciation: The writer’s evaluation of the appearance, significance, impact, 
etc., of natural objects, human artifacts and human individuals, but not human 
behavior. (Jovanovic-Krstic, 2004).  
There are two types under Judgment: social esteem and social sanction. 
Social esteem involves questioning, positively or negatively, explicitly or implicitly, 
one social aspect or more of the participant (i.e., person, group, institution, etc.). This 
type of judgment does not have legal consequences but is only confined to the social 
esteem of the variable that is under judgment. This type would include expressions 
like normal/ abnormal, capable/ incapable, etc. (Martin, 2000). Social Sanction 
involves judging (praising/condemning) from the legal point of view: legal/illegal, 




social codes, laws, or even the country’s constitution or religious principles are at 
question when we talk about social sanction. Consequently, violation of the social 
sanction would result in and legitimize a sort of punishment. The full system of 
Judgment as adapted from White (2002) is set out in Table (4.3).  
 The analysis of lexicalization will draw only on the Judgment subsystem as 
it is concerned with the textual realizations that will most likely occur in news 
reporting. Martin defines Judgment as “the institutionalization of feeling, in the 
context of proposals (norms about how people should and shouldn’t behave)” (2000: 
155). Thus, we have two types of Judgment: positive Judgment and negative 
Judgment. The social actors and their behavior thus may be judged as acceptable or 
unacceptable, moral or immoral, legal or illegal, etc. (Martin, 2000; White, 1999). 
However, Jovanovic-Krstic stresses that “Judgment is highly determined by cultural 
and ideological values, and as such what is viewed as appropriate in one culture may 
not be viewed in the same light in another” (2000: 75). The analysis, hence, will 
draw on what is acceptable or acceptable in the Arab and Egyptian culture when it 
analyzes examples of judgments in the data. In the analysis of lexical references, the 
following points are taken into consideration: 
1. The way participants are referred to; 
2. Any associated adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, 
conjunctional  clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups, 
pronouns, similes, metaphors, allusions, evocations, and 





Table  4.3 System of Appraisal judgment; Source: adapted from White 2002; cited in 
Jovanovic-Krstic  2004: 75) 
Social Esteem Positive (admire) Negative ( criticize) 
Normality (custom):  




Standard, everyday, average. …;
Lucky, charmed …;  
Fashionable, avant garde … 
Eccentric, odd, maverick …;  
Unlucky, unfortunate …; Dated, 
unfashionable …  
Capacity:  
‘Is the person 
competent, capable?’  
Skilled, clever, insightful …, 
Athletic, strong, powerful …; 
Sane, together...  
Stupid, slow, simple-minded  
clumsy, weak, uncoordinated …; 
Insane, neurotic …  
Tenacity (resolve):  
‘Is the person 
dependable, well 
disposed?’ 
Plucky, brave, heroic …;  
Reliable, dependable …; 
Indefatigable, resolute, 
persevering 
Cowardly, rash, despondent …;  
Unreliable, undependable …; 
Distracted, lazy, unfocussed …  
Social Sanction Positive [praise] Negative [condemn] 
Veracity (truth):  
‘Is the person honest?’ 
Honest, truthful, credible  
Authentic, genuine …;  
Frank, direct …;  
Deceitful, dishonest …;  
Bogus, fake …;  
Deceptive, obfuscatory …  
Propriety (ethics):  
‘Is the person ethical, 
beyond reproach?’  
Good, moral, virtuous …;  
Law-abiding, fair, just …;  
Caring, sensitive, considerate ..; 
Bad, immoral, lascivious …;  
Corrupt, unjust, unfair …;  







3. The Judgment type that is dominant in the data and its significance; 
4. The significance of the labelling system and its contribution to grouping, 
categorizing, discriminating, and hence, excluding the MB. 
4.2.5. Presupposition 
Presupposition is a term that is widely used in both linguistics and 
pragmatics. One feature of presupposition is that a presupposition of a sentence is 
also a presupposition of its negation (Kadmon, 2001, quoting Ferge, 1892; Yule 
1996: 29). So in that they are challenging our transparent democracy/they are not 
challenging our transparent democracy, the presupposition in both sentences is 
unaffected by negation as what is negated is challenging, but that we have 
democracy and it is transparent is presupposed and remains intact. The analysis 
concerns presupposition within the context of discourse and discourse cognitive 
processing; that is to say, the discoursal meanings which are explicitly or implicitly 
presented to be shared and taken-for-granted knowledge between the language 
producer and receiver. Studying presupposition to uncover discursive ideology is 
interesting and significant because:  
4. Presupposition is “notoriously manipulative” when it is unchallenged — or 
unnoticed altogether (Huckin, 1997);  
5. Presupposition can be created intentionally or unintentional by the writer/speaker. 
Presupposition is mostly of unintentionally-created nature and this is because 
the language user perceives the content of his/her propositions as real and true 




6. Presupposition and implicature are two closely related concepts as what is 
presupposed is also implied. We can say that implicature is a general type of 
presupposition; 
7. The manipulative power of presupposition lies in the fact that in a text with 
presupposition, the focus of the language reader/ hearer would be on another 
proposition in the text or on a part of the sentence other than the part that has 
the presupposed information. In the above democracy example, the focus of 
the reader is on do they really challenge or not? So what is presupposed or 
implied is removed from the reader’s direct contestation. 
Van Dijk (2005: 80) summarizes some strategies that are at work when 
processing and managing presupposition: 
1. If the recipients are believed to be members of my own epistemic 
community (culture, country, group, etc.), presuppose all socially shared 
knowledge of this epistemic community to be known by these 
recipient(s); 
2. If the recipients are believed to be members of another epistemic 
community, then activate knowledge about that other community. If such 
knowledge fails, assume that knowledge may be the same or similar to 
that of your own community. When in doubt ask, or show ignorance; 
3. If I have just acquired new knowledge, e.g., about specific events, it is 
probably not socially shared throughout the community, and hence not to 
be presupposed to be known to the recipients unless these recipients are 
known to have used the same source of information (e.g., the media); 
4. Interpersonal knowledge by definition may be presupposed to be known 
by the recipients with whom it was shared. In doubt, it should be referred 
to; 
5. Personal knowledge is not assumed to be shared by recipients, and should 
hence not be presupposed. 
Studies on presupposition have divided it into two types: pragmatic and 
conventional (Levinson, 1983; Grundy, 1995; Stalnaker, 2000; Norrick, 2001) or 




Rechniewski, 2001). The pragmatic presupposition is nonlinguistically realized and 
depends in its interpretation on the context of the utterance or the proposition. 
Understanding this type of presupposition derives “from the relation of the énoncé 
[proposition] to its context, including the context of the discursive ‘rules’ which 
ascribe to certain forms of language, certain pragmatic functions (ibid.). The 
linguistic/conventional presupposition works at the level of the current text and its 
propositions. Understanding this type of presupposition would derive from: 
1. Syntactic structure as in they hate our democracy (that we have democracy is 
presupposed); or  
2. Anaphoric/cataphoric use as in they are repeating the same mistake 
(presupposing that they have done it before).  
Presupposition can also occur at the sentence level in the form of persuasive rhetoric 
that can be used to convey the impression that what an agent of power says carries 
more weight (Huckin, 1995; 2002).  
 In the present analysis, the linguistic analysis of presupposition will reveal 
what type of information is presupposed in the news reports, how it affects the image 
of the MB, and whether it nurtures excluding and othering them.
  
5. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introduction  
The discussion in Chapter 3 on social and discursive practices has shown that 
the consecutive ruling regimes in Egypt have marginalized and excluded the MB. 
The government’s common tendency has been to encumber the growth of the 
organization under a legal umbrella. Although the group has been given, at times of 
leniency, a limited space to work, this space has always been temporary and without 
any guarantees for the future. The discussion concluded that: 1) the Egyptian 
authoritarian regimes have been controlling media outlets and using them to their 
own interests; and 2) Islamists, civil rights advocates and antigovernment groups 
have been discursively and socially excluded and discriminated against by using 
sheer power, negative media representation, or both. This chapter presents a textual 
analysis of the front-page news reports that deal with the MB to see whether this 
analysis would yield similar conclusion to that of the social and discursive practices. 
The main point from which the textual analysis departs is: Does the textual 
representation of the MB in al-Ahram create and reinforce the exclusionary attitude 
that the Egyptian government has been imposing on the Brotherhood? To answer this 
question, the 2000 and 2005 data are analyzed in the following sections, ‘The MB in 
2000’ and in Chapter 6. This order enables the study to determine whether there is 




orientation in the media coverage of the MB. The various textual techniques 
(Idealized Reader framework, transitivity, lexical choices, presupposition and 
sourcing) that are used in the analysis would enable us to understand the nature of 
the exclusionary discourse practiced against the MB.  
Newspaper consumers can be divided into three categories: those who a) read 
only the headlines; b) read the headlines and (part of) the lead; and c) 
comprehensively and critically read all or most of the newspaper sections. The 
present analysis, therefore, will approach the data first from the average reader 
perspective. This gives a clear idea on the effect of reading-for-a-gist on the average 
reader who skims the headlines and front-page stories. This is meant to respond to 
the criticism that CDA analysts approach the text from critically aware readers’ 
perspective and not from the point of view of average readers. On the second level of 
analysis, a number of analytical tools are used to approach the data from an in-depth 
analysis perspective. This way, some of the criticisms directed at CDA are responded 
to and, more importantly, the study questions are empirically validated.  
5.2. The MB in 2000 
5.2.1. The MB in Headlines: IR Perspective 
The search for ناﻮﺧﻻا, ’the Brothers’, in al-Ahram during 2000 retrieved four 
headlines (HL). Analyzing the headlines from the IR perspective found that 
mystification is a common feature among the four headlines. Mystification in the 
news results when an essential piece of information is missing and which is unlikely 




information is so crucial that it leads, to say the least, to misinforming the reader. 
The HL in (1) is an example. 
(1)  
 بﺰﺤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻳدﺎﻴﻗ ﺐﺻﺎﻨﻣ ﺔﻓﺮﻄﺘﻤﻟا تﺎﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟاو ناﻮﺧﻹا ﻦﻣ تادﺎﻴﻗ ﻲﻟﻮﺗ. 2.  
2. Leaders from the Brothers’ and extremist groups assume 
leadership positions in the Labor Party. 
 
 FP00, #8 
 
Reading the HL in (1) from the IR perspective would leave the reader 
perplexed about the answer to the question: what is the focal point of the HL? Given 
that this statement is issued by the Public Prosecutor as an accusation against some 
MB members and not given the relevant information on why joining a political party 
is an accusation, the IR will either cognitively fill in the missing information by 
recalling some background knowledge or will be left with unanswered questions. In 
both cases, mystification is the result. If the reader recalls the background knowledge 
related to the MB, provided by the social and discursive practices, the negative MB 
image would be the only result. The same technique of omitting crucial information 
is repeated in (2). 
 (2)   
 ﺔﻌﻠﻄﻣ ردﺎﺼﻣ :  ﺔﻴﻧﻮﻧﺎﻗ ناﻮﺧﻹا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا ﺮﻣاوأ 1.  








The focal point of the HL is that the warrants are legal. The crucial 
information about the grounds of the accusation, is, again, left unalluded to. The 
absence of this relevant information from (1) and (2) helps the IR create a cognitive, 
even though rudimentary, image of the MB as a threat and an excluded group. The 
theme of exclusion is stressed in (3) and (4).  
(3)   
  ﺔﻤﻜﺤﻤﻟا : تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ةﺮﺘﻓ لﻼﻐﺘﺳاو ﺔﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا تاﻮﻨﻘﻟا قاﺮﺘﺧا اﻮﻟوﺎﺣ نﻮﻤﻬﺘﻤﻟا
ﻢهرﺎﻜﻓﻷ ﺞﻳوﺮﺘﻠﻟ.  
3. 
3. The court: the accused [MB group] attempted penetrating through 
legitimate channels and exploiting the elections period to 
disseminate/promote their ideas. 
 FP00, #1  
  
(4)   
  ﻲﻔﺤﺻ ﺮﻤﺗﺆﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﻳزو : ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺳ فاﺪهﻷ ﻦﻳﺪﻟا رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳا ﺖﻟوﺎﺣ ناﻮﺧﻹا ﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ
ﺔﻳﺮﺳ ﺔﻴﻤﻴﻈﻨﺗو. 
4.
4. Minister of Interior Affairs in a press conference: The Brothers 
group has been attempting to exploit religion to [achieve] secret, 
political and organizational goals. 
 
 FP00, #2  
 
Here, the average reader would be mystified by the fact that neither of the 




respectively. Later in the analysis, it is also found that the reports give no more 
information than the headlines.  
The IR analysis of the 2000 HLs revealed that the HLs that covered the MB 
mystify the readers by not providing them with relevant information which is 
unlikely to be automatically generated, as in (1) and (2), and present the MB as a 
threat, as in (3) and (4). 
The next section examines the full text of the front-page news stories 
(henceforth FP) to see whether mystification is also a feature of the news reports. 
5.2.2. The MB in Front Pages (FP): IR Perspective 
Reading the FP reports that deal mainly or partly with the MB from the 
average reader view stresses the conclusion of the HLs analysis that mystification is 
an inherent feature of the news stories related to the MB. Mystification is used as a 
tool to politically and socially exclude the MB. In the HL in (5), the Minister of 
Interior is clearly negating the existence of any entity by the name of MB. The IR 
would perceive this as ‘if there is no political party or group by the name of MB, so 
these people’s activities are illegal and unlawful’.  
(5)   
 ﻲﻟدﺎﻌﻟا :  ﺎﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﺎﺑﺰﺣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ اﻮﻣادﺎﻣ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻤﺳا ﺎﺌﻴﺷ فﺮﻌﻧ ﻻ 1.
1. The Minister of Interior: we do not know of any entity called the 
Brothers as long as they are not an official party.  
 





The same orientation towards the MB can be concluded from the answer of President 
Mubarak to a question on freezing the Labor Party , as in (6, L.4)  
(6)   
  لاﺆﺳ :  ؟ﻪﻣدﺎﻘﻟا تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻞﺒﻗ ﻼﺧﺪﺗ ﻲﺿﺎﻤﻟا عﻮﺒﺳﻷا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ قﻼﻏإ ﺲﻴﻟأ 2.
  كرﺎﺒﻣ :  ﺎﻘﻠﻄﻣ ﻻ ,   ﻢﻬﻨﻜﻤﻳ ﺮﺧا بﺰﺣ يا رﺎﺼﻧا ﻞﺜﻣ ﻚﻟذ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻬﻠﺜﻣ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ رﺎﺼﻧا نﻻ
بﺰﺣ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻄﻐﺗ ﻲﻟا ﻪﺟﺎﺣ نود ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا لﻮﺧد , 
3.
  ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻼﻟ مﺪﻘﺘﻟا نﻮﻌﻴﻄﺘﺴﻳ ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﻪﻤﻈﻨﻣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ ﻢهو ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا نا ﻞﺑ . 4.
2. Q: Is not the closure of the Labor Party last week considered 
interference [in the Party’s affairs] before the coming elections? 
 
3. Mubarak: No, absolutely. This is because the supporters of the Labor 
Party can, like others, run in the elections as independents without 
the need to be Party-affiliated. 
 
4. Moreover, the MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as 
independents too. 
 
 FP00, #9  
  
 According to O’Halloran (2003: 225), the following conditions make it 
unlikely for elaborative inferences to be generated by the IR: 
A. The background knowledge is not readily accessible.; 
B. There is no one obvious inference to be generated. 
This means that for the report not to be mystifying, it has to provide the reader with 




answer in (6) in terms of the elaborative inference notion, it is found that the answer 
is mystifying as the elaborative inference regarding why the Party was frozen is not 
provided by him and is unlikely to be inferred by the IR. The fact that the supporters 
of the Labor Party can run as independents does not justify or interpret the action of 
freezing the Party. Consequently the President’s answer does not directly address the 
question and hence it mystifies the reader. The unneeded-for reference to the MB in 
L.3 may spark the connection between the Labor Party and the MB, and freezing the 
Party. This connection may require some work on the part of the reader to reach. 
Three months later, this connection was made clear when the General Prosecutor 
officially accused the Labor Party of having a relationship with ‘the banned Brothers 
group’ (FP00, # 8). The minimum effort that is usually exerted by the IR in 
skimming the news stories would lead them to conclude, as in (7), that connection 
with the MB is the legal reason for freezing the Party. However, the cognitive 
processing of the readers-for-a-gist does not go any further towards asking if this is a 
valid and worthy justification. 
(7)   
  ﻻوا :  ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﺑ ﻲآاﺮﺘﺷﻻا ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ طﺎﺒﺗرا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ﺎﻬﻃﺎﺸﻧ رﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا 4.
   ,  ﻪﻴﻣﻼﺳﻻا تﺎﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﻊﻣ ﻪﻧوﺎﻌﺗو  ﻪﻴﻨﻃﻮﻟا ﻩﺪﺣﻮﻠﻟ ﻪﻀهﺎﻨﻤﻟاو ﻪﻓﺮﻄﺘﻤﻟا
ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا مﻼﺴﻟاو ,  
5.
  بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻪﻳدﺎﻴﻗ ﺐﺻﺎﻨﻤﻟ تﺎﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻩﺬه داﺮﻓا ﺾﻌﺑ ﺪﻠﻘﺗو. 6.




the Labor Party to the banned MB. 
5. And its cooperation with elements from the extreme Islamists groups 
that are antinational unity and antisocial peace. 
 
6. And the assumption of some members of these groups of the Party 
leadership positions. 
 
 FP00, #8  
The same analysis is concluded from another front-page report (FP00, #6). In this 
report, Ibrahim Shukri, the Labor Party president, is interrogated by the Supreme 
State Security Prosecutor. One of the accusations is that the Labor Party had 
connections with the banned MB and extremist groups. In November 2000, the 
results of the military tribunal investigations were reported and a list of accusations 
charged to some MB members, as in:  
(8)  
نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا مﺎﻜﺣﻷ ﻪﻔﻟﺎﺨﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﺖﻤﻈﻧ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟ مﺎﻤﻀﻧﻻا 14.
رﻮﺘﺳﺪﻟا مﺎﻜﺣأ ﻞﻴﻄﻌﺗ ﺎﻬﻨﻣ ضﺮﻐﻟا 15.
 ﻲﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا مﻼﺴﻟﺎﺑ راﺮﺿﻻاو  16.
ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ طﺎﺸﻧ ءﺎﻴﺣﻻ ﻂﻴﻄﺨﺘﻟاو  17.
 تﺎﻴﻌﻤﺠﻟاو ﻪﻴﻨﻬﻤﻟا تﺎﺑﺎﻘﻨﻠﻟ مﺎﻤﻀﻧﻻا ﻖﻳﺮﻃ ﻦﻋ ﻪﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﻩادﺎﻌﻣ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺮﻴﻐﻟا ﺾﻳﺮﺤﺗو
ﻪﻳﺮﻴﺨﻟا  
18.
ﻪﻴﺿﺎﻤﻟا ﺐﻌﺸﻟا ﺲﻠﺠﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧا ﻲﻓ ﺢﻴﺷﺮﺘﻟا لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻧﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟاو ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا تاﻮﻨﻘﻟا قاﺮﺘﺧاو 
ﻪﻴﺑﺎﻴﻨﻟا ﺲﻟﺎﺠﻤﻟاو  
19.
ءيدﺎﺒﻣو رﺎﻜﻓا ﺮﺸﻨﻟ ﺞﻳوﺮﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟا ﻩﺮﺘﻓ لﻼﻐﺘﺳاو  ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟا
ﻪﻳﺮﻴهﺎﻤﺠﻟا طﺎﺳوﻻا  
20.




14. joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law  
15. the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,  
16. and damage the social peace, 
17. to Plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood 
18. and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining the professional 
unions and charities  
19. and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for 
nomination in the recent elections of both People’s Council 
[Parliament] and other representative bodies. 
20. and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and 
principles of the group to the masses. 
21. to provoke them be against the current legitimate government to gain 
its support to the group’s candidates 
 FP00#1 
In terms of mystification, the information in L.15 is not elaborated to explain 
how the goal of the MB is to cause constitutional disruption or damage the society’s 
security. In other words, the two conditions for making elaborative inference likely 
to be generated do not apply to the information given in FP #1, in (8) and therefore, 
mystification is the expected outcome. In (8), L.18 is indeed perplexing and difficult 
to decipher for the IR: it is neither clear how joining professional unions and civil 
societies would breed antigovernment attitude nor why it is considered an 
accusation. If this statement is true, the regime that criminalizes being active in civil 




are not justified.  
To sum up, the analysis of both the headlines and news reports on front pages 
in 2000 revealed that mystification is a prevailing feature in the news reports on the 
MB. It also revealed that the MB and any entity that is connected to it are excluded 
from the socio-political arena either by soft power, i.e., negatively represented in the 
media and/or sheer power, i.e., detention and imprisonment. 
The coming sections present a detailed linguistic analysis of the front page 
reports in terms of a set of linguistics tools. This is meant to examine the nature of 
the government discourse towards the MB and how more or less exclusionary it is.  
5.2.3. Transitivity 
 Analyzing the front page reports in terms of transitivity patterns highlights 
the ways the MB is represented in al-Ahram: what they are represented to be doing 
and what is done to them. The analysis retrieved a total number of 70 process types 
associated with the MB and they are distributed as shown in Table 5.1. The reports 
Table  5.1 Distribution of process types associated with the MB in 2000 
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 ﻲﺘﻟاو 13.  
ﻀﻧﻻا 14.  
ﺮﻐﻟا 15.  
ﺿﻻاو 16.  
ﺨﺘﻟاو 17.  





ﻪﻴﺿﺎﻤﻟا ﺐﻌﺸﻟا ﺲﻠﺠﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧا ﻲﻓ ﺢﻴﺷﺮﺘﻟا لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻧﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟاو ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا تاﻮﻨﻘﻟا قاﺮﺘﺧاو ,  
ﻪﻴﺑﺎﻴﻨﻟا ﺲﻟﺎﺠﻤﻟاو  
19.  
 طﺎﺳوﻻا ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟا ءيدﺎﺒﻣو رﺎﻜﻓا ﺮﺸﻨﻟ ﺞﻳوﺮﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟا ﻩﺮﺘﻓ لﻼﻐﺘﺳاو
 ﻪﻳﺮﻴهﺎﻤﺠﻟا  
20. 
ﻢﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟا ﻲﺤﺷﺮﻣ ﻊﻣ ﺎﻬﻔﻃﺎﻌﺗ بﺎﺴﺘآﻻ ﻪﻤﺋﺎﻘﻟا ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا ﻪﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﺪﺿ ﺎﻬﺗرﺎﺜﺘﺳاو .   21.  
13. [the prosecutor] accused the MB members of 
14. Joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law,  
15. the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,  
16. and damage the social peace 
17. to plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood 
18. and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining professional unions 
and charities  
19. and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for 
nomination in the recent elections of both People’s Councils [Parliament] 
and other representative bodies, 
20. and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and 
principles of the group to the masses 
21. to provoke them to be against the current legitimate government so as to 
gain their support for the group’s candidates. 





The image that is created by this representation is that this group is illegal, 
anticivil life and should be uprooted and excluded. The report withholds essential 
information, which leads to mystification of the reader. In the report there is no 
explanation of what the group members are actually doing to disable law 
enforcement (L.15) or damage the social peace (L.16). A more mystifying example 
is given in L.18, where it is not made clear to the reader why joining civil societies 
and professional syndicates is considered antigovernment. The same analysis can be 
extended to L.19, where no justification is give as to why working through political 
and legitimate channels to incur change in society is illegal. The MB is trying to 
implement political change through legal channels and in the light of the constitution 
but the process is represented to the reader as a crime. 
Studying the process types in another text where the MB is the Actor renders 
the same conclusion. In (10), the Interior Minister stresses what the MB has been 
trying to do:  
 (10)  
ﻦﻋ بﺎﻘﻨﻟا ﻪﻴﻓ ﻒﺸآ .  8. 
 ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا نﺎﺠﻠﻟا رﺎﻘﻣ فﺪﻬﺘﺴﺗ ﻪﻴﺋاﺪﻋ تﺎﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟ ﻂﻴﻄﺨﺘﻟا ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ تﻻوﺎﺤﻣ 9. 
ﻦﻣﻻﺎﺑ لﻼﺧﻻا ﺪﺼﻘﺑ ,   10. 
 ﻦﻴﻨﻃاﻮﻤﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﻳﺪﻟا ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳا ﺖﻟوﺎﺣ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ نأ ﺪآأو 11. 
اﻮﻠﺸﻓ ﻢﻬﻨﻜﻟ   ﺔﻳﺮﺳ ﺔﻴﻤﻴﻈﻨﺗو ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺳ فاﺪهأ ﺔﻣﺪﺨﻟ ﻪﻴﺒﻌﺷ ﺐﺴﻜﻟ اﻮﻄﻄﺧوﺔﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﺮﻴﻏو 12. 
 8. Where he uncovered 
9. Attempts by some candidates to plan terroristic actions against the 




10. in order to breach security 
11. He stressed that elements of the banned Muslim Brotherhood tried to 
exploit the influence of religion on citizens 
12. but they failed and they planned to win popularity for secretive, illegal, 
political and organizational purposes 
 FP00, #2
Here, the group is represented as trying to exploit the influence of religion on citizens 
(L11) and as having secret (impliedly illegitimate) plans (L12). Although the actors 
of the two processes in L10 and L10 – plan terrorist acts and breach security, 
respectively – are mystifyingly referred to as some candidates, the reader would 
cognitively anchor the actor with the MB candidates. 
 Two principles can be suggested to explain the process of cognitively 
anchoring the Actors in these clauses to the MB: the proximity principle and the 
historical principle. The proximity principle means that the average reader, when 
reading sentences whose subjects are not explicitly stated, tends to connect these 
sentences with the Actors of surrounding sentences. The historical principle concerns 
the role of social practices in shaping the historical collective memory of the average 
reader. The analysis of social practices in Chapter 4 leads to the predication that the 
average reader would connect violent acts to the MB in any text or context in which 
the group is alluded to.  
The negative image of the MB recurs throughout almost all the sentences of 




have proved the MB guilty of the same charges as above. Yet there is no explanation 
of the nature of these violent acts or how the group carried these crimes out. 
 (11)  
ﻪﺑﺎﻴﻨﻟا ﺎﻬﺗﺮﺟا ﻲﺘﻟا تﺎﻘﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟا ,  ﺎﻧﻮﻧﺎﻗ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﻊﻣ , 3.
ﻩرﺎﺛﻻا لﺎﻤﻋا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ طرﻮﺗ ﺖﺘﺒﺛا ﺪﻗ ,  ﺾﻳﺮﺤﺘﻟاو ,  ﻪﻴﻗاﺪﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻴﻜﺸﺘﻟاو 
ﻪﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻟﺎﺑ ﻚﺴﻤﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ,  
4.
3. Investigations conducted by the Prosecutor, with a number of members 
of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, 
4. Have proved the involvement of elements of the group in acts of 
provocation, incitement, and questioning the credibility of the 
government’s adherence to democracy. 
  FP00, #5 
  
On the other hand, analyzing the clauses where the MB occupies the Goal 
position – that is the object of material processes – reveals that the group is always 
the object of court ruling, charging, arresting, detaining and imprisonment or being 
acquitted. A good example of this is FP00, #1. 
It is also significant to analyze the mental processes because such analysis 
would show how the MB perceives the world, in cases where they are represented as 
the Sensor (subject of the mental process) or how they are perceived, in cases where 
they are the Phenomenon (object of the mental process). In the 2000 data, mental 




processes analysis retrieved two sentences, in the first of which the MB is the 
Sensor, as in (12), and in the second it is the Phenomenon, as in (13). In (12), the MB 
is associated with the process disbelieve/cast doubts and is presented as 
antigovernment group that does not believe in the government’s commitment to a 
civil and democratic society.  
 (12)   
ﻩرﺎﺛﻻا لﺎﻤﻋا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ طرﻮﺗ ﺖﺘﺒﺛا ﺪﻗ ,  ﺾﻳﺮﺤﺘﻟاو ,   ﻪﻴﻗاﺪﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻴﻜﺸﺘﻟاو
ﻪﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻟﺎﺑ ﻚﺴﻤﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ,  
4.
4. [investigations] Have proved the involvement of elements of the group 
in acts of provocation, incitement, and casting doubts on the credibility 
of the government’s adherence to democracy,  
  FP00, #5 
 (13)   
ﻲﻟدﺎﻌﻟا :  ﺎﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﺎﺑﺰﺣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ اﻮﻣادﺎﻣ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻤﺳا ﺎﺌﻴﺷ فﺮﻌﻧ ﻻ .   3.
3. Minister of Interior: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as 
long as they are not an official party. 
  FP00, #10 
 
In (13), the MB is the object of the process know and is negated any legal existence 
in the government’s cognition, represented here by the Interior Minister.  
The verbal process occurrences are also significant in stressing the negative 
representation of the MB. In the analyzed verbal sentences, it is the government’s 




negative on the MB. The search did not retrieve any instance from the data where the 
MB is a Sayer. The group is always talked about but its voice is never represented. 
The following are examples of verbal clauses with the government as a Sayer: 
A. The Minister of Interior [says]: we do not know any entity called the 
Brothers as long as they are not an official party. (FP00, #10, L.3) 
B. Mubarak [answers]: what is more is that the MB, though being an 
illegal organization, can run as independents. (FP00, #9, L.4) 
C. Informed sources said to al-Ahram that … (FP00, #5, L.2) 
D. The sources, also, said that the procedures to arrest the elements of the 
Muslim Brotherhood are lawful. (FP00, #5, L.6) 
E. and confirmed that none of the members of this group have been 
arrested under the authority of the emergency law. (FP00, #5, L.7) 
The analysis of verbal processes subcategorization reveals that all the verbal 
processes associated with the government belong to either the neutral or the positive 
sub-categories. The verb emphasized ﺪآأ is frequently used with the government as in 
the following examples in (14): 
 
 
The neutral subcategory say is used with informed sources as in (FP00, #5, L2 and 
L6). It is noticed that the participants in both positive and neutral types of verbal 
 (14)     
  The court emphasized FP00, # 1, L.5 
  The Minister emphasized  FP00, #2, L.7 




processes are always an official, an authority or an expert who says or confirms 
something negative about the MB. The analysis of verbal processes is also 
significant in terms of drawing the demarcating lines of the ideological square 
between the MB members and the government members in terms of they vs we. 
The last category to be analyzed is the relational processes. Relational 
processes in news reports would tell what the MB is/is not from the government’s 
view. The present data retrieved the following relational sentences, as in (15). 
(15) 
A. The sources also said that the procedures to arrest the elements of the 
Muslim Brotherhood are lawful. FP00, #5. L.6 
B. [The Labor Party] having links with the banned MB. FP00, #8, L.4 
C. The extreme Islamists groups that are antinational unity and antisocial peace 
… FP00, #8, L.5  
D. But some of them may run through agreements with other parties or as 
Independents. FP00. #10, L.4 
The two concepts that are established by these relational processes are that the MB is 
an illegal entity and that the government’s procedures against the MB are legal. 
To conclude this section, the analysis of transitivity underlined the negative 
image and the exclusionary attitude towards the Islamist group. The MB members 
are represented as doers of violent acts, disturbing the society, being an illegal entity, 




and discursive practices analysis in Chapter 3. In the next section, sourcing in news 
reports is analyzed.  
5.2.4. Sourcing  
The analysis of the 2000 data in terms of sourcing is relevant as far as the 
theme of exclusion is concerned. The data reveals four voices, or sources, that are 
frequently reported. The four voices are significantly either government officials: the 
Interior Minister, as in (16) and (17), the President, as in (18), the military court, as 
in (19) or informed sources, as in (20).  
(16)   
  ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﻳﺪﻟا ﺮﻴﺛﺎﺗ رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳا ﺖﻟوﺎﺣ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ نا ﺪآاو
ﻦﻴﻨﻃاﻮﻤﻟا  
7.  
7. He [the Interior Minister] stressed that elements of the banned 
Muslim Brotherhood tried to exploit the influence of religion on 
citizens 
 
 FP00, #2  
 
(17)   
 ﻲﻟدﺎﻌﻟا :  ﺎﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﺎﺑﺰﺣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ اﻮﻣادﺎﻣ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻤﺳا ﺎﺌﻴﺷ فﺮﻌﻧ ﻻ .  7.  
7. The Minister of Interior [says]: we do not know any entity called 
the Brothers as long as they are not an official party. 
 





(18)   
 لاﺆﺳ :  ؟ﻪﻣدﺎﻘﻟا تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻞﺒﻗ ﻼﺧﺪﺗ ﻲﺿﺎﻤﻟا عﻮﺒﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ قﻼﻏا ﺲﻴﻟأ  1. 
 باﻮﺟ :  ﺎﻘﻠﻄﻣ ﻻ ,  ﺮﺧا بﺰﺣ يا رﺎﺼﻧا ﻞﺜﻣ ﻚﻟذ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻬﻠﺜﻣ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ رﺎﺼﻧا نﻻ 
بﺰﺣ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻄﻐﺗ ﻲﻟا ﻪﺟﺎﺣ نود ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا لﻮﺧد ﻢﻬﻨﻜﻤﻳ ,   
2. 
  تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻼﻟ مﺪﻘﺘﻟا نﻮﻌﻴﻄﺘﺴﻳ ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﻪﻤﻈﻨﻣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ ﻢهو ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا نإ ﻞﺑ
ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ .   
3. 
1. Politics: Is not the closure of the Labor party last week 
considered interference (in the party’s affairs) before the coming 
elections? 
 
2. President Mubarak: No, absolutely. Because the supporters of the 
Labor party can, like others, run in the elections as independents 
without the need to the need to be party affiliated. 
 
3. Moreover, MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as 
independents 
 
 FP00, #9  
(19)   
 نا ﺎﻬﺘﻤﻠآ ﻲﻓ ﻪﻤﻜﺤﻤﻟا ﻪﺌﻴه تﺪآا ﻢﻜﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻖﻄﻨﻟا ﻞﺒﻗو  5. 
5. Before pronouncing the sentences, the court emphasized that  
 FP00,#1  
 
From the above-cited examples, it can be seen that all the participants who 
are privileged with access to media are official people. Both Mubarak and al-Adali 
are speaking from the perspective of their official positions, as president and 





Moreover, the reporter’s stance can be said to be in favour of what is reported 
by the government officials, and this is based on two reasons. First, the reporter’s 
choice of verbal processes are subcategorized as either neutral or positive, like stress, 
emphasize, confirm, say and answer. In example (19), the verbal process that is used 
with the court is confirmed and it is not known what made the reporter delineate the 
verbal action of the judges as such. Unless he credits what the court says, the reporter 
could have used said as a neutral process. The same analysis applies to (16). There is 
an absolute absence of voices from the MB side. The MB or any related individuals 
have never been reported in any of the news stories that covered them in al-Ahram. 
Objectivity requires that the report fairly represents the two sides of an issue 
and leaves it to the readers to judge for themselves. What is done here is a 
presentation of only one side of the argument from the perspective of the 
government. This renders the news coverage subjective and biased. Again, since this 
chapter is devoted to textual analysis, discussion of bias will not be elaborated here 
but will be kept for discussion in Chapter 6.  
To conclude, voicing analysis has shown that the ideology of excluding the 
MB is systematic and consistent. The 2000 data did not yield a single reference or 
voice of the MB. It is hard to explain or interpret the utter absence of the MB voice 
in reports that deal directly with them and in which they are accused of committing 
such significant crimes. The next section will further approach the data from the 
lexicalization perspective to see if the reporter’s choices on the level of vocabulary, 





5.2.5. Lexical Choices 
In this section, the analysis examines the social denotation, positive or 
negative, of the lexical items that are used to describe the MB. Using the Judgment 
framework of the Appraisal theory, it is found that all references to the MB in news 
reports are of a negative type. 
The lexical references that referred to the MB in the 2000 data can be 
grouped into four main categories. The first group establishes a strong connection 
between the MB and acts of both terror and violence. Depicting them as people who 
work against the security and safety of the society is a tangible example. They are 
represented as groups that are antinational unity and antisocial peace, (FP00, #8, 
L.5), and who plan to ruin the election process and want to fail the elections to serve 
their own agenda and their own candidates (FP00, #2, L.13). The Interior Minister 
accuses them as those who cast doubt on the election outcomes and describes them 
as those who want to distort the national achievement and who do not want stability 
in Egypt (FP00, #2). Moreover, they are a group whose goal is to disrupt the 
provisions of the constitution and they are damagers, inciters, provokers and 
seditionists (FP00, #1). However, the MB were also implicitly referred to as bullies 
and terrorists. In a press conference with the Interior Minister (FP00, #10), there was 
a question on how the police would deal with bullying and crimes of violence in the 
elections. Right after this question, the Minister was asked another question on the 
MB where the Minister answered by negating the existence of any entity by the 




after the question on violence and bullying insinuates a juxtaposed connection of the 
MB and violence.  
The same process of implication occurred in another interview with President 
Mubarak. First, Mubarak is asked: what was the Egyptian strategy in fighting Islamic 
terrorism? Then another question followed on the Emergency Law that had been in 
effect since Mubarak came to power in 1981. Third, there was a question on the 
forthcoming elections and the preparations to have transparent and democratic 
elections and how to prevent illegal interferences. The fourth question was on 
freezing the Labor Party. It has already been mentioned that the Labor Party was 
frozen because of connections with the MB and other Islamists. In his answer to this 
question, the President brought the MB to the discussion, although the question had 
nothing to do with the Brothers. This feeds the reader with the idea that there is a 
connection between Islamism, terrorism, Emergency Law, the Labor Party and the 
MB. 
The second group of lexical references denies Islamists legitimacy. The 
Minister of Interior describes them as not a legal party (FP00, #10). The labels 
illegal, illegitimate, unrecognized and banned are reiterated throughout the data to 
negatively modify the MB and its members. The label banned has the most 
frequency of occurrences. Searching for al-Ikhwan ناﻮﺧﻻا the Brothers and al-
MaHthura ةرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا/رﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا banned resulted in the frequency of 19, 11, respectively. 
Examples referring to the MB as banned and illegal are: the activity of which (the 
MB) is banned (FP00, #8), legally banned (FP00, #5), the outlaws, secret and 




Extremists is the third label that is used to delineate the Brothers. This label is 
attributed by implication to the MB, when the Labor Party was frozen based on 
hosting MB members (FP00, #6 and #8). Elements is a fourth label. The Longman 
Language Activator dictionary defines element as ‘a group who have the same ideas, 
aims, beliefs etc. that are different from those of a larger group, especially when you 
do not like or agree with them’. The significance of this definition in the present 
analysis lies in that it reinforces the conclusion of the analysis reached so far – that 
the official discourse on the MB is exclusionary in nature. The use of elements 
socially excludes the MB from Egyptian mainstream. It singles them out in a 
negative way as different and few. Elements supports othering the organization.  
The idea of othering is very relevant to the discussion of exclusion. In the 
2000 data, the label elements occurred eight times and all of them emphasized that 
the MB or Islamists in general were categorized as the other. Elements of the MB 
ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ occurred seven times (FP00, # 2 and #3 [twice], #5 [twice], #8 , 
#10), and the label is used associated with extremist Islamist groups in FP00, # 7and 
# 8. The context of the use of elements suggests the negative implication it has on the 
denoted people and hence excluding them. 
The fifth label that is used to foster othering the MB is the few ﺔﻠﻘﻟا. When the 
few is used to describe the other, it implies a division through which people are 
categorized along the we vs. they continuum-- we are the majority vs. they are the 
few. The label few is used three times by the Minister of Interior to refer to those 
who are challenging the government in the elections. This is interpreted as though 




excluded. In the following example, the label is given a further negative implication: 
‘The Minister assured that the police adhered to being neutral but being neutral does 
not mean being passive as the few wants it to be’ (FP00, #2 L15-16). Referring to the 
other as few and impliedly as passive highlights the ideological square along which 
the government is portrayed as good, majority and positive and the MB as bad, few 
and passive. 
The ideological square can be highlighted by the way pronouns are 
manipulated in a text. According to Silverstein (1995), deictics or shifters, such as 
pronouns, often have a central role in establishing the larger discursive structures that 
create and transform relationships. Thus, the analysis of pronouns and other types of 
deictics provides essential cues about the interactional significance of an utterance. 
By using and manipulating the pronouns, speakers/writers mean more than the 
referring function of the pronouns; they index some social and cultural codes in such 
use. The speaker, for example, by using the first-person pronoun, positions 
himself/herself in a particular social hierarchy which indexes social 
distance/intimacy, formality/informality, respect/contempt, gender, power, etc., and 
against which other positions in the hierarchy struggles. Some examples in which the 
Egyptian officials use pronouns indexically to refer to the MB are: 
1. They use the elections period to promote their ideas (FP00, #1); 
2. They want to fail the election to serve their goals and their candidates (FP00, 
#2); 
3. They do not want Egypt a stable country and we will not be bothered by them  




The boundary is now clear: they are bad and, by implication, we are good; 
their goals and candidates are different from our goals and candidates. It is clear here 
that they and them and we and us indicate more than the literal reference to the MB 
or the Minister of Interior, respectively. These pronouns are indexically used to refer 
to two ideologically opposing groups: we/us as the government, the elite, the 
dominating and they/them as the other, the few, the passive and the dominated. In the 
ideological square, we is so inclusive that it does not only include the speaker or the 
government but also includes the hearer/reader, too, who is triggered to be aligned 
with the speaker/writer.  
A further interesting example of labelling is referring to Hassan el-Banna, the 
founder of the MB, as ‘an anti-Western idea’ (FP00, # 11). The report talks about six 
Egyptian figures chosen among the most influential people in the twentieth century. 
El-Banna was chosen as one of these figures. This particular reference extends the 
we camp of the ideological square to include the West next to the government in our 
camp against the other camp of Islamists. 
To conclude, the analysis in this section has shown that the negative image of 
the MB is actively at work on the lexical level. The analysis of lexical choices also 
supported the hypothesis that exclusion is a constant policy of the Egyptian 
government towards the MB. The next section discusses presupposition as another 






The analysis revealed examples of presupposition that stress the theme of 
exclusion. It is found that the main function of presupposition in the data is to 
present the government in positive terms while negatively delineating the MB. In 
(21), the military court lists a number of accusations against the MB members. They 
want to: 
(21)  
1. Damage the social peace 
2. Revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood 
3. Provoke them be against the current legitimate government 
 FP00. #1 
These accusations presuppose the following: there is social peace, the MB is dead/ 
inactive and the current government is legitimate, respectively. In terms of the 
ideological square, these presuppositions categorize the government in the positive 
side: it is the cause of the social peace and it is legitimate, while positioning the MB 
on the other side: they destroy the social peace, reactivate a banned (implied) 
dangerous organization and are confronting the legitimate government. The adjective 
legitimate is significantly used to mean that the MB is illegitimate as long as it 
opposes the legitimate government. The same analysis can be extended to FP00, #8 
where the Islamist groups are represented as ‘antinational unity and antisocial peace’ 
(L.5). 
Presupposition and implication work hand in hand when ideology is 




bullies, terrorists and outlaws. In the report where the Interior Minister talks about 
election and bullying, he states that ‘our role is confronting only the outlaws who 
want to fail the elections’ (FP00, #2). The ‘outlaws’ –  ﻲﻠﻋ ﻦﻴﺟرﺎﺨﻟاﺔﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا , which 
means those who oppose legitimacy – presuppose that the current regime in Egypt is 
legitimate and any activity that is not in its interest is unpatriotic and unlawful. 
Presuppositions are also used to favourably colour the government and its 
official bodies. In the same press conference, the Minister condemns and threatens 
those who ‘cast doubts on the efforts and neutrality of the police; [and] aim to distort 
the national achievement’ (FP00, #2). The issue here is not if the police are neutral or 
not, because this information, given by an authority figure, is taken for granted and 
the election is considered an achievement. The focus of the reader/hearer is on those 
who are challenging these good achievements and thus whether what the official is 
talking about is an achievement or not is not contested. The two presuppositions, in 
turn, beautify both the government police and election. 
One way to turn an idea or concept from just being a personal or group 
ideology to a commonsense and taken-for-granted knowledge is by repeatedly using 
it as a presupposition. By virtue of presupposition, what was one day contested and 
argued is now an institutionalized rule or maybe a law that would cause any 
opposition to be tried, sentenced and imprisoned. Whether a certain system is 
democratic does not trigger an absolute consensus. Yet, the Egyptian regime finds it 
a reason to accuse the MB. The group is accused of  ﻚﺴﻤﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻪﻴﻗاﺪﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻴﻜﺸﺘﻟا
  ﺔﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻟﺎﺑ–’ questioning [casting doubts on] the credibility of the government’s 




regime’s honesty and commitment to democracy is so immune to questioning that 
talking about it is considered a felony.  
The analysis of presupposition has validated the results of previous analyses 
in that othering and excluding the MB is a main theme of front-page reports. In 
addition, presupposition is used to sustain and legitimize the current regime and, 
hence claim any opposition as illegitimate. 
The next chapter deals with the 2005 data in terms of the above-used tools to 
see if it yields a similar or different conclusion.
  
6. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN 2005 
6.1. MB in 2005 
In this chapter, the data of 2005 are analyzed in the same terms as those 
analysis of the 2000 data in the previous chapter. The significance of this chapter is 
to examine if the conclusion of the 2005 data would confirm or deviate from that of 
2000. If the two analyses ended with the same conclusion, this means excluding the 
MB is a systematic and consistent strategy. 
6.1.1. MB in Headlines: IR perspective 
Searching for headlines which talk about the MB in al-Ahram of 2005 
retrieved sixteen items. Quantitatively, this is a 400 percent increase from 2000. This 
considerable upswing is reflected qualitatively as well in the nature of the MB 
negative representation. Again, the approach to the headlines will be first in terms of 
the IR framework to examine what effect reading for a gist would have on average 
readers regarding their perception of the MB. The analysis echoed the recurring 
theme of exclusion in all the sixteen HLs. Exclusion is found to be achieved through 
presenting the group in the context of being banned, demonstration, connection with 




Reading the HL in (22) for a gist would make connection between these three 
lexical items: terrorism (L.2), chaos (L.2), religion-based party (L.3) and the MB 
(L.4) in the reader’s short-term memory.  
(22)  
ﺔﻴﺴﻧﺮﻔﻟا ورﺎﺠﻴﻓﻮﻟ ﺔﻔﻴﺤﺼﻟ ﺚﻳﺪﺣ ﻲﻓ كرﺎﺒﻣ :   تارﺪﺨﻤﻟاو بﺎهرﻹا ﺔﺤﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟ ئراﻮﻄﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻗ
ﻂﻘﻓ  
1. 
اﺪﺑأ ﻲﺿﻮﻔﻟا رﺎﺸﺘﻧﺎﺑ ﺢﻤﺳأ ﻦﻟو 2. 
ﻲﻨﻳد سﺎﺳأ ﻲﻠﻋ بﺰﺣ ﻞﻴﻜﺸﺘﺑ ﺢﻤﺴﻳ ﻻ نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا 3. 
يﺮﺧأ باﺰﺣﻷ مﺎﻤﻀﻧﻻا ﻦﻣ ناﻮﺧﻹا ﻊﻨﻣأ ﻻو 4. 
1. Mubarak to Le Figaro: Emergency law is only for dealing with 
terrorism and drugs 
2. I will not allow chaos to happen 
3. The law does not permit establishing parties on a religious basis 
4. I do not prevent the Brothers from joining other parties 
 FP05, # 58   
According to van Dijk, headlines are sites of “expression of semantic 
macrostructures, or topics, which organize local semantic structures” (2006b: 366). 
Accordingly, the topics, persons, events, participants, etc. that are mentioned in the 
headlines will likely be stored in the short-term memory of any reader and with 
frequent recurrence of the same topic and connotations, the very topic becomes part 
of the knowledge system of the reader. Skimming the HL in (23), readers-for-a-gist 






ﺐﻘﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻊﺑرﺄﺑ ﻢهﺮهﺎﻈﺗ 200  ﻦﻣ ﺔﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋأ ناﻮﺧﻹا ةرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا  1. 
ﺔﺑﺎﺻإ 30  ﻦﻣﻷا تاﻮﻗ ﻦﻣ 2. 
عﺮﺼﻣو ﻊﻓاﺪﺘﻟا ﺔﺠﻴﺘﻧ ﻦﻳﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا ﺪﺣأ 3. 
 1. After their demonstration in four governorates, the arrest of 200 
members of the banned Brothers group 
2. 30 state-security forces injured 
3. death of one demonstrator because of stampede 
                                                                                            HL05, #55 
The cognitive processing of this HL leads the readers to perceive the arrest of the 
MB members as justified. The readers, thus, are cognitively prepared to accept 
whatever the government tribunals consequently do with them. This perception of 
the event is intensified by L.2 and L.3 where the demonstrators are alleged to have 
caused injury or death. 
Some HLs are meant to create apprehension and fear of the MB in the 
Egyptian society. In (24), the HL is meant to create such fear.  
 (24)  
كرﺎﺒﻣ :  ﺔﻄﻠﺴﻟا نوﺪﻳﺮﻳ ناﻮﺧﻹا 6.  
ﺪﺑﻷا ﻲﻟإ نﻮﻤﻜﺤﻴﺴﻓ اﻮﻤﻜﺣ اذإو 7.  
دﻼﺒﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻖﻠﻘﻟا نﻮﺒﺒﺴﻴﺳو 8.  
ﻦﻤﺜﻟا عﻮﻓﺪﻣ ﺔﻳﺎﻔآ ﻪﺑ ﺖﻣﺎﻗ ﺎﻣ ..   9.  




6. Mubarak: The Brothers want authority 
7. If they rule, they will rule for ever 
8. And they cause chaos in Egypt 
9. What Kifaaya did is paid for [by the West or a foreign party] 
13. I could have formed similar demonstrations with a handful of money 
to shout “not kifaya”, “not enough.” 
 FP05, #50 
Here, the Egyptian President warns his people of the latent threat. Uncritical readers 
would perceive the warning as real, especially when it comes from a source of 
authority who should know more than anyone else about the security of the state. 
Analyzing the full text of this HL would reveal whether the warning is elaborated 
and justified or if it is just an ungrounded and unjustified warning. Readers without a 
goal, who skim the headlines, would most likely perceive the warning as real and 
they would interpret subsequent HLs in the light of this understanding. In this 
headline, the immediate information for the IR is the chaotic MB (L. 8) and the 
disloyal Kifaaya (L.9). 
Prison, detention and trial are recurrent themes that occurred in about 60 per 
cent of the HLs about the MB. Consequently, the resulted cognitive image on the 
group that cursory and uncritical readers would have is inevitably negative or at least 
apprehensive and unsupportive. 
It is noteworthy that about 82 percent of the headlines that mentioned the MB 
in 2005 occurred in the period from March–June, 2005, and all of them, as shown in 




readers’ cognition. This can be interpreted as preparing for the then-forthcoming 
legislative elections by imprinting a negative image on the MB and excluding from 
the readers’ cognition the most challenging force to the ruling National Democratic 
Party (NDP). Although the MB was the main and the only challenging competitor of 
the ruling NDP in the (November–December) 2005 election, there were only two 
references (12.5 percent) to the organization in the headlines from September–
December 2005. The two HLs, in line with the analysis, negatively represent the 
Brothers: HL #24 talks about the ‘release of 3 members of the banned Brothers 
group’ and HL #27 stresses that Ayman Nour, who was second to Mubarak in the 
presidential election, got all his votes from the MB. This was meant to instill the 
connection between the MB and antigovernment, and prison. The next section 
handles, in the same way as the previous analysis of the 2000 data did, the FP reports 
in terms of the IR perspective. 
6.1.2. MB in Front-Page: Idealized Reader Perspective 
Searching for al-Ikhwan ‘the Brothers’ in front-page reports resulted in sixty 
news items. Where the MB is not the main topic of the report, it is referred to, in 
most cases, in answers to questions in interviews or press conferences. Approaching 
the FP reports from the IR point of view reveals and supports the results of the 
analysis reached in the previous chapter: mystification, negative image and 
exclusion. It needs to be mentioned here that no attempt is made to analyze the 60 
reports in full. However, the results of the analysis, although it applies to all data, 




In L.6 in (25), there is no reference as to how ‘stirring the masses’ was done 
or to the nature of the ‘demonstration’. The absence of explanation in such a case 
leaves the reader with no choice but to believe the negative picture that the MB 
members were ‘pushing the masses to commit illegal actions and disturb security’. 
Given the cultural background, in the Arab world demonstrations are the nightmare 
of the Arab rulers; no demonstrations are tolerated and the police can use any 
weapon to disperse the protestors. The ‘caught-in-the-act’ process presented in L.9 is 
explained in L.10, again, mystifyingly. The reader is not given what type of action 
the MB leaders in were planning to do ‘to disturb the public peace and cause chaos’. 
The uncritical reader would process this arrest as justified.  
(25)  
 ﻪﻧا ﻦﻋ ﻲﻨﻣا رﺪﺼﻣ ﻒﺸآ  4.  
ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا ءﺎﻘﻟا ﻢﺗ 200  ﻲه تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻊﺑرﺄﺑ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋأ ﻦﻣ :  
 ﺲﻳﻮﺴﻟاو ﻪﻴﻠﻴﻋﺎﻤﺳﻻاو ﻪﻴﻠﻬﻗﺪﻟاو ﻩﺮهﺎﻘﻟا  
5.  
 ﻢﻬﻣﺎﻴﻘﻟﺮﻴهﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻩرﺎﺛﺎﺑ  6.  
ﺲﻣأ ﻪﻌﻤﺠﻟا ﻩﻼﺻ ﺐﻘﻋ ﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻢﻬﻀﻳﺮﺤﺗو ..    7.  
 نأ رﺪﺼﻤﻟا فﺎﺿأو  8.  
 ﻦﻣ ﻦﻳﺮﺧا ﻪﺛﻼﺛو ﻲﻧاﻮﺧﻻا يدﺎﻴﻘﻟا نﺎﻳﺮﻌﻟا مﺎﺼﻋ رﻮﺘآﺪﻟا ﻂﺒﺿ ﻦﻣ ﺖﻨﻜﻤﺗ ﻦﻣﻷا ﻩﺰﻬﺟأ
 لوﻷا لﺰﻨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا تادﺎﻴﻗ  
9.  




 ﺎﺨﻠﻃ ﻪﻨﻳﺪﻤﺑ مﺎﻨﻐﻟا ﺪﺠﺴﻣ مﺎﻣا اوﺮهﺎﻈﺗ ﺪﻗ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ ﺺﺨﺷ ﻲﻔﻟا ﻮﺤﻧ نﺎآو
ﻪﻴﻠﻬﻗﺪﻟﺎﺑ  
11.  
 بﻮﻄﻟﺎﺑ ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا لﺎﺟر فﺬﻘﺑ اﻮﻣﺎﻗ ، تاﺮهﺎﻈﻤﻟا ﺾﻓ ﻩروﺮﻀﺑ ﻦﻣﻷا تاﺮﻳﺬﺤﺗ ﻢﻏﺮﺑو
ﻩرﺎﺠﺤﻟاو ,   
12.  
و طﺎﺒﺿ ﻪﻌﺑرا ﻪﺑﺎﺻا ﻲﻟا يدأ ﺎﻤﻣ 26  دﻮﻨﺠﻟاو داﺮﻓﻻا ﻦﻣ ,    13.  
مﺎﻨﻏ يﺪﻬﻣ ﻪﻃ قرﺎﻃ ﻪﻤﺳاو ﻪﻋﺮﺼﻣ ﻦﻳﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا ﺪﺣأ ﻲﻘﻟو 40  ﻪﻨﺳ ,   تادﺎﻴﻗ ﻦﻣ ﻮهو
ﻦﻳﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا ﻊﻓاﺪﺗ ﻪﺠﻴﺘﻧ ﻪﻈﻓﺎﺤﻤﻟﺎﺑ ناﻮﺧﻻا .  
14.  
4. A security source has revealed that 
5. 200 members of the  banned MB have been arrested in four 
governorates 
6. As they stirred up the masses 
7. and incited them to demonstrate after Friday prayers yesterday. 
8. The source added 
9. the security forces were able to arrest Dr. Essam el-Eryaan, the leading 
Brother's figure and three other leaders in the house of the first 
10 While they were planning for actions causing instability  and chaos 
(peoples security) 




el-Ghannam mosque in Talkha 
12. In spite of police warning to end the demonstration, they pelted police 
with bricks and stones 
13. Which resulted in the injury of 4 officers and 26 soldiers 
14. Moreover Tarek Ghannam, 40,  one of the demonstrators  and  a 
leading figure in the MB, died   because of demonstrators' stampede 
 FP05, #55 
The report does not make available to the IR, who does not have time or 
effort to look for alternative news sources, the information why this huge number of 
people is demonstrating? The readers are left to understand that these people are 
unpatriotic, disloyal and troublemakers as they pelt police with bricks and stones 
(L.6), injure officers and soldiers (L.12) and irresponsibly kill one of their leaders 
(L.14). A detailed critical reading of the same report, as will be shown in the next 
sections, will at least throw some doubt on the trustworthiness of the content of the 
report. However, for the IR, the representation of the event (demonstration) is 
mystified and thus the result (police reaction) is justified. 
Mystification techniques are widely used in all the FP reports pertaining to 
how the elections process was going. In every line in (26), the reader would not be 






أﺳﻔﺮت اﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻣﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ أﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ وﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان   , ﻓﻔﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﻪ
 ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ ﺳﻴﺪﺗﺎن  , اﺷﺨﺎص  7 اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻋﻦ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ
  .3
  .4   . وذﻟﻚ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﺗﻬﺎﻣﺎت ﺑﺸﺮاء اﻻﺻﻮات
ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻴﻪ   6 اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ   , وﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ ﺑﻮﻻق اﺑﻮاﻟﻌﻼ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ
  ﺟﻨﻴﻪ  004 و  003 واﻟﻤﺴﺠﻠﻴﻦ ﺧﻄﺮ اﺳﺘﺎﺟﺮهﻢ ﺟﺰار ﺑﻤﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﺗﺘﺮاوح ﺑﻴﻦ
  .5
  .6    .  , ﻟﻤﺴﺎﻧﺪﻩ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ 
وﺿﺒﻄﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﻣﻌﻬﻢ اﺳﻠﺤﻪ ﺑﻴﻀﺎء وﺻﻨﺎدﻳﻖ ﻣﻴﺎﻩ ﻏﺎزﻳﻪ ﻓﺎرﻏﻪ ﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اي 
    . ﻣﻌﺎرك ﻣﺤﺘﻤﻠﻪ
  .7
ﺪم اﻧﺼﺎر ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﺴﻨﺞ واﻟﻤﻄﺎوي ﻻرهﺎب اﺳﺘﺨ  , وﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﻔﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ اﻳﻀﺎ
    , ﺧﺼﻮﻣﻬﻢ
  .8
 .9    . آﻤﺎ ﺷﻬﺪت ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﺠﺎن اﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت ﺷﺮاء اﻻﺻﻮات ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﻠﻨﻲ
آﻤﺎ ﻋﺎدت ﻇﺎهﺮﻩ ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ اﻻﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻨﺢ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ 
    , اﺻﻮاﺗﻬﻢ ﻟﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻈﻬﻮر ﻣﻦ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ اﻣﺲ
  .31
  .51    , ﺟﺮي اﻏﻼق ﻋﺪﻩ ﻟﺠﺎن ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ وﻣﺤﺎوﻟﻪ ارهﺎب اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ  , وﻓﻲ ﺑﻨﻲ ﺳﻮﻳﻒ
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5. in Boulak, Cairo police was able to arrest 6 thugs and recorded-as 
dangerous hired for L.E. 400 to 500 by a butcher, 
6. to support an independent candidate 
7. The police seized with them white arms to be used in any may-be 
battles 
8. in addition, in the Khalifa area, the supporters of some candidates 
used pocket knives to terrify their opponents, 
9. some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically, 
13. Also, the phenomena of distributing electric household sets to the 
voters to support a certain candidate has reappeared 
15. in Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying 
and terroristic acts, 
16. as the supporters of a certain candidate tried to fabricate a large brawl 
in which they used pocket knives and fighting sticks … 
FP05, #16 
 
Elaborative inferences, such as who and why, are unlikely to be inferred by 
the IR and they have to be provided by the report. If the report does not clearly state 
who did the action and why, the reader would cognitively look for other cues to 
generate these information. In (26), the reader reads about a fighting scene but 
cannot generate who is responsible for it. In L.1, all what we know from the report is 
that there was a clash between X and Y that ended in the injury of seven people. Did 




information, though crucial, are absent from the report. The responsibility of mutual 
clashes and vote purchasing (L.3, L.4, L.9), hiring of thugs (L.5), use of pocket 
knives (L.8), fabricating a brawl (L.16) is attributed to no one in the report. Although 
it cannot be said that this report has negatively represented the MB, the IR is left 
with a negative image of the group because of the accumulated knowledge processed 
from previous reports. This accumulated knowledge would assign actors to and 
reasons for the actions in the report by cognitively binding the violent acts with 
Islamists. The reader, in the interpretation process, will resort to other discursive and 
social practices as well as other reports that explicitly or by implication associate 
violence with Islamism. 
In (27), violence is clearly affiliated to the MB as in L.5 and, to highlight the 
credibility of the news for the average reader, the report sources a senior official in 
the Interior: the Ministry of Interior spokesperson. 
(27)  
ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﻢﺳﺎﺑ ثﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟا :   ﻩﺰﻬﺟﻷاحﺎﺠﻧ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺖﻠﻤﻋ ﻪﻴﻨﻣﻷا  ﻢﻏر ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا
ﻩدوﺪﺤﻤﻟا تازوﺎﺠﺘﻟا  
1. 
أآ ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﻩرازﻮﻟ ﻲﻤﺳﺮﻟا ثﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟاو ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﻳزو ﺪﻋﺎﺴﻣ دﺎﻤﺣ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ءاﻮﻠﻟا ﺪ  2.  
ﺪآاو  ﻲﻔﺸﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﻲﻟا ﻪﻠﻘﻧ ﺪﻌﺑ ﻪﻔﺘﺣ ﻲﻘﻟ ﻪﻳرﺪﻨﻜﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ اﺪﺣاو ﺎﺼﺨﺷ نا دﺎﻤﺣ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ءاﻮﻠﻟا
ﻩﺬﻓﺎﻧ ﻪﻨﻌﻄﺑ ﺎﺑﺎﺼﻣ ,   
7.  
  رﺎﻘﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺗو ﻪﻳﺎﻤﺤﻟ ﻢﻬﺗﻻوﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻨﺛا ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا دﻮﻨﺟو طﺎﺒﺿ ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﺐﻴﺻا ﺎﻤآ
ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻪﻴﺠﻄﻠﺒﻠﻟ يﺪﺼﺘﻟاو ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا .    
8.  





1.  The Ministry of Interior spokesperson: the security authorities worked 
on the success of the election process, regardless of the limited 
transgressions. 
2.  Major General Ibrahim Hammad, assistant of Minister of Interior and 
the Interior spokesman, stressed that: 
7.  He also stressed that in Alexandria , one person was stabbed and died 
after he was transferred to the hospital 
8.  A number of police officers and soldiers have been injured while in 
duty trying to protect and secure the voting sites and to confront the 
thugs. 
9.  He also stressed that the banned MB supporters are responsible of 
most of the violent acts. 
  FP05, #12  
 
Mystification is at work in L.7 and L.8 where it is not put at the disposal of the 
reader who was killed, who killed him, why or who injured the police officers in duty. 
However, the social practices, the accumulated knowledge and the comment of the 
spokesperson in L.9 all lead the IR to associate the violent actions with the MB 
candidates and their supporters. 
In the interview with the Egyptian President in one of the widely circulated 
Arabic newspapers, the Kuwaiti Politics, the President negatively represents the MB 





ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ  ﻣﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺻﺮﻳﻴﻦ وﻣﻊ  , ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﻜﻔﻴﺮﻳﻴﻦ  , اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺎ ﺳﺮ ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻒ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﺳﻴﺎدﻩ
 ؟ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻐﺪ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﻢ ﺿﺪ اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻪ وﺿﺪ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .4
  .5  . ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ ان ﺗﺮي وﺗﻘﺪر ﻣﻦ ﻳﻘﻒ وراءهﻢ : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .6 هﻨﺎك اﺳﺒﺎب ﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﻢ 
  .7   , واﻧﺎ اﻋﺮﻓﻬﺎ
  .8  اﻟﻌﻈﻤﻲ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻬﻤﻨﻲ هﻮ ﻣﺼﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﻐﺎﻟﺒﻴﻪ
ﻣﻊ اﻧﻲ اﻋﺮف ان وﻟﻲ   , ؟ﻣﺎ ﻗﺼﻪ ﻓﺘﺢ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ﻟﻘﻨﺎﻩ ﺣﻮار ﻣﻊ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
  اﻧﺎ ارﻳﺪ ان ﺗﻜﻮن ﺷﻔﺎﻓﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﻪ؟  .. ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎاﻟﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدي اﻻﻣﻴﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﷲ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺎﺗﺒﻬﻢ 
  .72
  .82    , ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﻤﻮح ﻓﻲ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻨﺎ ﺑﺘﺎﺳﻴﺲ اﻻﺣﺰاب اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﻪ
  .92   , وﻻ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﺒﺮ اﺣﺰاب اﺧﺮي ﻣﺮﺧﺼﻪ
  .03    , ?ﻟﻜﻦ هﻞ اﻃﺮوﺣﺎت اﻻﺧﻮان ﻣﻘﺒﻮﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎس
  .13  وان ﺗﺴﺘﺮوا ﺑﺤﺰب اﺧﺮ
  .23  ﻣﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺘﻀﻠﻴﻞاﻟﻨﺎس هﻨﺎ اﺟﺘﺎزوا 
  .33  وﻟﺪﻳﻬﻢ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﺮ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺷﻲء  , وﻳﻔﻬﻤﻮن ﻣﺠﺮﻳﺎت اﻻﻣﻮر
 eht fo ecnailla eht dniheb terces eht si tahw ,tnediserP .rM :scitiloP .4
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27. Politics: what is the story behind the Americans opening a dialogue 
channel with the MB? I know that the Saudi prince Abdalla has 
admonished them on it. I want a transparent answer 
28. President: Our law does not allow establishing religious parties 
29. yet they can work through other licensed parties 
30. However, are the theses of the MB acceptable by people 
31. Even if they cower under another party’s umbrella? 
32. People here have passed the phase of mystification 
33. They understand the current situation and they have an interpretation 
for everything. 
 FP05, #52 
The questions in lines 4 and 27 evoke the idea of MB disloyalty in the cognition of 
the IR: the MB members are opening contacts with a foreign country and ally with 
either publicly unacceptable or antigovernment groups. Moreover, the answers of 
Mubarak stress the same idea of the MB being disloyal and publicly unacceptable. 
The answers, L.5 and L.8 are so general that they leave the IR undecided about many 
issues in the report: the identity of who the MB is dealing with and the (secret) 
information that the President knows about the MB that supposedly makes them 
against the interest of the majority. L.30, mystifyingly, establishes the following as a 
fact: the MB is publicly unacceptable. Since the information came from the Head of 
State, uncritical readers would accept it without contestation. The statement is 




June (FP05, #38) and 8 June (FP05, #42), both the US ambassador in Cairo and 
Secretary of State, respectively, denied that any dialogue channels had been opened 
with the MB. Nevertheless, would the readers-for-a-gist be able to connect these 
news reports together to understand that the President’s claims were false and 
ungrounded? 
The FP report in (29) restates the same image: the MB is working against the 
mainstream. 
(29)   
كرﺎﺒﻤﻟ ﻩﺪﻳﻮﻣ ﻩﺮﻴﺴﻣ نﻮﻤﻈﻨﻳ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ فﻻا ﻩﺮﺸﻋ 1.  
بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ فﻻا ﻩﺮﺸﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ كرﺎﺷ ﻪﻴﻤﻠﺳ ﻩﺮﻴﺴﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا 2.  
ﻣﺆ ﻪﺗردﺎﺒﻣو كرﺎﺒﻣ ﻲﻨﺴﺣ ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻠﻟ ﻩﺪﻳﻩدﺎﻤﻟا ﻞﻳﺪﻌﺘﺑ ﻪﻴﺨﻳرﺎﺘﻟا )76(  رﻮﺘﺳﺪﻟا ﻦﻣ ,  3.  
ﻪﺤﻴﺷﺮﺗ نﻼﻋﺎﺑ ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻟا ﻪﺒﻟﺎﻄﻣو .   4.  
 رﺎﺼﻧا ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﻊﻤﺠﺗ ﺮﺧا ﺐﻧﺎﺟ ﻦﻣو ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ تادﺎﻴﻗو ﻪﻳﺎﻔآ ﻪآﺮﺣ ناﻮﺧﻻا  ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا
ﻲﺘﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟاو ﻦﻴﻴﻔﺤﺼﻟا ,   
5.  
ﻞﻣﺎﺸﻟا ﻲﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا حﻼﺻﻻﺎﺑ اﻮﺒﻟﺎﻃو .   6.  
1. 10,000 NDP members organize a march in support of Mubarak 
2. More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful 
march 
3. To supporting president Mubarak and his historic intuitive to amend 
constitutional article 76 
4. And ask him to declare his candidacy 




MB gathered in both lawyers and journalists’ syndicates 
6. and called for reform.  
                                                                                              FP05, # 51 
A cursory reading of (29) would imprint the following image: on one side, there are 
10,000 people supporting Mubarak, and on the other there are a ‘number of people’ 
representing the MB. Referring to the number when the reference is to us and 
mystifying it, in a belittling way, when it comes to them is another way to endorse 
the exclusionary ideological square. Modifying the ‘march’ of the NDP supporters as 
‘peaceful’ is also significant in adding a positive imprint to us and colouring the 
them by implication as opposite. 
During the analysis of how the MB is represented to the average reader in al-
Ahram, it was not difficult to trace and pin down the theme of exclusion and the 
strategies used to implement it. In (30), the Egyptian PM confesses that it is not easy 
to include the MB in the political body of Egyptian society under the frequently-
quoted justification that the MB is a religious party and the Constitution does not 
allow religion-based parties. 
(30)  
  ﻒﻴﻈﻧ :  ﻪﻃﺎﺴﺒﻟا ﻩﺬﻬﺑ ﺮﻣﻻا ﻚﻟﺬﺑ مﻮﻘﻧ ﻦﻟ ,   7.  
ﻚﻟﺬﺑ ﺢﻤﺴﻳ ﻻ ﺎﻧرﻮﺘﺳد .    8.  
 ﻲﻨﻳد سﺎﺳا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻪﻴﺳﺎﻴﺳ باﺰﺣﺎﺑ ﺢﻤﺴﻧ ﻦﻟ  9.  
ﻚﻟﺬﺑ ﺢﻤﺴﺘﺳ ﻲﺘﻟا لوﺪﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﻴﺜﻜﻟا ﺪﺟﻮﺗ ﻻو .   10.  




ﻪﻧوﺪﻳﺮﻳ ﺎﻣ ﻮه اﺬه .  ؟ﻚﻟﺬﺑ حﺎﻤﺴﻟا ﺎﻨﻟ ﻦﻜﻤﻳ ﻒﻴآ  12.  
7. Nazif: We would not simply do it, 
8. our Constitution does not allow it. 
9. we will not allow political parties based on religion 
10. and many countries do not allow it 
11. Would you like to see in Egypt, the party of Islam and Christian 
parties and parties of Judaism? 
12. This what they want to see happen, how would we allow it to?! 
 FP05, #48 
 
The average uncritical reader would not question the religion-based party statement 
nor examine its truth-value and, henceforth, would accept it. CDA and critically-
aware analysis, which will be explicated in the next sections, would have a different 
reading of the statement. 
To conclude this section, a number of techniques have been manipulated in 
news reporting in relation to the representation of the MB: mystification; explicit, yet 
ungrounded, accusations; othering (connection with foreign countries, 
antigovernment groups), and binding them with violence and chaos. Mystification 
keeps absent from the report the necessary background information that the reader-
for-a-gist needs to fully process the event and without which he/she is left open to 
accepting the between-the-lines reading of the reporter. In the following sections, a 





In the analysis of transitivity, only the processes that are related to the MB are 
counted. Therefore, the reports on elections have been fully analyzed and the 
processes have been counted in terms of their types and subtypes. However, 
sometimes, the front-page items cover the elections or the MB in part of it, the 
analysis then focuses only on that part.  
The analysis of transitivity patterns in the data of 2000 revealed the 
predominance of material processes, seconded by the verbal processes. The analysis 
has also shown that all the material processes are related to violence, chaos, prison, 
detention and demonstration which negatively marked the MB and helped to develop 
an atmosphere of apprehension and exclusion. In this section, the data of 2005 are 
analyzed to see if the analysis would render the same results. The total number of the 
processes in the analyzed data is 523. Analyzing the front-page news items resulted 
in, again, the significant predominance of material processes as shown in Table 6.1. 
The occurrence percentages are shown by Figure 6.1. A simple comparison between 
Figures 5.1 and 6.1 which is explained by Table 6.2, reveals that the percentage of  
Table  6.1 Distribution of process types in MB-related 2005 front-page reports 
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The collective image resulting out of skimming the headline is the MB members are 
violent and the police are the victim. This image is highlighted by the use of 
topicalization, where the predicate of the sentence  ﺐﻘﻋﻢهﺮهﺎﻈﺗ  , “after their 
demonstration” is placed in the subject position, ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا  200   ﻦﻣءﺎﻀﻋأ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ   
ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا “the arrest of 200 members of the banned Brothers.” The significance of 
topicalization is to prepare the reader cognitively to accept the effect (arrest) after 
mentioning the cause (demonstration) at the beginning of the sentence. Reading the 
full report in (30) confirms this analysis.  
In the text of FP05, #55 in (25), all the material processes associated with the 
MB belong to the semantic field of violence and chaos: stir, incite, demonstrate, 
demonstrate, plan and pelt. In this report, there are three causes which lead to three 
effects: 
 Causes (members of the MB as Actors of the clauses): 
1. 200 people demonstrating, inciting and provoking the masses; 
2. four people are secretively planning to disturb stability; 
3. 2000 are rioting, have injured the some policemen. 
Effects (members of the MB as Goal of the clauses): 
1. 200 arrested; 
2. gour people arrested; 
3. one MB member died, 
The cause/effect analysis is what imprints the negative image on the reader’s mind. 




government’s clampdown would look justified as to protect legitimacy. The strategy 
of accusing the group and its members of incitement and breaching social security 
recurs frequently in the 2005 data. It can be seen in (31), which talks about the arrest 
of the General Secretary of the MB organization, Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat.  
(31)    
ﻦﻴﻨﻃاﻮﻤﻟا ﺾﻳﺮﺤﺗ نﻮﻓﺪﻬﺘﺴﻳ اﻮﻧﺎآ ,  لﺎﻤﻌﻟاو بﻼﻄﻟا ﻪﺻﺎﺧ ,   5.  
ﻲﻧﺪﻤﻟا نﺎﻴﺼﻌﻟا ﻲﻟا ﻩﻮﻋﺪﻟاو ﻲﺿﻮﻔﻟا لﺎﻌﺷﻻ .  6.  
5. [the Brothers] were planning to provoke the public, specially students 
and workers 
6. To spark chaos and to call for civil disobedience 
                                                                                              FP05, #44  
 
The cause/effect strategy is repeatedly used to establish the negative representation, 
as in (32). 
(32)   
 ةرﺮﺒﻤﻟا ﺮﻴﻏ تاﺮهﺎﻈﻤﻟا....فﺪﻬﺘﺴﺗ رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻼﻟ ةدرﺎﻃ ﺐﻐﺷ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ دﺎﺠﻳإ  2.  
2. [Unjustified demonstrations]...aim to create a state of chaos that is 
centrifugal of [foreign] investments. 
 FP05, #53 
The “demonstrations,” implied as being led by the Brothers, create a state of chaos. 
The MB, again, as an Actor is presented as the cause of weakening the country’s 
economical resources by holding protests that will detract investments, which means 




The technique of associating the MB with violence and chaos took a sharp 
curve up with the beginning of the first round of elections in November 2005. The 
MB protest developed from ‘demonstration’ to ‘clashes’ and ‘fights’. One of the 
reports, in (33), devotes the full report to cover the elections and it reports nothing 
but violence.  
(33)   
 ﻦﻋ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﺢﺷﺮﻣو ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا ﺢﺷﺮﻣ رﺎﺼﻧأ ﻦﻴﺑ تﺎﻣدﺎﺼﻤﻟا تﺮﻔﺳأ
ﻪﺑﺎﺻا 7  صﺎﺨﺷأ ,  نﺎﺗﺪﻴﺳ ﻢﻬﻨﻴﺑ ﻦﻣ 
3.  
 ءاﺮﺸﺑ تﺎﻣﺎﻬﺗا ﺐﺒﺴﺑ ﻚﻟذوتاﻮﺻﻻا . 4.  
3. Clashing between the supporters of the NDP and the banned MB 
candidate resulted in the injury of 7 persons; Two of them were 
women in Old Cairo. 
4. This was because of mutual accusations of vote purchasing, 
 FP05, # 16 
Nominalization is a further linguistic strategy that is used to conceal the actor 
and mystify the agent. It is the use of a noun instead of a verb to express the action. 
Therefore, a nominalized version of X killed Y is the killing of Y. The result of 
nominalization is that the focus on agency is mystified and the action is perceived as 
a fact. According to Fairclough (2000: 26), the function of nominalization lies in that  
no specification of who or what is changing, a backgrounding of the 
processes of change themselves, and a foregrounding of their effect. In 
backgrounding the processes themselves, nominalization also backgrounds 




Nominalization, therefore, “freezes the processes and makes them static so 
that they can be talked about and evaluated” (Francis 1988: 203). The text is no 
longer about what is happening, but what is being “internalised and factualised by 
society as to the status of what has already happened: the relationship between events 
rather than events themselves” (ibid.: 216). The impact of using such a form is that 
‘nominalization of transitive verbs … holds enormous ideological potential, since it 
obfuscates responsibility by backgrounding (or often deleting) agency and causality’ 
(Richardson, 2004: 54). In (33), two nominalized forms are used: clashing and 
purchasing (L.3 and L.4). Readers are put in a position to focus on the result of the 
clashes rather than who caused them. One other function of nominalization is to 
normalize and nullify the agency. The event where A started the clash with B will be 
reported as the clashes between A and B. In the second version, the responsibility is 
distributed between the two parties rather than falling on A. Moreover, the anchoring 
principle would trigger the reader to align the two processes with the MB. The same 
process is repeatedly used in the data. One more example is given in (34) where it is 
not known who did the vote purchasing. 
(34)   
 ءاﺮﺷ تﺎﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﻩﺮﺋاﺪﻟا نﺎﺠﻟ ﺾﻌﺑ تﺪﻬﺷ ﺎﻤآﻲﻨﻠﻋ ﻞﻜﺸﺑ تاﻮﺻﻻا  9.  
9. Some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically, 
 FP05, #16 
 
Some other examples have shown that the effect of obscuring and mystifying 




as in (26) above. In L.5–7, it is known that the hired Actors  plan to use the white 
weapons and support the independent candidate. Yet it is not known for whom these 
thugs are working. In L8, the agent is referred to, again, mystifyingly, as the 
supporters of some candidates. It is the goal of news reports to lay down the event in 
front of the reader and leave it to him/her to judge who is responsible. But here, the 
event is affiliated with unidentified subjects. This leaves undecided about the real 
agents of the processes or they are triggered by the context to affiliate the agent role 
to the MB. 
A further technique that is used to mystify agency is ergativity. An example 
of ergativity is given in (35): 
(35)   
ﻒﻳﻮﺳ ﻲﻨﺑ ﻲﻓو ,  ﻦﻴﺒﺧﺎﻨﻟا بﺎهرا ﻪﻟوﺎﺤﻣو ﻪﺠﻄﻠﺒﻟا لﺎﻤﻋا ﺐﺒﺴﺑ نﺎﺠﻟ ﻩﺪﻋ قﻼﻏا يﺮﺟ ,    15.  
ﻪﻤﺨﺿ ﻩﺮﺟﺎﺸﻣ لﺎﻌﺘﻓا ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا ﺪﺣا رﺎﺼﻧأ لوﺎﺣو ,   ﺞﻨﺴﻟاو فﻮﻴﺴﻟا ﺎﻬﻴﻓ اﻮﻣﺪﺨﺘﺳا
مﻮﺸﻟاو ,  
16.  
  ﻩﺮﺟﺎﺸﻤﻟا ﺾﻔﻟ ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا ﺖﻋﺮﺳأ نأ ﻲﻟا .   17.  
طﻮﻴﺳأ ﻲﻓو ,  ﻪﻳرﺎﻧ ﻩﺮﻴﻋا ﻩﺪﻋ قﻼﻃا يﺮﺟ  ﺰآﺮﻣ ﻪﻴﻧﺎﺜﻟا ﻩﺮﺋاﺪﻠﻟ ﻪﻌﺑﺎﺘﻟا ﻲﺷﻮﻣ ﻪﻨﺠﻟ بﺮﻗ
طﻮﻴﺳا  
18.  
ةﺪﻳﺪﻋ تادﺎﺸﻣ ﺖﺛﺪﺣو ,   19.  
15.  In Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying 
and terroristic acts, 
16. As the supporters of a certain candidate tried to fabricate a large 




17. Until the police were able to break the melee up 
18. And in Assuit, a number of shots were fired near Moshee voting site  
19. There have been numerous altercations. 
                                                                                             FP05, # 16 
The three ergative processes (L.15, L.18 and L.19) are all of the Middle type that has 
only one participant: the Medium. The translation of the Arabic processes قﻼﻏا يﺮﺟ , 
 قﻼﻃا يﺮﺟ and تادﺎﺸﻣ ﺖﺛﺪﺣ are rendered passive forms: were closed, shots were fired 
and there have been, respectively. It worth noting here that the literal translations of 
the Arabic processes are a closing of the sites happened, firing of the shots took place 
and altercations happened respectively. Out of this analysis, the processes of closing, 
firing and altercations are represented as a reflexive type of actions, i.e., as if they 
made themselves or they just happened and no one is responsible. 
Another frequently used structure through which ergativity is realized is the 
passive voice, the effect of which is to hide the actual agent of the process. The 
structure be + injured is the one that is used predominantly and its frequency is 
distributed over the longest three reports that covered the elections in full. These 
three reports are FP05, #1 (3 times), FP05, #11 (4 times) and FP05, #12. The 
examples are given in (36 A–C). The ergative processes are underlined in the Arabic 
sections. 
(36A)   





ﺦﻴﺸﻟا ﺮﻔآ ﻲﻓو ,  ﺐﻴﺻأ ﻮﺤﻧ 35  ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا رﺎﺼﻧأ ﻦﻴﺑ تﺎآﺎﺒﺘﺷا ﻲﻓ ﺮﺋاود ﻩﺪﻋ ﻲﻓ ﺎﺼﺨﺷ  24 
 ﺚﻴﺣﺐﻴﺻأ ﺔﻤﻳﺪﺘﺴﻣ ﺔهﺎﻌﺑ ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟا ﺪﺣأ 32 
21. And 6 soldiers and a number of officers have been injured due to 
throwing of rocks and incendiary bottles 
24. In Kafr el-Shiekh, about 35 people were injured in clashed between 
the candidates supporters 
32. Where a lawyer has been injured with a permanent disability 
 FP05, # 1 
(36B)   
 ﺎﻤآﺐﻴﺻأ ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا ﺪﺣا )  ﻲﻨﻃو  11.  
ﺐﻴﺻأو ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا نﻮﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ رﺎﺼﻧا ﺪﺣا ,    12.  
 ﺪﻗوﺐﻴﺻأ  ﻲﺘﻟا تﺎآﺎﺒﺘﺷﻻا لﻼﺧ ﻢﻬﺗاﻮﺻﺎﺑ ءﻻدﻼﻟ اﻮﺒهذ ﻦﻳﺬﻟا ﻦﻴﻨﻃاﻮﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ تاﺮﺸﻌﻟا
ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﺮﺋاوﺪﻟا مﺎﻣا ﺖﻌﻗو ,    
13.  
ﻪﺴﻔﻧ ﺖﻗﻮﻟا ﻲﻓ ,  ﺐﻴﺻأ  ﺮﻜﺷ ﺮﻔآ ﻩﺮﺋاﺪﺑ يرﺎﻏز ﻦﺴﺣ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻟا ﺢﺷﺮﻣ ﻖﻴﻘﺷ
ﻪﻘﻴﻘﺷ رﺎﺼﻧا ﻦﻴﺑ ﻪﻈﻴﻠﻐﻟا ﻲﺼﻌﻟﺎﺑ ﻩﺮﺟﺎﺸﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻪﻣﺪﻗ ﻲﻓ ﺮﺴﻜﺑ ﻪﻴﺑﻮﻴﻠﻘﻟا ﻪﻈﻓﺎﺤﻤﺑ ,  
ناﻮﺧﻻا رﺎﺼﻧاو ,  
61.  
11. One of the independent candidates (NDP) was injured as well 
12. And one supporter of the banned MB was injured  
13. And tens of people who went to vote were injured during clashes 
that occurred in front of the voting sites 
61. At the same time, in Kafr Shokr the NDP candidate’s brother was 




his brother’s supporters and the MB supporters. 
 FP05, # 11 
(36C)   
 ﺎﻤآﺐﻴﺻأ  ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا رﺎﻘﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﻣﺄﺗو ﻪﻳﺎﻤﺤﻟ ﻢﻬﺗﻻوﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻨﺛأ ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا دﻮﻨﺟو طﺎﺒﺿ ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ
ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻪﻴﺠﻄﻠﺒﻠﻟ يﺪﺼﺘﻟاو .   
8.  
8. A number of police officers and soldiers were injured while attempting 
to protect and secure the voting sites and to confront the bullies 
 FP05, # 12 
In the sentences where the passive form ﺐﻴﺻأ injured is used, all that is known is that 
people are injured but the reader is not provided any information as to who injured 
them. 
In the 2005 elections, the main two players were the NDP and the MB. So in 
studying the above ergative clauses, the Medium is found to be either government-
related, MB-related, or is left vague (i.e., there is no clue who the Medium is). For 
the purpose of the present analysis, it will be assumed that if the Medium is 
government related, then the external cause (the assumed agent of the ergative 
process (Halliday, 1994: 165)) is the MB and if the medium is the MB, then the 
external cause is government-related. Moreover, if the medium cannot be assigned 
because it is left unmentioned in the text, it will be called ‘vague’ and more 
information will be sought in both the text and the context to generate the external 
cause for these ‘vague’ Mediums. The Medium distribution is presented in Table 6.3. 
The percentage of frequency of the Medium is presented in Figure 6.3. 
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This chart highlights the following points: 
1. The MB is the external cause of violent acts in 50 percent; 
2. The government is the external cause of violent acts in 12 percent. 
However, the percentage under ‘vague’ can be added to the government’s share 
based on the previous analysis which has shown that whenever the external cause is 
mystified, the context triggers the reader to hold the MB responsible for the violent 
acts. Therefore, the government would be responsible for only 12 percent as a cause 
of violence while the MB, in turn, would be responsible for 88 percent. In terms of 
the ideological square, the chart shows that the we vs they dichotomy works on the 
level of transitivity as well: our evils are mitigated while theirs are accentuated. 
The frequent reference to the MB in front-page stories in a negative way as in 
(37) supports the anchoring process by which the reader cognitively connects any 
violent act that has no explicit cause to the MB.  
(37)   
ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا ﻦﻣﻷا ﻩﺰﻬﺟأ ﺖﻘﻟأ ﺪﻗو 200   ﻦﻣ ﻪﺠﻄﻠﺒﻟاو ﺐﻐﺸﻟا يﺮﻴﺜﻣ ﻦﻣ ﺺﺨﺷ
ﻊﺴﺘﻟا تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻣ رﺎﺼﻧأ ,  . 
16.  
ﻪﺼﺘﺨﻤﻟا تﺎﺑﺎﻴﻨﻟا ﻲﻟا ﻢﻬﺘﻟﺎﺣا ﻢﺘﺗ فﻮﺳ ءﻻﻮه نأ لﻮﺌﺴﻣ ﻲﻨﻣأ رﺪﺼﻣ ﺮآذو .  17.  
 ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﻩرازو تﺪآأو ثاﺪﺣأ ﻊﻣ رﻮﻔﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﺖﻠﻣﺎﻌﺗ ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا تاﻮﻗ نأ ﺲﻣأ نﺎﻴﺑ
ﺐﻐﺸﻟا ,  
18.  
 ﻪﻟﺎﺣ ﻞﻇ ﻲﻓ ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻤﻟا وﺪﻳﺆﻣ ﺎهرﺎﺛأ ﻲﺘﻟا ﺐﻐﺸﻟا لﺎﻤﻋأ نﺄﺸﺑ ﻪﻴﻧﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا تاءاﺮﺟﻻا تﺬﺨﺗاو
ﻪﻐﻟﺎﺑ ﺮﺗﻮﺗ 
19.  




ا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻧﺎﻤﺛ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا يﺮﺟ ﻪﻧأو ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا نﻮﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻ
ﺐﻐﺸﻟا ﻪﻤﻬﺘﺑ .  
21.  
16. The security authorities arrested more than 200 riot-agitators and 
bullies among the supporters of different candidates 
17. A security source said that those people will be referred to the 
prosecution authorities. 
18. In a statement issued yesterday, the ministry of Interior confirmed 
that the police has immediately dealt with the riots 
19. And has taken legal action regarding the riots sparked by the 
candidates’ supporters amid an extremely tense situation 
20. Created by candidates with Islamic slogans, 
21. And more than 8 elements belonging to the banned MB have been 
arrested as riot-agitators.  
 FP05, #11 
In the first part of the report (L16–L.19), the actors of ‘riots’ and ‘violence’ are left 
unidentified. In L.20, the MB is claimed to be guilty and this justifies arresting them 
(L.21). In transitivity terms, the members of the MB are represented as Actor of 
violence and chaos and the object of arrest, where they are the Goal of the process. 
This is the most recurring image of the MB in al-Ahram so far. A further example of 
the MB as the Actor in material processes is given in (38) where the MB members 
are depicted as, again, terrorists, vandals, street fighters and bullies.  




 ﺑﺮﺷﻖ  .. ﻗﺎم ﻧﺤﻮ ﻣﺎﺋﻪ ﺷﺨﺺ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎر اﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﺻﺒﺮي ﺧﻠﻒ اﷲ
اﻟﻤﻘﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺷﺢ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﺑﻮزﻳﺪ ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻗﺴﻢ ﺛﺎن اﻻﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺰﺟﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻔﺎرﻏﻪ 
    .. واﻻﺷﺘﺒﺎك ﻣﻊ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻧﺼﺎرﻩ
  .92
  .03   . اﺳﻔﺮ ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ اﺛﻨﻴﻦ وﺗﻢ ﻧﻘﻠﻬﻤﺎ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﻔﻲ
ﺗﻢ اﺑﻼغ ﻗﺴﻢ دﻣﻨﻬﻮر ﻣﻦ ﻣﺪرس ﺑﻜﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺰراﻋﻪ ﺑﺪﻣﻨﻬﻮر وآﻴﻼ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ 
  اﻧﻪ 
  .13
  .23  ﻓﻲ اﺛﻨﺎء اﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻪ ﺳﻴﺎرﻩ ﻣﻼآﻲ اﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
ﻓﻮﺟﻲء ﺑﺎﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎر اﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺟﻤﺎل ﺣﺸﻤﺖ ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻜﺘﺒﻪ ﺑﺸﺎرع 
  ﺜﺒﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻓﺘﻴﻞاﻟﻄﺤﺎن ﺣﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺼﻲ وزﺟﺎﺟﺎت ﻣﻤﻠﻮءﻩ ﺑﺴﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﺰﻳﻦ وﻣ
  .33
  .43   . وﻗﺎﻣﻮا ﺑﺎﺗﻼف زﺟﺎج اﻟﺴﻴﺎرﻩ اﻟﺨﻠﻔﻲ
آﻤﺎ اﺑﻠﻎ ﺳﺎﺋﻖ اﻧﻪ ﺣﺎل ﻗﻴﺎدﺗﻪ اوﺗﻮﺑﻴﺴﺎ وﺑﺮﻓﻘﺘﻪ وآﻴﻞ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ اﻣﺎم ﻣﺪرﺳﻪ 
  اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﺤﺮم اﺑﻮاﻟﺮﻳﺶ 
  .53
  .63  واﺣﺪاث ﺗﻠﻔﻴﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻴﺎرﻩ   , ﻗﺎم ﺑﻌﺾ اﻻﺷﺨﺎص ﺑﺎﻳﻘﺎف اﻻوﺗﻮﺑﻴﺲ واﻟﺘﻌﺪي ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮب
  .73  وﻓﺮوا هﺎرﺑﻴﻦ
 sretrauqdaeh noitcele eht werht sretroppus setadidnac BM 001 tuobA .92
 yeht dna selttob ytpme htiw dieZ ubA damhA setadidnac PDN eht fo
 .sretroppus sih htiw dehsalc
 detropsnart erew ohw snosrep owt fo yrujni eht ni detluser ]hsalc eht[ .03
 .latipsoh eht ot
 osla si ohw erutlucirgA fo egelloC ruhnamaD ta rosseforp A .13





32. While he was driving  
33. He was surprised by the supporters of the Gamal Heshamt, running 
under Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid 
gasoline and installed by the fuse 
34. And they broke the car’s windshield 
35. A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company 
of Dr. el-Feqi’s representative , 
36. Some people blocked and stopped the bus , beated  them and caused 
some damages to the bus 
37. And then [they] escaped. 
 FP05, #11 
A salient feature of the clauses that have the MB as the Actor is war metaphor. The 
semantic field of the chosen processes belongs to fighting and war: throw, clash, 
injure, fight with sticks and burning bottles, break, block, damage, and escape. The 
war metaphor is significantly used to legitimize the process of exclusion (Wodak and 
Matouschek, 1993) that is practiced by the Egyptian government, and to naturalize 
all the harsh techniques and discursive representations that have been implemented 
against the group. All the unlawful acts are attributed to the MB and this attribution 
is made by someone who is said to have witnessed them. This ‘someone’ is 
sometimes a driver (L35), professor (L31), or a witness. The story, then, is confirmed 
discursively by, directly or indirectly, quoting some sources that do not belong to al-




One last example of material processes in which the MB is the Actor is given 
in (39). This example relevantly underlines the ideological square. Here, a senior US 
source is commenting on the Egyptian elections. He was quoted as denying the 
involvement of the Egyptian police or the government in the clashes and as accusing 
all the candidates of being involved in violence. He uses two material processes: run 
and implicated (i.e., involved). 
(39)   
ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻠﻟ ﻦﻴﺤﺷﺮﻣ ﺪﻳ ﻲﻠﻋ يﺮﺟ ﺎﻬﻀﻌﺑ نأو ,   5.  
ﻪﻠﺛﺎﻤﻣ ﻒﻨﻋ لﺎﻤﻋا ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﺖﻃرﻮﺗ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺑ .  6.  
5. Some of [the violent acts] which have run at the hands of candidates 
of the NDP 
6. While the MB was implicated [indulged / involved] in similar violent 
acts 
 FP05, #10 
Comparing the two clauses in L.5 and L.6 shows that the process in the first clause 
mitigates the action associated with government while accentuates it with the MB. In 
L.5, the violent act itself is the medium, according the ergativity analysis, and the 
real external cause is placed in the background while in L.6, the clause is phrased in 
an SVO order, which highlights the MB as a direct Actor of the material process 
involve. This means while some actions happened at the hands of the some NDP 
candidates (L.5), the MB (as a whole) was involved in violence. 
In the clause in (40), the MB is the Goal: the President knows the connections 




significant at that time because of two reasons. The first is the then-recent US 
invasion of Iraq with the help of some Iraqi opposition groups and the second is the 
negative US image in the Arab world because of its unfair foreign policy and its bias 





 (40)   
  ﻊﻣ ﻢﻬﺗﻻﺎﺼﺗا لﻮﺣ لوﺄﺑ ﻻوأ ﻲﻨﻴﺗﺄﺗ تﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﻤﻟاو ﻢﺋﺎﻧ ﻲﻨﻧأ اﻮﻨﻈﻳ ﻻأ ﻦﻴﻴﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷا ﻲﻠﻋ
ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻹا 
3. 
For these two reasons, the US or any connections with it would have negative 
repercussions in the consciousness of the ordinary Egyptian citizen. So reporting that 
the MB are running contacts with the US (like the Iraqi opposition) would trigger 
fear and apprehension towards the group’s intentions. 
The same theme of association is used when the MB is connected with 
entities that have a negative image in the memory of the Egyptian people, as in (41). 
This example is taken from an interview with the President by the Kuwaiti Politics. 
(41)   
ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻒﻟﺎﺤﺗ ﺮﺳ ﺎﻣ ,  ﻦﻴﻳﺮﻴﻔﻜﺘﻟا ﻊﻣ ,   ﺪﻐﻟا بﺰﺣ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻊﻣو ﻦﻴﻳﺮﺻﺎﻨﻟا ﻊﻣ
 ﺪﺿو ﻪﺳﺎﺋﺮﻟا ﺪﺿ ﻢﻬﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟاوﺲﻴﺋﺮﻟا ؟  
4. 
ﻢهءارو ﻒﻘﻳ ﻦﻣ رﺪﻘﺗو يﺮﺗ نا ﻊﻴﻄﺘﺴﺗ .  .5 
4. What is the secret behind the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood  
with the Takfiri groups, Nasserites and the Ghad party, and their  
coming together against the president? 
5. You can see it and know who stands behind them 
 FP05, #52 
3. The Americans [US administration] do not have to think that I am 






The MB is represented as initiating alliances with other groups that are or presented 
to be as extremists and of anti national interests: Takfiri, Nasserites and the Ghad 
‘tomorrow’ Party. Mubarak’s answer does not explicitly state that the US is the 
country that stands behind them but it is implied. Moreover, describing the ally as 
‘secret’ in the question implies that this action is perceived as treacherous by the 
regime – a perception that fosters the idea that the Egyptian regime tends to exclude 
any type of serious opposition.  
It is interesting to find, in later dates in al-Ahram, two statements denying the 
MB connections with the US. On 6 August 2005, David Walsh, a Secretary of State 
assistant, said, ‘there is no current connection between the US and the MB and there 
is no plans for any connection in the near future’ (FP05, #42). A message to the same 
effect was confirmed by the US Secretary of State on 12 June 2005 (FP05, #38). 
These two denials question the validity of what President Mubarak said on the 
existence of such connections and the authenticity of the information submitted to 
him. 
The idea of juxtaposing people along two camps, we vs. they, and associating 
them with material processes that belong to different semantic fields and that reflect 
the ideological square is repeatedly used in front pages. The following example in 
(42) portrays such division in a clear way.  
 (42)   
 ﻪﻴﻤﻠﺳ ﻩﺮﻴﺴﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ فﻻا ﻩﺮﺸﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ كرﺎﺷ 2.  




ﻪﺤﻴﺷﺮﺗ نﻼﻋﺎﺑ ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻟا ﻪﺒﻟﺎﻄﻣو .  4.  
 ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ تادﺎﻴﻗو ﻪﻳﺎﻔآ ﻪآﺮﺣ رﺎﺼﻧأ ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﻊﻤﺠﺗ ﺮﺧا ﺐﻧﺎﺟ ﻦﻣو
ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟاو ﻦﻴﻴﻔﺤﺼﻟا ﻲﺘﺑﺎﻘﻧ ,   
5.  
ﻞﻣﺎﺸﻟا ﻲﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا حﻼﺻﻻﺎﺑ اﻮﺒﻟﺎﻃو .  6.  
2. More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful march 
3. To support President Mubarak and his historic initiative to amend 
constitutional article 76 
4. And ask him to declare his candidacy 
5. On the other side, a number of people from Kifaya and the Banned MB 
gathered in both lawyers and journalists’ syndicates 
6. and called for reform.  
FP05, #51
This report pictures the two groups as belonging to two opposing teams. The use of 
the verbs is significant in this regard: while the first group participated, the second 
gathered. Participation has a socially positive connotation as people always 
participate willingly for good causes while the verb gather can have either positive 
or negative connotation based on the activity done. The actors of the process in L.5 
are the MB members and the Kifaaya movement, and this implies the negativity of 
the connotation of the verb gather, which can be said to mean demonstrate. 
Moreover, while the we camp called on the President to continue in power, the they 




The MB is, moreover, presented as a latent enemy that is waiting for the 
opportunity to take over power in Egypt, as in (43).  
(43)   
ﺔﻄﻠﺴﻟا نوﺪﻳﺮﻳ ناﻮﺧﻹا 6.  
 ﺪﺑﻷا ﻲﻟإ نﻮﻤﻜﺤﻴﺴﻓ اﻮﻤﻜﺣ اذإو 7.  
 دﻼﺒﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻖﻠﻘﻟا نﻮﺒﺒﺴﻴﺳو 8.  
 ﻩﻮﻄﺨآ ﻢآﺎﺤﻟا ﻪﻧدﺎﻬﻤﺑ نواﺪﺒﻴﺳ ناﻮﺧﻻا نا فﺎﺿاوأ ﻲﻟو 9.  
ﻪﻴﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻲﺿﻮﻔﻟا ﻩرﺎﺛﺎﺑ نوأﺪﺒﻳ ﻢﺛ ,   10.  
ﻢﻜﺤﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﺰﻔﻘﻟا ﻢﺛ .  11.  
6. The Brothers want authority 
7. If they rule, they will rule for ever 
8. And they will cause chaos in Egypt 
9. He added that the MB will start by appeasing the ruler 
10 And then start causing political chaos 
11. And then jump to the Office  
 FP05, #50 
To summarize the analysis of material processes, it can be said that all the 
material processes are meant to portray the MB as a threat. The political parties in 




legitimate for the MB to work towards that goal and it is not a pejorative act to be 
accused of. Whether they want to take over power or not is ungrounded information 
that is based on mere apprehension. Moreover, Mubarak himself has been ruling the 
country since 1981 without any near hope that he will willingly leave. Therefore, the 
accusation he is making in L.7 applies in the first place to him.  
Accusing the MB of causing anxiety (L.11) can be interpreted in relation to 
either Egyptian Christians or economic disasters. Both of these issues have been 
recurrent topics when talking about the MB and the likelihood of their coming to 
power in Egypt. Mubarak here is casting the MB as the villain to the Egyptians and, 
maybe to the West too, to legitimatize his position towards the MB. He is using the 
fear strategy to divide people into two camps where our camp is safer while theirs is 
dangerous. 
The analysis of both the verbal and relational processes indicates that they 
work in the same direction as the material processes in excluding the MB and 
associating them with negative images. In the data of 2000, all the verbal processes 
were associated with government authorities and press sources without any reference 
to the MB. In 2005, there are two reports where the verbal processes have an MB 
member as a Sayer. Interestingly, these verbal processes are either neutral or are in 
the interest of the government. In FP05 # 28 and #31, the MB spokesman and the 
MB Guidance Imam are quoted respectively on the same topic: the presidential 
election. In the first example, Dr. Habib, the MB spokesman, denied that the MB has 
any plans to vote for a certain presidential candidate (FP05, #28). In the other 




actively participate in the election (FP 05, # 31). The two verbal processes used with 
the MB figures worked in the interests of Mubarak as calling all the people to 
participate in the election with no guarantee that the elections are transparent and 
would only increase election turn out in Mubarak’s side. The verbal process used by 
the reporter to comment on what Habib said belongs to the negative type. The report 
quotes Habib as saying, ‘the result [of the elections] is, as he claims, known in 
advance’. Here the use of the negative verbal process claim indicates the reporter’s 
stance towards the content of what his source is saying; that the results are 
predetermined is just a claim of Habib. 
All the other verbal processes in the data are associated with the government: 
the President, PM, MPs, Ministers, or informed sources. The function of these 
processes is to either positively add to the government or negatively to the MB. All 
the verbal subtypes work in this direction. The President is always reported with the 
neutral subtype as in ‘he [the President] says: I am entrusted on the lives of 70 
million Egyptians’ (FP05, #50), or with a positive ones ‘he emphasized that the 
demonstrations [of the MB and Kifaya] are aimless’. When he is reported with a 
negative subtype, it is in the interests of the country, as in ‘he warned that 
demonstrations lead to the flight of investors, which, in turn, will lead to more 
unemployment in Egypt’ (ibid.). When emphasize is used, the ideological square is 
an issue. Following is a list of examples that shows how the verbal processes 
contribute to building the ideological square: 
Good self: 




neutrality and preserving stability and security. (#1)  
B. The ministry of Interior confirmed that the police has immediately dealt 
with the riots (#11) 
C. Major General Ibrahim Hammad emphasized that stability and security 
is number 1 priority during the election (#12) 
D. el-Fiki [a prominent NDP member] denied the happening of any fraud 
or manipulation in his constituency. (#9) 
 
Bad other: 
A. Information emphasized that they [MB] aim to plan to provoke the 
public, specially students and workers to spark chaos and to call for civil 
disobedience 
B. He also stressed that the banned MB supporters are responsible of most 
of the violence acts. (#12) 
C. Nazif [PM] downplayed the importance of the achievement of the MB 
in the late elections. 
D. He [el-Fiki] accused the MB of terrorizing the judges. (#9) 
Moreover, the negative verbal subtype is used significantly to highlight the 
MB members as obnoxious and arrogant, as in (44). The context of this report is that 
a group of people from different political trends gathered to form a coalition to help 
Egypt get out from its political, economic and social stagnancy. Representatives of 
these trends met to discuss the agenda of the project. According to the report, there 





ﻬﺒﺠﻟا ﻦﻣ بﺎﺤﺴﻧﻻا ﻲﻟا قزاﺮﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﻦﻴﺴﺣ ﺮﻄﺿا ﺚﻴﺣﺔ,   11. 
 ﺮﺋاﺪﻟا فﻼﺨﻟا ﻢﺴﺤﻟ ﻲﻗﺪﺻ ﺰﻳﺰﻋو ﻪﻌﻤﺟ نﺎﻤﻌﻧ نارﻮﺘآﺪﻟا ﻞﺧﺪﺗو 12.
 رﺎﻌﺷ نﻮﻜﻳ نﺄﺑ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻞﺜﻤﻣ ﻚﺴﻤﺗ ﺪﻌﺑﻞﺤﻟا ﻮه مﻼﺳﻻا ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻠﻤﺤﻟا ﻩرادإ .  13.  
11. As Huessin Abdrazeq was forced to withdraw from the front  
12. And Dr Gumaa and Dr Sidqi have to intervene to resolve the ongoing 
dispute  
13. After the MB representative insisted that the slogan campaign should 
be ‘Islam is the Solution’. 
 FP05, #26 
The MB member is represented in L.13 as the one who ruined the meeting. The use 
of the negative verbal process insist negatively highlights the behaviour of the MB 
representative as someone who was so relentless that he caused one representative to 
quit the meeting The same use reiterates in another report where the reported person 
said that the MB ‘wants to impose their opinion by force’ (FP05,#34 L.9). 
The last process category to be discussed is the relational: how the MB 
identifies and is identified by others. Most of the examples of relational processes 
occur in the predicate of verbal process. Therefore, to avoid repetition, the role of the 
relational processes in portraying the MB will be summarized. The main 
identifications of the MB through relational processes are (all the statements are 




A. Banned organization: Nazif said the MB is a banned organization (#49). The 
theme that MB is banned is not actually new but is a continuation of the 
excluding policy by subsequent regimes in Egypt as has been shown in the 
discussion of social practices. Many officials have reiterated the same 
statement in many occasions;  
B. Antigovernment: 90 percent of the votes Nour received are from the MB 
(#27). The focus on the MB as an antilegitimacy entity took various forms: 
accusing them of allying with other antigovernment groups, and supporting 
any project that would weaken the government;  
C. Connection to acts of violence: MB supporters are responsible for most of the 
violence acts (#12). This is a recurrent theme in 2000 and 2005. No single 
piece of news talks about the MB without a reference to them as committing 
violence, sentenced for violence, or released from prison; 
D. Ungrounded claimers: the hollow slogans, empty statements, loud voice 
policy and disturbing interference are the weapons of those who do have the 
truth (#9). This is actually a traditional technique of the NDP towards it 
opponents. The government attributes its real opponents with lack of vision, 
lack of planning and lack of socio-economic programmes;  
E. Connection to terrorism and al-Qaeda: Al-zawahry [the second man in al-
Qaeda] is from the MB (#36). A prominent Egyptian novelist and writer has 
reiterated the same meaning in (#34). In only one instance in the data under 




‘the MBs are neither terrorists nor extremists’ (#49). Other than that, al-
Qaeda is represented as historically connected to the MB; 
F. Aimless: the demonstrators have no programs. (#53). This point is related to 
D above. 
The only relational clause that positively represented the MB was when the 
president of the Egyptian parliament was asked about why the MB excelled all other 
opposing parties in the 2005 elections. He said, ‘The MB is more organized and more 
energetic’ (FP05, #17 L.1) . 
To conclude this section, the analysis of how the MB is represented according 
to the transitivity system in front-page reports underlines the group with a negative 
image of an exclusionary nature. The MB members are: 
• Associated with acts of violence; 
• Disturbing the society;  
• Members of an illegal entity; 
• Mentally perceived and identified as illegitimate.  
This image goes in line with both the social practices and the IR analyses in which 
the Brothers have been negatively represented. In the next section, voicing is 
analyzed to see who gets to be reported in the front page reports and the influence of 






All the news reports on the MB in 2005 reflect a stunning absence of the 
voice of Islamists even in the reports that handle critical election-related issues. The 
prevailing voice is that of the elites: government officials and close-to-the-
government thinkers. The macrostructures of the reports that deal with the MB in 
2005 are as follows: 
A. Use of violence in election; 
B. Police negative interference in the election process; 
C. Accusation of fraud; 
D. Connection to terrorism; 
E. Why MB success. 
In none of the reports that handled these topics has any MB member been sourced or 
reported. The organization is always talked about but never talks. In all the reports 
about the use of violence in election, the following bodies were sourced:  
1. The securities authorities (#1, #12); 
2. General marshal gamal hammad, the interior spokesman (#1, #15); 
3. The minister of justice (#1); 
4.  Security sources (#2, #10); 
5.  An american high-level source (#10); 
6. Safwat el-sherif, (#4,, #12). He is the chairman of the shura council 
(senators)  
And a minister of information and media for 22 years; 




8. Khairi shalabi (#34), an egyptian writer and thinker; 
9. David walsh, an assistant to the us secretary of state (#38); 
10. Condoleezza Rice the US Secretary of State (#42). 
It is noted that, during the presidential election, some news emerged that the 
MB recommended voting for Nour against Mubarak. Only then did al-Ahram source 
the MB spokesman to deny the news. After the MB surprised many fronts by 
winning 20 percent of the parliament’s seats in 2005, the question that has been 
ongoing since then is: what does stand behind the MB success? In an attempt to 
answer this question, Al-Ahram sourced only one of the NDP veterans , Dr. Ahmad 
Fathi Sorour (#12). When the Judges’ Club accused the police officers of interfering 
in the elections process, the following sources were reported: 
1. A US.senior official (#10); 
2. The Interior spokesman (#7); 
3. The Chairman of judges’ Club (#7). 
 Finally, In Damanhur constituency, one of the most prominent NDP figures, 
Dr. Mostafa el-Fiki, ran against the MB candidate, Dr. Gamal Heshamt. The official 
results announced the NDP candidate the winner. This was shocking to many fronts 
including the majority of the judges who supervised the process of voting and 
counting in that particular constituency. Dr. Heshamt held a press conference and 
announced that there was evidence of ballot rigging for the NDP candidate. Although 
this situation requires hearing from both sides, the report that covered the rigging 





In conclusion, the analysis of voicing in the news reports works on the same 
line of exclusion. The MB is not quoted directly or indirectly in any of the 2005 
reports – something that substantially affects the objectivity and trustworthiness of 
the reports. Since analyzing sourcing in the 2000 data revealed the same conclusion, 
it can safely be said that the absence of the MB voice in al-Ahram is not accidental 
and is a result of a systematic exclusionary strategy practised by the government. 
The next section examines the data in terms of lexical choices and references to the 
MB. 
6.1.5. Lexical Choices 
Labelling is a powerful tool that can be used to foreground the two poles of 
the ideological square. The analysis of labelling examines what lexical choices are 
used to refer to the MB and the effect of these choices in terms of the theme of 
exclusion. The process of naming or referring to people can be significant in terms of 
in- and out-grouping. So, calling someone loyal and another a betrayer would 
necessarily indicate that the first is included, i.e., with us, and the second is excluded. 
Lexical choices in the present data highlight the theme of othering the MB; that is to 
say, the MB is portrayed as standing in another square from the government, the 
people and the society. Othering the MB is done qualitatively and quantitatively as 
well. Qualitatively, the MB is excluded on the legal, cultural and social levels, and 
quantitatively, it is excluded in terms of being few and minority compared to the 




The MB is presented in the data as a legally banned group that is not allowed 
to take part in the political process. Ironically, in the parliament, the MB members 
act as one group under the Muslim Brothers slogan. Searching for al-Ikhwan, ناﻮﺧﻻا, 
‘the Brothers’ and al-MaHuuTHra banned, ةرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا /رﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا , resulted in the 
occurrence of 101 and 51 occurrences, respectively. This means that the label 
banned is associated with 50 percent of the MB occurrences. Studying the relational 
clauses in the 2005 news reports revealed that most of the labels and references to 
the MB are made implicitly and indirectly. This is done by leaving the responsibility 
of violence unattributed to any party, and because of the anchoring principle, 
whereby the readers attribute the responsibility of any violence actions to the 
members of MB. Consequently, all the references made to violence committers will 
be labels and references to the MB. One of the legal labels used to describe the MB 
is ﻦﻴﻔﻟﺎﺨﻤﻟا, violators (F05, #1). A violator is someone who transgresses the rules and 
consequently deserves punishment. Another label under the legal category is thugs 
and bullies, ﻪﻴﺠﻄﻠﺒﻟا, which were mentioned eleven times in the data associated with 
either no specified actor or with members of the MB. When they are associated with 
the MB, they are the external cause of the ergative clauses as in ‘the supporters of the 
religious candidate randomly fire shots’ (#1). Hooligans and thugs are mentioned 
three times (#7, L.8 and L.56; # 11, L.8) in the context of the religious candidate’s 
supporters committing violence against the NDP supporters. Another label from the 
same field is riot-provoking experts, ﺐﻐﺸﻟا ةرﺎﺛا ﻲﻓﺮﺘﺤﻣ (FP05, #7, L.13). This label is 
explicitly attributed to the MB in FP05, #11, L.11–13 and L.21–29. These clauses 




transitivity. The label troublemakers, ﺒﻏﺎﺸﻣﻦﻴ , is mentioned in the headline of FP05, 
#11 without any connection or attribution to any entity. However, the reader will 
definitely deduce that the troublemakers are the MB supporters and members.  
(45)   
21. About 100 MB candidates supporters threw empty bottles at the 
election headquarters of the NDP candidates Ahmad Abu Zeid, and 
they clashed with his supporters 
22. This resulted in the injury of two people, who were hospitalized 
23. A professor at Damanhur College of Agriculture, who is also 
representative of el-Fiki [an NDP candidate], has informed the police 
station that 
24. While he was driving  
25. He was surprised by the supporters of Gamal Heshamt, running under 
Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid gasoline and 
installed with fuses 
26. They broke the car’s windshield 
27. A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company 
of Dr al-Feqi’s representative,  
28. Some people blocked the road and stopped the bus, beat the 




29. And then escaped 
FP05, #11 
Violence initiator in FP05, #12 is another reference that is given to the MB to 
further highlight the negative image. Major General Ibrahim Hammad, the Minister 
of Interior’s assistant and the Interior Ministry spokesman, uses the label which gives 
it an official stamp. The label is not always used as a noun or attribute but sometimes 
as an action as in ‘[the MB members] incited them [the people] to demonstrate after 
Friday prayers yesterday’ (FP05, #55, L.7). Terrorists is also a label given to the MB 
by Mustafa el-Fiki in FP05, #9. He is reported to say ‘the Brothers terrorize the 
judges, especially the youth of them’. There is no further explanation given in the 
report on how the MB harass or terrorize the judges or in what capacity. Other than 
in this place, the MB is not linked to terrorism except by implication. 
Culturally, a group can be excluded by referring to them as not belonging to 
the mainstream culture. In addition, they can be referred to as those who have their 
own way of understanding religion, which is in contrast with the mainstream 
understanding and rituals. The main labels in this field are extremists and religious 
currents. Connecting the MB with extremism appears in two places in the data 
(FP05, #34 and # 36). In FP #34, the report surveys people’s opinions of and 
reactions to the terrorist explosions that took place in the Egyptian tourist city Sharm 
al-Sheikh in July 2005. One of the reported sources, Khairi Shalabi, a prominent 
writer and thinker, makes the statement that ‘these actions are done by al-Qaeda and 
the leading figures of al-Qaeda, like Ayman Azzawahry, belong to the Brothers’. He, 




implication of the labels current and extremists is that this group is culturally 
considered as representing itself and not the mainstream. The label religious current 
occurred nine times (#1 twice, #2, #11 twice, #15 and #34 three times). In all the 
occurrences, it referred to the MB, except in #34 where it referred to religious 
movements in general. 
Another label that feeds into the same direction is elements. It is repeated 
three times (#11 twice, #41) and in both cases it is used to refer to the MB. The 
significance of the use of this label in terms of exclusion has already been discussed 
in the analysis of lexical choices in Chapter five. Mubarak used the same concept of 
being culturally different in FP05, #59 when he said ‘We are all Muslims! Are the 
Brothers a different type! Each one [of Islamists] has his own concept. And we all 
perform prayers. So you can not differentiate between a Muslim and another’ (L. 21–
27). The argument that Mubarak was trying to make here was that since we all 
perform the same prayers and perform the basic religious duties, we are all Muslims 
and there is no need for a group of people to claim that they are different or have a 
different understanding of Islam. So according to Mubarak, the MB is considered a 
splinter from the fabric of society.  
Excluding a group or a person socially means representing them as not 
conforming to the socially accepted norms and rules. Labels and references of this 
type would fall under the social sanction type in the Appraisal Judgment analysis 
terms (see Table 4.2). In the data, there are three attributes from the social sanction 
category two of which are made by Safwat al-Shereef, Chairperson of the Shura 




on the violent acts committed during elections he said, ‘Resorting to these types of 
behavior is unacceptable and is a negative phenomenon, and constitutes a pressure 
on the election process’. He added that the NDP candidates were targets of great 
violence in front of the voting sites (FP05, #11). Since the main opponent of the 
NDP in the election was the MB, the NDP candidates, by implication, were harassed 
by the MB supporters and then they were practicing the type of behavior that he 
described as unacceptable and negative. In another report as in (54), the reporter 
describes the behaviour of the MB candidate as unacceptable. 
The last axis to be discussed and through which the other can be excluded is 
the quantitative. This simply means the representation of the other as minority, or 
referring to them as a small in number and power, helpless and contained, compared 
to the majority which is big in number and power, and has access to resources. This 
strategy has been revealed in data for 2000 and here as well. This technique is 
observed in FP05, #51 (given in (29). The ideological square is typically exemplified 
in this example and can be represented in terms of the we vs they dichotomy as 
follows: 
WE  THEY
- Are 10,000 
- Participate [ positive connotation] 
- Peaceful march 
- Support the President 
- Ask the President to continue 
- Are legal 
- Have access [implicated] 
- Are a number of … 
- Gather [neutral negative connotation] 
- NA (but impliedly the opposite) 
- Oppose the President 
- Ask the President to stop 
- Banned 





The analysis of lexical choices supports the search results reached so far: the 
news reports on the MB are meant to exclude the group legally, socially and 
culturally. The next section presents the last tool of analysis in this chapter: 
presupposition. 
6.1.6. Presupposition 
Although there are fewer examples of presupposition in the 2005 data 
compared to 2000, the examples found are significant and relevant to the theme of 
exclusion. The presupposition examples work in two directions, matching the two 
slots in the ideological square: good us vs bad them. The first group beautifies the 
image of the regime. When the PM was asked about the justification for imprisoning 
a large number of such an important category as the MB, he answered ‘the 
democratic reforms are much bigger than any arrests that happen due to riots …’ 
(FP05, #48). The PM here was presupposing that there are democratic reforms and 
he was using this as a justification for the arrests. The significance of his placing 
democratic reforms in the background is to hide it from questioning and, therefore, 
the focus of the reader will be diverted from focusing on the question of whether or 
not there democratic reforms to focus on whether the reforms are bigger than, hence 
justifying, the arrests or not. The significance of presupposition is given more weight 
when it is known that the interview was done in the US with US Today. Here the PM 
was portraying the good image of the Egyptian regime to respond to the US call to 
start serious democratic reforms and at the same time justifying the regime’s harsh 




In one of the reports, a security source said that three leaders of the MB were 
arrested because they were planning for actions to shake stability and breach 
people’s security (FP05, #55). This clause presupposes the existence of security and 
stability which, in turn, promotes the good image of the regime while negatively 
stamping the MB. Instead of being intrigued by the presupposition focal point, i.e., 
were they planning or not, the real question should be: is there stability and security 
in the Egyptian society or not? But the use of presupposition underlies this 
information and directs the readers’ attention to the verbal phrase: they were plotting 
and they deserve the punishment.  
A further example of presupposition that supports building the good self is 
when Mubarak said in one of the interviews ‘demonstrations will lead to the flight of 
both local and foreign investments’ (FP05, #50 and #53). It is presupposed that there 
are investments already going on in Egypt and this indicates that the government is 
properly running the country in terms of economy. This view that is given the lie by 
various professional reports about the unprecedented poverty level and 
unemployment in Egypt. This is a headline from Reuters reporting a UN source on 
poverty in Egypt: ‘Poverty grows in Egypt despite rapid growth’. However, how 
many readers would go and check on the information and statistics given in the 
government’s documents? This means that presupposition works on a large scale on 
the newspaper readership. One example of presupposition that embodies the essential 
stance of the government towards the MB is when Egyptian officials repeatedly 
ground the banning of the MB on the statement ‘the law/Constitution does not allow 




religious basis’ (FP05, #45, #48, #52). The included implication here is that there 
would be no problem in authorizing parties based on civil principles. Examining real 
life practices of the Egyptian regime would falsify this implication. Research is 
needed to validate these presuppositions and implications. This type of research 
would prove whether the government is really implementing and adhering to the law 
or if it is just a pretext to ban and suppress any potential politically threatening power 
from growing under a legal umbrella. In the next chapter, such an aspect is discussed 
in detail. 
Another relative presupposition is when the PM said, ‘they [the MB] say that 
they have given up violence. We are waiting to see this in reality’ (FP05, #45). The 
presupposition made here is that the Brothers have been violent and the question now 
is: did they abandon it or not? The significance of the presupposition is highlighted 
when it becomes known that this information was given in the US to the leaders of 
American society in the Washington Institute of Near Eastern Studies. The negative 
image of the MB was given to the West to justify Mubarak’s iron fist on Islamists 
and to promote the idea that he was the one who could preserve the interests of the 
US in the area.  
In sum, the analysis of presupposition supports the findings reached in 
previous analyses: othering and excluding the MB is a main theme of any report 
related to the group. In addition, presupposition is used to legitimize the current 





6.2. Concluding Note 
In this chapter, the front-page news reports have been analyzed by using a 
number of linguistic tools to examine how the news reports more or less 
include/exclude the MB. The analysis started by approaching the data from the 
perspective of an average reader to see what the readers-for-a-gist would get from 
quickly skimming the headlines and parts of the lead. Then the data were approached 
for detailed analysis using these tools: transitivity, sourcing lexical choices and 
presupposition. Significantly, all the analyses led to the same conclusion: whenever 
the MB is the topic of the proposition, it is always pejoratively portrayed and 
negatively talked about. The next chapter brings it all together. It takes the analysis 
results as a point of departure and compares them to other texts to see whether that 
gives a similar or different perspective. Moreover, it attempts to connect the 
divergent, local and global lines pertaining to Islamism to get a better understanding 
of the phenomenon and explain the grounds of why Islamism is perceived and 
presented the way it is.
  
7. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE 
DISCOURSE OF SILENCE 
7.1. Introduction 
The present chapter attempts to pinpoint the common ground underlying the 
negative MB representation as explained in the analysis. The analysis of transitivity 
has shown that the MB is portrayed solely in a negative way, associated with actors 
of violence, irresponsible acts and bullying. It is also identified as a banned group. 
The people sourced in the reports represented the good self side of the ideological 
square and the voice of the MB has never been raised or heard. The choice of lexical 
items singled it out as a different group from mainstream society and finally, the use 
of presupposition supported the negative image of the MB and the positive image of 
the regime. Parallel with the negative media representation, the MB organization and 
members have been exposed to various harassment techniques to curtail their 
influence and eradicate the potential political threat of the group. The regime has 
used several methods of persecution which ranged from the use of sheer power – 
such as detention – prohibition of travelling, prison, referral to military tribunes and 
liquidation of assets, to soft power, such negatively representing them in the media 
and in public, local and international, forums. This chapter is organized around the 
main points raised by the regime against the MB. An attempt is made to discuss the 




see whether these other sources will render a similar or different perspective from 
that which is presented in al-Ahram. The main issues that are raised against the MB 
and used as a pretext to persecute its activities are: 
1. The MB is a theocratic organization and is anticivil society; it wants to 
establish a theocratic state; 
2. The MB legitimates and uses violence to achieve its goals. The news reports 
frequently reported the group as being associated with violent acts against 
NDP candidates and society;  
3. The MB is against democracy regardless of their claim that they commit 
themselves to democracy and civil society and if they came to power, they 
would forsake democracy. 
Examining these points requires reference to other pertinent texts to see if 
that perspective is similar to or different from the image that is presented in the 
reports of al-Ahram. Studying other texts is called intertextuality. According to 
Fairclough, intertextuality is “the property texts have of being full of snatches of 
other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text 
may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth” (1992: 84). Furthermore, 
Fairclough typifies intertextuality into manifest intertextuality, how quoted 
utterances are selected, changed, and contextualized; and constitutive intertextuality, 
how texts are made up of heterogeneous elements, generic conventions, discourse 
types, register and style (ibid.). The importance of such analysis is that it shows how 





Intertextuality leads us to think of another crucial point, that is, the absence of 
intertextuality or intertextuality silence. Intertextuality silence is the omission of 
other crucial pertaining texts or sources that partially or drastically change the 
outcome of the present text and the absence of which mystifies the text. Huckin 
(2002) has developed a framework for studying textual silence. He defines silence as 
“the omission of some piece of information that is pertinent to the topic at hand” 
(348). According to Huckin, the five broad categories of textual silence are: 
1. Speech–act silences are those that have illocutionary force by virtue of being 
so interpretable by a reader/listener; 
2. Presuppositional silences are those that serve communicative efficiency by not 
stating what the speaker/writer apparently assumes to be common 
knowledge;  
3. Discreet silences are those that avoid stating sensitive information; 
4. Genre-based silences are those that are governed by genre conventions; 
5. Manipulative silences are those that deliberately conceal relevant information 
from the reader (ibid.).  
The intertextuality silence can be subcategorized under Huckin’s manipulative 
silence.  
This chapter considers what is absent from the MB representation in al-
Ahram. The first point that will be analyzed in the next section concerns Islamists 
and theocracy: it discusses whether Islamists are theocratic or not. Next, whether 
Islamists are democratic or not is handled in  where a definition of democracy and its 




essential point of the present dissertation and answers a basic question: why are 
Islamists excluded? This section talks about an enlightening side of the MB that is 
dimmed in al-Ahram and that is made invisible to its readers. The last section deals 
with one type of silence that has substantially contributed to establish the negative 
image created for Islamists in al-Ahram; that is sourcing. An attempt is made to 
listen to voices that were supposed to be present in al-Ahram when it reported on the 
MB, but were not, in order to see whether they support, modify or alter the present 
readings of al-Ahram reports. 
7.2. Islamists: Theocrats or Democrats 
One of the recurrent issues raised against the MB is that the Egyptian regimes 
have banned the organization due to its religion-based orientation and its 
nonacceptance of the concept of civil society. This argument has been marketed to 
justify the regime’s continuous refusal to include the MB in Egyptian political life 
and authorize them to establish a political party. This view is held not only by the old 
guardians of the NDP, but also by the new generation and many prominent writers 
and journalists. In an interview with Council on Foreign Relations, Mohamed 
Kamal,4 a prominent member of a new generation of reformers within Egypt’s ruling 
NDP, said: 
Our view towards the Muslim Brotherhood hasn’t changed. We still consider 
them a banned organization, an illegal organization. We still adhere to the 
                                                 
 





law that prevents the creation of a party based on religion, and that’s what 
they want to do. (Author’s emphasis) 
The question that poses itself here is: is the MB really a theocratic group that 
is in opposition to civil and democratic society? According to the Britannica Concise 
Encyclopedia, theocracy is defined as “Government by divine guidance or by 
officials who are regarded as divinely guided.” Examining the MB literature did not 
lead to any support of this theocratic orientation. In contrast, what is found is a 
complete negation of this idea. Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh, a leading MB member, 
wrote in The Guardian: 
We have been accused of being theocratic or promoting terrorism. In fact, we 
reject the theocratic model of the state and believe in a peaceful transfer of 
power and we respect the people’s choice through the ballot box. Many of 
our female members and activists were candidates in the elections and all are 
encouraged to participate in the public sphere. We have repeatedly 
condemned all forms of terrorism in Egypt and around the world, and have 
endorsed fatwas forbidding the terrorizing of innocent people. (16 March 
2007) 
Khairat el-Shatir, the MB vice-president, who at the time of writing (August 2009) is 
under arrest because of what is known to be the international MB Organization, also 
wrote in The Guardian, “We are committed to democracy and to respect fair election 
results, whatever the outcome” (23 November 2005).  
Although the MB literature reflects the same conclusion regarding theocracy 
of the state and confirms their appreciation of democracy, it needs to be clarified 
here, however, that political Islamists accept democracy as a general framework and 
not necessarily in detail. The basic features in democracy that are accepted by 
Islamists are:  
1. people have the right to express themselves; 




3. it is the consensus of the community that is the final arbiter in public 
affairs, and the concept of a veto power exercised by the clergy has no 
theological and legal basis (Ahmad, 2002); 
4. all citizens are equal before the law regardless of their religion, gender or 
ethnicity. 
However, democracy, in the literal sense of the term, is not agreed upon because:  
It is not the structure of an Islamic state that should constitute the focal point 
in constructing an Islamic polity; what really matters is the question of its 
functions, goals and objectives. The specific structural arrangements and 
institutional features of one Islamic state may differ from another due to 
differences in material conditions, but their guiding principles and values 
must reflect those enunciated in the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet. 
(ibid.) 
Under an Islamic state people therefore have the basic types of freedom but 
they are not the ultimate source of legislation. That is to say, for example, Islamic 
jurisprudence disallows drinking, handling and dealing with alcohol. Therefore, it is 
ultimately illegal to approve a law with a contrary effect even if it is a majority 
demand, which is unlikely to happen because the majority of people in an Islamic 
state would hold the view that alcoholism is prohibited by God before it is 
criminalized by the government or the law. This explains why the majority in the 
Muslim world does not handle alcohol even if it is available and allowed. Along the 
same lines, Walter Lippman considers it a weakness of democracy that it lays more 
emphasis on the origin of government rather than on what it should do:  
The democratic fallacy has been its preoccupation with the origin of 
government rather than the processes and results. The democrat has always 
assumed that if political power could be derived in the right way, it would be 
beneficent. His whole attention has been on the source of power, since he is 
hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to express the will of the 
people, first because expression is the highest interest of man, and second 
because the will is instinctively good. But no amount of regulation at the 
source of a river will completely control its behavior, and while democrats 




power, that is to say, a good mechanism of voting and representation, they 
neglected almost every other interest of men. (Cited in Diggins, 1994: 334) 
Theoretically speaking, if the majority in a democratic society decided, for 
example, to deprive women of some of their basic rights, would it be in the interest 
of the society to pass this law? The answer would be yes if we apply the form of 
democracy, but no if we examine the result and the goal of democracy. Furthermore, 
in their portraying of the reform project of Islamists, Arab regimes compare it to the 
present democratic state as applied in Europe and America. Such contextualization 
is, according to Holden, a “definitional fallacy”: 
In essence, it is the fallacy of believing that the meaning of ‘democracy’ is to 
be found simply by examining the systems usually called democracies. A 
common example of this is the idea that if you want to know what democracy 
is, you simply have a look at the political systems of Britain and America. 
There are some deep-rooted misconceptions involved here. Apart from 
anything else, though, such an idea involves the absurdity of being unable to 
ask whether Britain and America are democracies: if ‘democracy’ means, 
say, ‘like the British political system’ we cannot ask if Britain is a 
democracy. (1988: 4) 
Democracy, therefore, is not the issue so much as what type of democracy. 
Simply, there is no concept in Islam that makes it inherently incompatible with 
democracy (Erdoğan, 1999). It is not the purpose or the scope of the present study to 
get into detailed discussion on democracy and its applications. The concern here is to 
show that Islamists are not theocratic in the literal sense of the word that is promoted 
in media to instill fear of their project. Esposito calls the characterization of Islamists 
as theocratic “a gross distortion” (1999: 145) and he quotes Sayyid Qutb, 
The Islamic system is not restricted to solely to a replica of the first Islamic 
state … the Islamic system has room for scores of models and new needs of 
the contemporary age as long as the Islamic idea dominates these models in 




Furthermore, looking at the practices of the Brothers since the establishment 
of the organization makes it clear that they are far from theocratic. Since its 
establishment, the MB has focused on social reform: “they ran small hospitals, built 
neighborhood mosques and schools, established cottage industries, and opened local 
social clubs” (ibid.: 138). The MB is fundamentalist in the sense that it calls for a 
return to the genuine Islamic principles that are timeless but it does not stick to any 
particular form of government. 
Pinning down the reasons for the fear and apprehension of Islamists coming 
to power, Habib, a prominent Egyptian Christian thinker and writer (2009), says that 
in Islam there is no such concept of absolute religious authority as it was practiced 
by the church in the Medieval Age when the clergies ruled as the representatives of 
God on earth. He says 
In fact, Islamic historical experience did not know this model as defined by 
the historical experience of Western Christianity. In spite of this, the 
opponents of the Islamist project try to present it as a type of Divine Right 
rule, i.e., religious dictatorship. This concept is completely in contrast with 
the Islamic framework and has no basis in the Islamic jurisprudence and, 
furthermore, did not happen at all along the Islamic history. 
It can also be added that this misconception is fed by the fact that the Arab 
regimes do not want to lose their authority under the growing support for Islamists in 
their societies and, therefore, they portray Islamists to the West as the bogeyman. 
This fear is represented by Walsh, for example, who indicates that Islamists embody 
concerns for lives and freedoms, and their coming to power would cause instability 
in the Muslim world, terrorism and intolerance (Walsh, 2003 : 18). McGuinn wrote, 




rickety allies in favor of ‘popular’ Islamic forces” (Quoted in Abed-Kotob, 1995: 
321). 
If Islamists have been denied legality under the pretext of being theocrats, 
would the regime allow Islamists to form a civil political party? The answer is no. In 
January 1996, a group of young Egyptian Islamists announced the formation of a 
new Islamist party in Egypt and they named it al-Wasat, ‘The Middle/The Center’.5 
The founders of the new party included Muslims, Christians and women. Abu ‘Ila 
Madi, the representative of the founders, said that al-Wasat was a civil party with an 
Islamic identity. In May 1996, the State Party Affairs Committee refused the 
application submitted in January to authorize the party. The founders filed an appeal 
that was also refused in May 1998. In the same month, the founders recruited more 
people and submitted another application to establish al-Wasat al-Misri, ‘the 
Egyptian Wasat’ party, but it did not have any better luck. In 2004, the number of the 
founders reached 200 people among whom were prominent figures, such as the 
think-tank professor Abdel-Wahab el-Misiri, the veteran politician Fikri al-Gazzar 
(also called the laureate of parliament independents), a number of university 
professors, judges, lawyers, professionals, peasants, workers and artisans. Among the 
founders were also seven Christians and forty-four women. As usual, the 
government-appointed Parties Committee refused to authorize the proposed party 
under the pretext that “it does not offer anything new or different from the existent 
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parties.” The founders appealed to the Parties’ Court at the State Council 
Commission. A legal expert committee, presided over by a Christian judge, 
Chancellor Farid Nazeeh Tanago, who was the vice-president of the State Council 
Commission, prepared a report on the legal opinion and it was to the effect that the 
decision of the Parties’ Committee regarding al-Wasat should be cancelled. The 
report also noted that the programme of the party was indeed distinctive. A court was 
due to rule on the matter on 1 October 2005, but the decision was postponed at the 
request of the government’s lawyers. The government lawyers claimed they needed 
more time to read the ten-page report written by the legal experts. In April 2006, the 
case was returned to be reconsidered because the seven Christians had withdrawn 
their membership under, according to the al-Wasat website,3 government pressure. 
The party has not yet been approved. 
Defining what it means to have a both Islamic and a civil party at the same 
time, Habib, one of the founders, says, “Our Islamic identity is both religious and 
cultural. When we speak about al-Wasat, we refer to a cultural identity which all 
people, whether in Egypt or any other Arab country, have in common, be they 
Muslims or Christians” (el-Gawhary, 1996: 30). Madi, comparing it to a similar case 
in Germany, says “Western countries, such as Germany, for example, have Christian 
Democratic parties. I have a Muslim friend in Germany who is a member of the 
ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Al-Wasat is a civil party like the CDU – 
our culture is Islamic, while theirs is Christian” (ibid.).  
The Egyptian regime officials have repeatedly announced that there is an 




MB with the Labor Party has proven the official statement to be words for 
consumption. The Party has been frozen since 2000 and its newspaper has been 
confiscated and prevented from being published since then, and the reasons were the 
penetration of the MB members and leading figures in the Labor Party. 
What does the refusal to approve the al-Wasat Party and the harsh restriction 
on any outlet for Islamists to work legally mean? It suggests that the Egyptian 
government theocracy-justification is not the real reason behind taking that hard and 
harsh stance against the MB; and, second, it wants the NDP to maintain the 
monopoly of power in Egypt and it is not its intention to devolve power. This means 
there will be no space for the other to be represented in an orderly and democratic 
manner. Mubarak once said, ‘The Brothers want authority … if they once rule, they 
will rule forever’ (FP05, #50). Mubarak has been in power since 1981, which makes 
it looks like this statement applies to himself before it applies to others. What type of 
election or democracy does the Egyptian regime want? They would advocate the 
democracy that would keep them in power and would exclude the alternative 
Islamists. The next section examines this accusation in light of other texts.  
7.3. Election Process: Democratic or Authoritarian  
The analysis of transitivity and lexical choices has shown that the MB 
members are presented in al-Ahram as actors of violence: its members are 
represented as gangs of thugs who disturb people’s security and terrorize their 
opponents. To examine the validity of this image, I will study reports pertaining to 




activists and other civil organizations. I will also compare the regime’s actions in 
similar electoral situations to see its adherence and consistency to democracy and 
transparency. 
 The constitutional amendments that were approved by the parliament to have 
multicandidate presidential elections were devoid of any positive effect in terms of 
this democratic application. The Egyptian regime should be recognized for this step. 
However, the arbitrary terms associated with the amendments made it difficult if not 
impossible for any party other than the NDP to run a candidate. The amendments, as 
the report of the International Republican Institute (IRI) describes it, were 
“symbolic” (2005: 3). The Middle East Report (MER) (12/12/2005) called the 
amendments and the referendum “pseudo reforms.” According to the MER report, 
“On July 2, the Judges’ Club – the professional syndicate of the Egyptian bench that 
has been vocally campaigning for greater judicial independence – issued a report 
confirming that the turnout figures had been manipulated to exaggerate public 
backing for the amendment. The judges noted that, in several constituencies, the 
turnout had been officially registered at 100 percent.” This clearly indicates the 
falsification of the referendum results. The following points have been cited on the 
presidential election by the IRI report (2005): 
1. The limitation on a candidate to be a member in a party that has been 
established for at least five years with at least 5 percent of seats in both 




2. The short period of time from the announcement of the referendum results to 
the setting of the election date and the beginning of the campaign period 
denied the candidates from conducting effective campaigns;  
3. The continued state of emergency, weakness of opposition political parties, 
absence of independent candidates and limited time to prepare for elections 
all contributed to a situation that did not foster a genuinely competitive 
environment (ibid.); 
4. The membership of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) was 
composed of figures who were former high-ranking members of the NDP. 
This impugns the commission’s integrity and calls into question its 
objectivity in overseeing the presidential election (ibid.); 
5. The fact that the decisions of the PEC are “final and subject to no appeal” put 
the committee above the law; 
6. The PEC held the authority to select which judges would supervise election, 
and excluded nearly 1,500 judges who advocated for greater judicial 
independence in regard to elections and other issues. This move was seen as 
particularly politically motivated, given the shortage of judges to cover all 
9,739 polling stations. 
As for the 2005 parliamentary elections, several reports and witnesses have 
documented the elections as flawed, with interference from the part of the police and 
NDP. The IRI monitoring groups working with other civil organizations have 




1. Although in the first phase of election, there was almost no interference 
from the police as reported by all the monitoring organizations, local and 
international, in both the second and the third phases “the position taken 
toward the monitors was far more aggressive and many [monitors] were 
prevented from entering the polling stations. Several were arrested or 
beaten by police and candidates” supporters primarily affiliated with the 
ruling party (9); 
2. During the counting process, there was too much interference by the 
police, the judges and candidates’ supporters in the three phases. “Less 
than 10 percent of the monitors were allowed to observe this critical step 
in the election process thus impugning the credibility of the election 
results. Despite assurances from the Election Commission, domestic 
observers were systematically denied the right to observe the ballots being 
counted” (9); 
3. While the representatives of the opposition parties and independents were 
deprived from witnessing the vote counting under the pretext that the 
space is limited inside the counting stations, NDP representatives were 
allowed to witness the counting (16).  
According to the Washington Post (10 December 2005), the elections were 
“shameful” and:  
Government security forces and gangs of thugs from the ruling National 
Democratic Party blockaded access to dozens of polling sites where 
opposition candidates were strong. In several cases they opened fire on 
citizens who tried to vote; 10 people were reported killed. Inside the election 
stations, government appointees blatantly stuffed ballot boxes in full view of 
judicial monitors. In some districts, they ignored court orders seeking to 
prevent them from buying votes or busing in nonresidents to defeat 
opposition candidates.  
A close reading of the results of the 2000 and 2005 elections leads to the 
belief that the NDP is not the majority’s party. In 2000, official NDP candidates 
obtained only 172/444 of the seats. However, it was thanks to the 
‘returning/rejoining’ independents that the NDP reached a 90 percent majority. In 
2005, the NDP candidates only obtained 149/444 of the seats and the same scenario 




was so lenient in the first phase of the first round in 2005, is explained by Brownlee 
(2006) as  
The result of 88 MPs is less than they would have garnered in a fair election 
but a historical high for the Brotherhood. I would say the results were 
probably a signal from Mubarak to Bush to back off on democracy 
promotion. Subsequent developments show that the government feels free to 
disregard the Brotherhood delegation and begin a new the process of 
excluding them.  
Examining the regime’s behavior in the municipal elections would shed some 
more light on the nature of the ruling regime in Egypt in terms of its adherence and 
commitment to democracy or elections. Such an analysis would tell whether the 
regime faithfully believes in democracy and it is a mere “democratic disguise.” 
It is known that municipal bodies are crucial for any country in running the 
daily business of people. In Egypt, local councils have long been dominated by the 
ruling NDP. The importance of these councils increased after the 2005 amendment 
of the constitutions that made it a condition for any presidential candidate to obtain 
endorsements from 250 parliament and local councils members in order to run. The 
government thus was apprehensive of the MB reaching those councils, securing the 
required endorsement and running a candidate for presidency. Therefore, in February 
2006, Mubarak postponed the local elections that were scheduled for April 2006 for 
two years. The reasons for postponing the elections were to:  
A. Preserve the governing NDP monopoly of power at a time when its grip has 
begun to loosen after the results of the 2005 elections;  





In 2008, in a step to curb the MB from achieving any significant success in 
the postponed local elections, the government allowed only 60 out of the MB 10,000 
potential candidates to register. Coordinating this with step, there was a crackdown 
against the group. Media reports and a press conference by the MB parliamentary 
bloc referred to the detention of around 700–800 of the group’s potential candidates 
(Human Rights Watch (HRW), 29 March 2008. Tarik al-Beshri (2008), a retired 
senior member of the Egyptian judiciary and a prominent thinker, describes the MB 
decision to participate in the local election, although they did not gain any seats, as 
‘appropriate’. This is not because they would win but because it uncovered the 
“intention of the regime to exclude the group,” and it “shows that the election is not a 
real one. They also revealed the long-standing tradition of the regime in all elections; 
that is to say, the elections are run to guarantee that the government is the ultimate 
winner.” However, what the MB and other movements have achieved is that now 
“local and external reactions to the falsification of elections became more serious 
and publicly recognized than before.”  
When the MB stood up and supported the judges campaigning for judicial 
independence and clean elections, the government cracked down on them. In January 
2007, hundreds of members of the “nonviolent” Muslim Brotherhood were detained 
solely for:  
exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association … Security 
forces originally arrested Khairat al-Shatir, deputy General Guide of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and 16 other prominent members of the organization in 
simultaneous predawn raids in December 14, along with more than 140 
students from Al-Azhar University, and later charged with supplying the 





Although the Cairo Criminal Court ruled that all charges against the MB be 
dismissed and all the detainees be immediately released, the government flouted the 
court rule and moments after their acquittal, all the MB senior members were 
rearrested by the police.  
In February of the same year, Mubarak, acting in his capacity as 
Commander-of-Chief, transferred the MB cases and those of twenty-four other 
members to a military tribunal. Commenting on the rearrest, Sarah Whitson said that 
it “shows a complete contempt for the rule of law and shocking disrespect for the 
court” (HRW, 2007a). It is known that Egypt is a state party to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). According to the ICCPR, “the trial 
of civilians by military courts should be very exceptional and occur only under 
conditions that genuinely afford full due process” (HRW, 2007). Since the court has 
ruled to release all detainees, the unjustified referral to military tribunal is understood 
to be a method to “deliver the desired verdict” (HRW, 2007). On 28 January, the 
public prosecutor, Abd al-Magid Mahmud, ordered the assets of the members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood frozen on the grounds that they financed a banned organization 
(al-Jazeera, 9 January 2007). All this coincides with Mubarak labelling the MB “a 
threat on national security” (al-Jazeera,12 January 2007). 
 In a step that shows the Egyptian regime’s intransigence, Mr. Ramsey Clark, 
a former US Attorney General, and Yvonne Ridley, a British award-winning 
journalist, were prevented from attending the third session of the military trial of 
thirty-three MB leaders. Moreover, it is reported that during the first two 




International, Human Rights Watch, and Arab Human Rights organization (HRW, 4 
June 2007). In a press conference, Clark, who was detained in the Cairo airport for 
three hours, said, “What happened to me is embarrassing to the Egyptian 
government. I have travelled to countries across the five continents to monitor 
political trials there but I was neither prevented from attending trials nor denied 
access to the country.” Clark accused the Egyptian government of violating the laws 
of human rights by not allowing fair and neutral trial to the MB and condemned the 
government’s “brazen injustice against the Muslim Brotherhood.” 
Highlighting the reasons for the government’s relentless behaviour, Clark 
said that the trial was politically motivated to prevent the group from maintaining its 
services to the society. “How come up to fourteen university professors,” he 
exclaimed, “are among those referred to the military tribunal? University professors 
should be at the university, not in prison.” In the same conference, the Amnesty 
International delegate’s report was not different in both its message and tone from 
Clark’s (Al-Jazeera, 17 July 2007; Ikhwanweb, 5 November 2007; Yvonne Ridley, 
20 July 2007; HRW, 15 April 2008).  
Moreover, looking at other aspects of life in Egypt would echo the same type 
of authoritarianism on the part of the government. The government does not tolerate 
any attempt that makes people aware of their rights or how to defend them. It 
controls academic life from schools to universities and it strictly bans and censors the 
use of Internet as a means of expression and blogging. In April 2007, state security 
officers closed the headquarters of the Center for Trade Union and Workers’ 




educates them as to their rights, and reports on labor-rights issues. The police had 
closed two other branch offices. The Ministry of Social Solidarity has blamed the 
CTUWS of inciting labor unrest around the country (HRW, 26 April 2007).  
In a lengthy in-depth report, Human Rights Watch examines how the 
regime’s dictatorship affected the academic life in Egypt. Under Instruments of 
Repression, the report says that the Egyptian government uses three main tools, in 
various combinations, to stifle academic freedom: a pervasive police presence on 
campus, the political appointment of key administrators and a series of laws that 
regulate internal affairs produce a university system under strict control of the state. 
“University education in Egypt cannot produce proper intellectuals,” said Ahmad 
Taha, a poet and former professor. “It is nothing more than a government office.” 
Using these instruments of repression, the state dictates what material can be taught 
and studied, restricts what opinions can be expressed and how and interferes in staff 
and student activities. In so doing, it undermines the autonomy universities need to 
protect academic freedom and violates basic human rights (HRW, 8 June 2005). 
Lastly, the Egyptian government has been very harsh on internet bloggers 
who write or promote antiregime material, so much so that Time wondered in one of 
its issues Why Egypt Is Cracking Down on Bloggers (Time, 1 June 2006). There have 
been dozens of cases of police harassment of bloggers. Commenting on the reaction 
of the government campaign against the bloggers, Fadi Al Qadi, Cairo-based Human 
Rights activist, told Time, “Intimidation has reached a really serious level. The 




been really awful. It is not legal, it is brutal, and it is a fundamental contradiction of 
the Egyptian government’s promises of reform” (ibid.). 
 The puzzle of the coexistence of democracy and persecution of opposition in 
Egypt is solved by Zakria (2001) when he states “America’s allies in the Middle East 
are autocratic, corrupt and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant and 
pluralistic than what would likely replace them.” What would likely replace them are 
Islamists. Therefore, elections are democratic as long as they do not bring up 
Islamists or the “sham democrats,” as Zakaria (ibid.) names them, to power.  
Answering the following questions is significant before ending this section: if 
the type of regime in Egypt is closer to being authoritarian, why does it continue to 
call itself “democratic” and why does it run elections? According to Mady, elections 
in the Arab world have functions that are different from thier counterparts in the 
Western countries. Such elections are “means to demonstrate a false facade of 
democracy that disguise regimes that are not democratic and/or it is there to respond 
to external demands of observing human and civil rights and this what is called 
constitutional hypocrisy” (2007). The difference between totally authoritarian 
regimes and exclusionary ones is that with the latter, opposition groups are allowed 
to participate in elections for government posts, but the institutions of competition 
consistently favour the incumbent regime’s candidates (Schedler, 2002). So 
“institutional opportunities for opposition participation” Brownlee states, “is the only 
conceptual border between these authoritarian regimes and exclusionary ones” and 
both regimes end up with the same results regarding the opposition “either through 




the Brothers, that if they rule, they would rule forever, because it is Mubarak and his 
party who are ruling forever and forcibly dispersing any effort and exterminating any 
group that work seriously for the interest of Egypt and Egyptians.  
To wrap up the discussion, it can be said that it is a mere allegation and 
unfounded argument that the MB is theocratic or undemocratic. “Commitment to 
democracy is a serious issue but cannot be gauged by hurling groundless 
accusations.” (el-Ghobashy, 2005) 
Studying other texts pertaining to elections, Islamists and democracy has 
added more insight to the understanding of why the MB is both presented negatively 
in al-Ahram and continuously persecuted by the government. The MB’s negative 
image as presented in news reports is only a means used by the regime to uproot the 
most active group in the Egyptian political scene. Therefore, the question now is: 
what is the reason for this policy of exclusion? It can be said that it is the successful 
performance of the MB that shaped the group as a potential threat to the regime. The 
MB is an exemplary organization and when given a space of leniency, even if 
limited, its members show great success and quickly gain people’s trust. They are 
also strictly organized and have the ability to mobilize people. The NDP, therefore, 
finds it necessary not to include the MB into the political system and keep 
persecuting them. In the next section, the MB as political force in Egyptian life and 





7.4. Islamism: Threat of Success  
In the previous section, we have concluded that the Egyptian regime 
persecutes the MB because of its fear of the organization’s successful expansion in 
society. Here, we will shed some light on why the Brothers are gaining popular 
support. The discussion will present some facets of the group’s success that gained 
people’s trust and brought the government’s fear as well. Summarizing the essential 
role played by the MB in the Egyptian society, al-Beshri (2008) says: 
What is going on is that the government has become incapable of managing 
the state and the various state bodies became in a state of standstill and so 
disintegrated that they cannot carry out its assumed responsibilities...MB is 
the only organized body that is able to mobilize people, however, the regime 
in Egypt is interested in not seeing any challenging and mobilizing 
organization. 
Explaining the rise of Islamism in the 1970s and the popular support that it 
has been receiving, Karawan adds that beside Islam being the faith of the majority, 
there are other factors that helped Islamism to appear: “policy failure and the 
declining legitimacy of many Arab regimes” and the “highly uneven development, 
the increased social tensions and dislocation” (1997: 15). Such reasons still stand 
today. Other studies attributed the support to the feeling of “anomie” and 
“dislocation” (Kepel, 1993). This interpretation is based on Durkheim’s analysis of 
social change and anomie where people feel they are aliened and their identity is 
compromised. The rapid urbanizing changes that Egypt witnessed during al-InfitaaH 
‘open door policy’ in the 1970s can be given as a cause for people’s adopting and 
supporting Islamists. From a Marxist view, the process of modernization drives the 




a result of the Western influence, the growing Western power and the interference in 
the Muslim countries affairs. Relative deprivation among the majority of 
impoverished Egyptian population is also regarded as a main cause of the popularity 
of Islamism (Vandenbroucke, 1983). Disregarding the external influence that may 
have helped the public acceptance of an Islamist agenda, be it economic or political, 
Munson (2001) looks at the issue from the Islamists’ perspective and argues that the 
main reasons constituting the support are the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas, 
organizational structure, group activities and the beliefs and practices of ordinary 
Egyptians. Although Munson’s study covered the period 1932–54, his conclusions 
still stand today. 
The public support of Islamists cannot simply be attributed to one reason. 
People who choose to be members of the MB or to vote for them in the elections are 
motivated by various reasons depending on their age, education and social class, to 
mention just some factors. The World Bank has reported that the economy of the 
Middle East is drawing back every year and that in Egypt, as an example, more than 
25 percent of the population is under the poverty line. This reason is good enough to 
push lower- and middle-class people to support Islamists. The same people would 
also be driven by the official corruption, routine, bribery, favoritism and the 
nonexistence of an equal-opportunity principle, which spilled over the Egyptian 
society. Middle-class and educated people may be pushed by the fact that the 
postcolonial leadership’s credibility in almost all Islamic countries is low. John 
Esposito notes that modernization has not led to the triumph of secular political and 




capitalism and Marxism have, in fact, come to be viewed by Muslims as the sources 
of Muslim political and economic failures (1999). The support of Christian thinkers 
and writers of the MB adds to the complexity and multiplicity of perspectives on 
Islamism. In the Middle East Report (el-Gawhary, 1996), Rafiq Habib, a prominent 
Christian thinker, said “as an Arab Christian, I identify myself with the values 
system of the Arab and Islamic civilization which expresses my feelings and 
preferences” (el-Gawhary, 1996: 30). In conclusion, because of the MB’s 
comprehensive agenda, it has been able to attract the interest of a broad spectrum of 
Egyptian people and no single reason would be enough to explain the organization 
popularity. 
When Islamists have had the chance to run any professional organization, 
such as syndicates, educational institutions, etc., they have proved to be successful to 
the extent that they have been viewed as an optimal replacement of the regime whose 
presence has led to stagnancy in all aspects of life in Egypt. 
Indicators of development in Egypt show that the gap between the rich and 
the poor is reaching an unbridgeable state. This can be easily read in the UN 
development reports, the frequent demonstrations by workers in almost all Egyptian 
official institutions (university professors, teachers, factory workers, IRS workers, 
judges, etc.,) demanding salary raise to meet sky-rocketing prices. Egypt today 
witnesses the emergence of an affluent class that controls almost every aspect of the 
Egyptian society side-by-side with another devastated class who can barely feed 
themselves. The affluent class enjoys living in skyscrapers, luxurious palaces and 




malls in Zammalek, Nasr City, Masr al-Jdidiah, etc. and sending their children to 
local foreign-language schools or abroad, while the other class lives in overcrowded 
rooms or tin-made huts or modest apartments, with barely enough food, and rare 
access to clean water or humane health treatment.  
The MB has a comprehensive agenda of reform that was introduced in 
Chapter 3 and is repeated here: MB is “a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi 
truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an 
economic company, and a social idea” (Mitchell, 1969: 9, 14). Giving his opinion on 
the comprehensiveness of the MB agenda, Walsh (2003) describes the three stages 
through which political Islamists in Egypt worked out their idea or ideology. First, 
they sought to gain properly elected representation in the parliament, largely through 
coalitions with other small opposition parties; second, it has taken control of 
professional and student associations (the most prominent organizations in the 
country), again through proper electoral process; and finally, they have established a 
network of social services in neighbourhoods and villages. “These initiatives fill 
gaps in government services, creating an enormous degree of popular support for the 
Brotherhood without directly challenging the government” (ibid.). 
Whenever the Brothers are given a chance, they embark in all walks of life to 
improve and create a society where people live like free people, not like slaves. Out 
of this belief, the Egyptian political and social civil societies have been invigorated 
at times when Islamists were leading the work. During the researcher’s 
undergraduate years, the MB were running the Student Unions and they offered 




textbooks, school supplies, clothes, tutoring services and conferences. When they 
were elected to the Boards of the bar, engineering and medical syndicates, they 
eclipsed any other organization, official or non-official, in terms of the services 
offered. One of the distinctive projects that several thousands of young people in the 
1990s benefited from was the marriage project, where the engineers’ syndicate 
brokered between its members and wholesalers to provide various marriage-related 
services and goods at affordable prices with easy methods of payments.  
During the devastating 1992 earthquake, the syndicates, run by the MB, stood 
up to their responsibility to help the victims. Tons of contributions (blanket, tents, 
clothes, food, etc.) were collected in few days and were ready to be distributed until 
the wise government issued Military Decree 4/1992, requiring all Egyptian charities 
to obtain government approval before collecting any donations. The government was 
caught off guard by the substantial amount of donations the MB was able to collect 
in a short period while the government stood paralyzed.  
On the economic level, the MB is credited with the establishment of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions, which  
offer depositors a return nearly double the 13 percent interest of the 
commercial banks by operating under profit-sharing arrangements instead of 
simply issuing certificates of deposit. The great advantage of the Islamic 
banks is their predominance in the informal sector of the economy (mostly 
unofficially remitted wages from the Gulf), which accounts for about 35 
percent of the official Egyptian GDP. The banks admittedly have suffered in 
the past from clear instances of fraud and mismanagement, but their general 
success has broadened the Brotherhood’s constituency to include parts of the 
business sector and has solidified its support among workers’ families who 




However, in its clamping down on Islamists the government does not differentiate 
between extremists and moderates. 
 In conclusion, the success of the MB on various levels was the main reason 
behind its popular support, and that is why the government’s performance is 
outshone by the MB’s performance. This performance has been recognized by 
scholarly research and reports. Dr Amani Qandil6 (2005) attributes the MB success 
not as a ‘takeover’ but because of professionalism and dedication and fair election. 
The following are the main points of Qandil’s book on the political role of 
professional syndicates under Islamists: 
1.  The MB’s 2005 success is a logical evolution of what the group has been 
doing for more than 20 years; 
2. The evolution of consciousness and awareness of the MB second-generation 
members due to the changes that have happened in the Egyptian society after 
adopting liberal economic policies, which led millions of Egyptians to be 
politically and economically marginalized, directed the attention and gained 
the attraction of broad middle-class categories. The bar and other associations 
when run by Islamists responded to the needs of the middle class, especially 
the newly graduates;  
3. In parallel, the syndicates directed their attention to the devastated poor class 
and impoverished areas by establishing mosque-attached free or low-cost 
clinics and hospitals;  
4. Highly organized skills, dedicated energy, industrious effort are common 




5. Recognizing and appreciating the value of work and teamwork that appeared in 
the coalition between different associations and other civil societies in Egypt 
and the Arab World; 
6. Once the president of the medical syndicate (who is not affiliated with MB) 
wrote “I wish we learned from Islamists their meticulousness, high-profile 
performance, dedicated work, commitment and adherence to what we believe 
in” (Wafd, 14 January 1993); 
7. Understanding and assimilating of the rules of the political game and the 
acceptance to work through it. It has been notable that the MB never ran for 
any of the syndicates’ presidency chairs. This position remained an open 
channel between them and the government. They, moreover, never sought 
confronting the government. 
In addition to the success of the MB as a political player, another factor can 
be added to decipher the reasons of the exclusion campaign led against them: this is 
the general fear of Islamism in the West. The Egyptian and maybe the Arab regimes 
play on this fear and portray Islamism to the West as a hobgoblin that would cause 
chaos and disasters not only in the Middle East, but also in the world. Islamism is 
also presented as a threat to Western interests in the East. Exporting this idea on 
Islamists can be recognized when Amr Moussa [it should be  Muhammad Mussa], 
Egypt’s Interior Minister, said in The Economist, “The Brotherhood is a greater 
threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups. We are 
determined not to go Algeria’s way.” Mubarak has also repeatedly made similar 




terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood” (Walsh, 2003). To 
the Washington Post he said, “When the funeral [of MB General Guide] took place, 
there were over 80,000 Muslim Brothers there. When you Americans talk about 
democracy in the Middle East, who do they think is going to take over? Democrats? 
It will be the Muslim Brotherhood’s pawns in Cairo, Amman, Riyadh and Palestine” 
(Mady, 2007: 112). Mubarak (2007) announced that “the Brothers are dangerous 
because they follow a religion-based policy and if they come to power, Egypt will be 
banned internationally.” 
 This section has presented the main reasons that brought support and success 
to the MB and these are the same reasons that can be considered to have driven the 
government to persecute them. In the next section, sourcing is revisited in the light 
of intertextuality to see if the readers of al-Ahram have been kept away from 
essential and critical information pertaining to the events presented to them, and 
which, if presented, would have changed their readings. 
7.5. Sourcing 
Genre-based silence is one of Huckin’s five types of textual silence (Huckin, 
2002). It “concerns those omissions that are conventional to a particular genre” 
(351). Since the data of the present study are based on news reporting, this section is 
devoted to studying any genre-based silences in the front-page reports. 
Sourcing in news reports is closely related to the notion of objectivity. 
Richardson points out that an objective report is not necessarily neutral, as it cannot 




be neutral but still has some orientation or value added to it by the reporter. Sourcing 
is one of the areas where the reporter can add value to the report, hence affecting the 
objectivity of the report. This value can be examined by looking at who is given 
space to comment on the events and who is not. The reporter can choose to source 
one side and/or silence the other and hence supporting in the exclusion of the other. 
In reporting, for example, a protest demonstration, the reporter may choose to side 
with the protesters, the protested-against, or both. In the first two cases, the 
ideological value is seen in silencing the side that is not voiced. In the third, the 
analyst needs to look at both sides: who is reported, what verbal processes are used 
with each one of them, how many times they have the chance to comment, etc. The 
occurrence of the first two types is a tangible example of Huckin’s genre-based 
silence because sourcing both sides is a prerequisites of an objective report. 
The textual analysis of sourcing in previous sections has shown the absence 
of the MB’s voice. The absence of the MB’s voice is stunning because in reporting 
events that relate to the credibility of the candidates and mutual accusations, the 
reader needs to hear from both sides. In such a case, however, the report did not 
quote or report the voice of the MB candidate(s). Genre-based silence is a prevailing 
feature in al-Ahram reporting as in (47). The reporting of this particular event is a 
significant example of the bias against the MB candidate. The case deals with two 
candidates. The first is Dr. el-Fiki, who is a prominent NDP member, a university 
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He is now the chairperson of the Foreign Relations Committee in the parliament. The 
second is Dr. Heshmat, an MB member who won the parliamentary election in the 
Damanhur consistency in 2000. In 2005, el-Fiki was announced a winner of the 
Damnhour seat, an announcement that was stunning to Heshmat and his supporters 
who refuted the result as a fraud. They said that vote counting of 80 percent of the 
ballots showed that Heshamt had won easily (28,000/7,000). Heshmat insisted that 
there was ballot rigging by the judge who presided the constituency. On 24 
November 2005, the daily el-Misery el-Youm published an article by Judge Noha el-
Zeini, a deputy chair at the Administrative Prosecution Authority, in which she 
presented the rigging she witnessed during the Egyptian 2005 election in the same 
constituency. The rigging was in the interest of the NDP candidate, Dr. el-Fiki. In 
her account, although the ballot count showed Gamal Hashemite gaining 35,000 
votes while 7,000 went to el-Fiki, the president of the Electoral General 
Commission, who asked all monitoring judges to leave, and, after making many low-
voiced telephone calls, announced el-Fiki the winner. In spite of the trouble she 
would be in because of publishing this report, she wrote that she decided to ease her 
conscience and speak the truth. She wrote that she handed in her counting results 
very late because she double-checked her results by recounting the ballots. Almost at 
the end of counting, “it was apparent that el-Feqi’s rival, the Muslim Brotherhood 
candidate, Gamal Heshmat would end up with a sweeping victory.” This was 
because Heshmat got about 25,000 and el-Fiki almost 7,000. She also denied any 




Interestingly, the testimony of Judge el-Zeiny catalyzed reactions from other 
judges about electoral fraud and 137/160 in the same constituency backed up her 
claims. The judges testified that they were subject to insults and attacks. In an 
independent procedure, the Judges’ Club formed a committee to investigate the fraud 
and the final report of the committee has confirmed the fraud, harassment and police 
passivity towards thugs bullying in front of the voting centres.  
Dr. Heshmat appealed to the Court of Cassation which ruled of the invalidity 
of the elections and that the election should be held again. The Cassation ruling was 
sent to the parliament to be executed but the government ignored the ruling. 
Furthermore, el-Fiki has appeared on Egyptian TV channels and newspapers 
and claimed that the Cassation ruling proved that there was no rigging. Here, el-Fiki 
intentionally misinformed the public about what exactly the court ruled. el-Zeiny 
explained that what the court ruled was that the election procedures were invalid 
(because of the intrusion of police by harassing the judges and voters, etc.) and 
therefore the election results were void. The court did not refer to or investigate the 
issue of rigging, a process that involves time-consuming procedures like recounting, 
summoning judges and other witnesses to question them, etc., which the court did 
not do. It is, therefore, evident that when el-Fiki said that the Cassation Court 
exonerated him, he was not telling the truth. On the other hand, his parliament seat 
was void in any case, either because of the rigging or the rule of the Cassation Court. 
However, he never stepped down nor was the election held again. 
The exclusion of MB figures such as Gamal Heshmat is considered by 




as “the government opted for targeted exclusion of a few key MB representatives 
like Gamal Heshmat and Mohammad Morsi, to prevent their parliamentary 
delegation from developing experience” (2006: n.p.). The report on el-Fiki’s case, in 
conclusion, was misleading to the reader when it did not source Heshmat or any 
other figure from the MB side. 
Another example on how news reporting on the MB is professionally 
deficient in terms of sourcing is FP05, #55 (given in (23)). Although the whole 
report is on the arrest of MB senior members, no voice from the MB side is 
mentioned or referred to. According to the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, 
that arrest was illegal as it was done without warrants from the prosecution 
authorities. Moreover, information on the identity of the arrested figures is concealed 
from the report. This information would at least pose a question mark on the 
credibility of the accusation. The arrested figures were:  
• Dr. el-Eryaan, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Arab doctors, has 
an MS in clinical pathology and a degree in law;  
• Professor Amr Darrag, professor at Cairo university and deputy president of 
Cairo University Staff Club; 
• Professor Hamdi Shaheen, assistant professor in the school of Science, Cairo 
university; 
• Mr. Yassir Abdo, the Secretary-General of the Egyptian Trade Union.  
 If one of these figures was asked or voiced in the report, the reading of the 
report would have been given a different angle. Interestingly, al-Ahram Weekly, the 




described the event in a different way from that of al-Ahram. According to the 
Weekly, the arrest was part of a government campaign against the group because of 
its recent increasing cooperation with other human rights movements like Kifaya and 
in response to a rumour that al-Eryaan might run for presidency.  
The discussion of the two cases of both el-Fiki and al-Eryaan highlights the 
degree of manipulation and misinformation caused by silencing the other. The genre-
based silence in the report exemplified by not having any voice from the MB side or 
neutral witnesses like Judge al-Zeini is a serious defect in the news story. It has been 
shown that the interpretation of the event has drastically changed when the same 
story is heard from different sources.  
7.6.  Concluding Note 
In this chapter, the silence framework has been used to look at the results of 
the textual analysis. Analyzing silence was not as easy as the textual analysis 
because, as Huckin (2002: 348) rightly put it, “manipulative silence is the least 
linguistically constrained and therefore most difficult type of silence to identify and 
analyze.” 
The analysis of silence has revealed aspects that the textual analysis was not 
able to uncover. The textual analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 has presented the MB as the 
“devil’s advocate” that wants to take over power from the NDP, and as the people’s 
nightmare causing and spilling over into violence, insecurity, bullying and treachery. 
Stunningly and in contrast, the present chapter has laid down an opposite picture: the 




people regardless of gender or religion, carrying out developmental and humanitarian 
projects, peacefully fighting to be admitted to work legally. Moreover, the MB 
members professionally and successfully ran the bar, medical, engineers’ syndicates 
until the government, with its exclusionary bylaws, took over these associations. 
The silence analysis has shown that Islamists are not against democracy or 
civil society. It is actually the military regime that has been ruling Egypt by state of 
emergency since 1981, harassing NGOs and interfering in university affairs. The 
MB’s frequent success and rivalry-potential are the reasons that triggered the severe 
exclusionary policies practiced against them. In spite of all this success and of being 
the largest opposition group bloc, Islamists unjustifiably have never been quoted 
except negatively during news stories in 2000 and 2005.  
Prominent writers in al-Ahram occasionally touch upon this group’s negative 
image and exclusion. In his daily column Mawaqef, ‘Stances’, Anis Mansur, a 
distinguished columnist and writer echoing the same conclusions, writes 
Recently, I had a conversation with some friends from the Muslim Brothers 
who are MPs. They expressed that they will not object for objection sake and 
they will have to benefit from the new [parliamentary] experience. They also 
said they will not be friends [with the government] overnight and will express 
their opinions in all issues and this is their right. They will be neither a 
‘bogeyman’ nor the ‘ugly duckling’ but they will stick to Islamic mannerism 
… they want people to see MB as a role model although newspapers 
represent them as the scarecrow and ‘devils of terrorism’. This means they 
are willing to present their good image and not the ugly picture represented 
by security authorities and official papers.  
I knew also that they are deeply concerned with the country’s problem s… 
they do not want to increase the burdens on the already burdened Egyptian 
people or make their life blacker [harder]. They have solutions to many 
problems but neither officials nor newspapers want to listen to or publish 
them. They hope to find the parliament a healthy outlet for their ideas. They 
do not have any newspaper that could speak on their behalf or correct the 
ugly picture presented by other papers. (al-Ahram, 29 December 2005: n.p.) 
  
8. CONCLUSION 
8.1. CDA, Islamism and Media 
The present study has examined how Islamists are represented in the 
government newspaper, al-Ahram, by using the framework of Cricitcal Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). Most CDA studies have been done within a Western context so the 
contribution of the present work lies in its use of CDA to examine the issue of 
representing social actors in the Eastern and Arab context. The data have been 
chosen from one of the most widely-distributed newspapers in the Arab worldly, al-
Ahram. Al-Ahram is state-owned and is considered to be very close to the ruling 
regime in Egypt. The data have been chosen from two periods, 2000 and 2005. These 
two years have been chosen because two significant parliamentary elections took 
place in which the MB performance outshone that of other political parties and the 
group appeared as a potential threat to the continuation of the NDP in power. The 
study hypothesis was: will this growing MB performance be paralleled with negative 
representation in government-endorsed papers?  
In Chapter 2, CDA is explicated as a framework of analysis and the main 
trends working under its shield are introduced, pointing out the similarities and 
differences in the main three CDA trends: the historical approach of Wodak, the 
cognitive approach of van Dijk and the social approach of Fairclough. A deeper look 




have common ground and they complement each other. All three trends have been 
used in the present study. The history of the MB since its establishment in 1928, the 
social practices in Egyptian society and the cognitive processing of news reports by 
the average reader are examined. At the end of Chapter 2, more details on 
Fairclough’s approach are given, as this approach constitutes the point of departure 
of this dissertation.  
Chapter 3 deals with the social and discursive practices. Issues such as how 
news is made in the Arab world, the relation between media and ideology, media and 
representation and Islamism have been elaborated. The early origins of Islamism 
since 1920s are discussed and the nature of the relation between Islamists and 
different Egyptian regimes since the 1940s is has been examined. The chapter 
concludes that the MB has been facing a policy of exclusion and exoticism under all 
regimes. It was found that methods of persecution against the MB differed from one 
regime to another but the hardest was during Nasser’s time which was exterminatory 
in nature. During Sadat’s time, the MB had a period of leniency, but it was still 
banned from working publicly. Yet, there were periods of crackdown on the group. 
Mubarak’s time can be considered the worst in terms of exclusion. This is not only 
because of the physical persecution exercised against the MB but the degree of 
representing the group negatively took a sharp curve up. 
Chapter 4 has presented both how the data were collected and how they were 
analyzed. Al-Ahram Online Index has been used to retrieve all the front-page news 
reports that deal, wholly or in part, with the MB. The search variables were ناﻮﺧﻻا,  




banned’. The retrieved items were manually sifted to make sure that every report 
included in the analysis talks about the MB or Islamists in Egypt. The search resulted 
in eleven and sixty news reports in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Concorde software 
was used to search the data for occurrences and percentages of the search variables 
related to the MB. The software, though simple, was useful in locating the immediate 
context of any references to Islamists, MB or any related variable. 
In Chapter 5 and 6, the data of 2000 and 2005 are analyzed. The data were 
approached textually to examine how some linguistic tools contribute to the negative 
representation of the MB. For every linguistic feature, how, more or less, it relates to 
the exclusion of the MB has been examined. The data were first approached from the 
perspective of the Idealized Readers (IR). O’Halloran’s IR framework was used to 
read and analyze the data from the perspective of the readers-for-a-gist. The IR 
analysis of both 2000 and 2005 data revealed the same results: Mystification is a 
prevailing feature of the headlines and news reports. Mystification keeps necessary 
background information, such as who did what and why, absent from the report. This 
information is so essential to understanding the news that its absence would cause 
mystification of and misinformation to the reader who then would be open to 
accepting the in-between-the-lines meaning. This incomplete information causes 
confusion to the reader’s cognition and because such readers do not have the time or 
want to make the effort to seek the missing information in other sources, they 
cognitively anchor the actions that are always violent in nature to the MB. The 
association of the MB with violence is cognitively done because of the high 




Transitivity is the second tool used for the textual analysis. Transitivity 
analysis helps to lay out the event (presented by the processes) and its main 
participants (Actor, Goal). Transitivity, therefore, laid down the action, who did it 
and to whom. The significance of this analysis is that it enables us to categorize the 
clauses according to whether the MB is Actor or Goal. Second, it helps to locate the 
different types of processes that are associated with the MB. The Transitivity 
analysis, therefore, highlights the negative image associated with the MB. In the 
clauses where the MB are Actors, it has been found that they are always doers of 
violent and bullying acts and are causing insecurity and challenging state authority 
(material processes); they are identified as illegal and banned (relational processes) 
and they are perceived as banned and dangerous (mental processes). 
The data have also shown predominance of the material process (70 percent) 
which signifies the negative representation of the MB. Interestingly, the verbal 
processes have always shown the government and its officials as Sayers while the 
group has not been used as the subject of verbal clauses. The verbal clauses were 
used to comment on, say or stress a negative aspect about the MB. The analysis of 
verbal processes subtypes, moreover, has shown that neutral and positive verbal 
subtypes were always associated with the government while the MB was always 
associated with the negative subtype.  
Ergativity concerns the clauses with no subject, like passive and subjectless 
clauses. The ergativity analysis has shown that 88 percent of the clauses have the 
government officials as medium (the one to whom the action is done; injured, killed, 




violence in elections. Transitivity analysis again underlines the exclusionary nature 
of MB representation in front-page reports. 
Analyzing sourcing was significant to show who is/is not reported in certain 
events. It has been noticed that there was a complete absence of the MB voice from 
the news reports. In the reports that deal directly with the organization or it members, 
their voice has never been quoted or sourced. In 2005 elections, an MB candidate 
accused the NDP prominent member, Mustafa el-Fiki, of ballot rigging and it was 
the MB candidate who should have won the parliament seat. The report that dealt 
with this particular case only presented the voice of el-Fiki while the voice of other 
involved parties was inexplicably absent. The complete absence of the MB voice in 
news reporting substantially affected the news trustworthiness and objectivity. It is 
evident that this absence is not accidental because the analysis of the sourcing in 
2000 and 2005 data has yielded the same conclusion, which is a strong indication of 
the systematic policy of exclusion persecuted towards the MB members. 
The analysis of lexical choices has given the same conclusion. Members of 
the MB have been lexically represented as thugs, bullies, agitators, riots-provokers, 
elements and banned. All these references negatively portray the group on both the 
legal and social levels. Although all references intensify the tone of othering the MB, 
the use of the noun ﺔﻠﻘﻟا,  ’the few’, has been shown to be of particular significance. 
The term has been expressed through various devices like pronouns as in we will not 
care for them, or those will not affect us, or, I am only concerned with the majority 




we are good while they are bad. The lexical items used to represent and attribute the 
MB can be categorized into four groups:  
1. Social negative judgment: unacceptable, extremists; 
2. Legally-loaded judgments: professional riots-provokers, legally banned, riots-
provokers; 
3. Culturally-alienated: extremists; 
4. Quantitatively few: few, a number of, those.  
The analysis of presupposition did not yield a different conclusion. The 
presupposition instances that occurred in the data clearly demarcated the MB and the 
government as two opposing entities. In the following examples, presuppositions are 
italicized: 
1. The democratic reforms are much larger than any arrests that happen due to 
riots, etc.; 
2. They want to cast doubts on the efforts and neutrality of the police [who] aim to 
distort the national achievement; 
3. The MB members were arrested because they were planning for actions to 
disturb stability and breach people’s security; 
4. The MB members say that they have given up violence. We are waiting to see 
this in reality; 
5. In his first response to the allegations made by MB against him, Dr el-Fiki …; 
6. Our role is confronting only those who oppose legitimacy, who wanted to make 





In these examples, the ideological square (we vs. they) is clearly foregrounded: we 
are legal, legitimate and source of security while the other (MB) is illegal, 
illegitimate and a source of disturbance and chaos. The textual analysis has verified 
and supported the hypothesis that the theme of exclusion regarding the representation 
of the MB in al-Ahram is systematic and consistent.  
The main issues that have been raised against the MB in the reports were: 
A. The group is theocratic; 
B. The group does not have a democratic orientation; 
C. The group is a threat not only to Egypt but to the Western interests 
The main concern of CDA is to uncover the latent forms of ideology and 
manipulation in the discourse. One way to achieve this is to access the event/s from 
other sources of different perspectives to see whether they would yield different 
conclusions. Therefore, in Chapter 7, when these issues have been examined in 
sources other than al-Ahram, a completely different image of the MB was realized. 
Looking for what was missing or silenced in al-Ahram the report has been the ideal 
approach to read the data from a different angle.  
The silence analysis started by looking for evidence that the MB is theocratic 
and that they are aspiring to establish and run a state by the divine right rule. The 
researched sources did not yield any indication that the group believed or adopted the 
theocratic ideology and, to the contrary, the group was found to accept democracy, 
advocate human rights and encourage women’s participation, respect the citizenship 
principle, not to discriminate against people based on race or religion and to promote 




The analysis found that the Egyptian regime, in contrast with what al-Ahram 
promotes, is not implementing or practicing democracy. The Egyptian version of 
democracy is tailored to suit the government’s interest where the concept of 
democracy can be stretched and tightened according to the regime orientation. It is 
stretched when the opposition parties are not strong enough to politically challenge 
the government. However, when the opposition is organized, has the support of 
people and forms a politically potential threat to the government, democracy is 
tightened to maintain the government’s monopoly of power. Although the Egyptian 
Constitution allows a multi-party political system, the government does not allow 
any serious parties to appear, let alone grow to challenge the current regime. The MB 
has been fighting for a legitimate presence in the political system for decades without 
any success. Al-Wasat Party, as another example, has been trying to get official 
permission to be a legal political party since 1996 with no hope of being authorized 
in the near future.  
8.2. The Exclusion Framework 
The conclusions of both the textual and silence analyses can be developed 
into a framework that is suitable for analyzing social exclusion. The framework is 
represented in Figure 8.1. The framework can be used to analyze other types of 
social exclusion. In this framework, exclusion can be realized either linguistically, 
where exclusionary features can be tracked on the level of clauses, or 
nonlinguistically, where the text must be gone beyond to examine the absence of the 
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the they side. All it analyzes is how the other is represented in our text. Moreover, 
another framework that would analyze the we side is possible: how we represent 
ourselves in our discourse. 
8.3. Why Exclusion 
The success of the MB in professional syndicates and other associations 
stands as the main reason for the regime’s obduracy and inexorability towards 
legalizing the organization to allow it to enjoy a considerable weight in the Egyptian 
politics and substantial support of the populace. The regime pessimistically trembles 
at the emergence of any active and organized group that addresses both the state and 
people’s needs. Such groups would make vulnerable the regime’s inadequacy, 
inefficiency and illegitimacy. Another reason for the government’s stance towards 
Islamists is to obtain and sustain the West’s support. The Egyptian government, by 
portraying Islamists as dangerous, increases the already-existing Western fear of 
Islamists and the assumed threat to democracy and Western interests. Arab regimes 
are considered the gatekeepers of Western policies and interests in the region and, in 
return, they enjoy the political, financial and military support of the US and the West 
to remain in power. The West knows that Arab leaders are autocratic, corrupt, and 
heavy-handed dictators, yet “they [Arab leaders] are better than the alternative.”6 The 
                                                 
 
6 As noted by Fareed Zakaria’s Newsweek article How To Save the Arab World. This is an 
embodiment of this view:  
 ‘Arafat is reported to have responded [to Bill Clinton] with words to the effect, ‘If I do what 
you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow.’ The Saudi monarchy’s most articulate spokesman, 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, often reminds American officials that if they press his government too hard, 




fear of Islamists is exemplified by Zakaria (2001) when he says that Islamists “would 
happily come to power through an election but then set up their own dictatorship.” 
The question now is: what is the difference then between Mubarak’s dictatorship and 
that of Islamists? Why does the West support one and fear the other? 
A third reason is that the exclusion of Islamists can be considered as a link in 
the Orientalism chain. Many studies that deal with issues of anti-Muslim rhetoric in 
Western societies (Richardson, 2004; Poole, 2002; Esposito, 1992; Halliday, 1992) 
present Orientalism as a discourse of division of the world into We (the West) and 
They (the East). This division is clear in news reports related to Muslims, Muslim 
countries, and Islam. It can be said that othering Islamists is an extension of the 
Orientlist discourse. This means that while the old Orientalist discourse is between 
two identities, East and West, and focuses on Islam and Muslim in general terms, the 
new discourse has replaced Muslims with Islamists. So the new oriental discourse is 
on Islamism and Islamists.  
If Orientalism in the last two centuries had led to colonialism in which most 
of the Muslim countries were colonized by Western countries, the new Orientalism 
views Islamism as its enemy. Islamism constitutes the major obstacle in front of the 
attempts to culturally Westernize and socially and economically dominate Muslim 
and Arab countries. The West, to confront Islamism and minimize its prospective 
                                                                                                                                          
 
American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests that Egypt’s government might ease up 
on political dissent, allow more press freedoms and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses up and 
snaps, ‘If I were to do what you ask, the fundamentalists will take over Egypt. Is that what you 





influence, has chosen to support the ruling Arab regimes, which are claimed to 
represent moderate Islam, against their main political opposition groups, Islamists 
who are claimed to represent the fundamental Islam. Islamists, with their potential 
comprehensive renaissance and cultural project that aims to raise awareness in Arab 
and Muslim countries to catch up with building a model of a civilized culture and 
nation, constitute the formidable obstacle facing the new form of colonization. The 
confrontation is, thus, now between the former colonizers, represented by the Arab 
regimes and Islamists. The Arab regimes would suffocate any potential threat and 
stifle people’s overwhelming indignation regarding the Muslims and Arabs 
overwhelmingly deteriorating life in all aspects.  
Reading some events that happened in the second half of the twentieth 
century would support the above analysis:  
1. In Algeria, Islamists (FIS) sweepingly won the December 1991 legislative 
elections. Faced with the real possibility of the FIS victory, the government 
cancelled the second stage of elections in January 1992. Then, a French-
supported five-member Higher State Council, chaired by Mohamed Boudiaf, 
took over power in a military coup;  
2. After 9/11, the US called on the Arab regimes to undertake real political reforms 
towards democracy in their countries. A sincere response to these calls would 
inevitably bring Islamists to power. Therefore, the US stepped back in its 
endeavor to promote democracy in the Arab world after strong signs that 




silent, regardless of the several reports from local and international human 
rights watch organizations on the deteriorating level of human rights in Egypt; 
3. In a transparent election, monitored by both local and international 
organizations, Islamists won the majority in the parliamentary election in 
January 2006. Since then the Palestinian Islamist’s government has not been 
welcomed in most of the Arab regimes. The winning Hamas has been put on 
the US terrorism list. The Washington Post reported the arrival of Hamas as a 
disaster: “The election results stunned US and Israeli officials, who have 
repeatedly stated that they would not work with a Palestinian Authority that 
included Hamas, which both countries and the European Union have 
designated as a terrorist organization.” Although Hamas came to power 
democratically, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, said 
in a statement that the Palestinian people had “voted democratically and 
peacefully.” But, he added, “These results may confront us with an entirely 
new situation which will need to be analyzed.” The US has supported the 
Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, in his endeavours to control and dwarf 
the new government. In October 2006, there was a US supported coup  d’etat 
through which Abbas has formed a new government. This coup d’etat has 
created a sectarian paradigm between Hamas and FattH. Since then, the Gaza 
Strip has suffered blockades by both Israel and Egypt alike; 
4. The suffocating blockade imposed by the Egyptian government on the people of 
Gaza. Egypt has shut down the crossing gate ‘outlet’ between Egypt and Gaza 




Artery of Life. The Gazans are caught in the crossfire because they choose to 
stand by their democratically elected government; 
5. Egypt trains FatH-affilaited (PLO) Special Operations Forces through US aid. A 
question was submitted to the Arab Affairs Committee in the Egyptian 
parliament regarding this issue. Why does the government support Abbas 
against Hamas?; 
6. Magdy Huseein, the General Secretary of the frozen Egyptian Labor Party was 
referred to a military tribunal and ruled for two-year prison because he visited 
Gaza to express his support; 
7. In an interview with al-Ahram, Fukuyama said 7 
In the long run, if the US keeps insisting on the Egyptian regime to open the 
political forum to all parties, the result will be that the MB will take the 
chance and take over, exactly like what Hamas did in Palestine. The question 
now is: Will the US be happy with extremists in power? 
Although these events occurred at different times and places, they are all 
along the same line and can be interpreted within the same framework that connects 
Orientalism to the discourse on Islamism. A study devoted to this issue would shed 
more light on the relation between campaigns against Islamists, postcolonialism 
politics and the West. 
  
                                                 
 
7 <http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Index.asp?ADSLUser=1&id1=47399&id2=956898677&id3 





8.4. Can Islamists Be Included? 
The question now is: can Islamists be included in mainstream politics? The 
answer is yes as long as the involved parties, including Islamists, sincerely abide by 
the rules of democracy. The best example that can be cited here is the experience of 
Islamists in Turkey. Habib, one of the founders of al-Wasat Party, sees that the 
experience of the Turkish Welfare Party shows “how to be politically active 
Islamists within a civil party.” Habib significantly points out that although al-Wasat 
is similar to the Welfare, there are contextual differences. In Egypt, the Islamic law 
is, by Constitution, the main source of legislation while in Turkey it is not (el-
Gawhary, 1996). This means that, if Turkey, with its secularism-based Constitution, 
happened to include Islamists in a unique experience, would Egypt not also do so? 
There is mutual responsibility between Islamists and governments. 
Governments have to open up and implement serious reforms towards including all 
streams in society. How long can the Egyptian dictatorship, or others, stand not 
taking the urgent step to reconcile with the opposition? More significantly, how long 
would it take people to give up on believing in the legitimate and peaceful methods 
of change? Otherwise, as the International Crisis Group puts it “the government risks 
realizing too late that it has squandered a vital opportunity and wasted the fruits of its 
own earlier successes on the security front” (2004: n.p.). On the other hand, Islamists 
need to be clearer on issues like democracy, the role of women and minorities’ 
rights, among all other sensitive issues that cause apprehension of Islamism. 
Moreover, opening communication channels with civil societies in the West would 




8.5. Study Limitations and Implication for Future Research 
The analysis and conclusions of this study are limited by two factors. First, 
this study only investigates the representation of one socio-political group, the MB, 
and thus it cannot be claimed that the conclusions apply to all other political groups 
that oppose the regime. Second, the analyzed data cover two periods, 2001 and 2005, 
in al-Ahram’s circulation. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be extended to other 
government media outlets but it rather suggests further research in these areas. 
The present research opens the door for further research in various directions. 
The following is a list of some suggested topics: the present study analyzed front-
page news reports. A future study would cover other news sections like op-ed pieces, 
articles and columns. That study would be revealing in terms of comparing and 
validating the results of the present dissertation. During the analysis, it was found 
that what was silenced in al-Ahram was spoken out about in the English-language al-
Ahram Weekly which is issued by the same institution. Another study would examine 
the representation of Islamists in the al                                                 -Ahram 
Weekly. The data in this study covered only two years, 2000 and 2005. Further 
research covering other years would add to the findings of this dissertation. 
There is a particular need to study exclusion in other media outlets like the 
Internet, TV programs, movies, etc. 
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  00-02-11    1# ,00PF
 .1 اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﻪ ﺗﺼﺪر اﺣﻜﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻻﺧﻮان
 .2 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ وﺑﺮاءﻩ ﺧﻤﺴﻪ  21 ﺳﻨﻮات ل  3 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ و  3 ﺳﻨﻮات ل  5 اﻟﺴﺠﻦ
 .3 اﻟﻤﺘﻬﻤﻮن ﺣﺎوﻟﻮا اﺧﺘﺮاق اﻟﻘﻨﻮات اﻟﺸﺮﻋﻴﻪ  : اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ
 .4 اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻟﻠﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻻﻓﻜﺎرهﻢواﺳﺘﻐﻼل ﻓﺘﺮﻩ 
   
  اﺻﺪرت اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ اﻣﺲ اﺣﻜﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
   ,وذﻟﻚ ﺑﺪاﺧﻞ اﻟﻨﻘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﻬﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ 
 .5
ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ   21 ﺳﻨﻮات ﻋﻠﻲ  3 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺴﺠﻦ  3 ﺳﻨﻮات ﻋﻠﻲ  5 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻗﻀﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﺠﻦ  02 واﻟﻤﺘﻬﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ
 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ  5 وﺑﺮاءﻩ
 .6
 .7 وآﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﻪ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻘﺪت ﺟﻠﺴﺎﺗﻬﺎ اﻣﺲ 
وﺣﻀﺮهﺎ ﻣﻤﺜﻠﻮن ﻋﻦ اﻟﺼﺤﻒ اﻟﻘﻮﻣﻴﻪ واﻟﺤﺰﺑﻴﻪ ووآﺎﻻت اﻻﻧﺒﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﻪ وﻋﺪد آﺒﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻴﻦ 
  . واهﺎﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ
 .8
 .9 وﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻢ اآﺪت هﻴﺌﻪ اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ ﻓﻲ آﻠﻤﺘﻬﺎ ان
.01 اﻟﻘﺎﻃﻊ ﻣﻦ اﻻوراق اداﻧﺘﻪ ﺗﺘﻢ ﺗﺒﺮﺋﺘﻪﻣﻦ ﻟﻢ ﻳﺜﺒﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ 
هﻴﺌﻪ اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﺧﺬت اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻜﺎﻓﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻃﻼع واﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﻲ اوراق اﻟﺪﻋﻮي وﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﻪ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ ﺷﻬﻮد اﻻﺛﺒﺎت 
  , واﻟﻨﻔﻲ
.11
.21 آﻤﺎ اﺳﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻌﻪ اﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﻪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﻪ
.31 واﻟﺘﻲ وﺟﻬﺖ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ ﺟﻤﻴﻌﺎ
.41 اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﻧﻈﻤﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺨﺎﻟﻔﻪ ﻻﺣﻜﺎم
.51 اﻟﻐﺮض ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر
.61  واﻻﺿﺮار ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻼم اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ  , 
.71  واﻟﺘﺨﻄﻴﻂ ﻻﺣﻴﺎء ﻧﺸﺎط ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
.81  وﺗﺤﺮﻳﺾ اﻟﻐﻴﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻌﺎداﻩ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﻟﻠﻨﻘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﻬﻨﻴﻪ واﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﻴﺮﻳﻪ  , , 





 طﺎﺳوﻻا ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟا ءيدﺎﺒﻣو رﺎﻜﻓا ﺮﺸﻨﻟ ﺞﻳوﺮﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻳﺎﻋﺪﻟا ﻩﺮﺘﻓ لﻼﻐﺘﺳاو
ﻪﻳﺮﻴهﺎﻤﺠﻟا  
20.
ﻢﻴﻈﻨﺘﻟا ﻲﺤﺷﺮﻣ ﻊﻣ ﺎﻬﻔﻃﺎﻌﺗ بﺎﺴﺘآﻻ ﻪﻤﺋﺎﻘﻟا ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺸﻟا ﻪﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا ﺪﺿ ﺎﻬﺗرﺎﺜﺘﺳاو .   21.
ﻦﺠﺴﻟا ﻲﻟﺎﺘﻟﺎآ ﻲهو ﺎﻬﻣﺎﻜﺣا ﻪﻳﺮﻜﺴﻌﻟا ﻪﻤﻜﺤﻤﻟا ترﺪﺻا ﻢﺛ 5  ﻲﻠﻋ تاﻮﻨﺳ 3   ﻊﻳﺪﺑ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻢهو ﻦﻴﻤﻬﺘﻣ
ﺪﻴﺠﻤﻟاﺪﺒﻋ )57(  ﻪﻨﺳ ,  ﻒﻳﻮﺳ ﻲﻨﺑ ﻪﻌﻣﺎﺟ يﺮﻄﻴﺒﻟا ﺐﻄﻟا ﻪﻴﻠآ ﻞﻴآو ,  يوﺎﻤﺸﻋ لﻮﻠﻏز ﺪﻌﺳو )44(   ﻪﻨﺳ
ﻩﺮهﺎﻘﻟا ءﺎﺒﻃا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ مﺎﻋ ﻦﻴﻣاو ﺐﻴﺒﻃ ,  ﻲﻧاﻮﻠﺤﻟا ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ﺪﻤﺣا )36(  ﻦﻴﻤﻠﻌﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻮﻀﻋو سرﺪﻣ ﻪﻨﺳ .   
22.
ﻦﺠﺴﻟﺎﺑ ﺖﻀﻗ ﺎﻤآ 3  ﻲﻠﻋ تاﻮﻨﺳ 12  سﺪﻨﻬﻣ داﺪﺤﻟا ﺪﻤﺣا ﺖﺣﺪﻣ ﻢهو ﺎﻤﻬﺘﻣ ,   ﻦﻴﻣا حﻮﻧ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ رﺎﺘﺨﻣو
ﻦﻴﺤﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ قوﺪﻨﺻ ,  ﻦﻴﺳﺪﻨﻬﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ مﺎﻋ ﻦﻴﻣا ﺮﺸﺑ ﻞﻴﻋﺎﻤﺳا ﻲﻠﻋ ﺪﻤﺤﻣو ,   ﻦﻳﺪﺑﺎﻌﻟا ﻦﻳز ﷲاﺪﺒﻋو
ﻲﻟﺪﻴﺻ نﺎﻤﻴﻠﺳ ,   يوﺪﺑ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﺪﻟﺎﺧوﺎﻘﺑﺎﺳ ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﺪﻋﺎﺴﻣ ﻦﻴﻣا ,   ﻮﻀﻋ ﺪﻌﺳ ﻲﻔﻄﺼﻣ مﺎﺸه ﺪﻤﺤﻣو
ءﺎﺒﻃﻻا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ,  ءﺎﺒﻃﻻا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻮﻀﻋ ﻞﻜﻴه ﻢﻴﻈﻌﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﺪﻴﺳو ,   ءﺎﺒﻃا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻮﻀﻋ رﺎﺘﺴﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻗﻮﺷ ﺪﻤﺣا
طﺎﻴﻣد ,  طﻮﻴﺳا ﻪﺳﺪﻨه ﻪﻴﻠﻜﺑ ذﺎﺘﺳا ﻆﻴﻔﺤﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﻢﻴﺣﺮﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﺪﻤﺣاو ,  ﺐﺳﺎﺤﻣ يﺮﻤﺴﻟا ﻞﻴﻠﺠﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﻒﻃﺎﻋو ,  
ﻠﺠﻣ ﻮﻀﻋوﻦﻴﻳرﺎﺠﺘﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﺲ ,  ﻲﻟﺪﻴﺻ ﺪﻴﺴﻟا ﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑاو ,   ﺐﻴﺒﻃ ﻦﻤﺣﺮﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﻲﻔﻄﺼﻣ ﻩﺪﺒﻋو
ءﺎﺒﻃﻻا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻮﻀﻋو .   
23.
ﻩءاﺮﺒﺑ ﺖﻀﻗو 5  ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا يﺪﻴﺷﺮﻟا ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ﻢه ﻦﻴﻤﻬﺘﻣ ,   ﻲﻠﻋو ﺲﻳﻮﺴﻟﺎﺑ ﻪﻴﻋﺮﻔﻟا ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻞﻴآو
طﻮﻴﺳا ﻪﺳﺪﻨﻬﺑ ذﺎﺘﺳا ﻆﻴﻔﺤﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻢﻴﺣﺮﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ,  ﺪﻌﺳ ﺪﻤﺤﻣو  ءﺎﺒﻃا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ مﺎﻋ ﻦﻴﻣاو ﺐﻴﺒﻃ ﻩﻮﻴﻠﻋ
ﻩﺰﻴﺠﻟﺎﺑ ,  ﻩرﻮﺼﻨﻤﻟﺎﺑ ﻦﻴﺳﺪﻨﻬﻤﻟا ﻪﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻮﻀﻋو سﺪﻨﻬﻣ راﻮﻧﻻا ﻮﺑا ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﺪﻤﺣا ,   ﻦﻴﺴﺣ دﻮﻤﺤﻣ ﺪﻤﺣاو
ﻒﻇﻮﻣ .   
24 
 
1 The military tribunal issues decisions pertaining the Brothers' group 
(tanzeem): 
2 5-year prison for 3, 3-year prison for 12, and not-guilty for 5. 
3 The court: the accused (group) attempted to penetrate through legitimate 
channels and  
4 To exploit the election period to disseminate/ promote their ideas 
  
5. The court issued its decisions pertaining the banned  MB case 
9. Before pronouncing the sentences,  the court stressed that  
13. [the prosecutor] accused the MB members of 
14. joining a group organized in violation of the provisions of the law  
15. the purpose of which is to disrupt the provisions of the constitution,  
16. and damage the social peace, 
17. to Plan to revive the banned Muslim Brotherhood 
18. and to incite others to be antigovernment by joining the professional unions 
and charities  
19. and to infiltrate the legitimate and legal channels through running for 
nomination in the recent elections of both People's Council [Parliament] and 
other representative bodies. 
20. and to exploit the electoral campaigns to disseminate the ideas and principles 
of the group to the masses. 
21. to provoke them be against the current legitimate government to gain its 
support to the group's candidates 
22. Then, the military court issued its decisions as follows: prison xxxx 
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  00-91-11 ,2# ,00PF
 .1   : وزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﺗﻤﺮ ﺻﺤﻔﻲ
 .2  ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﺗﻤﻴﺰت ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻗﻪ دون ﺗﺤﺮﻳﻒ او ﺗﺎوﻳﻞ
 .3  ﺑﻌﺾ اﺣﺰاب اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ ﺗﺴﻌﻲ ﻟﻀﻢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ ﻟﻬﻴﺌﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ
 .4  اﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻻهﺪاف ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ وﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﻴﻪ ﺳﺮﻳﻪ ﺣﺎوﻟﺖﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان 
   
 .5    , اراد وزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺣﺒﻴﺐ اﻟﻌﺎدﻟﻲ ان ﻳﻀﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﺎط ﻓﻮق اﻟﺤﺮوف
 .6    , واﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ اﺛﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ادﻋﺎء ﻋﻦ دور اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ
 .7    , وﻋﻘﺪ وزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻮﺗﻤﺮا ﺻﺤﻔﻴﺎ اﻣﺲ ﺑﺎآﺎدﻳﻤﻴﻪ ﻣﺒﺎرك ﻟﻼﻣﻦ
 .8   . آﺸﻒ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻨﻘﺎب ﻋﻦ
 .9  ﻣﺤﺎوﻻت ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﺨﻄﻴﻂ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺎت ﻋﺪاﺋﻴﻪ ﺗﺴﺘﻬﺪف ﻣﻘﺎر اﻟﻠﺠﺎن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ 
.01    , ﺑﻘﺼﺪ اﻻﺧﻼل ﺑﺎﻻﻣﻦ
.11  اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ واآﺪ ان ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﺣﺎوﻟﺖ اﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر ﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮ 
.21  وﺧﻄﻄﻮا ﻟﻜﺴﺐ ﺷﻌﺒﻴﻪ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﻪ اهﺪاف ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ وﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﻴﻪ ﺳﺮﻳﻪ وﻏﻴﺮ ﺷﺮﻋﻴﻪ  ﻟﻜﻨﻬﻢ ﻓﺸﻠﻮا
ودورﻧﺎ اﺳﺘﻬﺪف اﻟﻤﻮاﺟﻬﻪ ﻟﻠﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺸﺮﻋﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﻂ واﻟﺬﻳﻦ ارادوا اﻓﺸﺎل اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻟﺨﺪﻣﻪ اهﺪاﻓﻬﻢ   ,
   وﻣﺮﺷﺤﻴﻬﻢ
.31
.41  وﻟﻦ ﻧﻠﺘﻔﺖ ﻟﻬﻮﻻء  , هﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﻻﻳﺮﻳﺪون ﻟﻤﺼﺮ اﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮار
واﺷﺎر وزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﻲ ان ﺣﻤﻼت اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺒﻨﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻠﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻬﺪ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ وﺣﻴﺎدهﺎ ﺗﻬﺪف اﻟﻲ ﺗﺸﻮﻳﻪ 
    , اﻧﺠﺎز ﻗﻮﻣﻲ
.51
.61   . وان ﺣﻤﻼت اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﺟﺎءت ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﻻرﺗﺒﺎك وﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ وﻓﻘﺪان اﺗﺰان ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﻠﻪ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻔﺸﻞ اﻟﻘﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﻌﺾ
.71    , اﻟﺘﺰﻣﺖ اﻟﺤﻴﺎد ﻃﻮال اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪوأآﺪ أن اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ 
 .81   , آﻤﺎ آﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺮﻳﺪهﺎ اﻟﻘﻠﻪ  , وﻻ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ذﻟﻚ ان ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺤﻴﺎد هﻮ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴﻪ
 
  
  :ecnerefnoc sserp a ni roiretnI fo retsiniM 1
 etarucca os erew snoitcele )tnemailrap( ylbmessA s'elpoeP fo stluser ehT 2
 .noitaterpretnI ro noitrotsid yna tuohtiw dna
 draob rieht ot stnednepedni gnitiurcer kees seitrap noitisoppo emoS 3
 fo egatnavda ekat /tiolpxe ot gnitpmetta neeb sah puorg 'srehtorB ehT 4
 .slaog lanoitazinagro dna lacitilop terces ]eveihca[ ot noigiler
  
 ,srettel eht no stod tup ot detnaw ,ildA-le bibaH ,roiretnI fo retsiniM 5
 ]laiciffo[ eht fo elor eht gnidrager smialc eht tuoba snoitseuq ot dnopser dna 6
  ,ssecorp larotcele eht gnirud secivres ytiruces
 ymedacA karabuM eht ta ecnerefnoc sserp a dleh roiretnI eht fo retsiniM ehT 7
 ytiruceS fo
 derevocnu eh erehW 8
 sretrauqdaeh eht tsniaga snoitca citsirorret nalp ot setadidnac emos yb stpmettA 9
 snoissimmoc larotcele eht fo




11 He emphasized that elements of the banned Muslim Brotherhood tried to 
exploit the influence of religion on citizens 
12.  but they failed and they planned to win popularity for secretive, illegal, 
political and organizational purposes 
 
13. In addition, our role is confronting only the outlaws who want to fails the 
elections to serve their own agenda and their own candidates. 
14. There are those who do not want stability to Egypt, but we are not affected by 
them   
15. The Minister also referred that the campaigns adopted by the few to cast doubts 
on the efforts and neutrality of the police aim to distort the national 
achievement.  
16. Campaigns to cast doubts [on the results] came as a result of confusion and 
contradiction of the few people because they terribly failed [in the elections]. 
17. And the police hve been neutral during the elections 
18. But being neutral does not mean being passive,   
19. As the few want it to be 
 
FP00, #5, 09-23-00  
ﻪﻌﻠﻄﻣ ردﺎﺼﻣ :   ﺾﺒﻘﻟا ﺮﻣاوا(is)ﻪﻴﻧﻮﻧﺎﻗ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ  1 
    
 ﻪﻌﻠﻄﻣ ردﺎﺼﻣ ﺖﻟﺎﻗنا ماﺮهﻼﻟ  2. 
ﻪﺑﺎﻴﻨﻟا ﺎﻬﺗﺮﺟا ﻲﺘﻟا تﺎﻘﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟا ,  ﺎﻧﻮﻧﺎﻗ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﻊﻣ ,  3. 
ﻩرﺎﺛﻻا لﺎﻤﻋا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ طرﻮﺗ ﺖﺘﺒﺛا ﺪﻗ ,  ﺾﻳﺮﺤﺘﻟاو ,   ﻲﻓ مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻪﻴﻗاﺪﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻴﻜﺸﺘﻟاو
ﻪﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻟﺎﺑ ﻚﺴﻤﺘﻟا ,   
4. 
ﻌﻟا خﺎﻨﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺮﻴﺛﺎﺘﻠﻟ ﻢﻬﻨﻣ ﻪﻟوﺎﺤﻣ ﻲﻓﻦﻴﺒﺧﺎﻨﻟاو مﺎ .   5. 
  نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟا تاءاﺮﺟاو ﻂﺑاﻮﺿ ﺐﺴﺣ ﻢﺘﺗ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا تاءاﺮﺟا نا ردﺎﺼﻤﻟا ﺖﻟﺎﻗو ,    6. 
ئراﻮﻄﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻘﺑ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ﻩﺬه ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ يا ﻞﻘﺘﻌﻳ ﻢﻟ ﻪﻧا تﺪآاو ,   يﺮﻴﺜﻣو ﻪﻴﺠﻄﻠﺒﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻖﺒﻄﻳ يﺬﻟا
ﺐﻐﺸﻟا .   
7. 
1. Informed Sources: The warrants to arrest elements of the Brothers [are] 
legal 
  
2. Informed sources said to al-Ahram that 
3. Investigations conducted by the Prosecutor, with a number of members of the 
outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, 
4. Have proved the involvement of elements of the group in acts of provocation, 
incitement, and questioning the credibility of the government's adherence to 
democracy, 
5. in an attempt to influence the general climate and the electorate.  
6. The sources, also, said that the procedures to arrest the elements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood are lawful, 
7. and emphasized that none of the members of this group have been arrested 






  00-12-90 ,6# ,00PF
 1 ﺣﻮل ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺎت ﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞﺑﺪء اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻣﻊ اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺷﻜﺮي 
  
ﺑﺪات ﻧﻴﺎﺑﻪ اﻣﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﺻﺒﺎح اﻣﺲ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎت ﻣﻮﺳﻌﻪ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻤﻬﻨﺪس اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺷﻜﺮي رﺋﻴﺲ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞ 
 اﻟﻤﺠﻤﺪ ﻧﺸﺎﻃﻪ 
 .2
 .3  , ﻓﻲ اﻻﺗﻬﺎﻣﺎت واﻟﻤﺨﺎﻟﻔﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺴﻮﺑﻪ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﺘﻲ اﻧﺘﻬﺖ اﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎت اﻟﻤﺪﻋﻲ اﻻﺷﺘﺮاآﻲ
 .4  , اﺗﻬﺎﻣﺎت ﺟﻨﺎﺋﻴﻪ  7 وﺷﻤﻠﺖ
 .5   . واﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻄﺮﻓﻪ  , ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ارﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﺤﺰب ﺑﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
ﺳﺎﻋﺎت ﻋﻠﻲ ان ﺗﻮاﺻﻞ   4 وﻗﺪ اﺧﻠﺖ اﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﻪ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﻬﻨﺪس اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺷﻜﺮي ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ اﺳﺘﻤﺮت
   . اﻟﻴﻮم ﺳﻤﺎع اﻗﻮاﻟﻪ
 .6
  
 ytrap robaL eht fo snoitaloiv eht no irkuhS miharbI gnitagorretni gnitratS .1
  
  htiw noitagorretni ediw detrats noitucesorP ytiruceS etatS emerpuS ehT .2
 ytrap robaL nezorf eht fo tnediserp eht ,irkuhS miharbI reenignE
 lareneG eht yb ytrap eht ot detubirtta snoitasucca dna snoitaloiv eht gnidrageR .3
 rotucesorP
 dedulcni hcihW .4
 spuorg tsimertxe eht dna puorg BM dennab eht htiw snoitcennoc gnivah .5
 eb lliw eh dna sruoh 4 rof detsal taht noitagitsevni eht retfa desaeler saw irkuhS .6
 .yadot retal gniraeh a no
 
  00-02-70 ,8# ,00PF
  .1   : اﻻﺷﺘﺮاآﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞاﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﺠﻬﺎز اﻟﻤﺪﻋﻲ 
 .2  ﺗﻮﻟﻲ ﻗﻴﺎدات ﻣﻦ اﻻﺧﻮان واﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻄﺮﻓﻪ ﻣﻨﺎﺻﺐ ﻗﻴﺎدﻳﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺰب
   
 .2  اﺗﻬﺎﻣﺎت اﻟﻲ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞ اﻻﺷﺘﺮاآﻲ  9 وﻗﺪ اﻧﺘﻬﺖ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎت اﻟﻲ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ
 .3   : واﻟﺬي ﺛﺒﺖ ارﺗﻜﺎﺑﻪ اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻟﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﻪ
 .4  ﺑﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮر ﻧﺸﺎﻃﻬﺎارﺗﺒﺎط ﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞ اﻻﺷﺘﺮاآﻲ   : اوﻻ
 .5  وﺗﻌﺎوﻧﻪ ﻣﻊ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﺮﻓﻪ واﻟﻤﻨﺎهﻀﻪ ﻟﻠﻮﺣﺪﻩ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﻪ واﻟﺴﻼم اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ
 .6  وﺗﻘﻠﺪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻓﺮاد هﺬﻩ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺎت ﻟﻤﻨﺎﺻﺐ ﻗﻴﺎدﻳﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺰب
   
 ytraP robaL eht no troper lanif )lareneG yenrottA =( rotucesorP tsilaicoS .1
 :esac
 pihsredael emussa spuorg tsimertxe dna 'srehtorB eht morf sredaeL .2
  .ytraP robaL eht ni snoitisop
  
 robaL eht gnigrahc  ni detluser ]lareneG yenrottA eht fo[ noitagitsevni ehT .2
 snoitasucca 9 htiw ytraP




4. first, the having links with the banned MB  
5. and its cooperation with elements from the extreme Islamists groups that are 
antinational unity and anti social peace 




FP00, #9, 05-29-00  
)ﻪﻴﻧﺎﺒﺳﻻا ﺲﻴﻳﺎﺒﻟا ﻪﻔﻴﺤﺼﻟ ﺚﻳﺪﺣ ﻲﻓ ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻟا ﻊﻣ راﻮﺣ( تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻاو ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ رﺎﺼﻧا  1 
   
لاﺆﺳ :  ؟ﻪﻣدﺎﻘﻟا تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻞﺒﻗ ﻼﺧﺪﺗ ﻲﺿﺎﻤﻟا عﻮﺒﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ قﻼﻏا ﺲﻴﻟا  2 
باﻮﺟ :  ﺎﻘﻠﻄﻣ ﻻ ,   لﻮﺧد ﻢﻬﻨﻜﻤﻳ ﺮﺧا بﺰﺣ يا رﺎﺼﻧا ﻞﺜﻣ ﻚﻟذ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻬﻠﺜﻣ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا بﺰﺣ رﺎﺼﻧا نﻻ
بﺰﺣ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻄﻐﺗ ﻲﻟا ﻪﺟﺎﺣ نود ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ,   
3 
ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻼﻟ مﺪﻘﺘﻟا نﻮﻌﻴﻄﺘﺴﻳ ﻪﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﻪﻤﻈﻨﻣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ ﻢهو ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا نا ﻞﺑ .   4. 
 
1. ( an interview with the president): Labor Party supporters and elections 
  
2. Q: Is not the closure of the Labor party last week considered interference (in the 
party’s affairs) before the coming elections? 
3. A: No, absolutely. Because the supporters of the Labor party can, like others, 
run in the elections as independents without the need to the need to be party 
affiliated 
4. Moreover,  MB, though being an illegal organization, can run as independents 
 
FP00, #10, 04-30-00  
)ﻲﻔﺤﺻ ﺮﻤﺗﻮﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﻳزو (  :ناﻮﺧﻼﻟ دﻮﺟو ﻻ !..   1.  
   
لاﺆﺳ :ﺐﻌﺸﻟا ﺲﻠﺠﻣ تﺎﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧا ﻲﻓ ﺎﻬﻟ ﺮﺻﺎﻨﻋ ﺢﻴﺷﺮﺘﻟ ﻲﻌﺴﺗ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ .   مﺎﻣا ﻢﻜﻔﻗﻮﻣ ﺎﻤﻓ
؟تﺎﺤﻴﺷﺮﺘﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻞﺜﻣ !   
2. 
ﻲﻟدﺎﻌﻟا :  ﺎﻴﻋﺮﺷ ﺎﺑﺰﺣ اﻮﺴﻴﻟ اﻮﻣادﺎﻣ ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻤﺳا ﺎﺌﻴﺷ فﺮﻌﻧ ﻻ .    3. 
ﻦﻴﻠﻘﺘﺴﻤآ وا قﺎﻔﺗا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻌﻣ اﻮﻠﺧد بﺮﺤﻟ ﻪﻣﺎﻤﻀﻧﺎﺑ ﺢﻴﺷﺮﺘﻟا ﻊﻴﻄﺘﺴﻳ ﺪﻗ ﻢﻬﻀﻌﺑ ﻦﻜﻟو  4. 
   
1. The Minister of Interior in a press conference : Nothing is called MB 
  
2. The banned Muslim Brotherhood seeks to nominate some of its elements in the 
parliament elections, what is your position on this? 
3. The Minister of Interior: we do not know any entity called the Brothers as long 
as they are not an official party. 





 5002 FO STROPER SWEN DNA SENILDAEH EHT
  50/80/21 1# ,50PF
 1 أﻋﻨﻒ ﻳﻮم ﻓﻲ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ
 2 وﺷﻐﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ واﻟﺪﻗﻬﻠﻴﺔ وآﻔﺮ اﻟﺸﻴﺦ ﺑﺪﻣﻴﺎط واﺻﺎﺑﻪ اﻟﻌﺸﺮات ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺎدﻣﺎت  2ﻣﺼﺮع 
 3 أﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻷﻣﻦ ﺗﻮآﺪ اﻟﺘﺰاﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻴﺎد دون اﻟﺘﺨﻠﻲ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻟﻔﻴﻦ
 4 اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺟﺮت ﺣﺴﺐ ﺿﻤﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﺤﻴﺪﻩ واﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﻪ واﻟﻨﺰاهﻪ  : وزﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﺪل
  
 5 وﺳﻂ أﺟﻮاء ﻣﺸﺤﻮﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻣﺎت واﻟﺸﻐﺐ
ﺑﺎﻻﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻲ ﻋﺸﺮات اﻟﻤﺼﺎﺑﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ   , وﺛﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺧﻄﻴﺮﻩ  , وﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﻲ ﺣﺪ ﺳﻘﻮط ﻗﺘﻴﻠﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ دﻣﻴﺎط
   , اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت اﻻﺧﺮي
 6
 7   . ﺟﺮت أﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﻊ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت ﺟﻮﻟﺔ اﻻﻋﺎدة ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ واﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ
اﺻﺪرت ﻣﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﻟﻘﻀﺎء اﻻداري ﺣﻜﻤﺎ ﺑﺘﺎﺟﻴﻞ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دواﺋﺮ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ داﺋﺮﺗﺎن ﻓﻲ آﻔﺮ  ﺑﻌﺪ ان
   . واﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﻪ هﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ اﺟﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻗﻬﻠﻴﻪ  , اﻟﺸﻴﺦ
 8
  , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻟﻠﻮﻃﻨﻲ  621 ﻣﻨﻬﻢ  , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻣﺜﻠﻮا ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻻﺣﺰاب واﻟﻘﻮي اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ  452 وﺗﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ
وﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﺮاﻣﻪ   , وﻣﺮﺷﺢ واﺣﺪ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻨﺎﺻﺮي  , واﺛﻨﺎن ﻟﻠﻮﻓﺪ  , رﻩﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮ  53 و
   . ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻼ  98 و  , ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻴﺲ
 9
 01  وذآﺮ ﻣﺼﺪر اﻣﻨﻲ ان اﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ دﻣﻴﺎط ﺷﻬﺪت
 11    , ﻗﻴﺎم اﻧﺼﺎر أﺣﺪ ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ اﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﻤﻊ أﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻜﻮﺑﺮي اﻟﻌﻠﻮي ﺑﻤﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﻤﺪﻳﻨﻪ 
 21   , اﻟﻤﺮوروإﻳﻘﺎف ﺣﺮآﻪ 
 31    , وﻗﺬف ﻗﻮات اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺠﺎرﻩ
 41  وإﻃﻼق اﻋﻴﺮﻩ ﻧﺎرﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ أﻋﻠﻲ أﺳﻄﺢ اﻟﻤﻨﺎزل
 51  وﺻﺮح اﻟﻠﻮاء اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺣﻤﺎد اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪث اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻲ ﻟﻮزارﻩ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺄن
 61  أﺣﺪاث اﻟﺸﻐﺐ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ دﻣﻴﺎط 
 71  ﺑﻄﻠﻘﺎت ﻧﺎرﻳﻪأﺳﻔﺮت ﻋﻦ ﻣﻘﺘﻞ ﺷﺨﺼﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮﻳﻪ اﻟﺨﻴﺎﻃﻪ ﻣﺘﺄﺛﺮﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﺻﺎﺑﺘﻬﻤﺎ 
 81   , أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﺾ أﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ
 91    , ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ إﺻﺎﺑﻪ ﺛﺎﻟﺚ ﺑﺎﺻﺎﺑﻪ ﺧﻄﻴﺮﻩ ﻧﺠﻢ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ارﺗﺠﺎج ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺦ
 02  , ﻹﺟﺮاء ﻋﻤﻠﻴﻪ ﺟﺮاﺣﻴﻪ ﻟﻪ  , وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﻧﻘﻠﻪ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﺸﻔﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺳﻴﺌﻪ
 12   . ﻩ وزﺟﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﺤﺎرﻗﻪوﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺒﺎط ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ اﻟﻘﺬف ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺠﺎر  , وﻗﺪ أﺻﻴﺐ ﺳﺘﻪ ﻣﺠﻨﺪﻳﻦ
 22  , وﻧﻔﻲ اﻟﻤﺼﺪر ﻣﺎ ﻋﻤﺪت ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻔﻀﺎﺋﻴﺎت اﻟﻲ ﺗﺮدﻳﺪﻩ ﺣﻮل ﺗﺪﺧﻞ اﻻﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻷﻣﻨﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺎر اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ
اﻟﺘﺰام اﻷﻣﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻴﺎد دون اﻟﺘﺨﻠﻲ ﻋﻦ دورﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎت اﻷﻣﻦ واﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮار واﻟﺘﺼﺪي  واآﺪ
   . ﻟﻼﻧﺸﻄﻪ اﻻﺟﺮاﻣﻴﻪ وﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺸﻐﺐ
 32
 42    , ﺷﺨﺼﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪﻩ دواﺋﺮ ﻓﻲ اﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ أﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ  53 أﺻﻴﺐ ﻧﺤﻮ  , وﻓﻲ آﻔﺮ اﻟﺸﻴﺦ
 52   . ﻣﻤﺎ دﻓﻊ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﺔ اﻟﻲ اﻃﻼق اﻟﻘﻨﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﻴﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻣﻮع ﻟﺘﻔﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎهﺮﻳﻦ




 72   . ﻗﻮات اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻲ اﻃﻼق اﻟﻘﻨﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﻴﻠﻪ ﻟﻠﺪﻣﻮع ﻟﺘﻔﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﻤﺘﺠﻤﻌﻴﻦﻣﻤﺎ اﺿﻄﺮ 
 82   . وﻣﺸﺘﻮل اﻟﺴﻮق  , وﺗﻞ ﺣﻮﻳﻦ  , واﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰﻳﻪ  , ودﻳﺮب ﻧﺠﻢ  , واﻟﻘﻨﺎﻳﺎت  , ووﻗﻌﺖ اﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻴﺎ اﻟﻘﻤﺢ
 92  : ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ وﻗﺎل
 03   , اﻧﻬﻢ ﺗﻢ ﻣﻨﻌﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل اﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎر اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ
 13  , وﻣﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻨﺼﺮ  , واﺗﻤﻴﺪﻩ  , وﺗﻘﺪم ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﺑﺸﻜﻮي رﺳﻤﻴﻪ ﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺰﻗﺎزﻳﻖ
 23   . ﺣﻴﺚ اﺻﻴﺐ اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﺑﻌﺎهﻪ ﻣﺴﺘﺪﻳﻤﻪ
 33    , ان اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺟﺮت ﺗﺤﺖ ﺳﻴﻄﺮﻩ اﻣﻨﻴﻪ آﺎﻣﻠﻪ , اﻟﻠﻮاء اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺣﻤﺎد وﻗﺎل 
 43   . او اﺧﻼل ﺑﺎﻻﻣﻦ  , اﻟﻠﺠﺎن ورﺟﺎل اﻟﻘﻀﺎء ﻣﻦ اي ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪوان ﻗﻮات اﻻﻣﻦ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﻮاﺟﺒﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﻪ 
ان اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ رﺻﺪت اﻧﺼﺎر ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺣﺎوﻟﻮا اﺳﺘﻬﺪاف ﻋﺸﺮ ﻟﺠﺎن ﻟﻠﻘﻴﺎم  واوﺿﺢ
    , وﺷﻐﺐ ﺑﺎﻋﻤﺎل ﺑﻠﻄﺠﻪ
 53
 63    , اﻧﻪ آﺎن هﻨﺎك ﺗﻌﺎون آﺎﻣﻞ وﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ آﺒﻴﺮ ﺑﻴﻦ وزارﺗﻲ اﻟﻌﺪل واﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ واآﺪ
.73   , ﺎل داﺋﻢواﻧﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺗﺼ
.83  واﺷﺎر اﻟﻲ ان اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺿﺒﻂ اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﻘﺎر 
ﺗﻤﻬﻴﺪا ﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻓﺴﺎد اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ   , ﺗﻮﻟﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﻮن ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﺨﺰﻳﻦ اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﻮف واﻟﺠﻨﺎزﻳﺮ واﻟﺸﻮم
    , اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪﻩ ﻟﺠﺎن ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ
.93
.04   . ﻟﻠﻨﻴﺎﺑﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖوﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺿﺒﻂ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ وﺗﻘﺪﻳﻤﻬﻢ 
 fo gniworht ot eud derujni neeb evah sreciffo fo rebmun a dna sreidlos 6 dnA .12
 selttob yraidnecni dna skcor
 eht neewteb dehsalc ni derujni erew elpoep 53 tuoba ,hkeihS-le rfaK nI .42
 sretroppus setadidnac
 ytilibasid tnenamrep a htiw derujni neeb sah reywal a erehW .23
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  .1   ! أﺳﻠﺤﻪ ﻧﺎرﻳﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺎﻗﻮس
   
  .2  ذآﺮت ﻣﺼﺎدر اﻣﻨﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ ﻓﺎﻗﻮس ان
  .3  ﻗﺎم ﺑﺘﺪﺑﻴﺮ آﻤﻴﺎت ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﻨﺎرﻳﻪ   , وﻳﺪﻋﻲ ﺣﺴﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﻟﺤﻴﻮان  , اﺣﺪ اﻟﻘﻴﺎدﻳﻴﻦ اﻻﺧﻮاﻧﻴﻴﻦ 
  .4   . ﻓﺮﻳﺪ اﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻞ ﺧﻠﻴﻞﻟﺪﻋﻢ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ 
وﻣﺤﺮرات ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﻴﻪ اﺧﻮاﻧﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻗﺎﻋﺪﻩ ﺑﻴﺎﻧﺎت   , وﻣﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﻪ  , وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺿﺒﻂ آﻤﻴﺎت ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﻠﺤﻪ واﻟﺬﺧﻴﺮﻩ
   . ﺟﻬﺎز آﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ
 .5








  .1 50-40-21 3# ,50PF
  .2 ﻣﺼﺮاﻳﺎم وﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ اﺷﺮس اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ   4
  .3 اﻟﻘﻀﺎء اﻻداري ﻳﻘﺮ ﺑﺎﺣﻘﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮاﻗﺒﻪ اﻟﻔﺮز ﺑﺪواﺋﺮ ﺗﻠﻴﻔﺰﻳﻮﻧﻴﻪ





  .4   , اﺷﺮس ﺣﻤﻠﻪ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﺮ  , ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﺑﻌﺪ ارﺑﻌﻪ اﻳﺎم ﻣﻦ اﻻن
  .5   , اﺷﺮس ﺣﻤﻠﻪ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﺮ  , ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﺑﻌﺪ ارﺑﻌﻪ اﻳﺎم ﻣﻦ اﻻن
  .6    , وﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻘﺮر ان ﺗﺠﺮي ﺟﻮﻟﻪ اﻟﺤﺴﻢ اﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻳﻮم اﻻرﺑﻌﺎء اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻞ
  , ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻴﺲ وﻣﺜﻠﻪ ﻟﻠﻜﺮاﻣﻪ  , وواﺣﺪ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺻﺮي  , ﻟﻠﻮﻓﺪ  2 ﻣﻨﻬﻢ  , ﻣﻘﻌﺪا  721 ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ  452 وﻳﺘﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ
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  .1 
  .2 ﻟﻠﻮﻃﻨﻲ وواﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﻓﺪ  8 ﻧﺎﺟﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ  9
  .3 ﻣﻘﻌﺪ  721 ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻳﺨﻮﺿﻮن ﻣﻌﺮآﻪ ﺣﺎﺳﻤﻪ اﻻرﺑﻌﺎء اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻞ ﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺼﻴﺮ  452
  .4 وﻳﻘﺘﺮب ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ اﻏﻠﺒﻴﻪ اﻟﺜﻠﺜﻴﻦ  422 اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ زاد ﻋﺪد ﻧﻮاﺑﻪ اﻟﻲ  : اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ
 .5 ﻋﺎﺋﻼت اﺑﻮﺳﺘﻴﺖ وﻋﺒﺪاﻻﺧﺮ واﺑﻮآﺮﻳﺸﻪ اﻟﺴﻮهﺎﺟﻴﻪ ﺗﻐﺎدر اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن
 .6  اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻓﻲ دﻣﻴﺎط وﺷﻤﺎل وﺟﻨﻮب ﺳﻴﻨﺎء واﺳﻮان واﻟﺒﺤﺮ اﻻﺣﻤﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﻘﺎﻋﺪ
   ﺧﺴﺮوا ﻣﻘﺎﻋﺪهﻢﻓﻲ ﺳﻮهﺎج   11 ﻧﻮاب ﺣﺎﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ و  01 
   
. 7    , ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺎت ﻋﺪﻳﺪﻩ اﺳﻔﺮت ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﻪ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ
 .8  ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ   0771 ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ  , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻘﻂ  9 ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻨﺠﺢ ﺳﻮي
 .9  دﺧﻠﻮا اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ
.01   . ﻣﻘﻌﺪا  721 ﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺼﻴﺮ  , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ  452 اﻻرﺑﻌﺎء اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﻴﻪ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ ﺑﻴﻦﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺳﺘﺠﺮي اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻳﻮم 
.11 واﺷﺎرت اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻲ ان ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺰﻳﻦ 
.21   , ﻳﻨﺘﻤﻮن اﻟﻲ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺒﺎدئ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
.31  . ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻳﻨﺘﻤﻲ اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺰ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ اﻟﻲ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻮﻓﺪ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ
ﻣﻦ   2 ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ و  53 ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ و  621 ﺳﻮف ﻳﺪﺧﻞ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻻﻋﺎدﻩو
  . وواﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻜﺮاﻣﻪ ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻴﺲ واﻟﺒﺎﻗﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ  , وواﺣﺪ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﻨﺎﺻﺮي  , اﻟﻮﻓﺪ
.41
.51   , وﻗﺪ ﻓﺸﻠﺖ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻮز ﺑﺎي ﻣﻘﻌﺪ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ
.61   , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ  94 ﺑﺮﻏﻢ دﺧﻮﻟﻬﺎ ب
اﻟﺪﻗﻬﻠﻴﻪ واﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ وآﻔﺮ اﻟﺸﻴﺦ وﺳﻮهﺎج   : ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت  53 وﺗﺨﻮض اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﺟﻮﻟﻪ اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ب
   , وﺷﻤﺎل ﺳﻴﻨﺎء ودﻣﻴﺎط
.71




  50-10-21  6# ,50PF
  .1  اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺪي اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر واﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻩرﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻮزراء ﻓﻲ 
  .2  % 51وزﻳﺎدﻩ دﺧﻞ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﻻآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ    % 4  اﻧﺨﻔﺎض ﻣﻌﺪل اﻟﺘﻀﺨﻢ ﻻﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ
  
وﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻈﺮ ﻋﻘﺪ اﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﺠﺎرﻩ اﻟﺤﺮﻩ ﻣﻊ ﺗﺮآﻴﺎ وان ﻧﺠﺎح اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن ﻻ ﻳﺘﻌﺎرض   .








  50-72-11  7# ,50PF
 .1 واﺟﻮاء ﻣﺸﺤﻮﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮﺗﺮ  .. اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺻﻌﺒﻪ
 .2 ووﻗﻔﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﺨﻴﺮﻳﻪ واﻃﺴﺎ واﻟﻤﻨﺸﻴﻪ  .. داﺋﺮﻩ  56اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﺟﺮي ﻓﻲ 
 .3  واﻋﻼن ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﺧﻼل ﺳﺎﻋﺎت  .. ﺑﺪء ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﻔﺮز
  .4  اﻟﺪواﺋﺮاﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﺸﺮات واﻏﻼق ﻣﺮاآﺰ اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ 
   
ﺗﻌﻠﻦ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺧﻼل ﺳﺎﻋﺎت ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺟﻮﻟﻪ اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ 
    , اﻟﺸﻌﺐ
 .5
 .6  اﻟﺘﻲ ﺟﺮت اﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﻊ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ ﻣﻨﺎخ اآﺜﺮ اﻧﻀﺒﺎﻃﺎ وﺣﺰﻣﺎ 
. 7    . ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﺼﺪي اﻻﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻤﺜﻴﺮي اﻟﺸﻐﺐ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ
 .8    , داﺋﺮﻩ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ  56 وﻗﺪ اﻏﻠﻘﺖ ﺻﻨﺎدﻳﻖ اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻌﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎء اﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ
 ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻻﺣﺰاب واﻟﺘﻴﺎرات اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ   032 وﺗﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻘﺎﻋﺪ اﻟﻔﺌﺎت واﻟﻌﻤﺎل ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ
  ﻧﺎﺋﺒﺎ   611 ﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎر
 .9
واﻃﺴﺎ   , ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﺨﻴﺮﻳﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ  : هﻲ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﺮار اﻟﻘﻀﺎء اﻻداري ﺑﻮﻗﻒ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دواﺋﺮ
   . واﻟﻤﻨﺸﻴﻪ واﻟﺠﻤﺮك ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ  , ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻴﻮم
.01
.11  وﻗﺪ ﺑﺎدرت ﻗﻮات اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻴﻪ ﺑﺘﺎﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ  
.21    . وﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ  , واﻟﻔﻴﻮم  , اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ  : ﺑﻀﺒﻂ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﺘﺮﻓﻲ اﺛﺎرﻩ اﻟﺸﻐﺐ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت
اﻟﺘﻘﺎرﻳﺮ اﻟﺼﺤﻔﻴﻪ اﻟﻲ ﺗﺮاﺟﻊ ﻇﺎهﺮﻩ اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ واﺷﺎرت 
   . اﻟﺴﺎﺧﻨﻪ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺟﺮت ﻳﻮم اﻻﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ
.31
.41  ﺗﺸﻴﺮ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮات وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻻﻋﻼم واﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﻴﻦ اﻟﻲ ﺗﺮاﺟﻊ ﻧﺴﺒﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن   , ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ
.51   . ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﺮﺿﻬﻢ ﻟﻼﻳﺬاء ﺑﺴﺒﺐ هﺬﻩ اﻻﻓﻌﺎلاﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪت اﻋﻤﺎل ﻋﻨﻒ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ ﺧﺸﻴﻪ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ 
.61  وﻗﺪ اﺷﺘﻜﻲ اﻧﺼﺎر ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻌﻮﺑﻪ وﺻﻮﻟﻬﻢ اﻟﻲ ﻟﺠﺎن اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ اﻟﺤﺰم اﻻﻣﻨﻲ 
.71    . اﻟﺬي ﺳﺎد اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ اﻣﺲ
واﻇﻬﺮت ﻋﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻃﻮال ﻧﻬﺎر اﻣﺲ ﺳﻴﺮ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻋﻠﻲ وﺗﻴﺮﻩ ﻣﺸﺎﺑﻬﻪ ﻟﻤﺎ ﺣﺪث ﻓﻲ 
  ﺣﻠﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲاﻟﻤﺮ
.81
.91    , ﻗﺮر ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﺸﺮﻓﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺟﻮﻟﻪ اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ وﻗﻒ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت  , وﻓﻲ ﺗﻄﻮر ﻻﺣﻖ
واﻏﻼق ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﻜﺎﺗﺐ اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﺗﻲ رﺷﻴﺪ وآﻔﺮ اﻟﺪوار اﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻨﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﺧﻮل 
   . وﺗﺒﺪﻳﻞ آﺸﻮف اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ
.02
.12    , واﺗﻬﻢ ﻧﺎدي اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﺑﻔﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاآﺰ اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع
.22    , ﻣﻤﺎ دﻓﻊ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﺸﺮﻓﻴﻦ اﻟﻲ ﻏﻠﻘﻬﺎ
.32  واﻟﻐﺎء اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ ﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﻬﺬا اﻟﺸﺎن
.42    : وﻋﻀﻮ ﻟﺠﻨﻪ ﻣﺮاﻗﺒﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﻨﺎدي اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ  , وﻗﺎل هﺸﺎم ﺑﺴﻄﻮﻳﺴﻲ ﻧﺎﺋﺐ رﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺤﻜﻤﻪ اﻟﻨﻘﺾ
.52    , ان اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﺣﺎﺻﺮت اﻟﻠﺠﺎن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ  
.62  
وﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﺗﻲ   , وآﻔﺮ ﺷﻜﺮ  , واﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮدﻳﻪ  , ورﺷﻴﺪ  , وآﻔﺮ اﻟﺪوار  , وﻣﻨﻌﺖ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﺧﻮل ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ
   . ﻏﺮﺑﺎل واﻟﺪﺧﻴﻠﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
.72
.82    : اﻋﻠﻦ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪث ﺑﺎﺳﻢ وزارﻩ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ  , وﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻪ
اﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺻﺤﻪ ﻟﻤﺎ اذاﻋﺘﻪ ﻗﻨﺎﻩ ﻓﻀﺎﺋﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﺑﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻣﺮآﺰي ادآﻮ 
    , ورﺷﻴﺪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﺒﺤﻴﺮﻩ
.92
.03  . واﻟﻔﻴﻮم  , واﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ  , ﻋﺪا اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ اﻟﺜﻼث اﻟﺘﻲ ﻻ ﺗﺠﺮي ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
.13  .  , ورﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت  , ﻣﺤﻤﻮد اﺑﻮاﻟﻠﻴﻞ وزﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﺪل اﻋﻠﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر  , وﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ
وﻣﺎ ﺷﺎب ﺑﻌﺾ   , ان اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﻤﺪي اﻧﺘﻈﺎم ﺳﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ دواﺋﺮ اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ
 . اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺠﺎوزات
.23




.43   , اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﻟﺤﻘﻮق اﻻﻧﺴﺎن اﺳﺘﻤﺮارا ﻻﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪرﺻﺪت 
.53    . ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﻮﺛﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻧﺰاهﻪ وﺷﻔﺎﻓﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ 
.63    : وﻗﺎل ﺑﻴﺎن اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﻪ
.73  وﻟﺠﻨﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت   , ووزﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﺪل  , اﻧﻬﺎ ﺳﺘﺮﻓﻊ ﺧﻼل ﺳﺎﻋﺎت ﺑﻼﻏﺎت ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم
.83    , ﺿﺪ ﺣﺎﻻت اﻻﻋﺘﺪاء ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن واﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ
.93  . واﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻻﺳﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﺒﻴﻀﺎء ﺑﺎﻻﺳﻤﺎء واﻟﺼﻮر ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ ﻣﺮﺗﻜﺒﻴﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﺪاﻟﻪ
آﻤﺎ رﺻﺪت اﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﻟﺪﻋﻢ اﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ ﺗﺪﺧﻼت ﻓﻲ ﺳﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ 
  , واﻟﻔﻴﻮم
.04
.14    , اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪوﺗﺼﺎﻋﺪا ﻟﻠﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﻪ و 
.24    , وﺗﺎﺧﻴﺮ ﻓﺘﺢ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن ﻓﻲ دواﺋﺮ ﻗﻨﺎ
.34  . ﻣﻤﺎ اﺿﻌﻒ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺎخ اﻻﻳﺠﺎﺑﻲ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ
.44  واﺷﺘﻜﺖ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻪ ﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﻦ 
.54  واﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ   , واﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ  , اﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﻪ  : اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻻﺳﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﻨﺎرﻳﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت
.64  . واﻟﺘﺎﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ  , ﺗﻬﺪد اﻣﻦ وﺳﻼﻣﻪ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪﺑﺼﻮرﻩ 
.74  وﺷﻬﺪت ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ ﺗﻮﺗﺮا وﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮات ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ 
.84  ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻢ ﺗﻌﻘﺪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﻘﻨﺎﻃﺮ اﻟﺨﻴﺮﻳﻪ 
.94    , ﺑﻌﺪ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻘﻀﺎء اﻻداري ﺑﺒﻄﻼن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﻬﺎ
.05  . وﺗﺮاﺟﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺮي اﻻﺧﺮي  , وزاد اﻟﺤﻀﻮر ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮي اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ
واﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ   , آﻤﺎ ﺷﻬﺪت ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﺠﺎن ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﻪ ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮات ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
    , اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ
.15
ﻟﻌﺪﻩ  وﺻﻔﻂ ﺗﺮاب ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻪ اﻟﻜﺒﺮي  , وﺑﻠﻘﻴﻨﺎ  , وﻣﺤﻠﻪ ﺣﺴﻦ  , ﻣﻤﺎ ادي اﻟﻲ اﻋﺎﻗﻪ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻟﺠﺎن ﻗﺮي اﻟﻬﻴﺎﺗﻢ
  . ﺳﺎﻋﺎت
.25
.35  آﻤﺎ ﻗﺎم اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﺳﻌﺪ ﻋﻄﻴﻪ ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﺷﺒﺮاﺧﻴﺖ ﺑﺤﻴﺮﻩ 
.45    , ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎء ﺣﺠﺎرﻩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻘﺎر اﻟﻠﺠﺎن ﻓﻲ اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﺎهﺪ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﻪ اﻻزهﺮﻳﻪ
.55  ﻣﻦ ﻣﺜﻴﺮي اﻟﺸﻐﺐ وﺑﺤﻮزﺗﻬﻢ ﺟﻨﺎزﻳﺮ وﺳﻨﺞ   31 واﻟﻘﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ
.65  . ﻟﻠﻨﻴﺎﺑﻪ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻪوﺳﺘﺘﻢ اﺣﺎﻟﺘﻬﻢ 
.75  وﻗﺪ اﻋﺘﺮض اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻴﻪ واﻟﻤﺴﺠﻠﻮن ﺧﻄﺮ 
.85    , ﻣﻤﻦ ﻳﺤﻤﻠﻮن ﺳﻴﻮﻓﺎ ﺳﻴﺎرﻩ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺪ راﺷﺪ ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ ﺳﻴﺪي ﺟﺎﺑﺮ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
.95    , ﻓﻲ اﺛﻨﺎء ﻣﺮورﻩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻟﺠﻨﻪ ﺑﺎﺣﺪي اﻟﻤﺪارس
.06    , وﺗﺒﻴﻦ ان اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻴﻪ ﻳﻌﻤﻠﻮن ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﻪ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ
.16   . ﺤﺖ ﻗﻮات اﻻﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ اﺣﺘﻮاء اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒوﻧﺠ
ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮﻳﺪي اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺗﻮآﻞ ﻣﺴﻌﻮد ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺪﺧﻴﻠﻪ   12 واﻟﻘﺖ اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ
    , ﺑﺎﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
.26
.36  ﻟﺘﻌﺪﻳﻬﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮب ﻋﻠﻲ اﻓﺮاد اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ 
.46    , وإﺣﺪاث إﺻﺎﺑﻪ ﻟﺨﻤﺴﻪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ
.56    , وﺗﻬﺸﻴﻢ زﺟﺎج ﺛﻼث ﺳﻴﺎرات ﻟﻠﺸﺮﻃﻪ
.66  ﺷﺨﺼﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﺠﺎن ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ  72 ﻧﺠﺤﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺿﺒﻂ آﻤﺎ
.76    , ﻟﻤﺤﺎوﻟﺘﻬﻢ ﺗﺮوﻳﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ
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  .2  اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت واﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﻟﺘﺎﻣﻴﻦ ﺳﻼﻣﻪ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ واﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦﺗﻨﺴﻴﻖ آﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻟﺠﻨﻪ 
  .3  ﻋﻀﻮ ﺑﻤﻨﻈﻤﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ وﺣﻘﻮق اﻻﻧﺴﺎن ﻳﺮاﻗﺒﻮن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت  0053 
   
اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻧﻈﻴﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺼﺮﻳﺤﺎت ﻟﺼﺤﻴﻔﻪ ﻓﺎﻳﻨﻨﺸﻴﺎل ﺗﺎﻳﻤﺰ اﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اهﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻜﺎﺳﺐ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺣﻘﻘﺘﻬﺎ  وﻗﻠﻞ
  ﻓﻲ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﻪ  , ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﺎ
  .4
  .5  واﻧﺘﻘﺪ اﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺧﺎﺿﻮا اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻋﻠﻲ اﻧﻬﻢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻮن
  .6   . ﻻ ﻳﻨﺘﻤﻮن اﻟﻲ اي ﺣﺰب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ  , ﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﻴﻦﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﺎﺗﻲ اﻟ  : وﻗﺎل  , 
  .7  وﻗﺎل اﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺻﻔﻮت اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ اﻻﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
  .8  ان اﻟﺤﺰب ﻳﺨﻮض اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﻜﻞ ﺷﺮف وﻧﺰاهﻪ
  .9  ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺠﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ  , ﺣﺎﻣﻼ ﻟﻮاء اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ اﺟﻞ ﻣﺼﺮ
.01  ﺣﺴﻨﻲ ﻣﺒﺎرك آﻞ اﻣﺎل اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦاﻟﺬي ﺳﻴﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻊ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ   , 
.11  وﻳﺴﺘﺠﻴﺐ ﻟﻤﻄﺎﻟﺒﻬﻢ
.21  وﻋﻠﻲ راﺳﻬﺎ ﻣﺸﻜﻠﻪ ﺗﺸﻐﻴﻞ اﻟﺸﺒﺎب ﺑﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻃﻤﻮح  , وﻳﻘﺪم ﺣﻠﻮﻻ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻪ وﺣﺎﺳﻤﻪ ﻟﻤﺸﻜﻼﺗﻬﻢ
.31  واﺳﺘﻨﻜﺮ اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ وﺗﺰﻳﻴﻒ اﻻﺻﻮات
ﻜﻞ ﻧﺰاهﻪ ﺣﺘﻲ اﺧﺮ ﻣﻮآﺪا ان اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ وﺣﻜﻮﻣﺘﻪ ﻟﻦ ﻳﺘﺮاﺟﻌﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺧﻮض ﻣﻌﺮآﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑ
  ﺳﺎﻋﻪ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ
.41
  %57 ﺑﻌﺪ ﻓﻮزﻩ ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﺰﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻲ  , ﻣﺸﻴﺮا اﻟﻲ ان اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﺳﻴﺤﺴﻢ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻏﻠﺒﻴﻪ ﺳﺎﺣﻘﻪ 
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  .1  ﻓﺮز اﻻﺻﻮات ﻓﻲ ﻣﻜﺎن ﻋﺎم ﻣﻮﻗﻔﻲ ﺳﻠﻴﻢ وﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﻻﻋﺎدﻩ : ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ ل اﻻهﺮام
  .2  اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن هﻤﺎ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ وﺳﺎﺗﺮك ﻣﻘﻌﺪي ﻟﻮ ﺛﺒﺖ ﺗﺰوﻳﺮ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺘﻲ
   
  .3    , ﻓﻲ اول رد ﻋﻠﻲ ادﻋﺎءا  ت ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ ﺣﺪوث اي ﺗﺰوﻳﺮ او ﺗﻼﻋﺐ ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﺗﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ ﺑﺒﻨﺪر دﻣﻨﻬﻮر وزاوﻳﻪ  ﻧﻔﻲ
   . ﻏﺰال
  .4
  .5    , ان ﺷﻦ ﻣﺜﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺤﻤﻠﻪ ﺿﺪﻩ آﺎﻧﺖ اﻣﺮا ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻌﺎ ﻣﻨﺬ ﻋﺪﻩ ﺷﻬﻮر  : وﻗﺎل
  .6    , وﺻﺤﻪ ﻋﻀﻮﻳﺘﻪ  , و ﺳﻼﻣﻪ ﻣﻮﻗﻔﻪ  , اﻧﻪ ﻳﺤﺘﻜﻢ اﻟﻲ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻓﻲ آﺸﻒ اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻪ ﻣﻮآﺪا
  .7   . ﻣﻌﺮﺑﺎ ﻋﻦ اﺳﺘﻌﺪادﻩ ﻟﻠﻘﺒﻮل ﺑﺎي ﻗﺮار ﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻓﺮز اﻻﺻﻮات وﻟﻮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻜﺎن ﻋﺎم
ﻓﻲ ﺣﻮارﻩ ﻣﻊ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﻮﺳﻲ اﻟﻤﺤﺮر اﻟﻘﻀﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻼهﺮام ﺑﺘﺮك ﻣﻘﻌﺪﻩ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻟﻮ ﺛﺒﺖ وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ 
    , ﺣﺪوث ﺗﺰوﻳﺮ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺘﻪ
  .8
اﻣﺎ ﻣﺤﺎوﻟﻪ اﻟﺘﺸﻮﻳﺶ وﺳﻴﺎﺳﻪ اﻟﺼﻮت اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻲ واﻟﺒﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﻨﺎرﻳﻪ واﻟﺸﻌﺎرات اﻟﺠﻮﻓﺎء ﻓﻬﻲ ﺳﻼح ﻣﻦ ﻻ 
   . ﻳﻤﻠﻜﻮن اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻪ
  .9
اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر اﻟﻔﻘﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻌﻲ ﻻرهﺎب اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻩ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ اﻟﺸﺒﺎب ﻣﻊ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﻪ  واﺗﻬﻢ
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  .1  اﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﺑﺪا ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﺑﻌﻴﺪا ﻋﻦ اﻷﻣﻦ : ﻣﺼﺪر اﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ رﻓﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮي
   
  .2  ﻣﺼﺪر اﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ رﻓﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮي ﻓﻲ وزارﻩ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ ان  اآﺪ
  .3  اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺎﺣﻪ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﻢ ﺗﻔﻴﺪ ﺑﺎن 
  .4    , اﺣﺪاث اﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﻧﺠﻤﺖ ﻋﻦ اﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ
  .5    , وان ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺟﺮي ﻋﻠﻲ ﻳﺪ ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
  .6    . ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺗﻮرﻃﺖ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻋﻤﺎل ﻋﻨﻒ ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻠﻪ
ﻟﺪي اﻻدﻻء   , واﺿﺎف اﻟﻤﺼﺪر اﻧﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺠﺐ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ ﺗﻮﻓﻴﺮ اﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﻪ ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ
    , ﺑﺎﺻﻮاﺗﻬﻢ
  .7
  .8   . ﻓﺎﻧﻨﺎ ﻻ ﻧﻤﻠﻚ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﻔﻴﺪ ﺑﺎن اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ آﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺑﺪء ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﻌﻨﻒ
ﻗﺪ ادﻟﻲ ﺑﺘﺼﺮﻳﺤﺎت اوﺣﺖ ﺑﺘﺤﻤﻴﻞ اﺟﻬﺰﻩ   , اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪث ﺑﺎﺳﻢ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ  , وآﺎن ﺷﻮن ﻣﺎآﻮرﻣﻴﻚ
  اﻻﻣﻦ
  .9
.01    . اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺣﺪث ﻣﻦ اﻋﻤﺎل ﻋﻨﻒ
وﻗﺪ اﻋﺮب دﻳﻔﻴﺪ ووﻟﺶ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ وزﻳﺮ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻟﻘﺎء اﻗﺘﺼﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺮاﺳﻠﻲ ﺻﺤﻒ اﻻهﺮام و 
  ﻦ اﺳﻔﻪ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﻻﺣﺪاثاﻟﺤﻴﺎﻩ و اﻟﻨﻬﺎر ﻋ
.11
.21   . اﻧﻪ ﻳﺎﻣﻞ ﻓﻲ ان ﺗﺘﻢ اﻟﺠﻮﻻت اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻬﺪوء  : وﻗﺎل
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  .1  ﺳﺨﻮﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ
  .2  ﺗﻔﺠﺮ اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ
  .3  اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ وﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ ﺗﺘﻘﺪﻣﺎن ﻗﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ
  .4  وهﺪوء ﻧﺴﺒﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺼﻌﻴﺪ  .. وﺷﻐﺐ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﺤﻴﺮﻩ
  .5  ﻣﺸﺎﻏﺐ  002 اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﺗﺘﺪﺧﻞ ﻟﻠﺴﻴﻄﺮﻩ وﺗﺎﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ وﺗﻀﺒﻂ اآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ
  .6  اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ ﻳﺎﺳﻒ ﻻﺣﺪاث اﻟﻌﻨﻒ وﺗﺎﺛﻴﺮهﺎ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ
  .7   ﺑﺪء ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﻔﺮز واﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻻوﻟﻴﻪ ﺧﻼل ﺳﺎﻋﺎت
  .8  ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ  % 09 وﺗﻮﻗﻊ اﻻﻋﺎدﻩ ﻓﻲ
   
ﺧﻴﻤﺖ اﺟﻮاء اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﻊ 
    , ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت ﻣﺼﺮﻳﻪ
 .9
 .01   , اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪت اﻋﻨﻒ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻣﺎت  , وﺳﻘﻂ اول ﻗﺘﻴﻞ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺎﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ




 .21    , واﺻﻴﺐ اﺣﺪ اﻧﺼﺎر ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
وﻗﺪ اﺻﻴﺐ اﻟﻌﺸﺮات ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ذهﺒﻮا ﻟﻼدﻻء ﺑﺎﺻﻮاﺗﻬﻢ ﺧﻼل اﻻﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ وﻗﻌﺖ اﻣﺎم 
    , اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ
  .31
ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب   441 ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ  , ﻣﺮﺷﺢ  0071 وﻳﺒﻠﻎ ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺰﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻲ
    , ﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ  18 و  , اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
  .41
واﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ واﻟﻘﻮي   , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ  25 وﻋﺪدهﻢ  , ﺑﺎﻻﺿﺎﻓﻪ اﻟﻲ ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
    , ﻣﺮﺷﺤﺎ  9241 وﻳﺒﻠﻎ ﻋﺪدهﻢ  , اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ اﻻﺧﺮي
  .51
ﺷﺨﺺ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺜﻴﺮي اﻟﺸﻐﺐ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ   002 وﻗﺪ اﻟﻘﺖ اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ
  .  , اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت اﻟﺘﺴﻊ
  .61
  .71   . ﻣﺼﺪر اﻣﻨﻲ ﻣﺴﺌﻮل ان هﻮﻻء ﺳﻮف ﺗﺘﻢ اﺣﺎﻟﺘﻬﻢ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﻪ وذآﺮ
  .81   , ﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻔﻮر ﻣﻊ اﺣﺪاث اﻟﺸﻐﺐوزارﻩ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻴﺎن أﻣﺲ أن ﻗﻮات ا وأآﺪت
  .91  واﺗﺨﺬت اﻻﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﻪ ﺑﺸﺎن اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﺸﻐﺐ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺛﺎرهﺎ ﻣﻮﻳﺪو اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺗﻮﺗﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﻪ
  .02    , اﺷﺎﻋﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻮن ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎرات اﺳﻼﻣﻴﻪ
  .12   . اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﺑﺘﻬﻤﻪ اﻟﺸﻐﺐواﻧﻪ ﺟﺮي اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن 
  .22   : اﻧﻪ اﺗﻀﺢ اﻻﺗﻲ  : ﻣﺼﺪر اﻣﻨﻲ واﺿﺎف
ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﻪ ﻟﻤﺎ ﺑﺜﺘﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﻨﻮات اﻟﻔﻀﺎﺋﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺳﻴﻒ اﻟﻘﺒﺎري ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻗﺴﻢ آﺮﻣﻮز 
  ﺑﺎﺻﺎﺑﺎت ﺧﻄﻴﺮﻩ
  .32
 .42  ﺗﺎآﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺤﺺ ان اﺻﺎﺑﺘﻪ ﻣﺠﺮد ﺟﺮح ﺳﻄﺤﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻴﺪ  .. 
  .52   . اﺣﺪ ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﻲ اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪوادﻋﺎؤﻩ ﺿﺒﻂ ﺳﻴﻒ ﻣﻊ 
ﺣﺪوث ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮﻩ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻋﻴﺪ ﺳﺎﻟﻢ وﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻋﻮدﻩ ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻗﺴﻢ ﺛﺎن ﺷﺒﺮا اﻟﺨﻴﻤﻪ 
داﺧﻞ ﻣﻘﺮ ﻓﻨﺎء ﻣﺪرﺳﻪ اﺳﻜﻮ   .. واﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎر اﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﺟﻤﺎل ﺷﺤﺎﺗﻪ اﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ  , ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ
    , اﻻﺑﺘﺪاﺋﻴﻪ
  .62
  .72    .. ﺧﺎرج ﻣﻘﺮ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﻪاﻋﻘﺒﻬﺎ اﻃﻼق اﻋﻴﺮﻩ ﻧﺎرﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ 
  .82   . وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ اﺣﺘﻮاء اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ
ﺑﺮﺷﻖ اﻟﻤﻘﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ   .. ﻗﺎم ﻧﺤﻮ ﻣﺎﺋﻪ ﺷﺨﺺ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎر اﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﺻﺒﺮي ﺧﻠﻒ اﷲ
ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺷﺢ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ اﺑﻮزﻳﺪ ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻗﺴﻢ ﺛﺎن اﻻﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺰﺟﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻔﺎرﻏﻪ واﻻﺷﺘﺒﺎك ﻣﻊ ﺑﻌﺾ 
    .. اﻧﺼﺎرﻩ
  .92
  .03   . ﻦ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ اﺛﻨﻴﻦ وﺗﻢ ﻧﻘﻠﻬﻤﺎ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﻔﻲاﺳﻔﺮ ذﻟﻚ ﻋ
  .13  ﺗﻢ اﺑﻼغ ﻗﺴﻢ دﻣﻨﻬﻮر ﻣﻦ ﻣﺪرس ﺑﻜﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺰراﻋﻪ ﺑﺪﻣﻨﻬﻮر وآﻴﻼ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ اﻧﻪ 
  .23  ﻓﻲ اﺛﻨﺎء اﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻪ ﺳﻴﺎرﻩ ﻣﻼآﻲ اﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
اﻟﻄﺤﺎن ﻓﻮﺟﻲء ﺑﺎﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺷﻌﺎر اﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺟﻤﺎل ﺣﺸﻤﺖ ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻜﺘﺒﻪ ﺑﺸﺎرع 
  ﺣﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺼﻲ وزﺟﺎﺟﺎت ﻣﻤﻠﻮءﻩ ﺑﺴﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﺰﻳﻦ وﻣﺜﺒﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻓﺘﻴﻞ
  .33
  .43   . وﻗﺎﻣﻮا ﺑﺎﺗﻼف زﺟﺎج اﻟﺴﻴﺎرﻩ اﻟﺨﻠﻔﻲ
آﻤﺎ اﺑﻠﻎ ﺳﺎﺋﻖ اﻧﻪ ﺣﺎل ﻗﻴﺎدﺗﻪ اوﺗﻮﺑﻴﺴﺎ وﺑﺮﻓﻘﺘﻪ وآﻴﻞ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺼﻄﻔﻲ اﻟﻔﻘﻲ اﻣﺎم ﻣﺪرﺳﻪ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﺤﺮم 
  اﺑﻮاﻟﺮﻳﺶ 
  .53
  .63  واﺣﺪاث ﺗﻠﻔﻴﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻴﺎرﻩ   , ﻗﺎم ﺑﻌﺾ اﻻﺷﺨﺎص ﺑﺎﻳﻘﺎف اﻻوﺗﻮﺑﻴﺲ واﻟﺘﻌﺪي ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮب
  .73  وﻓﺮوا هﺎرﺑﻴﻦ
  .83    , اﻟﺒﻴﺎن وﻓﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺧﻠﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮﻳﺪي اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺣﺴﻴﻦ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﻪ اﺻﺎﺑﺘﻪ ﺑﺠﺮح ﻧﺎﻓﺬ واآﺪ 
  .93   . ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻨﺸﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ  22 وذﻟﻚ ﻋﻘﺐ ﻣﻨﺎﻓﺴﻪ ﺣﺎدﻩ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ
  .04    , وﺳﺠﻠﺖ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮات ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ
  .14   . آﻤﺎ ﺿﺒﻄﺖ ﻋﺸﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ اﻟﻤﺸﺎﻏﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺪﻳﻨﻪ ﻗﻮص ﺑﻘﻨﺎ
ﺎ ﻋﻦ اﺳﻔﻪ ﻟﺤﺎﻻت اﻟﻌﻨﻒ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬ  , اﻻﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ  , وﻗﺪ اﻋﺮب اﻟﺴﻴﺪ ﺻﻔﻮت اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ
    . ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ ﺧﻼل اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت
  .24




  .44   . وﺗﻤﺜﻞ ﺿﻐﻮﻃﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ  , وﻇﺎهﺮﻩ ﺳﻠﺒﻴﻪ  , وان اﻟﻠﺠﻮء اﻟﻲ ﻣﺜﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻻﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ اﻣﺮ ﻣﺮﻓﻮض
  , وﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ  , ﺧﺎﺻﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ  , ﺗﻌﺮﺿﻮا ﻟﻌﻨﻒ آﺒﻴﺮ اﻣﺎم اﻟﻠﺠﺎنواﺿﺎف ان ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ 
وﻗﺪ ﺷﻬﺪ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ   , واﺷﺎر اﻟﻲ وﺟﻮد ﺣﻤﺎﻳﻪ آﺎﻣﻠﻪ اﻣﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺠﺎن اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ  . وﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﺠﺎن اﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﻪ
   . اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ واﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﻴﻦ
  .54
  .64    , د اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦﻣﻦ دواﺋﺮ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻧﻈﺮا ﻟﻜﺜﺮﻩ ﻋﺪ  %09 وﺗﻮﻗﻊ اﻟﺸﺮﻳﻒ ﺣﺪوث اﻋﺎدﻩ ﻓﻲ
  .74    , وان ﻳﺤﻘﻖ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﺗﻘﺪﻣﺎ
  .84   . وان ﻳﻈﻞ ﻣﺤﺘﻔﻈﺎ ﺑﺎﻻﻏﻠﺒﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺣﻘﻘﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت
  .94   . وﻗﺪ ﺗﺮآﺰت اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﻓﻲ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت اﻟﺘﺴﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺟﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت
واﺣﺘﻠﺖ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﺴﺒﺎق اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻮﻟﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﺣﺪاث اﻟﻌﻨﻒ 
    , واﻻﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت اﻟﻤﻠﺘﻬﺒﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ
  .05
  .15    , وﺗﺼﺎﻋﺪت اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻈﻬﻴﺮﻩ
ﺣﺎﻟﻪ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﻣﺴﺘﺸﻔﻴﺎت   52 ﺮ ﻣﻦوﺗﻠﻘﺖ ﻏﺮﻓﻪ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت ﻣﺪﻳﺮﻳﻪ اﻟﺼﺤﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ اآﺜ
   . اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ
  .25
  .35  ذآﺮت اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﻟﺤﻘﻮق اﻻﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮاﻗﺐ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت   , وﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﻪ اﺧﺮي
ان وآﻴﻞ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﻌﺘﻮق ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ ادآﻮ ورﺷﻴﺪ ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﺒﺤﻴﺮﻩ ﻗﺪ ﻃﻌﻦ ﻓﻲ 
   . توﻧﻘﻞ اﻟﻲ اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﻔﻴﺎ  , رﻗﺒﺘﻪ
  .45
  .55  ا  , ﻟﻢ ﺗﺨﻞ دواﺋﺮ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﺜﻼث ﻣﻦ اﻋﻤﺎل ﻋﻨﻒ  , وﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪ
  .65    , دت اﻟﻲ وﻗﻮع ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺎﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ واﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ واﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ
  .75    , وﺷﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻣﺎت ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ
  , وداﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺸﺮق  , اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻤﻠﺖ داﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﻐﺮبوﻗﺪ ﺗﺪﺧﻠﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ اﻳﺠﺎﺑﻲ وﻓﻌﺎل ﻻﻧﻬﺎء ﺗﻠﻚ اﻻﺷﺘﺒﺎآﺎت 
   . وداﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﻤﻨﺎخ
  .85
  .95  ودﻋﺖ اﻻﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻠﻴﻪ هﺪوءهﺎ اﻟﻤﻌﺮوف   , وﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﻪ اﺧﺮي
واﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ   , وﺳﺎدﺗﻬﺎ اﺟﻮاء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ اﻟﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﺻﺒﺮي ﺧﻠﻒ اﷲ
   . وذﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ اﻻوﻟﻲ  , اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﺣﻤﺪ اﺑﻮزﻳﺪ
  .06
اﺻﻴﺐ ﺷﻘﻴﻖ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﺣﺴﻦ زﻏﺎري ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ آﻔﺮ ﺷﻜﺮ ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻮﺑﻴﻪ   , ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ
    , واﻧﺼﺎر اﻻﺧﻮان  , ﺑﻜﺴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺪﻣﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺼﻲ اﻟﻐﻠﻴﻈﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﺷﻘﻴﻘﻪ
  .16
اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ واﻧﺼﺎر ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻣﺤﻴﻲ   , آﻤﺎ وﻗﻌﺖ ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮﻩ اﺧﺮي ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻻﺧﻮان ﺗﻴﻤﻮر ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻐﻨﻲ






 sretov eht eruces dna noitautis eht lortnoc ot erefretni seitirohtua ytiruces ehT  .5




 llew sa derujni saw )PDN( setadidnac tnednepedni eht fo enO .11
 derujni saw BM dennab eht fo retroppus eno dnA .21
 derrucco taht sehsalc gnirud derujni erew etov ot tnew ohw elpoep fo snet dnA .31
 setis gnitov eht fo tnorf ni
  





18. In a statement  issued yesterday, the ministry of Interior confirmed that the 
police has immediately dealt with the riots 
19. And has taken legal action regarding the riots sparked by the candidates’ 
supporters amid an extremely tense situation 
20. created by candidates under Islamic slogans, 
 created by candidates under Islamic slogans, 
21. And more than 8 elements belonging to the banned MB  have been arrested  as 
riot-agitators.  
29. About 100 MB candidates supporters threw the election headquarters of the 
NDP candidates Ahmad Abu Zeid with empty bottles and they clashed with his 
supporters 
30. This resulted in the injury of two who were hospitalized 
31. A professor at Damanhur College of Agriculture who is also representative of 
el-Fiki [ an NDP candidate]  has informed the police station that 
32. While he was driving  
33. He was surprised by the supporters of the Gamal Heshamt, running under 
Islamic slogans, carrying sticks, bottles filled with liquid gasoline and installed 
by the fuse 
34. And they broke the car’s windshield 
35. A driver also reported to the police that while driving in the company of Dr. el-
Feqi’s representative , 
36. Some people blocked and stopped the bus , beated  them and caused some 
damages to the bus 
37. And then escaped 
61. At the same time, in in Kafr Shokr the NDP candidate’s brother  was injured  
with a fraction in his foot in a big fight with sticks between his brother’s 
supporters and the MB supporters. 
 
   
FP05, # 12  11-21-05  
ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﻢﺳﺎﺑ ثﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟا :  حﺎﺠﻧ ﻲﻠﻋ ﺖﻠﻤﻋ ﻪﻴﻨﻣﻷا ﻩﺰﻬﺟﻷا ﻩدوﺪﺤﻤﻟا تازوﺎﺠﺘﻟا ﻢﻏر ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا  1. 
   
أآ ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﻩرازﻮﻟ ﻲﻤﺳﺮﻟا ثﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟاو ﻪﻴﻠﺧاﺪﻟا ﺮﻳزو ﺪﻋﺎﺴﻣ دﺎﻤﺣ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ءاﻮﻠﻟا ﺪ  2.  
  ﺮﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ نﺎﻣﻷاو راﺮﻘﺘﺳﻻا نأﻮه ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا ﻪﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻲﻓ لوﻷا فﺪﻬﻟا ,    3.  
 لﺎﻗو ﻪﻴﻨﻣﻻا ﻩﺮﻄﻴﺴﻟا ﺖﺤﺗ ﻪﻋﺎﺴﻟا ﻚﻠﺗ ﻲﺘﺣ ﻲﻨﻣﻻا ﻊﺿﻮﻟا نأ ثﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟا .    4.  
  ﻪﻴﺳﺎﺳﻻا ﻪﻤﺴﻟاوﻲه  ﻲﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟا ﻲﻨﻣﻻا راﺮﻘﺘﺳﻻا  5.  
  تاﺮﻘﻤﻟاو ﺮﺋاوﺪﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ ﻲﻓ تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻪﺘﺳ ﻲﻓ تﺮﺼﺤﻧا ﻲﺘﻟا تازوﺎﺠﺘﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ ﻦﻋ ﺮﻈﻨﻟا فﺮﺼﺑ
ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا .   
6.  
ﺪآاو  ﻪﻨﻌﻄﺑ ﺎﺑﺎﺼﻣ ﻲﻔﺸﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﻲﻟا ﻪﻠﻘﻧ ﺪﻌﺑ ﻪﻔﺘﺣ ﻲﻘﻟ ﻪﻳرﺪﻨﻜﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ اﺪﺣاو ﺎﺼﺨﺷ نا دﺎﻤﺣ ﻢﻴهاﺮﺑا ءاﻮﻠﻟا
ﻩﺬﻓﺎﻧ ,   
7.  
  يﺪﺼﺘﻟاو ﻪﻴﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا رﺎﻘﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺗو ﻪﻳﺎﻤﺤﻟ ﻢﻬﺗﻻوﺎﺤﻣ ءﺎﻨﺛا ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا دﻮﻨﺟو طﺎﺒﺿ ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﺐﻴﺻا ﺎﻤآ
ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻪﻴﺠﻄﻠﺒﻠﻟ .    
8.  
 ﺪآاو ﻒﻨﻌﻟا لﺎﻤﻋا ﺐﻠﻏا ﻦﻋ نﻮﻟﻮﺌﺴﻤﻟا ﻢه ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا نﻮﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ رﺎﺼﻧا نا  9. 




 .snoissergsnart detimil eht fo sseldrager ,ssecorp noitcele eht fo sseccus
  
 eht dna roiretnI fo retsiniM fo tnatsissa ,dammaH miharbI lareneG rojaM .2
 :taht desserts ,namsekops roiretnI
 eh retfa deid dna debbats saw nosrep eno , airdnaxelA ni  taht desserts osla eH .7
 latipsoh eht ot derrefsnart saw
 gniyrt ytud ni elihw derujni neeb evah sreidlos dna sreciffo ecilop fo rebmun A .8
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  50-61-11  ,61 # ,50PF 
  .1  وآﻮﺑﻮﻧﺎت ﻟﺸﺮاء اﻻﺻﻮات  .. اﺣﺘﻜﺎآﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻨﺞ واﻟﻤﻄﺎوي
  .2 وآﺎﻣﻴﺮات اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮل ﺗﺼﻮر ﺑﻄﺎﻗﺎت اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع داﺧﻞ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن
  
اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ وﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ أﺳﻔﺮت اﻟﻤﺼﺎدﻣﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ أﻧﺼﺎر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ   , ﻓﻔﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ اﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﻪ
 ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ ﺳﻴﺪﺗﺎن  , اﺷﺨﺎص  7 ﻋﻦ اﺻﺎﺑﻪ
  .3
  .4   . وذﻟﻚ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﺗﻬﺎﻣﺎت ﺑﺸﺮاء اﻻﺻﻮات
ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻴﻪ واﻟﻤﺴﺠﻠﻴﻦ   6 ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ  , وﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻪ ﺑﻮﻻق اﺑﻮاﻟﻌﻼ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ
  ﺟﻨﻴﻪ  004 و  003 ﺧﻄﺮ اﺳﺘﺎﺟﺮهﻢ ﺟﺰار ﺑﻤﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﺗﺘﺮاوح ﺑﻴﻦ
  .5
  .6     .  , ﻟﻤﺴﺎﻧﺪﻩ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ 
  .7     . وﺿﺒﻄﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﻣﻌﻬﻢ اﺳﻠﺤﻪ ﺑﻴﻀﺎء وﺻﻨﺎدﻳﻖ ﻣﻴﺎﻩ ﻏﺎزﻳﻪ ﻓﺎرﻏﻪ ﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اي ﻣﻌﺎرك ﻣﺤﺘﻤﻠﻪ
  .8    , اﺳﺘﺨﺪم اﻧﺼﺎر ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﺴﻨﺞ واﻟﻤﻄﺎوي ﻻرهﺎب ﺧﺼﻮﻣﻬﻢ  , وﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﻔﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ اﻳﻀﺎ
 .9    . آﻤﺎ ﺷﻬﺪت ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﺠﺎن اﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت ﺷﺮاء اﻻﺻﻮات ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﻠﻨﻲ
.01    , وﺗﺮددت ﺷﺎﺋﻌﺎت ﻋﻦ ارﺗﻔﺎع ﺻﺎروﺧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻌﺮ اﻟﺼﻮت اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮﻻق اﺑﻮاﻟﻌﻼ
.11    , ﺟﻨﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻈﻬﻴﺮﻩ  005 ﺛﻢ ﺻﻌﺪ اﻟﻲ  , ﺟﻨﻴﻪ  001 ﻓﻘﺪ ﺑﺪا ﺻﺒﺎﺣﺎ ب
.21  . ﻧﻬﺎﻳﻪ اﻟﻴﻮموﻗﺎل اﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻧﻪ ﻗﻔﺰ ﻣﺤﻠﻘﺎ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻒ ﺟﻨﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ 
آﻤﺎ ﻋﺎدت ﻇﺎهﺮﻩ ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ اﻻﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﻨﺢ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ اﺻﻮاﺗﻬﻢ ﻟﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ 
    , اﻟﻈﻬﻮر ﻣﻦ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ اﻣﺲ
.31
ﻓﻘﺪ ﺣﺼﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮون ﻣﻦ اﺑﻨﺎء اﺣﺪي دواﺋﺮ اﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ ﻋﻠﻲ آﻮﺑﻮﻧﺎت ﺻﺮف اﺟﻬﺰﻩ آﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﻪ ﺧﺎﺻﻪ اﻟﻤﻜﻮاﻩ 
    ., واﻟﻤﺮوﺣﻪ ﻣﻦ اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺬ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎر اﻻﻗﺘﺮاع
.41
.51    , ﺟﺮي اﻏﻼق ﻋﺪﻩ ﻟﺠﺎن ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﺒﻠﻄﺠﻪ وﻣﺤﺎوﻟﻪ ارهﺎب اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ  , وﻓﻲ ﺑﻨﻲ ﺳﻮﻳﻒ
.61  , اﺳﺘﺨﺪﻣﻮا ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﻴﻮف واﻟﺴﻨﺞ واﻟﺸﻮم  , ﻴﻦ اﻓﺘﻌﺎل ﻣﺸﺎﺟﺮﻩ ﺿﺨﻤﻪوﺣﺎول اﻧﺼﺎر اﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤ
.71   . اﻟﻲ ان اﺳﺮﻋﺖ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ ﻟﻔﺾ اﻟﻤﺸﺎﺟﺮﻩ  
.81  ﺟﺮي اﻃﻼق ﻋﺪﻩ اﻋﻴﺮﻩ ﻧﺎرﻳﻪ ﻗﺮب ﻟﺠﻨﻪ ﻣﻮﺷﻲ اﻟﺘﺎﺑﻌﻪ ﻟﻠﺪاﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻣﺮآﺰ اﺳﻴﻮط  , وﻓﻲ اﺳﻴﻮط
.91   , وﺣﺪﺛﺖ ﻣﺸﺎدات ﻋﺪﻳﺪﻩ
.02    . اﺑﺮزهﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺠﻨﻪ ﺑﺎﺧﻮم ﺑﺪاﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﺒﺪاري 
.12    , واﻧﺘﺸﺮت ﺷﺎﺋﻌﺎت ﺑﺜﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻮن واﻧﺼﺎرهﻢ ﺿﺪ اﻟﺨﺼﻮم
.22  وﺻﻠﺖ اﻟﻲ درﺟﻪ ﺗﺮدﻳﺪ ﺷﺎﺋﻌﻪ ﻋﻦ وﻓﺎﻩ اﺣﻤﺪ اﻟﻘﺎﻳﺎﺗﻲ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻓﻼح ﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ اﻟﻌﺪوﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻨﻴﺎ
.32  اﻻﻣﺮ اﻟﺬي آﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﺟﻮﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻟﻴﻨﻔﻴﻬﺎ
.42    , وﻟﺠﺎ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﻲ اﺳﺘﻐﻼل ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮل اﻟﻤﺘﻄﻮرﻩ
.52  وﻗﺎﻣﻮا ﺑﺎﻋﻄﺎء اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮل اﻟﻤﺰودﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﺎﻣﻴﺮات ﻟﻠﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ 




كاذ وا ﺢﺷﺮﻤﻟا اﺬﻬﻟ ﺖﻳﻮﺼﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﻢﻬﻣﺎﻴﻗ اوﺪآﻮﻳ ﻲﻜﻟ .    27.
ﺲﻣا ادﻮﺟﻮﻣ ءﺎﻨﻐﻟا نﺎآ ﺎﻀﻳا  28.
 تازﺎﺠﻧﺎﺑ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ نوﺪﻴﺸﻳ ﺖﻴﺳﺎآ ﻂﺋاﺮﺷ لﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻼﻌﻟاﻮﺑا قﻻﻮﺑ ﻩﺮﺋاد ﻲﻓ ﻦﻴﺑﺮﻄﻤﻟا تﻮﺻ ﻼﻋ ﺪﻘﻓ
تﺎﺌﻓ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا ﺢﺷﺮﻣ ,  ﻞﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﺮﺧﻻا ﺢﺷﺮﻤﻟاو .   
29.
1. Clashes with pocket knives ….coupons  for purchasing votes7 
2. Cell phones image of the bullets 
  
3. Clashes between the supporters of the NDP and the banned MB candidate 
resulted in the injury of 7 persons, two of them were women in Old Cairo, 
4. This was because of mutual accusations of vote purchasing, 
5. in Boulak, Cairo police was able to arrest 6 thugs and recorded-as dangerous  
hired for  L.E. 400  to 500 by a butcher, 
6. to support an independent candidate 
7. The police seized with thwm white arms to be used in any may-be battles 
8. in addition,  in the Khalifa area, the supporters of some candidates used pocket 
knives to terrify their opponents, 
9. some voting sites witnessed vote purchasing done publically, 
13. Also, the phenomena of distributing electric household sets to the voters to 
support a certain candidate  has reappeared 
15. in Bani Suwif, some of the voting sites were closed due to bullying and 
terroristic acts, 
16. as the supporters of a certain candidate  tried to fabricate a large brawl in which 
they used pocket knives  and fighting sticks... 
17. until the police was able to break the melee up 
18. And in Assuit, a number pf shots were fired near Moshee voting sitei n Assuit. 




FP05, #17  13-11-05  
ﻲﻟوﻻا ﻪﻟﻮﺠﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ ﻪﺴﻤﺧ حﺎﺠﻨﻟ اﺮﻴﺴﻔﺗ روﺮﺳ مﺪﻗو  1.  
ﻲﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا عرﺎﺸﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻪﺿرﺎﻌﻤﻟا باﺰﺣا ﻒﻌﺿ ﻦﻋ ﻒﺸﻜﻳ اﺬه نا ﻩﺪﻴآﺎﺘﺑ ,    2.  
ﺎﻤﻴﻈﻨﺗو ﺎﻃﺎﺸﻧو ﻪآﺮﺣ ﺮﺜآا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ناو .   3.  












  اﻧﻄﻼق اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ اﻻوﻟﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎتk
 .1
  ﺗﺤﺖ اﻻﺷﺮاف اﻟﻘﻀﺎﺋﻲ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ
 .2
  ﺟﺮت ﻓﻲ هﺪوءاﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت 
 .3
  واﻧﺨﻔﺎض ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﻜﺎوي اﻟﻤﻌﺘﺎدﻩ ﻣﻦ اﺧﻄﺎء ﺟﺪاول اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ
 .4
  وﺟﻮد اﻣﻨﻲ ﻣﻜﺜﻒ وﻣﻨﻈﻢ ﺧﺎرج اﻟﻠﺠﺎن
 .5




  ﻓﺎن اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﻴﻦ ﻻﺣﻈﻮا ﻗﻠﻪ ﺣﺎﻻت اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻻﺣﺘﻜﺎآﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ اﻧﺼﺎر اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ
 .7
    , ﻓﻴﻤﺎ وﺻﻒ ﺑﺎﻧﻪ ﻧﺠﺎح ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد اﻻﻣﻨﻲ اﻟﻤﻜﺜﻒ واﻟﻤﻨﻈﻢ
 .8
ﺧﺎﺻﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪواﺋﺮ اﻟﺴﺎﺧﻨﻪ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪت ﺗﻨﺎﻓﺴﺎ ﺣﺎدا ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻲ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ وﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان 




  50-70-11  ,12# ,50PF
و ﻣﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﺮوج ﻟﺰوﺟﻬﺎ   .. ﻣﻴﺎﻩ اﻟﺮيوﻗﻄﻊ  ﺷﺮﻳﻂ ﻓﻴﺪﻳﻮ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻘﻨﻮات اﻟﻔﻀﺎﺋﻴﻪ  : ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﺮآﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻴﻪ
   ! ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺪرﺳﻪ
  .1
   
  وﻓﻲ داﺋﺮﻩ ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻪ اﻟﻤﻨﻴﺎ ﺣﺪث ﺻﺪام ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺎﺋﻠﺘﻴﻦ ﺣﻮل ﻣﺴﺎﻧﺪﻩ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ 
 .2
    , ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺛﺮﻩ اﺣﺪاهﻤﺎ ﺑﻘﻄﻊ ﻣﻴﺎﻩ اﻟﺮي ﻋﻦ ارض اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻠﻪ اﻻﺧﺮي ﻟﻤﺪﻩ ﻳﻮﻣﻴﻦ
 .3
    , ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ان اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺘﻤﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﺎس ﻻي ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ
 .4
    , وﺗﺪﺧﻞ ﻋﻤﺪﻩ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﻪ ﻟﻠﺼﻠﺢ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ
 .5
    . واﺗﻔﻖ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﺎن ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺴﺎﻧﺪﻩ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﺧﺮ ﻟﻮﻗﻒ اﻻﺣﺘﻘﺎن
 .6
  وﻓﻲ ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﻪ ﻣﺤﺎوﻟﻪ اﻟﺪﻋﺎﻳﻪ ﻟﻠﺰوج 
 .7
  وﺟﻬﺖ ادارﻩ اﺣﺪي اﻟﻤﺪارس ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻌﻴﺪ اﻧﺬارا 
 .8





    , ودﻋﺖ ﺗﻼﻣﻴﺬهﺎ اﻟﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﺑﺰوﺟﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺎزﻟﻬﻢ
.01
.11   . وﺣﺚ اﺳﺮهﻢ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻪ
.21    , وﻓﻲ ﺳﻠﻮك اﺧﺮ ﻣﺮﻓﻮض
.31  ﻓﻘﺪ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﻋﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ اﻋﺼﺎﺑﻪ ﻓﻲ اﺣﺪي دواﺋﺮ اﻟﻤﻨﻮﻓﻴﻪ 
ﺟﻨﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺪاﺋﺮﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﻮﺗﻤﺮ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﻲ ﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ   05 وﻗﺎم ﺑﺘﻮزﻳﻊ ﻣﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺌﻪ ال
   ! ﻣﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ
.41
  ,roivaheb elbatpeccanu nI .21
 repmet sih tsol ayyifuoneM ni setadidnac BM eht fo eno .31
 a retfa ycneutitsnoc eht fo elpoep eht ot 05.E.L fo sllib gnitubirtsid detrats dna .41
 ecnerefnoc noitcele sih dleh etadidnac PDN
 
 
   
 
 
  50-71-01  ,42# ,50PF
  .1  اﺧﻼء ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﺛﻼﺛﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻋﻀﺎء ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
   
ﺑﺎﺧﻼء ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﺛﻼﺛﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻋﻀﺎء   , اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻲ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻻول ﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﻪ اﻣﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ  , اﻣﺮ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر هﺸﺎم ﺑﺪوي
  ﺟﻨﻴﻪ  0002 و  05 ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﺑﻜﻔﺎﻟﻪ ﺗﺘﺮاوح ﺑﻴﻦ
  .2
  , وﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻧﻌﻴﻢ اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﺪرس  , ﻳﺎﺳﺮ ﻣﺤﻤﻮد  : وآﺎﻧﺖ اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ اﻟﻘﺖ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﺜﻼﺛﻪ وهﻢ 
  اﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩوذﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ اﺛﻨﺎء اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮات اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷﻬﺪﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻔﺘﺮﻩ   , وﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪي ﻧﺎﻇﺮ ﻣﺪرﺳﻪ
  .3




  50-01-90  ,62# ,50PF
اﺣﺰاب وﻗﻮي ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﺗﻌﻠﻦ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺟﺒﻬﻪ   9ﻗﺎﺋﻤﻪ ﻣﻮﺣﺪﻩ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ 
  وﻃﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ
  
  .1
   
واﻟﻘﻮي اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺟﺒﻬﻪ وﻃﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻋﻠﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﺣﺰاب اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ   , ﻓﻲ ﺗﻄﻮر ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺊ
 .2   , واﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮري
    . واﺗﻔﻘﺖ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺧﻮض اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﺑﻘﺎﺋﻤﻪ ﻣﻮﺣﺪﻩ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﻪ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ
 .3
   . واﻟﺘﺰﻣﺖ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻨﺴﻴﻖ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﻤﻮﺣﺪﻩ
 .4
واﻟﺤﺮآﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ   , وﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  , واﻟﺘﺠﻤﻊ  , واﻟﻨﺎﺻﺮي  , وآﺎﻧﺖ اﺣﺰاب اﻟﻮﻓﺪ
واﻟﺘﺤﺎﻟﻒ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻟﻼﺻﻼح   , وﺣﺰب اﻟﻮﺳﻂ  , وﺣﺮآﻪ اﻟﻜﺮاﻣﻪ  , وﺣﺰب اﻟﻌﻤﻞ  , ﻣﻦ اﺟﻞ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ آﻔﺎﻳﻪ
    , واﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻗﺪ ﻋﻘﺪت اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﺎ ﺑﻤﻘﺮ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻮﻓﺪ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ اﻣﺲ
 .5
ﻗﺮر ﻣﻤﺜﻠﻮهﺎ اﻋﻼن ﺗﺎﺳﻴﺲ ﺟﺒﻬﻪ وﻃﻨﻴﻪ ﻟﻠﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ واﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮري ﺗﻀﻢ اﻻﺣﺰاب واﻟﻘﻮي ﺣﻴﺚ 





ﻖ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﺘﺰام اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻨﺴﻴ  , ﻣﻤﺜﻞ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺒﻬﻪ  , وأآﺪ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻣﺮﺳﻲ
 .7  اﻟﻤﻮﺣﺪﻩ
   . ﺗﻤﻬﻴﺪا ﻟﺨﻮض اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻠﻪ
 .8
    . واﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻧﻌﻤﺎن ﺟﻤﻌﻪ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﺛﺎ رﺳﻤﻴﺎ  , واﺧﺘﺎرت اﻟﺠﺒﻬﻪ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻋﺰﻳﺰ ﺻﺪﻗﻲ ﻣﻨﺴﻘﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﺎ ﻟﻬﺎ  , 
 .9
    , وﻣﻤﺜﻞ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان  , وﺷﻬﺪ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎع ﺟﺪﻻ واﺳﻌﺎ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺣﺴﻴﻦ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﺮازق اﻻﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺘﺠﻤﻊ
.01
.11    , ﺣﻴﺚ اﺿﻄﺮ ﺣﺴﻴﻦ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﺮازق اﻟﻲ اﻻﻧﺴﺤﺎب ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﺒﻬﻪ
.21  وﺗﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮران ﻧﻌﻤﺎن ﺟﻤﻌﻪ وﻋﺰﻳﺰ ﺻﺪﻗﻲ ﻟﺤﺴﻢ اﻟﺨﻼف اﻟﺪاﺋﺮ 




  50-01-90  ,72# ,50PF
   %5.88أﻟﻒ ﺻﻮت ﺑﻨﺴﺒﺔ   613 ﻣﻼﻳﻴﻦ و  6 رﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﻨﺘﺨﺐ ﻟﻤﺼﺮ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ﻳﺤﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ أولﻣﺒﺎرك 
 .1
  %.32ﺁﻻف ﺑﻨﺴﺒﺔ   013 ﻣﻼﻳﻴﻦ و  7 ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻴﻦ
 .2
   %89واﻷﺻﻮات اﻟﺼﺤﻴﺤﺔ 
 .3
  أﻟﻒ ﺻﻮت   045 اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﺑـﻧﻮر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰ 
 .4
  ﺁﻻف ﺻﻮت ﻧﺎﺋﺐ رﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻮﻓﺪ  802 وﺟﻤﻌﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ وﺣﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ
 .5
  ﻣﻦ أﺻﻮات ﻣﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﻐﺪ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻹﺧﻮان% 09
 .6
  اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺟﺮت ﻓﻲ إﻃﺎر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔ واﻟﻨﺰاهﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ إﺷﺮاف ﻗﻀﺎﺋﻲ آﺎﻣﻞ   : ﻣﻤﺪوح ﻣﺮﻋﻲ
 .7
  ﺣﺠﺮ اﻟﺰاوﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎء اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ  .. اﺧﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ
 .8
  اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ أﻣﺎم ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ اﻷرﺑﻌﺎء اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻴﻤﻴﻦ ﻳﺆدياﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺨﺐ 
 .9
.01   اﺣﺘﻔﺎﻻت ﺟﻤﺎهﻴﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺪن واﻟﻘﺮي اﺑﺘﻬﺎﺟﺎ ﺑﻔﻮز ﻣﺒﺎرك
   
.11    , واﻟﺘﻲ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺪوب اﻻهﺮام اﺣﻤﺪ ﻣﻮﺳﻲ  , وآﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻘﺎرﻳﺮ اﻟﺮﺻﺪ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ
.21  ﻗﺪ آﺸﻔﺖ ﻋﻦ ان ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻋﻘﺪت اﺗﻔﺎﻗﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻐﺪ 
.31  وهﻮ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺴﻪ  , ﺗﻢ ﺑﻤﻮﺟﺒﻪ ﺧﺮوج اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻤﻴﻦ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﻜﻨﺪرﻳﻪ اﻟﻲ ﻗﻨﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻮﻗﻴﺖ واﺣﺪ
.41  ﻮاﺗﻬﻢ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﻪ ﻧﻮروادﻟﻮا ﺑﺎﺻ
.51   . اﻟﺬي اﺳﺘﻌﺎن ﺑﻌﺪد ﻣﻨﻬﻢ آﻤﻨﺪوﺑﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ
ﻣﻦ اﻻﺻﻮات اﻟﺘﻲ ذهﺒﺖ   %09وﺻﺮح ﻣﻨﻴﺮ ﻓﺨﺮي ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻨﻮر ﻧﺎﺋﺐ رﺋﻴﺲ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻮﻓﺪ ل اﻻهﺮام ﺑﺎن 





.71   . هﻲ اﺻﻮات ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  , ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎء ﺷﻤﺎل ﺳﻴﻨﺎء واﺳﻮان 
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  .1  ﻣﺼﺮ ﺗﺪﺧﻞ ﻋﺼﺮ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺨﺐ
  .2  اﻟﻤﻼﻳﻴﻦ ﺷﺎرآﻮا ﻓﻲ اول اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت رﺋﺎﺳﻴﻪ
  .3  واﻻﻗﺒﺎل ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺮي ﻓﺎق اﻟﻤﺪن
   
  .4  اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻪ اﻟﺘﺰﻣﺖ اﻟﺤﻴﺎد واﻻﻗﺘﺮاع ﺗﻢ وﺳﻂ اﺟﻮاء هﺎدﺋﻪ دون ﻣﺨﺎﻟﻔﺎت ﺟﺴﻴﻤﻪ
  .5  اﻟﺴﻤﺎح ﻟﻠﻤﻨﻈﻤﺎت اﻟﺤﻘﻮﻗﻴﻪ ﺑﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻣﻦ داﺧﻞ اﻟﻠﺠﺎن
   
  .1   , اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩاﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻻول ﻟﻤﺮﺷﺪ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان   , ﻧﻔﻲ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺣﺒﻴﺐ  , وﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺘﻪ
  .2    , ان ﺗﻜﻮن هﻨﺎك ﺗﻌﻠﻴﻤﺎت ﻗﺪ ﺻﺪرت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﻪ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻴﻪ
ان ﻃﺮﻳﻘﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ ﺗﺮآﺖ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻋﻀﻮ ﻣﻦ اﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﻟﻠﻤﻔﺎﺿﻠﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس   : وﻗﺎل
   . ﻦ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞوﻗﺪرﺗﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻮﻓﺎء ﺑﻤﺎ ﻃﺮﺣﻮﻩ ﻣ  , ﺑﺮاﻣﺠﻬﻢ وﺗﺎرﻳﺨﻬﻢ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ
  .3
  .4    , اﻧﻪ ادﻟﻲ ﺑﺼﻮﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﺴﺘﺎرﻩ  : وﻗﺎل 
  .5   , وﻏﻤﺲ اﺻﺒﻌﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺒﺮ اﻟﻔﻮﺳﻔﻮري
ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ان ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﺪ زﻋﻤﻪ   , ﺟﺪﻳﻪ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎتﻣﺸﻴﺮا اﻟﻲ ان اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺗﺴﻴﺮ آﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ آﺎﻧﺖ  






  50-30-90  ,92# ,50PF
  .1  ! أﻧﺎ أﻓﻀﻞ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺸﺮﻩ  : ﺑﻮرﺳﻌﻴﺪﻧﻮر ﻓﻲ 
   
وﺻﻒ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر أﻳﻤﻦ ﻧﻮر ﻣﺮﺷﺢ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻐﺪ ﻓﻲ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻪ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺑﺎﻧﻪ اﻻﻓﻀﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ 
   ..وهﺎﺟﻢ  اﻟﻌﺸﺮﻩ
  .2
  .3   !! وان آﺎن ﻻﻳﺪﻋﻲ اﻧﻪ اﻓﻀﻞ ﻣﺼﺮي
  .4 اﻟﻌﺪو اﻟﺼﻬﻴﻮﻧﻲاﻳﻤﻦ ﻧﻮر اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﻩ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ وﻃﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻊ ﻣﻊ 




   . اﻟﺼﺤﻔﻴﻴﻦ واﻋﺪاد دﺳﺘﻮر ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻟﻤﺼﺮ





  50-22-80 ,13# ,50PF
  .1  ﻣﻬﺪي ﻋﺎآﻒ ﻳﺪﻋﻮ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت
   
  .2  دﻋﺎ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻣﻬﺪي ﻋﺎآﻒ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺪ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ 
  .3  اﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻳﺠﺎﺑﻴﻪ 
  .4  ووﺻﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺑﺎﻧﻬﺎ اﻣﺎﻧﻪ وﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﻪ اﻣﺎم اﷲ واﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ
  .5   . ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺪﻗﻴﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎر ﺟﺎء ذﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻴﺎن اﺻﺪرﻩ اﻣﺲ
  .6  واآﺪ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺪ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﻣﻬﺪي ﻋﺎآﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻴﺎن اﺻﺪرﻩ اﻣﺲ ان 
  .7    , ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﺧﻮان ﺟﻤﻴﻌﺎ اﻻ ﻳﻮﻳﺪوا ﻇﺎﻟﻤﺎ او ﻳﺘﻌﺎوﻧﻮا ﻣﻊ ﻓﺎﺳﺪ او ﻣﺴﺘﺒﺪ وﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ اﻟﺘﺪﻗﻴﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎر
  .8   . وان ﻳﻌﻠﻤﻮا ان اﻟﺸﻬﺎدﻩ ﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﻪ اﻣﺎم اﷲ وﻳﺠﺐ ان ﺗﺬهﺐ ﻟﻤﻦ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻖ
  .9  واﺷﺎر ﻋﺎآﻒ اﻟﻲ ان ﻣﻦ ﻳﺮﻳﺪ ﺣﻜﻢ ﻣﺼﺮ وﻳﺴﻌﻲ اﻟﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ادراك ﻋﻈﻢ اﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﻪ 
.01   . واﻧﻪ ﻟﻦ ﻳﻔﻠﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺤﺴﺎب  , وان اﷲ ﺳﻴﺤﺎﺳﺒﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﻌﻞ
.11  واوﺿﺢ ان ﻣﺼﺮ ﺗﻤﺮ اﻻن ﺑﻤﺮﺣﻠﻪ دﻗﻴﻘﻪ واﺣﺪاث ﺟﺴﻴﻤﻪ 
.21  ﺗﺠﺮي ﻋﻠﻲ ﺳﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ 
.31  ﺗﻠﻔﺖ اﻻﻧﺘﺒﺎﻩ 
.41  وﺗﺜﻴﺮ اﻻهﺘﻤﺎم
.51   , وﺗﺪﻋﻮ آﻞ ﻣﺼﺮي اﻣﻴﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺺ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺼﻠﺤﻪ اﻻﻣﻪ ان ﻳﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ
.61    , وان ﻳﻘﻮم ﺑﻮاﺟﺒﻪ ﺗﺠﺎهﻬﺎ 




  0-52-70 ,43# ,50PF
  .1  اﻻﻓﻌﺎل اﻟﻐﺎﺿﺒﻪ ﺗﺘﻮاﻟﻲﻳﺪا ﺑﻴﺪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﻪ اﻻرهﺎب وﻻﺗﺰال ردود 
   
  .2  اﻟﻤﻔﻜﺮ واﻻدﻳﺐ ﺧﻴﺮي ﺷﻠﺒﻲ اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻞ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺟﺎﺋﺰﻩ اﻟﺪوﻟﻪ اﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮﻳﻪ هﺬا اﻟﻌﺎم ان  وﻳﺮي
  .3  ﻣﻘﺎوﻣﻪ اﻻرهﺎب ﻣﻤﻜﻨﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﺸﺮط ا
  .4  ﻟﻦ ﻳﻜﻮن هﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﺤﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻻرهﺎب 
  .5  وﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮي ان اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ ﺗﺠﺎﻣﻞ اﻟﺘﻴﺎر اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ 
  .6  اﻟﻤﺠﺎﻣﻠﻪوﺗﻐﺎﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ 
  .7  ﻣﻊ أن هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺠﺎﻣﻠﻪ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺊ 
  .8  واﻟﻤﻌﺮوف ان اﻟﺘﻴﺎرات اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﺮﻓﻪ ﺗﺮﺑﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺪرﺳﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان
  .9   . اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻳﺪ ان ﺗﻔﺮض راﻳﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮﻩ وﺗﺠﻌﻞ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﺪ واﻟﺠﻼد








  50-03-60  ,63# ,50PF
  .1   : ﺻﺤﻔﻲوزﻳﺮ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﺗﻤﺮ 
  .2  ﻗﺎﺋﻤﻪ اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ وﻟﺪﻳﻬﻢ اﻟﺘﻮﺟﻬﺎت ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ
   
  .3  وﺣﻮل ﻣﺎ ان آﺎن هﻨﺎك ارﺗﺒﺎط او ﻋﻼﻗﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻮﺑﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﻪ وﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ 
  .4  ﻗﺎل اﻟﻮزﻳﺮ ﻧﺤﻦ ﻧﺘﻜﻠﻢ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪﻩ 
  .5  هﻮ ﻋﺒﺪ اﷲ ﻋﺰام اﻟﺬي آﺎن ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ وﺑﺎآﺴﺘﺎن ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﺮوف ان اﻻب اﻟﺮوﺣﻲ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻌﻤﻞ
  .6   . واﻟﻈﻮاهﺮي ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ  , 
  
 eht dna aiduaS ni ’detnaw‘ eht neewteb noitcennoc yna si ereht rehtehw dnA .3
 dias retsinim eht ,BM
 adeaQ-la tuoba klat eW .4
 si ]spuorg tsidahij[ krow siht ot rehtaf lautirips eht taht si nwonk si tahw tuB .5
 natsikaP dna tpygE ]deiduts[ ni saw ohw mazzA alladbA
 .BM eht morf si yrhawazzA dnA .6
 
 
  50-21-60 ,83 # ,50PF
  .1  ﻻ اﺗﺼﺎﻻت ﻣﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان
   
ﻧﻔﺖ آﻮﻧﺪوﻟﻴﺰا راﻳﺲ وزﻳﺮﻩ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ وﺟﻮد اي اﺗﺼﺎﻻت اﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ ﻣﻊ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان 
    , اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
  .2
  .3    : وﻗﺎﻟﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﺿﺮﺗﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ
  .4   . ان وﺟﻮدهﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﻪ هﺪﻓﻪ ﺗﺸﺠﻴﻊ اﻻﺻﻼﺣﺎت واﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪﻩ ﻓﻲ اﻗﺎﻣﻪ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺣﺮﻩ وﻧﺰﻳﻬﻪ
  .5  وﻧﻔﺖ ان ﺗﻜﻮن آﻮﻧﺪوﻟﻴﺰا راﻳﺲ وزﻳﺮﻩ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ 
  .6 ﻗﺪ اﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻤﺜﻠﻴﻦ ﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ 
  .7  ﻻﻧﻬﻢ ﻻ ﻳﺸﻜﻠﻮن ﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺎ ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺎ
 .doohrehtorB milsuM eht htiw snoitcennoc oN 
 
 
  50-91-60 ,93# ,50PF
  .1 ﻣﻦ اﻻﺧﻮان  364  اﻻﻓﺮاج ﻋﻦ
  .2 ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ  73ﺣﺒﺲ  واﺳﺘﻤﺮار
   
  .3 أﻋﻠﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر ﻣﺎهﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم ان
  .4   , ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ اﺧﻠﻲ ﺳﺒﻴﻠﻬﻢ ﻻﻧﺘﻬﺎء ﻣﺒﺮرات ﺣﺒﺴﻬﻢ اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎﻃﻲ  364 
  .5   , ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﺤﺒﻮﺳﻴﻦ  73 وﻣﺎزال
  .6  ﻴﺎ ﻟﺤﻴﻦ اﻧﺘﻬﺎﺋﻬﺎوﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲ ﺳﻴﺮ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻘﺎت اﺳﺘﻤﺮار ﺣﺒﺴﻬﻢ اﺣﺘﻴﺎﻃ
  srehtorB eht morf 364 fo esaeleR .1
 .deniated llits era desucca 73 ylnO .2
  
 
  50-51-60 ,04# ,50PF




   
  .1  ﺷﺨﺼﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ   731 ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﺑﺎﺧﻼءاﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر ﻣﺎهﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم  أﻣﺮ
  .2    , ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ اﺣﺪاث اﻟﺘﺠﻤﻬﺮ اﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩ اﻟﻘﺒﺾآﺎﻧﺖ أﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ أﻟﻘﺖ 
  , واﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ  , واﻟﻤﻨﻴﺎ  , واﻟﻔﻴﻮم  , واﻻﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻠﻴﻪ  , واﻟﺒﺤﻴﺮﻩ  , اﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ  : اﻟﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت ﻳﻨﺘﻤﻮنواﻟﻤﻔﺮج ﻋﻨﻬﻢ 
   . ودﻣﻴﺎط  , واﻟﺪﻗﻬﻠﻴﻪ
 .3
  




 50-31-60  ,14# ,50PF
 
 
  .1 ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ اﻻﺧﻮان  361 اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻳﺎﻣﺮ ﺑﺎﺧﻼء ﺳﺒﻴﻞ
  
ﻣﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ اﻟﻤﻨﺴﻮب اﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﻻﻧﺘﻤﺎء   361 اﻣﺮ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر ﻣﺎهﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم ﺑﺎﺧﻼء ﺳﺒﻴﻞ
  , اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ 
  .2
  .3  . واﻟﻤﺪرﺳﻴﻦ  , واﻟﻨﻘﺎﺑﻴﻴﻦ  , واﻟﻄﻼب  , واﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻴﻦ  , وهﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻃﺒﺎء
  , واﻻﺳﻤﺎﻋﻴﻠﻴﻪ  , واﻟﺸﺮﻗﻴﻪ  , واﻟﻐﺮﺑﻴﻪ  , اﻟﻘﺎهﺮﻩ  : وآﺎن ﻗﺪ اﻟﻘﻲ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺣﺪاث اﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩ ﺑﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت
    , ودﻣﻴﺎط
  .4







  50-60-80 ,24 # ,50PF
  .1  واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺗﻨﻔﻲ اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﺑﺎﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
   
وﺟﻮد اي اﺗﺼﺎﻻت ﺑﻴﻦ   , ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪ وزﻳﺮﻩ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻪ ﻟﺸﺌﻮن اﻟﺸﺮق اﻻدﻧﻲ  , دﻳﻔﻴﺪ ووﻟﺶ ﻧﻔﻲ
    , وﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  , اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﻩ
  .2
  .3   . او ان ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ ﺧﻄﻂ ﻟﻠﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ
  .4  ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻨﺼﺒﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎرس اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ   , ﻓﻲ اول ﻟﻘﺎء ﻟﻪ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺮاﺳﻠﻲ اﻟﺼﺤﻒ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ وﻗﺎل 




  50-50-31 ,34# ,50PF
  .1  ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  25 اﻻﻓﺮاج ﻋﻦ
  
ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ ﻓﻲ   25 اﻣﺮ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺸﺎر ﻣﺎهﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم اﻣﺲ ﺑﺎﻻﻓﺮاج ﻋﻦ
    . اﻟﻤﻨﺼﻮرﻩ واﻟﺰﻗﺎزﻳﻖ
  .2
  .3   . آﺎﻧﺖ اﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻻﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ اﻟﻘﺖ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ اﺛﻨﺎء اﺣﺪاث اﻟﺘﻈﺎهﺮ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﻪ ﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان




  .5  ﻃﺎﻟﺒﺎ اﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﻤﻴﻦ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﻧﻔﺲ  77 ﻳﺬآﺮ ان اﻟﻨﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﻌﺎم آﺎن ﻗﺪ اﻓﺮج ﻗﺒﻞ ﻋﺪﻩ اﻳﺎم ﻋﻦ 
  
   puorg srehtorB dennab eht morf stneduts 25 fo esaeleR .1
 
 
  50-50-32 ,44 # ,50PF
  .1  اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ
   
  .2   , اﻟﺮﺟﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  , أﻟﻘﺖ أﺟﻬﺰﻩ اﻷﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺒﺾ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻣﺤﻤﻮد ﻋﺰت
  .3    , اﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ  22 و  , اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻮﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ ﺳﻜﺮﺗﻴﺮ ﻋﺎم اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻪ واﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ
  .4  اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻧﻬﻢ  اآﺪتﺣﻴﺚ 
  .5    , ﺧﺎﺻﻪ اﻟﻄﻼب واﻟﻌﻤﺎل  , آﺎﻧﻮا ﻳﺴﺘﻬﺪﻓﻮن ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺾ اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ
  .6   . ﻻﺷﻌﺎل اﻟﻔﻮﺿﻲ واﻟﺪﻋﻮﻩ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻌﺼﻴﺎن اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ
   puorg srehtorB dennab eht fo yraterceS noitazinagrO eht  fo tserrA .1
  
 dennab eht ni ytirohtua dnoces eht ,tazzE .rD detserra evah seidob ytiruceS .2
  puorg doohrehtorB
 srebmem 22 rehto dna ,BM eht fo yraterces lareneg eht si osla ohw .3
 yeht taht demrifnoc noitamrofni ehT .4
 srekrow dna stneduts yllaiceps ,cilbup eht ekovorp ot nalP .5





  50-50-22  ,54# ,50PF
  .1 ﻓﻲ ﺣﻮار ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻴﺎدات اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﺑﻤﻌﻬﺪ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﺸﺮق اﻻدﻧﻲ
  .2 اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ روﻳﻪ ﺑﻮش ﻋﻦ ﺿﺮورﻩ ﻗﻴﺎدﻩ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻟﻼﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﻪ  : ﻧﻈﻴﻒ
  .3 اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﻣﻊ اﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﺠﺎوز اﻟﺨﻴﻂ اﻟﺮﻓﻴﻊ
  .4  اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﻨﺼﻴﺤﻪ واﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺌﻮﻧﻨﺎ
  
 .5   , آﻤﺎ ﺗﻤﺴﻚ ﺑﻤﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ اﻟﺮاﻓﺾ ﻻﻧﺸﺎء اﺣﺰاب ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺲ دﻳﻨﻴﻪ
 .6 وذﻟﻚ ردا ﻋﻠﻲ ﺳﻮال ﻟﻤﺮاﺳﻞ اﻟﺘﻠﻴﻔﺰﻳﻮن اﻻﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ اﻳﻬﻮد ﻳﺎﻋﺎري
ﺣﻮل دﻋﻮﻩ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻔﺼﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻴﻪ واﻟﻌﺮاﻗﻴﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎدﺛﺎت ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﺣﻮل اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ 
 اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﺒﻠﺪﻳﻬﻤﺎ 
 .7
 .8  , ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﺗﺮﻓﺾ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻗﻴﺎم ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻧﺸﺎء ﺣﺰب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ
 .9   , وﻧﻔﻰ ﺑﺸﺪﻩ ان ﺗﻜﻮن اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ ﺗﻤﻨﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ
.01 ﻣﺸﻴﺮا اﻟﻲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻪ ان ﻟﻬﻢ ﺳﺒﻌﻪ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻧﺎﺋﺒﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن
.11   , آﻤﺎ ان اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻳﻘﻮﻟﻮن اﻧﻬﻢ ﺗﺨﻠﻮا ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ
.21 وﻧﺤﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻧﺘﻈﺎر ان ﻳﺜﺒﺘﻮا ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ
.31 ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻗﺪ ﻻﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﺴﺘﻐﺮﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ اﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ ﻗﻴﺎم اﺣﺰاب دﻳﻨﻴﻪ واﺿﺎف
.41 ﻓﺎن اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ
.51  ﺣﻴﺚ ان ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ اﻗﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﺴﻴﺤﻴﻪ آﺒﻴﺮﻩ




.71  وﺳﻌﻲ ﻟﻔﺮض اراﺋﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮﻩ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﻘﻴﻪ اﻻﻗﻠﻴﺎت
.81  ان ﻣﺼﺮ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻪ وأﺿﺎف
.91   . وﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ دون اﻧﺸﺎء ﺣﺰب دﻳﻨﻲ
  
 
  50-50-91  ,84# ,50PF
  .1  : ﺗﻮداي . اس . ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﻟﺼﺤﻴﻔﻪ ﻳﻮﻧﻈﻴﻒ ﻓﻲ 
  .2 ﻣﺒﺎرك ﻃﺮح ﻣﺒﺎدرﺗﻪ اﻟﺸﺠﺎﻋﻪ 
  .3 واﻟﺘﺤﺪي اﻻن ﻋﻠﻲ ﻋﺎﺗﻖ اﺣﺰاب اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻪ
  
  .4  , اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن ﺗﺒﻘﻲ ﻣﻨﻈﻤﻪ ﻣﺤﻈﻮرﻩ  : ﺳﺆال
  .5  وﺗﻢ اﺧﻴﺮا اﻋﺘﻘﺎل ﻣﺌﺎت ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﺎﺑﻴﻊ اﻻﺧﻴﺮﻩ
ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﺴﺪ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺑﺎن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﻪ دور آﻴﻒ ﺳﺘﺠﺪون ﻃﺮﻳﻘﻪ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﻟﻤﺜﻞ هﺬا اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﻤﻬﻢ 
 ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﺒﻠﺪ؟
  .6
  .7   , ﻟﻦ ﻧﻘﻮم ﺑﺬﻟﻚ اﻻﻣﺮ ﺑﻬﺬﻩ اﻟﺒﺴﺎﻃﻪ  : ﻧﻈﻴﻒ  
  .8    . دﺳﺘﻮرﻧﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺴﻤﺢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ
  .9  ﻟﻦ ﻧﺴﻤﺢ ﺑﺎﺣﺰاب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس دﻳﻨﻲ 
  .01   . وﻻ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺘﺴﻤﺢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ
  .11  هﻞ ﺗﻮدﻳﻦ ان ﺗﺮﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﻟﻼﺳﻼم وﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﻴﺤﻴﻪ وﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﻟﻠﻴﻬﻮدﻳﻪ؟ 
  .21  آﻴﻒ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﺴﻤﺎح ﺑﺬﻟﻚ؟  . هﺬا هﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺮﻳﺪوﻧﻪ
  .31  اذن ﻻ ﻳﺒﻘﻲ اﻣﺎم هﻮﻻء اﻟﻨﺎس ﺳﻮي اﻟﺘﺮﺷﺢ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻗﻮاﺋﻢ اﻃﺮاف اﺧﺮي؟  : ﺳﺆال  * 
  .41   . وﻧﺤﻦ ﻧﺮﺣﺐ ﺑﻘﻴﺎﻣﻬﻢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ  , اﻟﺒﺮﻟﻤﺎن آﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﻴﻦﻧﻈﻴﻒ اﻋﻀﺎء اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻟﻬﻢ ﻣﻤﺜﻠﻮن ﻓﻲ   * 
وﺗﻌﺎرض   , وردا ﻋﻠﻲ ﺳﻮال ﺣﻮل ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﻪ اﻣﺲ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﻘﺎل ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺷﻄﻲ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان
   , ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﻮﺟﻪ ﻧﺤﻮ اﻻﺻﻼح اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ
  .51
ﺠﻪ ﻟﺸﻐﺐ ﻓﻲ ان اﻻﺻﻼﺣﺎت اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﻪ اوﺳﻊ آﺜﻴﺮا ﻣﻦ اي اﻋﺘﻘﺎﻻت ﻗﺪ ﺗﺤﺪث ﻧﺘﻴ  : ﻧﻈﻴﻒ ﻗﺎل
   . او ﻏﻴﺮ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻣﻮر  , اﻟﺸﻮارع
  .61
ﻳﺘﻢ ﻷول ﻣﺮﻩ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل   , أن اﻻﺻﻼح اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ هﻮ ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ أﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺪﺳﺘﻮر وأﺿﺎف
   . اﻧﺘﺨﺎب رﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮرﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻴﻦ أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺷﺢ
  .71
 :yadoT SU htiw weivretni na ni ,fizaN ,MP ehT .1
 ]noitutitsnoC eht dnema ot [ evitaitini lacirotsih sih dettimbus sah karabuM .2
  
 dennab deredisnoc llits si BM eht :Q .4
 .detserra neeb evah meht fo sderdnuh yletal dna .5
 naitpygE eht fo trap tnatropmi yrev a hcus rof wolla dluow taht yaw a ereht sI .6
 ?yrtnuoc eht fo ecnanrevog eht ni elor a evah ot ydob lacitilop
 ,ti od ylpmis ton dluow eW :fizaN .7
 .ti wolla ton seod noitutitsnoC ruo .8
 noigiler no desab seitrap lacitilop wolla ton lliw ew .9
 ti wolla ton od seirtnuoc ynam dna .01
 dna seitrap naitsirhC dna malsI fo ytrap eht ,tpygE ni ees ot ekil uoy dluoW .11
 ?msiaduJ fo seitrap






  50-81-50 ,94 # ,50PF
  .1   : رﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻮزراء ﻓﻲ ﻟﻘﺎﺋﻪ ﺑﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ
  .2 ﻣﺤﻈﻮرة ﻣﻨﻈﻤﺔاﻹﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن  
  .3 إرهﺎﺑﻴﻴﻦ ﻟﻴﺴﻮا ﻟﻜﻨﻬﻢ
  
 .4    , ﻧﻈﻴﻒ وﺟﻮد ﺧﻠﻂ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺘﺸﺪدﻳﻦ واﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ واﻻرهﺎﺑﻴﻴﻦ وأآﺪ
 .5    , ﻓﺎﻟﻤﺘﺸﺪدون ﻟﻴﺴﻮا ارهﺎﺑﻴﻴﻦ
 .6    , واﻻﺧﻮان ﻟﻴﺴﻮا ﻣﺘﺸﺪدﻳﻦ وﻻ ارهﺎﺑﻴﺒﻦ
 .7    , وأن اﻻرهﺎﺑﻴﻴﻦ ﻻ ﻳﺸﺘﺮط أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮا ﻣﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
 .8   , ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ اﺧﺘﻼﻓﻨﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺘﻜﻮﻳﻦ ﺣﺰب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻣﺸﻴﺮا اﻟﻲ أﻧﻪ
 .9  ﻓﺎن ﻣﺼﺮ ﻟﻢ ﺗﻘﻒ ﺣﺎﺋﻼ دون دﺧﻮل أي ﻣﻨﻬﻢ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻟﻨﻴﺎﺑﻴﻪ
 :sriaffA ngieroF no licnuoC naciremA eht htiw gniteem sih ni MP .1
 noitazinagro dennab a si srehtorB ehT .2
 stsirorret ton era yeht tuB .3
 
 
  50-41-50 ,05 # ,50PF
  .1 ﻣﻠﻴﻮن ﻣﺼﺮي   27 ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﻴﺎة ﻣﺆﺗﻤﻦأﻧﺎ   : ﻣﺒﺎرك
  .2 ﺗﻮﻓﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻴﺶ اﻟﻜﺮﻳﻢ ﻟﻬﻢ وﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺘﻲ
  .3  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﺷﺎﻣﻞ إﻟﻲ أﺣﻤﺪ اﻟﺠﺎر اﷲ رﺋﻴﺲ ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺘﻴﺔ
 .4 ﺟﺎء ﻗﺮارا ذاﺗﻴﺎ   67  ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ اﻟﻤﺎدة
 .5 ﻟﻀﻐﻮط داﺧﻠﻴﺔ أو أﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ وﻟﻢ ﻳﺼﺪر اﺳﺘﺠﺎﺑﺔ
 .6 اﻹﺧﻮان ﻳﺮﻳﺪون اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ
  .7 وإذا ﺣﻜﻤﻮا ﻓﺴﻴﺤﻜﻤﻮن إﻟﻲ اﻷﺑﺪ 
  .8 وﺳﻴﺴﺒﺒﻮن اﻟﻘﻠﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻼد 
  .9  .. ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﻪ آﻔﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺪﻓﻮع اﻟﺜﻤﻦ
.01 أن اﻻﺧﻮان ﺳﻴﺒﺪاون ﺑﻤﻬﺎدﻧﻪ اﻟﺤﺎآﻢ آﺨﻄﻮﻩ أوﻟﻲ  وأﺿﺎف
.11    , ﺛﻢ ﻳﺒﺪأون ﺑﺎﺛﺎرﻩ اﻟﻔﻮﺿﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ
.21   . ﺛﻢ اﻟﻘﻔﺰ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ
.31 ﻣﻈﺎهﺮات ﺑﺤﻔﻨﺔ ﻓﻠﻮس ﺗﻬﺘﻒ ﻣﺶ آﻔﺎﻳﺔ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢوآﺎن ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎﻧﻲ 
  
.41   , اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮات ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺒﺮرﻩ وﺣﺬر
.51    , ﻣﺸﻴﺮا اﻟﻲ اﻧﻪ ﺳﺘﻮدي اﻟﻲ هﺮوب اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻄﺎﻟﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻼد
.61    , ان ﻣﺜﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮات ﻻ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ ﻟﻬﺎ واآﺪ
.71   , وﺗﺴﺘﻬﺪف اﻳﺠﺎد ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺷﻐﺐ ﻃﺎردﻩ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻲ واﻻﺟﻨﺒﻲ
.81   . وﻣﺴﺌﻮﻟﻴﺘﻲ ﺗﻮﻓﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻴﺶ ﺑﻜﺮاﻣﻪ ﻟﻬﻢ  , ﻣﻠﻴﻮن ﻣﻮاﻃﻦ  27 اﻧﻪ ﻣﻮﺗﻤﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﻴﺎﻩ وﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ  : وﻗﺎل
.91    , وﻓﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﻪ ﻓﺘﺢ ﻗﻨﺎﻩ ﺣﻮار ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪﻩ وﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان
.02    , أن هﻨﺎك ﻗﺼﻪ ﻃﻮﻳﻠﻪ ﻳﻌﺮف آﻞ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﻴﻠﻬﺎ  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻗﺎل
.12    , وﻋﻠﻲ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ أﻻ ﻳﻈﻨﻮا أﻧﻨﻲ ﻧﺎﺋﻢ
.22   . واﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﺎﺗﻴﻨﻲ أوﻻ ﺑﺎول ﺣﻮل اﺗﺼﺎﻻﺗﻬﻢ ﻣﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان
 
 snaitpygE snoillim 07 fo sevil eht no detsurt ma I :karabuM .1
 efil tneced a htiw meht edivorp ot si ytilibisnopser yM .2





4. The amendment of article 76 was a self-initiative 
5. It did not happen because of internal or US pressure 
6. The Brothers want authority 
7. If they rule, they will rule for ever 
8. And they cause chaos in Egypt 
9. What Kifaaya did is paid for [by the west or foreign party] 
10. He added that the MB will start with appeasing the ruler 
11. And then they start causing political chaos 
12. And then jump to the Office 
13. I could have formed similar demonstrations with a handful of money to shout ' 
not kifaya' 'not enough' 
  
14. The president warned against the unjustified demonstrations 
15. as it will lead to the flight of investors , which, in turn, will lead to more 
unemployment in Egypt 
16. The president stressed that these demonstrations have no strategy (i.e. random) 









FP05, # 51, 14-05-05  
ﺮﺸﻋة كرﺎﺒﻤﻟ ةﺪﻳﺆﻣ ﻩﺮﻴﺴﻣ نﻮﻤﻈﻨﻳ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ فﻻا  1.  
   
ﺔﻴﻤﻠﺳ ةﺮﻴﺴﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻨﻃﻮﻟا بﺰﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻀﻋ فﻻا ﻩﺮﺸﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜآأ كرﺎﺷ  2.  
ﻣﺆﻩدﺎﻤﻟا ﻞﻳﺪﻌﺘﺑ ﻪﻴﺨﻳرﺎﺘﻟا ﻪﺗردﺎﺒﻣو كرﺎﺒﻣ ﻲﻨﺴﺣ ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻠﻟ ﻩﺪﻳ )76(  رﻮﺘﺳﺪﻟا ﻦﻣ ,    3.  
 ﺲﻴﺋﺮﻟا ﻪﺒﻟﺎﻄﻣوﻪﺤﻴﺷﺮﺗ نﻼﻋﺎﺑ .   4.  
 ﻲﺘﺑﺎﻘﻧ ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ﻦﻣ تادﺎﻴﻗو ﻪﻳﺎﻔآ ﻪآﺮﺣ رﺎﺼﻧا ﻦﻣ دﺪﻋ ﻊﻤﺠﺗ ﺮﺧا ﺐﻧﺎﺟ ﻦﻣو
ﻦﻴﻣﺎﺤﻤﻟاو ﻦﻴﻴﻔﺤﺼﻟا ,    
5.  
ﻞﻣﺎﺸﻟا ﻲﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا حﻼﺻﻻﺎﺑ اﻮﺒﻟﺎﻃو .   6.  
1. 10,000 NDP members organize a march in support of Mubarak 
  
2. More than 10,000 NDP members have participated in a peaceful march 
3. To supporting president Mubarak and his historic intuitive to amend 
constitutional article 76 
4. And ask him to declare his candidacy 
5. On the other side, a number of people from Kifaya and the Banned MB gathered 
in both lawyers and journalists’ syndicates 
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واﻋﻤﺎﻟﻲ   .. ﻟﺴﺖ ﻣﺤﺘﺎﺟﺎ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﻖ ﻧﻔﺴﻲ  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺒﺎرك ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ ﺻﺤﻴﻔﻪ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻪ اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺘﻴﻪ
  .. ﻳﻌﺮﻓﻬﺎ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ
  .1
  .2 ﺣﻠﻘﻪ ﺗﻠﻴﻔﺰﻳﻮﻧﻴﻪوﻟﺴﺖ ﺑﺤﺎﺟﻪ اﻟﻲ 
  .3 اﻟﺒﻠﺪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻋﺰﺑﻪ ﻣﻠﻜﻲ واﻧﺎ ﻗﻴﻢ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺘﻔﻮﻳﺾ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ
  واذا اردت ان اﻓﻌﻞ ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻓﻴﺠﺐ ان ارﺟﻊ اﻟﻴﻪ
  
ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ ﺣﺰب اﻟﻐﺪ  ﻣﻊ اﻟﻨﺎﺻﺮﻳﻴﻦ وﻣﻊ  , ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﻜﻔﻴﺮﻳﻴﻦ  , اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺎ ﺳﺮ ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻒ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﺳﻴﺎدﻩ
 ؟ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﻢ ﺿﺪ اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻪ وﺿﺪ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .4
  .5  . ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻴﻊ ان ﺗﺮي وﺗﻘﺪر ﻣﻦ ﻳﻘﻒ وراءهﻢ : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .6 هﻨﺎك اﺳﺒﺎب ﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﻢ 
  .7   , واﻧﺎ اﻋﺮﻓﻬﺎ
  .8  اﻟﻌﻈﻤﻲ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻬﻤﻨﻲ هﻮ ﻣﺼﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﻐﺎﻟﺒﻴﻪ
او ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﺒﺎدرﻩ ﻗﻠﻪ وﻓﺎء ﻣﻦ   , ﻻءﺆاﻟﻨﺎس ﻻ ﺗﺮﻳﺪ ان ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﺣﺴﻨﻲ ﻣﺒﺎرك ﻣﺘﺎﺛﺮا ﻣﻦ ه
  ؟ ﺷﻌﺐ ﻣﺼﺮ
  .9
.01   , ﻣﻠﻴﻮن  27 ﻋﻨﺪك
.11   , أرآﺰ ﺟﻬﺪي آﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ اﺟﻞ ان اآﻔﻴﻬﻢ
.21    , ﺑﻘﺪر ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻄﻴﻊ  , وان ﻳﻌﻴﺸﻮا ﺑﻜﺮاﻣﻪ
.31    , اﻟﺒﻠﺪ ﻳﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن وﺛﻼﺛﻤﺌﻪ اﻟﻒ ﻧﺴﻤﻪ آﻞ ﺳﻨﻪ
.41    . ﺗﺨﻴﻞ ﻃﻠﺒﺎت هﻮﻻء ﻟﻮﺣﺪهﻢ آﻢ ﺗﺒﻠﻎ
.51    . واﻟﺴﻨﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﺳﻴﺰﻳﺪ هﻮﻻء ﺑﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﺪد
.61    , ﻣﻠﻴﻮﻧﺎ  24 ﻓﻲ ﺑﺪاﻳﻪ وﻻﻳﺘﻲ آﺎن ﻋﺪد اﻟﺴﻜﺎن
ﻣﻜﺎﻓﺤﻪ اﻟﺒﻄﺎﻟﻪ ﺑﺤﺎﺟﻪ اﻟﻲ   . ﻗﻮل ﻟﻚ هﻨﺎك ﺑﻄﺎﻟﻪأﻧﻌﻢ   , ﺗﻘﻮل ﻟﻲ هﻨﺎك ﺑﻄﺎﻟﻪ  .. ﻣﻠﻴﻮﻧﺎ ﻧﻌﻢ  27 اﻟﻴﻮم ﺑﻠﻎ
    . اﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر
.71
.81   , ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻈﺎهﺮات اﻟﺘﻲ ﻧﺮاهﺎ ﺳﻴﻬﺮب اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ
.91   , ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ان اﻟﺒﻄﺎﻟﻪ ﺳﺘﺰﻳﺪ وﺗﺘﻔﺸﻲ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻨﺎس
.02    , وﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﺴﺒﺐ ﻳﺒﺪا ﺗﺎﺛﺮي  , وﻣﻦ هﻨﺎ
.12  وﻟﻴﺲ ﻻي ﺷﻲء اﺧﺮ ﻳﺰﻋﺞ هﺬا اﻟﻮﺿﻊ
.22  وﻟﻮ اﻧﻪ ﻟﻦ ﻳﻮﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺪوﻟﻪ
.32  اﻻ اﻧﻪ ﻳﺨﻠﻖ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺗﺒﺎﻃﻮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻊ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎري
.42  واﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻖ وﺧﻠﻖ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﺷﻐﺐ ﺳﺘﻘﻊ اﻟﻤﺼﻴﺒﻪ  , وﺗﻮﺟﻬﺖ ﻧﺤﻮ اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻧﻊ  , اذ ﻧﻈﻤﺖ ﻣﻈﺎهﺮات
اﻻف اﻟﻌﻤﺎل واﻻﻃﺒﺎء واﻟﻤﻮﻇﻔﻴﻦ واﻟﻤﻬﻨﺪﺳﻴﻦ اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﻌﻤﻠﻮن ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺼﺎﻧﻊ واﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻖ ﺳﻴﺘﻮﻗﻔﻮن ﻋﻦ 
  اﻟﻌﻤﻞ
.52
.62  اﻟﻤﻔﺮوض ان ﻧﺮاﻋﻲ ﻣﺼﻠﺤﻪ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ  , ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﻣﺎﻓﻴﺶ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺎت اي اﻟﺒﻄﺎﻟﻪ زادت
اﻟﻌﻬﺪ ﻣﻊ اﻧﻲ اﻋﺮف ان وﻟﻲ   , ؟ﻣﺎ ﻗﺼﻪ ﻓﺘﺢ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ﻟﻘﻨﺎﻩ ﺣﻮار ﻣﻊ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
  اﻧﺎ ارﻳﺪ ان ﺗﻜﻮن ﺷﻔﺎﻓﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﻪ؟  .. اﻟﺴﻌﻮدي اﻻﻣﻴﺮ ﻋﺒﺪاﷲ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺎﺗﺒﻬﻢ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ
.72
.82    , ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﻤﻮح ﻓﻲ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻨﺎ ﺑﺘﺎﺳﻴﺲ اﻻﺣﺰاب اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻴﻪ
.92   , وﻻ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﺒﺮ اﺣﺰاب اﺧﺮي ﻣﺮﺧﺼﻪ
.03    , ?ﻟﻜﻦ هﻞ اﻃﺮوﺣﺎت اﻻﺧﻮان ﻣﻘﺒﻮﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎس




ﻞﻴﻠﻀﺘﻟا ﻪﻠﺣﺮﻣ اوزﺎﺘﺟا ﺎﻨه سﺎﻨﻟا  32.
رﻮﻣﻻا تﺎﻳﺮﺠﻣ نﻮﻤﻬﻔﻳو ,  ءﻲﺷ ﻞﻜﻟ ﺮﻴﺴﻔﺗ ﻢﻬﻳﺪﻟو  33.
4. Politics: Mr. President, what is the secret behind the alliance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood with the Takfiri groups, the Nasserites and the Ghad party, and 
their coming together against the president? 
5. President: you can see it and know who stands behind them. 
6. There are reasons for them to come together 
7. and I know these reasons 
8. but I only care for the interest of the majority 
27. Politics: what is the story behind the Americans opening a dialogue channel 
with the MB? I know that the Saudi prince Abdalla has admonished them on it. 
I want a transparent answer 
28. President: Our law does not allow establishing religious parties 
29. yet they can work through other licensed parties 
30. However, are the theses of the MB acceptable by people 
31. even if they cower under another party’s umbrella? 
32. People here have passed the phase of mystification 
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كرﺎﺒﻣ :   ﺖﻠﻤﺣ  تﺎﻴﺤﻀﺘﻟا ﻮﺑأ ﻮﻬﻓ ءﻲﺷ ﻞآ ﻪﻠﺟﻷ نﻮﻬﻳ ﺮﺼﻣ ﺐﻌﺷ ﻦﻜﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻀﻣو ﺔﻘهﺮﻣ ﺔﻧﺎﻣأ  1.  
 ةرﺮﺒﻤﻟا ﺮﻴﻏ تاﺮهﺎﻈﻤﻟاﻻ  ﺎﻬﻟ ﺞﻣاﺮﺑفﺪﻬﺘﺴﺗو رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻼﻟ ةدرﺎﻃ ﺐﻐﺷ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ دﺎﺠﻳإ  2.  
 ﻲﻠﻋﻦﻴﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻹا ﻊﻣ ﻢﻬﺗﻻﺎﺼﺗا لﻮﺣ لوﺄﺑ ﻻوأ ﻲﻨﻴﺗﺄﺗ تﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﻤﻟاو ﻢﺋﺎﻧ ﻲﻨﻧأ اﻮﻨﻈﻳ ﻻأ ﻦﻴﻴﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷا  3.  
1. Mubarak: I have carried a heavy and tiring burden but everything can be 
sacrificed for the Egyptian people sake.  
2. Unjustified demonstrations have  no programs and aim to create a state of riots 
that is centrifugal of [foreign] investments 
3. Americans [US administration] do not need to think that I am sleeping; 
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ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻊﺑرﺎﺑ ﻢهﺮهﺎﻈﺗ ﺐﻘﻋ 200  ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ  .1 
ﺔﺑﺎﺻا 30   ﻦﻣﻻا تاﻮﻗ ﻦﻣ  .2 
ﻊﻓاﺪﺘﻟا ﻪﺠﻴﺘﻧ ﻦﻳﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا ﺪﺣأ عﺮﺼﻣو  .3 
   
 ﻪﻧا ﻦﻋ ﻲﻨﻣا رﺪﺼﻣ ﻒﺸآ  4. 
ﻲﻠﻋ ﺾﺒﻘﻟا ءﺎﻘﻟا ﻢﺗ 200  ﻲه تﺎﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ ﻊﺑرﺄﺑ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا ناﻮﺧﻻا ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺟ ءﺎﻀﻋأ ﻦﻣ :   ﻪﻴﻠﻬﻗﺪﻟاو ﻩﺮهﺎﻘﻟا
 ﺲﻳﻮﺴﻟاو ﻪﻴﻠﻴﻋﺎﻤﺳﻻاو  
5. 










1. After their demonstration in four governorates, the arrest of 200 members of the 
banned Brothers group 
2. The injury of 30 State Security forces 
3. The death of one demonstrator because of stampede 
  
4. A security source has revealed that 
5. 200 members of the  banned MB have been arrested in four governorates 
6. As they stirred up the masses 
7. and incited them to demonstrate after Friday prayers yesterday. 
8. The source added 
9. the security forces were able to arrest Dr. Essam el-Eryaan, the leading Brother's 
figure and three other leaders in the house of the first 
10. While they were planning for actions causing instability  and chaos (peoples security) 
11. Furthermore, about 2000 Brothers members demonstrated in front of el-Ghannam 
mosque in Talkha 
12. In spite of police warning to end the demonstration, they pelted police with bricks 
and stones 
13. Which resulted in the injury of 4 officers and 26 soldiers 
14. Moreover Tarek Ghannam, 40,  one of the demonstrators  and  a leading figure in the 
MB, died because of demonstrators' stampede 
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ﺔﻴﺴﻧﺮﻔﻟا ورﺎﺠﻴﻓﻮﻟ ﺔﻔﻴﺤﺼﻟ ﺚﻳﺪﺣ ﻲﻓ كرﺎﺒﻣ :  ﻂﻘﻓ تارﺪﺨﻤﻟاو بﺎهرﻹا ﺔﺤﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟ ئراﻮﻄﻟا نﻮﻧﺎﻗ 1.  
  اﺪﺑأ ﻲﺿﻮﻔﻟا رﺎﺸﺘﻧﺎﺑ ﺢﻤﺳأ ﻦﻟو 2.  
 ﺢﻤﺴﻳ ﻻ نﻮﻧﺎﻘﻟاﻲﻨﻳد سﺎﺳأ ﻲﻠﻋ بﺰﺣ ﻞﻴﻜﺸﺘﺑ 3.  
يﺮﺧأ باﺰﺣﻷ مﺎﻤﻀﻧﻻا ﻦﻣ ناﻮﺧﻹا ﻊﻨﻣأ ﻻو  4.  
  
ﺲﻣأ ﻪﻌﻤﺠﻟا ﻩﻼﺻ ﺐﻘﻋ ﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ﻢﻬﻀﻳﺮﺤﺗو ..    7. 
 نأ رﺪﺼﻤﻟا فﺎﺿأو  8. 
مﺎﺼﻋ رﻮﺘآﺪﻟا ﻂﺒﺿ ﻦﻣ ﺖﻨﻜﻤﺗ ﻦﻣﻷا ﻩﺰﻬﺟأ  ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا تادﺎﻴﻗ ﻦﻣ ﻦﻳﺮﺧا ﻪﺛﻼﺛو ﻲﻧاﻮﺧﻻا يدﺎﻴﻘﻟا نﺎﻳﺮﻌﻟا
 لوﻷا لﺰﻨﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻩرﻮﻈﺤﻤﻟا  
9. 
ﻦﻴﻨﻃاﻮﻤﻟا ﻦﻣﺄﺑ لﻼﺧﻻاو راﺮﻘﺘﺳﻻا ﻪﻋﺰﻋز فﺪﻬﺘﺴﻳ كﺮﺤﺘﻟ نوﺪﻌﻳ اﻮﻧﺎآ .   10. 
ﻪﻴﻠﻬﻗﺪﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﺨﻠﻃ ﻪﻨﻳﺪﻤﺑ مﺎﻨﻐﻟا ﺪﺠﺴﻣ مﺎﻣا اوﺮهﺎﻈﺗ ﺪﻗ ﻪﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟا ءﺎﻀﻋا ﻦﻣ ﺺﺨﺷ ﻲﻔﻟا ﻮﺤﻧ نﺎآو  11. 
 ﻢﻏﺮﺑوﻩرﺎﺠﺤﻟاو بﻮﻄﻟﺎﺑ ﻪﻃﺮﺸﻟا لﺎﺟر فﺬﻘﺑ اﻮﻣﺎﻗ ، تاﺮهﺎﻈﻤﻟا ﺾﻓ ﻩروﺮﻀﺑ ﻦﻣﻷا تاﺮﻳﺬﺤﺗ ,   12.  
و طﺎﺒﺿ ﻪﻌﺑرا ﻪﺑﺎﺻا ﻲﻟا يدأ ﺎﻤﻣ 26  دﻮﻨﺠﻟاو داﺮﻓﻻا ﻦﻣ ,    13.  
مﺎﻨﻏ يﺪﻬﻣ ﻪﻃ قرﺎﻃ ﻪﻤﺳاو ﻪﻋﺮﺼﻣ ﻦﻳﺮهﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا ﺪﺣا ﻲﻘﻟو 40  ﻪﻨﺳ ,   ﻪﻈﻓﺎﺤﻤﻟﺎﺑ ناﻮﺧﻻا تادﺎﻴﻗ ﻦﻣ ﻮهو





  .5 هﻞ ﺳﺘﺸﺮع ﻗﻴﺎم اﺣﺰاب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻪ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ؟
  .6 ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎ اي اﻋﺘﺮاض ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﺣﺰاب اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .7  ﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ  91 هﻨﺎك
  .8 دﻳﻨﻲ وﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻻﻳﺴﻤﺢ ﺑﺘﺸﻜﻴﻞ ﺣﺰب ﻋﻠﻲ أﺳﺎس
  .9 ﻓﻬﻢ أﺣﺮار  , اﻧﻨﻲ ﻻ اﻣﻨﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﻟﻲ اﺣﺰاب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪ
.01  واآﺪ اﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺪﻳﻪ اي اﻋﺘﺮاض ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﺣﺰاب اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ
.11  ﺣﺰﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ  91 ﻓﻬﻨﺎك 
.21    , ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻻ ﻳﺴﻤﺢ ﺑﺘﺸﻜﻴﻞ ﺣﺰب ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس دﻳﻨﻲ 
.31   . ﻓﻬﻢ اﺣﺮار  , ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﻟﻲ اﺣﺰاب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﻪ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﻪوﻻ اﻣﻨﻊ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ 
 dna msirorret htiw gnilaed rof ylno si wal ycnegremE :oragiF eL ot karabuM .1
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  50-71-10 ,95# ,50PF
  .1 ﺣﻜﻢ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﻪ ﺻﻌﺒﻪ ﺟﺪا : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﻟﻘﻨﺎﻩ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﻪ
  .2 واذا آﺎن اﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻧﻲ ﻓﻠﻦ اﺳﺘﻄﻴﻊ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻞ
  .3 اﻧﺎ رﺟﻞ ﺟﺎد اﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻟﺼﺒﺎح ﺣﺘﻲ ﻣﻴﻌﺎد اﻟﻨﻮم
  .4 آﻤﺎ ﺗﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﺷﻴﺮاك اﺑﻨﺘﻪواﺑﻨﻲ ﻳﺴﺎﻋﺪﻧﻲ  .. 
  
ﺳﻮال ﻋﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎﻧﻴﻪ اﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ واﻟﺮوﺳﺎء اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ان ﺗﻌﺮف ﻣﻌﻈﻤﻬﻢ هﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ان ﺗﺘﺤﻮل   : اﻟﻤﺬﻳﻊ }
  ﻟﺪوﻟﻪ دﻳﻨﻴﻪ؟
  .5
  .6  اﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﻋﻤﺮهﺎ ﻣﺎﺗﻜﻮن دوﻟﻪ دﻳﻨﻴﻪ  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ
  .7  آﺎن ﻋﻨﺪي اﻟﺮاﺟﻞ اﻻﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎﻧﻲ دﻩ 
  .8  ﻟﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﺗﺼﺎﻻت ﺑﺒﻌﺾ ﻧﺎس ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ 
  .9  ﻗﻠﺖ ﻟﻪ اﻧﺎ هﺴﺎﻟﻚ ﺳﻮال 
.01  اﻧﺘﻢ ﺑﺘﻠﻌﺒﻮا ﻟﻌﺒﻪ ﺧﻄﺮ 
.11  وهﻴﻀﺮوآﻢ 
.21  ﻳﻌﻨﻲ اﺣﻨﺎ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻨﺎ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ ﻣﺶ هﻨﻔﺮح ﺑﻬﺎ 
.31    . اﻧﺘﻢ ﻋﻨﺪآﻢ ﺣﺰب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس دﻳﻨﻲ؟
.41   . ﻗﺎل ﻟﻲ ﻻ
.51  ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس دﻳﻨﻲ؟ﻗﻠﺖ ﻟﻪ واوروﺑﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺣﺰب 
.61  . ﻗﺎل ﻟﻲ ﻻ  
.71  ﻗﻠﺖ ﻟﻪ ﻣﺎﺗﻄﻠﺒﻮش ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ
.81   . ﺳﻴﺒﻮا اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ
.91  ﻗﻠﺖ ﻟﻪ اﺣﻨﺎ ﻣﺎﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎش
.02  اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻳﻤﻨﻊ
.12  ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ اﺣﻨﺎ آﻠﻨﺎ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
.22  ﻳﻌﻨﻲ اﺧﻮان دﻩ ﺻﻨﻒ واﺧﻮان ﻣﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ
.32  اﻧﻮاع ﻣﻦ اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ  4 او  3 ﻳﻄﻠﻊ ﻟﻲ




.52  اﺣﻨﺎ آﻠﻨﺎ ﻣﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻣﺎ
.62  وآﻠﻨﺎ ﺑﻨﺎدي اﻟﻔﺮﻳﻀﻪ
.72   . ﻓﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪرش ان اﻧﺖ ﺗﻔﺮق ﺑﻴﻦ هﺬا وذاك
.82  وﻳﻘﺪروا ﻳﺨﺸﻮا اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﻴﻪ
.92  او ﻳﻨﻀﻤﻮا ﻻﺣﺰاب
.03  ﻟﻜﻦ ﺣﺰب ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺎس دﻳﻨﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎ ﺑﻴﺤﺮﻣﻮا 
.13  .ﻣﺎهﻴﺎش ﺑﺪﻋﻪ إﻧﻤﺎ ﺑﻴﺤﺮﻣﻮا
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  .1  اس اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ  . ﺑﻲ  . ﻣﺒﺎرك ﻓﻲ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ ﻣﻊ ﺷﺒﻜﻪ ﺑﻲ
   
هﻞ ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ ﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎدﻩ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ أن اﻻﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﻤﻘﺪورهﻢ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺟﻴﺪﻩ اذا ﻣﺎ أﺟﺮﻳﺖ   : ﺗﺸﺎرﻟﻲ
   . اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﺣﺮﻩ وﺷﻔﺎﻓﻪ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
  .2
  .3   . اﺗﺮآﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻬﺎﻳﻪ  , ﻳﺎ ﺗﺸﺎرﻟﻲﻟﻤﺎذا ﺗﺨﻮض ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﻪ   : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺒﺎرك
  .4  ﻣﺎذا ﺗﻌﻨﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺮآﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻬﺎﻳﻪ ؟  : ﺗﺸﺎرﻟﻲ 
  .5   . اﻟﻲ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﻪ  : اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﻣﺒﺎرك
  
REFERENCES 
Abed-Kotob, S. 1995. The Accommodationists speak: Goals and strategies of the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. International Journal. Middle East Studies 
(27): 321–39. 
Ahmad, M. 2002. Islam and democracy: The emerging consensus. 
http://www.islamonline.net/english/Contemporary/2002/05/Article15.shtml. 
Accessed February 2009. 
Akhavan-Majid R. and Wolf, G. 1991. American mass media and the myth of 
libertarianism: Toward an elite power group theory. Critical Studies in Mass 
Communication (8): 139–51. 
al-Ali, M.N. 2006. Religious affiliations and masculine power in Jordanian wedding 
invitation genre. Discourse and Society 17(6): 691–714. 
al-Beshri, T. 2008. Brothers are the enabled power to mobilize the Egyptian street. 
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1203758629
733&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout. Accessed June 2009. 
al-Jazeera. 2007a. Brothers are dangerous because they are theocratic. 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/01/11/30648.html. Accessed 
September 2007.  
al-Jazeera. 2007b. Egypt freezes the assets of 29 senior Muslim Brothers leaders and 
their families. http://www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/ 
archive?ArchiveId=1031129. 01/9/2007. Accessed September 2007. 
al-Jazeera. 2007c. International observers condemn the policies against the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Egypt. 
http://www.aljazeera.net/News/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1063571. 
Accessed September 2007. 
al-Jazeera. 2007d. Mubarak considers Brothers a threat on Egypt’s national security. 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1029580. 
Accessed September 2007. 
al-Jazeera. 25 January 2007. Egypt detains more of the Brothers. 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=1030775 , 




Allan, S. 1999. News Culture. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Alvesson, M. and Deetz, S. 2000. Doing Critical Management Research. London: 
Sage. 
Anderson, L. 1987. Lawless government and illegal opposition: Reflections on the 
Middle East. Journal of International Affairs 40(2): 219–32. 
Austin, J.L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. London: Oxford University Press. 
Ayoob, M. 2007. The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the 
Muslim World. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Ayubi, N.N.M. 1980. The political revival of Islam: The case of Egypt. International 
Journal of Middle East Studies (12): 481–99. 
Baaklini, A. Denoux, G. and Springborg, R. 1999. Legislative Politics in the Arab 
World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions. London: LynneReinner 
Publishers.  
Bagnall, N. 1993. Newspaper Language. Oxford: Focal Press. 
Bakhtin, M.M. 1981. The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barkho, L. 2008a. The BBC’s discursive strategy and practices vis-a-vis the 
Palestinian –Israeli conflict. Journalism Studies 9(2): 278–94. 
Barkho, L. 2008b. The discursive and social power of news discourse: The case of 
Aljazeera in comparison and parallel with the BBC and CNN. Studies in 
Language and Capitalism 3(4): 111–59. 
http://www.languageandcapitalism.info/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/slc3-4-
barkho.pdf . Accessed September 2009. 
Barkho, L. 2008c . The Discursive and Social Power of News Discourse: The case of 
Aljazeera in comparison and parallel with the BBC and CNN. Studies in 
Langage and Capitalism, http://www.languageandcapitalism.info/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/slc3-4-barkho.pdf 
Bell, A. 1991. The Language of News Media. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bell, A. 1995. Language and media. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics (15): 23–
41. 
Bell, A. and Garret, P. 1998. Approaches to Media Discourse. London: Blackwell. 





Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.  
Binder, L. 1988. Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
Bishop, H. and Jaworski, A. 2003. ‘We beat ’em’: Nationalism and the hegemony of 
homogeneity in the British press reportage of Germany versus England Euro 
2000. Discourse and Society 14(3): 243–71.  
Blackledge, A. 2005. Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamin.  
Blommaert, J. 2005. Discourse: A Critical Introduction. London: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Blommaert, J. and Bulcaen, C. 2000. Critical Discourse Analysis. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 29: 447–66. 
Bourdieu, P. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power, edited by J.B. Thompson, 
translated by G. Raymond. London: Polity Press. 
Brownlee, J. 2004. Durable authoritarianism in an age of democracy. Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, Princeton University. 
Brownlee, J. 2006. Egyptian Elections. Email exchange with the author. 
Bush, G.W. 2001. Remarks by the president upon arrival. http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. Accessed 
May 2008. 
Bush, G.W. 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-
11.html, retrieved on January 2007. Accessed June 2008. 
Campagna, J. 1996. From accommodation to confrontation: The Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years. Journal of International Affairs 50(1): 
279–304. 
Candlin, C.N. and Maley, Y. 1997. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity in the 
discourse of alternative dispute resolution. In B. Gunnarsson, P . Linell and 
B. Nordberg (eds.) The Construction of Professional Discourse, pp. 201–22. 
London: Longman. 
Carston, R. 2002. Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit 
Communication. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Chehabi, H. and Linz, J. 1998. Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns 




Chen, K. and Morley, D. 1996. Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. 
London: Routledge. 
Chen, L. 2005. Transitivity in media texts: Negative verbal process sub-functions 
and narrator bias. IRAL (43): 33–51. 
Chouliaraki, L. 1999. Media discourse and national identity: Death and myth in a 
news broadcast. In R. Wodak and C. Ludwig (eds.) Challenges in a Changing 
World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 37–62. Wien: Passagen 
Verlag. 
Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. 1999. Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking 
Critical Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Clark, K. 1998. The linguistics of blame: Representations of women in the Sun’s 
reporting of crimes of sexual violence. In D. Cameron (ed.) The Feminist 
Critique of Language, pp. 83–97. London: Routledge. 
CNN. 2007. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/30/powell.us.arab. 
forum/index.html, retrieved January 2007. Accessed September 2008. 
Cotter, C. 2001. Discourse and media, in D. Schiffrin et al. (eds.) The Handbook of 
Discourse Analysis, pp. 416–36. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Cottle, S. (ed.). 2000. Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing cultural 
boundaries. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Caldas-Coulthard, R. and Coulthard, M. (eds.). 1996. Texts and Practices: Readings 
in Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 84–104. London: Routledge. 
Curran, J. and Seaton, J. 1988. Power without Responsibility. London: Routledge. 
Develotte, C. and Rechniewski, E. 2001. Discourse analysis of newspaper headlines: 
A methodological framework for research into national representations. The 
Web Journal of French Media Studies (4). http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/joed4.htm.  
Diggins, J.P. 1994. The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of 
Knowledge and Authority. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 




Dunne, M. 2005. Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse. 




Duszak, A. 2002. Us and Others: Social Identities across Languages, Discourses 
and Cultures. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.  
Eggins, S. 2004. An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics. London: Pinter.  
El-Amrani, I. 2005. Controlled reform in Egypt: Neither reformist nor controlled, 
Middle East Report. http://merip.org/mero/mero121505.html. Accessed 
Oct.ober 2009.  
El-Gawhary, K. 1996. We are a civil party with an Islamic identity, an Interview with 
Abu ‘Ila Madi Abu ‘Ila and Rafiq Habib. Middle East Report, 199: 30–32. 
El-Ghobashy, M. 2005. The metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 37(3): 373–95. 
El-Moshtohry .E. 2006. L’idéologie a travers des indices linguistiques: Analyse des 
discours de la presse écrite arabophone et francophone en Egypte (2000 a 
2002). Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Montreal.  
Erdoğan, M. 1999. Islam in Turkish politics: Turkey’s quest for democracy without 
Islam. Critique (15): 25–49. 
Erjavec, K. 2001. Media representation of the discrimination against the Roma in 
Eastern Europe: The case of Slovenia. Discourse and Society 12(6): 699–727. 
Esposito, J. 1998. Islam and Politics. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Esposito, J. 1999. The Islamic Threat: Myth or reality? Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Fairclough, N. 1992a. Discourse and text: Linguistics and intertextual analysis within 
discourse analysis. Discourse and Society 3(2): 193–217. 
Fairclough, N. 1992b. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fairclough, N. 1993. Critical discourse analysis and the marketization of public 
discourse: the universities. Discourse and Society 4(2): 133–68. 
Fairclough, N. 1995a. Media Discourse. London: Edward Arnold. 
Fairclough, N. 1995b. Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Longman. 
Fairclough, N.1999 . Language and Power. London: Longman.  
Fairclough, N. 2001a. Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific 
research. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) Methods of Critical Discourse 




Fairclough, N. 2001b. Language and Power (2nd edn). London: Longman.  
Fairclough, N. 2002. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. 
London: Routledge.  
Fairclough, N. 2003. Political correctness: The politics of culture and language. 
Discourse and Society 14(1): 17–28. 
Fairclough, N. 2004. Semiotic aspects of social transformation and learning. In R. 
Rogers (ed.), An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis in Education, 
pp. 225-236. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. 1997. Critical discourse analysis: An overview. In T.A. 
van Dijk (ed.) Discourse and Interaction, pp. 67–97. London: Sage. 
Fazlur, R. 1986. The principle of Shura and the Role of the Umma in Islam. In M. 
Ahmad (ed.) State, Politics and Islam, pp. 87–96. Indianapolis: American 
Trust Publications. 
Flowerdew, J. and Li, D. 2002. Discriminatory news discourse: Some Hong Kong 
data. Discourse and Society 13(3): 319–45.  
Fowler, R. 1991. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. 
London: Routledge.  
Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (eds.). 1979. Language and Control. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Francis, G. 1988. Theme in the daily press: Thematic selection and distribution in 
written discourse, Word, 40(1-2): 201-221. 
Gee, J.P. 1996. Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses. London: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Giddens, A. 1997. Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Goatly, A . 2000. Green grammar and grammatical metaphor. In A. Fill and P. 
Mühlhäusler (eds.) Ecolinguistics Reader: Language, Ecology and 
Environment, pp. 203–25. London: Continuum. 
Gordon, J. 1992. Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July 
Revolution. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. 





Greimas, A. 1987. On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory. Translated by 
P.J. Perron and F.H. Collins. London: Frances Pinter.  
Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.) Syntax and 
Semantics 3: Speech Acts, pp. 41–58. New York: Academic Press. 
Grosz, B.J. and Sidner, C.L. 1986. Attention, intentions, and the structure of 
discourse, Computational Linguistics 12(3): 175–204. 
Grundy, P. 1995. Doing Pragmatics. London: Arnold. 
Habermas, J. 1967. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. 1972. Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann. 
Habermas, J. 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habib, R. 2009. Authority of religion and authority of politics (in Arabic). 
http://mdarik.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=12365089
15563&pagename=Zone-Arabic-MDarik%2FMDALayout. Accessed 
September 2009.  
Hackett, R.A. and Zhao, Y. 1994. Challenging the master narrative: Peace protest and 
opinion/editorial discourse in the US Press during the Gulf War. Discourse 
and Society 5(4): 509–41.  
Hall, S. 1976. A world at one with itself. In S. Cohen and J. Young (eds.) The 
Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media, pp. 
85–94. London: Constable. 
Hall, S. 1997a. Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices. 
London: Sage. 
Hall, S. 1997b. The rediscovery of “ideology”: Return of the repressed in media 
studies. In O. Boyd-Barrett & C. Newbold (eds.), Approaches to Media,  354-
364. London: St. Martin's Press. 
Halliday, M.A.K. 1967–8. Notes on transitivity and theme in English, Parts 1–3, 
Journal of Linguistics 3(1): 37-–81, 3.2, 199-244 and 4(2): 179–215. 
Halliday, M.A.K. 1973. Explorations in the Functions of Language. London: Edward 
Arnold. 
Halliday, M.A.K. 1978. Language as a Social Semiotic. London: Arnold. 




Halliday, M.A.K., 1994. An Introduction to Functional Grammar (2nd ed.). London: 
Arnold.  
Hartley, J. 1982. Understanding News. London: Routledge. 
Harvey, D. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. London: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Hassan, A.A. 1993. Islamists’ performance in the parliament during the fifth 
legislative term: A study on Parliamentary oversight (in Arabic). In The 
Proceedings of the First Junior Researchers Conference: On Political 
Developments in Egypt, pp. 28–55.  
Henry, F. and Tator, C. 2002. Discourses of Domination: Racial Bias in the 
Canadian English-Language Press. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Herbert, D. 2003. Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the 
Contemporary. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Herman, E. and Chomsky , N. 1988/2002. Manufacturing Consent. New York: 
Pantheon. 
Hodge, B. 1979. Newspapers and communities. In R. Fowler, B. Hodge, G. Kress 
and T. Trew (eds.) Language and Control. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Hodge, R. and Kress, G. 1993. Language as Ideology. London: Routledge. 
Holden, B. 1988. Understanding Liberal Democracy. London: Philip Allan 
Publications.  
Huckin, T. 1995. Critical discourse analysis. The Journal of TESOL 2(3): 95–112. 
Huckin, T. 1997. Critical discourse analysis. In T. Miller (ed.), Functional 
approaches to written text. Washington, DC: US Department of State, Office 
of English Language Programs. 
Huckin, T. 2002. Textual silence and the discourse of homelessness. Discourse and 
Society 13(3): 347–72. 
Hudson, M. and Stanier, J. 1997. War and the Media. Stroud: Sutton. 
Human Rights Watch. 2005a. Reading between the ‘red lines‘. The repression of 
academic freedom in Egyptian universities. 




Human Rights Watch. 2005b. False Freedom. 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/11/14/false-freedom?print. Accessed 
June 2008. 
Human Rights Watch. 2007a. Brothers face military tribunals. 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/02/14/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-
detainees-face-military-tribunals.  
Human Rights Watch. 2007b. Egypt: Flawed military trials for Brotherhood leaders. 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/06/04/egypt-flawed-military-trials-
brotherhood-leaders. Accessed June 2008. 
Human Rights Watch. 2007c. Egypt :End harassment of Labor Rights Group 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/04/26/egypt-end-harassment-labor-rights-
group. Retrieved 26 April 2007. Accessed June 2008 
Human Rights Watch. 2008. Egypt: Jailing 800 activists casts doubt on elections. 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/29/egypt-jailing-800-activists-casts-
doubt-elections. Accessed 29 March 2008. 
Ibrahim, S. 1996. Reform and frustration in Egypt. Journal of Democracy 7(4): 125–
35. 
Ibrahim, S. and Sherbiny, N. 2000. A reply to my accusers. Journal of Democracy 
11(4): 58–63. 
Idris, J. 2007. Shoora and democracy: A conceptual analysis. 
http://www.jaafaridris.com/English/Articles/shoora.htm. Accessed June 2008. 
Ikhwanweb. 2007. Ramsey Clark: Egyptian regime commits violations against 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=14537&SectionID=77. Accessed 
June 2008.  
International Crisis Group. 2004. Islamism in North Africa II: Egypt’s opportunity. 
ICG Middle East and North Africa Briefing, 20 April. 
International Republican Institute. 2005. Parliamentary election assessment In Egypt 
November 15–21. 
http://www.iri.org/mena/egypt/pdfs/Egypt%27s%202005%20Parliamentary%
20Elections%20Assessment%20Report.pdf. Accessed September 2008. 
Ismail, S. 1998. Confronting the other: Identity, culture, politics and conservative 
Islamism in Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies 30: 199–
225. 




Johnstone, B. 2002. Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Jovanovic-Krstic, V. 2004. Evaluating the discourse of war in the press media: A 
lexicogrammatical examination of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia from 
the perspective of Appraisal Theory. Unpublished PhD dissertation. New 
York University.  
Kadmon. N. 2001. Formal Pragmatics: Semantics, Pragmatics, Presupposition, and 
Focus. London: Blackwell. 
Karawan, I.A. 1997. Ideas as weapons: Militant Islamist groups in Egypt. In I.A. 
Karawan, W. McCormack and S.E. Reynolds (eds.) Values and Violence: 
Intangible Aspects of Terrorism, pp. 31–42. New York: Springer.  
Karim, K.H. 1997. The historical resilience of primary stereotypes. In S. Riggins 
(ed.). The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse, pp. 153-
–82. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kasher, A. 2000 (ed.). Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Vol. IV: Presupposition, 
Implicature and Indirect Speech Acts. London: Routledge. 
Kassem, M. 2004. Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule. London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Kassem, M. 2006. Egypt: Politics in the new millennium. UNISCI Discussion Papers 
12: 121–34. 
Keenan, E.L. 2000. Two kinds of presupposition in natural language. In A. Kasher 
(ed.) Pragmatics: Critical Concepts, Vol. IV: Presupposition, Implicature and 
Indirect Speech Acts, pp. 8–15. London: Routledge.  
Kepel, G. 1993. Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
Kienle, E. 1998. More than a response to Islamism: The political deliberalization of 
Egypt in the 1990s. Middle East Journal 52(2): 220–35. 
Kincheloe, J.L. and McLaren, P. 2000. Rethinking critical theory and qualitative 
research. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, pp. 279–313. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
 Klaehn, J. 2005a. A critical review and assessment of Herman and Chomsky’s 
Propaganda Model. In J. Klaehn (ed.) Filtering the News: Essays on Herman 
and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model. Montreal: Black Rose Books. 
Klaehn, J. 2005b. Behind the invisible curtain of scholarly criticism: Revisiting the 




Knight, G. and Dean, T. 1982. Myth and Structure of News. Journal of 
Communication 32: 144- 161. 
Kress, G. 1976. System and Function in Language: Selected Papers. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kress, G. 1983. Linguistic and ideological transformations in news reporting. In H. 
Davis and D. Walton (eds) Language, Image, Media, pp. 120–38. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Kress, G. 1990. Critical discourse analysis. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 11: 
84–99. 
Kress, G. 1997. Before Writing: Rethinking the Paths to Literacy. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Kress, G. and van Leeuwen, T. 1996. Reading Images: Grammar of Visual Design. 
London: Routledge. 
Labov, W. 1972. Language in the Inner City. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Lakoff, G. 1996. The Metaphor System for morality. In A.E. Goldberg (ed.) 
Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language, pp. 249–66. Stanford, CA: 
CSLI Publications. 
Lederer, W.J. and Burdick, A. 1958. The Ugly American. London: Gollancz. 
Levinson, S.C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Linde, C. 1997. Evaluation as linguistic structure and social practice. In B. 
Gunnarson, P. Linell and B. Nordberg (eds.) The Construction of Professional 
Discourse, pp. 151–72. London: Longman. 
Lynch, M. 2003. Taking Arabs seriously. Foreign Affairs,82 (5): 81-94. 
Madianou, M. 2005. Mediating the Nation: News, Audiences and the Politics of 
Identity. London: UCL Press.  
Mady, A. 2007. Functions of election in the Arab World. 
http://www.arabrenewal.org/articles/4975/1/aaCDC-CaaIaeA-Aai-
CaCaEICECE-Yi-CaUCaa-CaUNEi/OYIE1.html. Accessed Oct. 2009. 
Makram-Ebeid, M. 1996. Egypt’s 1995 elections: One step forward, two steps back? 




Manning, C.D. 1996. Ergativity: Argument Structure and Grammatical Relations. 
Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.  
Martin, J.R. 1992. English Text: System and Structure. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.  
Martin, J.R. 2000. Beyond exchange: Appraisal systems in English. In S. Hunston 
and G. Thompson (eds.) Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the 
Construction of Discourse, pp. 142–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, J.R., Matthiessen, C. and Painter, C. 1997. Working with Functional 
Grammar London. New York: Arnold.  
Mazid, B. 1999. Ideology and control in some speech and newspaper genres: a 
Politico-linguistic approach to discourse analysis. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Cairo University, Egypt.  
Mazraani, N. 1995. Functions of Arabic political discourse: The case of Saddam 
Hussein’s speeches. Zeitschrft fur ArabLiche Linguistik (30): 22–36.  
Mazraani, N. 1999. Aspects of Language Variation in Arabic Political Speech-
Making. London: Routledge. 
McChesney, R. 1999. Rich Media, Poor Democracy. Champaign, IL: University of 
Illinois Press. 
McChensey , R. 2000. Free press for sale: what Americans don't hear and see in the 
news  (Interview by Robert Jensen, The Sun magazine, Baltimore), 
http://www.daclarke.org/WTChit/McChesney.html. accessed May 2008. 
McGuinn, B.R. 1992. The Islamic challenge in Egypt: Has it reached the point of no 
return? Middle East Insight 9(1): 61–68. 
McQuail, D. 2002. McQuail’s Reader in Mass Communication Theory. London: 
Sage. 
Mellor, N. 2005. The Making of Arab News. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Miles, M. and Huberman, M. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded 
Sourcebook. London: Sage. 
Mitchell, R. 1996. The Society of the Muslim Brothers. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Morley, D. and Chen, K. (eds.). 1996. Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural 




Moscovici, S. 1984. The phenomenon of social representations. In R. Farr and S. 
Moscovici (eds.) Social Representations, pp. 3–69. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Munson, M. 2001. Islamic mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood. The Sociological Quarterly 42(4): 487–510.  
Nasser, M. 1979.  Press, Politics, and Power: Egypt's Heikal and Al-Ahram Ames : 
Iowa State University Press.Nir, R. and Roeh, I. 1992. Intifada coverage in 
the Israeli press: Popular and quality papers assume a rhetoric of conformity. 
Discourse and Society 3(1): 47–60.  
Nasser, M.K. 1990. Egyptian mass media under Nasser and Sadat: Two models of 
press management and control. Journalism Monographs 124. 
Norrick, N.R. 2001. Discourse and semantics. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H.E. 
Hamilton (eds.) The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, pp. 76-–99. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
O’Halloran, K. 2003. Critical Discourse Analysis and Language Cognition. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Oktar, L. 2001. The ideological representation of representational processes in the 
representation of us and them. Discourse and Society (12)3: 313–46. 
Ostini, J. and Fung, A. 2002. Beyond the four theories of the press: A new model of 
national media systems. Mass Communication and Society. New York: 
Longman.  
Ouda, J., el-Borai, N. and Abu Saada, H. 2001. A Door onto the Desert: Egyptian, 
Legislative Elections of 2000. Cairo: Association of Democratic 
Development. 
Page, R. 2003. ‘Cherie: Lawyer, wife, mum’: Contradictory patterns of 
representation in media reports of Cherie Booth/Blair. Discourse and Society 
14(5): 559–79. 
Pennycook, A. 1994. Incommensurable discourses? Applied Linguistics 15(2): 115–
38. 
Pennycook, A. 2001. Critical Applied Linguistics: A Critical Introduction. London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 





Qandil, A. 2005. Musical chair game between professional syndicates and Parliament 
(in Arabic). Al-Ahram No. 43462. 
Rayner, P., Wall, P. and Kruger, S. 2004. Media Studies: The Essential Resource. 
London: Routledge. 
Reah, D. 1998. The Language of Newspapers. London: Routledge.  
Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. 1999. Discourse and racism: European perspectives, 
Annual Review of Anthropology 28: 175–99. 
Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. 2001. Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism 
and AntiSemitism. London: Routledge. 
Renkema, J. 1993. Discourse Studies: An Introductory Textbook. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
Rice, C. 2006.  Rice calls for A 'Mew Middle East', 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/1e054faa-dbad-4810-b5f4-
4052663eec42.html. Accessed January 2007. 
Richardson, J. E. 2004. (Mis)representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British 
Broadsheet Newspapers. Philadelphia: John Benjamin. 
Richardson, J.E. 2006. On delineating ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ criticisms of 
Muslims. http://www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/ 
criticsm/ondelineatingreasonableandunreasonable.html. Accessed September 
2009. 
Richardson, J. E. 2007. Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Rojo, L.M. 1995. Division and rejection: From the personification of the Gulf 
Conflict to the demonization of Saddam Hussein. Discourse and Society 6(1): 
49–80. 
Rugh, W.A. 1987. The Arab Press. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. London: Penguin. 
Said, E. 1981. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books. 
Schedler, A. 2002. The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy 132: 36–50.  





Schegloff, E. 1999. Discourse, pragmatics, conversation analysis, Discourse and 
Society 1(4): 405–35. 
Shabana. I.A. 2005. A pragmatic study of aspects of political discourse in press 
headlines. Unpublished PhD dissertation, al-Azhar university, Cairo, Egypt. 
Shavit, U. 2003. The road to democracy in the Arab World. 
http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/2154AZ_26_Shavit.pdf 
(accessed May 2008). 
Silverstein, M. 1995. Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural description,. In B. 
Blount (ed.) Language, Culture, and Society: A Book of Readings, pp. 187–
221. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. 
Simons, M. 2002. Presupposition and relevance. In Z. Szabo (ed.) Semantics vs. 
Pragmatics, pp. 329–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Simpson, P. 1993. Language, Ideology and Point of View. London: Routledge. 
Sivan, Emmanuel. 1990. Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 
Oxford: Blackwell.  
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 2004. Relevance Theory. In G. Ward and L. Horn (eds.) 
Handbook of Pragmatics, pp. 607–32. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Springborg, R. 1989. Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. 
Colorado: Westview Press. 
Stalnaker, R.C. 2000. Pragmatic presupposition. In A. Kasher (ed.) Pragmatics: 
Critical Concepts, Vol. IV: Presupposition, Implicature and Indirect Speech 
Acts. London: Routledge. pp. 16–31. 
Stepan, A. and Robertson, G. 2003. An ‘Arab‘ more than a ‘Muslim‘ democracy gap. 
Journal of Democracy 14(3): 30-–44. 
Thetela, P. 2001. Critique discourses and ideology in newspaper reports: A discourse 
analysis of the South African press reports on the 1998 SADC’s military 
intervention in Lesotho. Discourse and Society 12(3): 347–70.  
Thompson, J.B. 1990. Ideology and Modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. 






Titscher, S. et al. 2000. Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis. London: Sage. 
Trew, T. 1979a. Theory and ideology at work. In R. Fowler, B. Hodge, G. Kress and 
T. Trew (eds.) Language and Control, pp. 94–116. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Trew, T. 1979b. What the papers say: Linguistic variation and ideological difference. 
In R. Fowler, B. Hodge, G. Kress and T. Trew (eds.) Language and Control, 
pp. 117–56. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Tuchman, G. 1972. Objectivity as strategic ritual. American Journal of Sociology 77: 
660–80.  
Tuchman, G. 1978. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality. New York: 
Free Press. 
van Dijk, T. 1988a. News as Discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
van Dijk, T. 1988b. News Analysis: Case Studies of International and National News 
in the Press. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
van Dijk, T. 1991. Racism and the Press, in Robert Miles, ed., Critical Studies in 
Racism and Migration, New York: Routledge. 
van Dijk, T. 1992. Discourse and the denial of racism, Discourse and Society 3(1): 
87–118. 
van Dijk, T. 1993. Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse and Society 
4(2): 249–83. 
van Dijk, T. 1995a. Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis, in C. Schäffner and 
A.L. Wenden (eds.) Language and Peace, pp. 17–33. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
van Dijk, T. 1995b. Discourse semantics and ideology, Discourse and Society 6(2): 
243–59. 
Van Dijk, T. 1996a. Discourse, Power and Access, in C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and 
Coulthard (eds.) Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse 
Analysis, pp. 84-106. London and New York: Routledge 
van Dijk, T. 1996b. Opinions and ideologies in editorials. 
http://www.hum.uva.nl/teun/editoria.htm. Accessed July 2009. 
van Dijk, T. 1997. Discourse as Interaction in Society, in T.A. van Dijk (ed.) 




van Dijk, T. 1998a.  Ideologies in political discourse on immigration. 
http//hum.uva.nl/teun/ideo-rac.htm. Accessed July 2009. 
van Dijk, T. 1998b. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage. 
van Dijk, T. 1998c. Opinions and ideologies in the press. In A. Bell and P. Garrett 
(eds.) Approaches to Media Discourse, pp. 21–63. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
van Dijk, T. 2000a.  Cognitive Discourse Analysis. http://www.discourse-in-
society.org/cogn-dis-anal.htm Accessed July 2006. 
van Dijk, T. 2000b. Knowledge and news. http://www.discourse-in-
society.org/know-news.html. Accessed July 2006. 
van Dijk, T. 2004a. Critical context studies. http://www.discourse-in-
society.org/Critical%20context%20studies.htm. Accessed July 2006. 
van Dijk, T. 2004b. Racism, Discourse and Textbooks: The Coverage of Immigration 
in Spanish Textbooks. Istanbul: History Foundation. 
van Dijk, T. 2005. Contextual knowledge management in discourse production: A 
CDA perspective. In R. Wodak and P. Chilton (eds.) A New Agenda in 
Critical. Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity, 
pp. 71–100. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.. 
van Dijk, T. 2006a. Ideology and discourse analysis. Journal of Political Ideologies 
11(2): 115–40. 
van, Dijk, T. 2006b. Discourse and manipulation. Discourse and Society 17(3): 359–
83. 
van Dijk, T. 2006c. Discourse, context and cognition, Discourse Studies 8(1): 159-
177. 
van Dijk, T and Kintsch, W. 1983. Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. New 
York: Academic Press. 
van Dijk, T., Aertselaer, J. & Pütz, M. 2004. Introduction: Language, discourse and 
ideology, in Pütz, M. et al.(eds.) Communicating Ideologies: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Language, Discourse, and Social Practice 
xiii-xxx. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 





van Leeuwen, T. 1996. The representation of social actors. In C.R. Caldas-Coulthard 
and M. Coulthard (eds.) Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse 
Analysis, pp. 32–70. London and New York: Routledge. 
van Leeuwen, T. and Wodak, R. 1999. Legitimizing immigration control: A 
discourse- historical analysis. Discourse Studies 1(1): 83–118. 
Vandenbroucke, L. 1983. Why Allah’s zealots? A study of the causes of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Middle East Review 16: 30–41. 
Vatikiotis, P. J. 1978. Nasser and His Generation. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Vatikiotis, p. J. 1991. The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to 
Mubarak.  Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Verschueren, J. 1985. International News Reporting. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Walsh, J. 1992. The Sword of Islam, Time International 15 June: 18–22.  
Walsh, J. 2003. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam. 
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1048. Accessed September 
2008. 
Washington Post. 2005. Egypt’s ugly election. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901837.html. Retrived 10 
December 2005. Accessed September 2008. 
Waterbury, J. 1983. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Weiss, G. and Wodak, R. (eds) 2003. Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and 
Interdisciplinarity in Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Palgrave. 
Wetherell, M. 2001. Debates in discourse research. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and 
S.J. Yates (eds.) Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, pp. 380–99. 
London: Sage Publications.  
White, P.R. 1999. An introductory tour through Appraisal Theory. 
http://www/grarnmatics.com/appraisal/AppraisalOutline/Unframed/Appraisal
Outline.htm. Accessed June 2007. 
White, P.R. 2002. Engagement: Intertextuality. 
http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/index.html. Accessed June 2007.  





Widdowson, H.G. 1996. Reply to Fairclough discourse and interpretation: 
Conjectures and refutations. Language and Literature 5(1): 57–69. 
Widdowson, H.G. 1998. The theory and practice of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(review article). Applied Linguistics 19(1): 136–51. 
Wodak, R. 1995. Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. In J. 
Verschueren, J.-O. Östman, J. Blommaert and C. Bulcaen (eds.) Handbook of 
Pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Wodak, R.1996. Disorders of Discourse. London: Longman. 
Wodak, R. 1999. Critical Discourse Analysis at the end of the 20th century. Research 
on Language and Social Interaction 32(2): 185–93. 
Wodak, R. 2002. Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis. ZfAL 36: 5–31. 
http://www.uni-koblenz.de/~diekmann/zfal/zfalarchiv/zfal36_1.pdf. Accesed 
July 2008. 
Wodak, R. 2007. Pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis: A cross-disciplinary 
inquiry. Pragmatics and Cognition, 15-1: 203-225. 
Wodak, R. and Matouschek, B. 1993. We are dealing with people whose origins one 
can clearly tell just by looking: Critical discourse analysis and the study of 
neoracism in contemporary austria, Discourse & Society 4(2): 225–48. 
Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. 2001. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: 
Sage. 
Wodak, R. and van Leeuwen, T. 2002. Discourses of unemployment in Europe: The 
Austrian case. Text 22(3): 345–67. 
Wodak, R. and Chilton. P. (eds.). 2005. A New Agenda in Critical Discourse 
Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
Young, P . and Jesser, P. 1997. The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to 
Desert Strike. London: Macmillan. 
Yule, G. 1996. The Study of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zakaria, F. 2001. How to save the Arab World. 
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/122401_how.html. 
Accessed July 2008. 
Zakaria, F. 2001. How to save the arab World: Washington’s hands-off approach 





http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses01/rrtw/Zakaria.htm. accessed Dec. 
2008. 
Zubaida, S. 1989. Islam, the People and the State. New York: I.B.Tauris. 
 
